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**DISCARD**



# THE GREATNESS AND DECLINE OF ROME

VOL. III.

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THE FALL OF AN ARISTOCRACY

BY  
GUGLIELMO FERRERO

TRANSLATED BY  
REV. H. J. CHAYTOR, M.A.  
HEADMASTER OF PLYMOUTH COLLEGE

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## CHAPTER I

## THREE TEMPESTUOUS DAYS

Meeting of the conservatives on the Capitol—The deliberations of Antony and Lepidus—Antony's visit to Calpurnia—The night of March 15-16—Negotiations on the morning of the 16th—Speech of Brutus in the afternoon—Antony's action on the evening of the 16th—The night of March 16-17—Discussion in the Senate on the morning of the 17th—Proposals and objections.

THE conspirators, the chief personages in Rome and Antony speedily recovered from the stupefaction into which they had been thrown by the unexpected assassination of Cæsar. During the progress of the conspiracy the assassins had been forced to exchange messages in secret and to observe a caution which precluded any complete harmony of design. Upon Cæsar's assassination and the manner of it they had been agreed: but as concerned their future action they had no more definite design than to lay immediate proposals before the Senate for the restoration of the republic. This project had failed; and they now found themselves in the deserted Capitol, overcome by the reaction which follows great excitement, dismayed by the panic which they had witnessed in the streets, doubtful of the view which the city would take of their action and uncertain what attitude would be adopted by the veterans and the mob. What then, was to be done? It is not surprising that under such circumstances and swayed by such considerations, the conspirators thought it advisable to secure an understanding with the most influential members of the conservative party before taking further action. They resolved to send down the slaves who had accompanied them to the houses of their most powerful friends, inviting their presence in the

The situation  
after Cæsar's  
murder.

Mar. 15, Capitol. At the same time the leading members of the aristocratic party had recovered from their first bewilderment and were attempting to secure information concerning the conspirators: Cicero, in the utmost excitement and anxiety, wrote a laconic note to Basilus, \* offering his congratulations and asking what he and his friends proposed to do. Antony was no less anxious for immediate news; who had killed Cæsar and who should be consulted in so dangerous a crisis? Thus messengers began to speed through the streets of Rome upon that afternoon, collecting news and carrying letters and messages in every direction.

The discussion  
in the Capitol.

So profound an animosity towards Cæsar had been gathering in the depths of men's minds during recent years, that it was not difficult to find a number of senators who were bold enough to accept the conspirators' invitation to the Capitol. Among them was Cicero, who arrived almost beside himself with delight; the excitement of the crisis had at length aroused the weary and dissatisfied scholar from his long inactivity. Deliberations were at once begun. It was clear that the Senate must be assembled as soon as possible: the question then arose, who should convoke it. By the laws of the constitution, this was the function of the surviving consul, and some senators proposed to apply to him: the idea was by no means so irrational as has been supposed by modern historians, who are too prone to forget that the conspirators could not criticise the proposal in the light of subsequent events. Only a few months earlier Antony, with Brutus, Cassius and Trebonius, had been a moderate Cæsarean. He had eventually joined the opposite faction; but his debts, the slights to which the dictator had exposed him, and the solicitations of his wife, Fulvia, might serve as his excuse and lead his former friends to hope that he would cease this temporary aberration now that Cæsar was dead. Cicero, on the other hand, was delighted to find among the conspirators his best friends and the most

\* Cic. F. vi. 15. (To Basilus) *Tibi gratulor: mihi gaudeo: te amo: tua tueor: a te amari et quid agas, quidquid agatur certior fieri volo*. This note is generally thought to have been written on March 15, immediately after the news of Cæsar's death.

Mar. 15,  
44 B.C.

conspicuous figures in the parties which had hitherto been opposed; he offered a more daring proposition: it was not safe to trust Antony: it would be better to turn the situation to account by an immediate *coup d'état*: Brutus and Cassius, as prætors, should usurp Antony's powers to convoke the Senate, to call the citizens to arms as had been done in the time of Catiline's conspiracy, and to seize control of the State: meanwhile all should remain in the Capitol and form a Senate in miniature, pending the convocation of the whole body.

How opinions were divided in the course of the discussion we cannot tell: Brutus and Cassius seem to have supported the first proposal: in any case Cicero's advice was not adopted. The soldiers were more timorous than the man of letters: they feared that the people were either too deeply attached to Cæsar or too apathetic to rise at their call, or possibly might rise against themselves. All offered profuse congratulations to the assassins, but none were willing to remain and support the *coup-d'état*. Discussion was prolonged and the hours went by: the days of March are short and dusk was drawing near. Eventually it was decided that as the enterprise of the assassination had been successful, its results should not be endangered by a new and hazardous attempt. It was therefore resolved to open negotiations with Antony and to invite him to the Capitol for discussion upon the convocation of the Senate and the peaceful restoration of the republic: upon what conditions or by what means this object was to be achieved, no one had any clear statement to make: it was merely resolved that Antony should not be deprived of any honours granted him by Cæsar. Further discussion dealt with the organisation of popular demonstrations on the next day for the purpose of turning public opinion in favour of the murder and several senators were commissioned to open negotiations with Antony. In this task, however, Cicero declined any share.

Meanwhile, Antony's position was equally embarrassing. Lepidus, Cæsar's *magister equitum*, was apparently the only man who ventured to visit him that afternoon, and at the time of his arrival, the consul had received no reliable information

Antony's  
position.



Mar. 15,  
44 B.C.

concerning the conspirators. Such news as could be derived at the moment from servants and apparitors was naturally vague and confused. At the same time it was impossible for Antony to form a definite view of the situation, until he knew by what persons Cæsar had been killed. Thus it is likely enough that while the conspirators were debating in the Capitol, Lepidus and Antony spent an anxious time together in the attempt to reconcile conflicting rumours, until the evening, when their doubts were dispersed by the blaze of the torches accompanying the ambassadors of the tyrannicides. The latter naturally began by giving the names of the conspirators in order to lend weight to the peace proposals which they brought: Antony was then able to realise to his dismay the extent and importance of the conspiracy and to understand why none but Lepidus had come to his house. Cæsar had been killed by the leading members of the Cæsarean and Pompeian parties, who had formed a coalition for the purpose. Historians are generally agreed that, upon Cæsar's death, Antony's sole design was to seize his place and power. It is far more probable that when he had learned the true nature of the conspiracy, he must have feared, during that evening at least, that he would speedily follow Cæsar to the grave. Cæsar's death was for him an unmixed evil: not only did it destroy such temporary advantages as he had derived from his recent change of attitude, but it made them so many possibilities of ruin. The conservatives and the moderate party had been encouraged and strengthened by the success of the conspiracy and would attempt once more to secure the supreme power: if they succeeded, what chance was there for him, who would be regarded as a traitor by the conspirators? The ambassadors had certainly made friendly overtures; but these must have seemed rather ominous than reassuring to Antony, who imagined the conspirators to be a fierce and determined party and not a timorous and hesitating group. These proposals certainly seemed to veil some treachery. Why should he go to the Capitol, to the midst of the conspirators, whose chief desire must be to slaughter him as they had slaughtered Cæsar? It would be madness to entertain the idea.

Meanwhile he could not afford to reject the peace proposals without more ado and to break definitely with the conspirators, for he was helpless and could look only to Lepidus for support. In this great dilemma, he fell back upon the usual resource of indecision and asked to be allowed to consider the matter until the following evening.

Mar. 15,  
44 B.C.

To his great relief, the ambassadors accepted this proposal and when they had gone, Antony and Lepidus could resume their deliberations in the light of their better knowledge of the situation. They now knew that the conspiracy had been organised by the leaders of the conservative party and speedily agreed upon the following plan. All the conspirators, whether Cæsarean or conservative, were to be branded alike; Cæsar's murder was to be denounced to the people as the outcome of a plot, intended to destroy all the dictator's work: by this means they might collect the remnants of the *collegia* of Clodius, unite the most important members of their party who had remained faithful to Cæsar, call up such veterans as were in the neighbourhood, and thus form a small force which Lepidus would command and which might serve to defend themselves and their position in case of need. When this policy had been arranged, Lepidus went off to collect troops and Antony, at length remembering his dead colleague, betook himself to the forum under cover of the night with an escort of slaves, and made his way to the *domus publica* whither three slaves had carried Cæsar's body on a litter. There he looked upon the slender and motionless frame of the man whose astonishing energy he had witnessed almost daily for the past ten years; he saw and spoke with Calpurnia. Probably he had little difficulty in securing from her Cæsar's letters, a sum of 100 millions of sesterces and the valuables which he kept in his house: indeed Calpurnia herself probably offered them to him. A helpless woman was not competent to guard these treasures under the very eyes of the conspirators upon the Capitol, and probably both she and Antony were surprised that the conspirators had not thought of seizing this booty; this oversight is but another proof of the frantic haste with which the conspiracy was bungled. Moreover Antony was within his rights, as consul, in

Antony's plan  
of action.

Mar. 15-16, taking possession of Cæsar's archives : indeed, Cæsar himself, as a preliminary to his departure, had entrusted him with many documents containing arrangements for dealing with public business during his absence. Be this as it may, Antony carried these effects to his house and then proceeded with astonishing alacrity to despatch slaves, freedmen, and clients in every direction : he sent messengers through Rome to warn the heads of the *collegia* and the electioneering agents : through Rome and to the neighbouring towns to beat up the veterans and invite them to the house of Lepidus, to find the most influential of Cæsar's friends, to discover his colonists and adherents, and in every case to urge their immediate departure for Rome, telling them that the conservative party was attempting to annul all Cæsar's actions, to resume possession of the property which he had sold, of the gifts he had distributed and of the rights he had conceded. At the same time the conspirators in the Capitol, though they had failed to grasp the significance of Antony's reply, were busy with preparations for the popular demonstrations of the next day, sending out slaves, freedmen, clients and friends to ask support of any and every one and to buy the help of the election agents. Ancient cities were not artificially lighted, and Rome was usually silent and deserted after sunset : but her streets were full of rumours and commotion throughout that night, the first that Cæsar slept in peace.

Events of the morning.

It was not, however, easy for either party to stir public feeling. Cæsar's few implacable enemies rejoiced and his few devoted friends lamented his death : but the public at large remained undecided. To many the assassination brought satisfaction of long-standing enmity, of bitter memories of the civil war, or of the envy which invariably pursues the possessor of place and power. Many again, as is constantly the case in such tragedies, pitied the man who had been attacked and slain by sixty fierce assassins, forgetful of the fact that he was the head of a party and also of an empire and could have exterminated his enemies in an hour if he had lived. However these feelings of pity and sympathy were then overwhelmed by a great and dominating sense of fear. No one could realise that



Mar. 16,  
44 B.C.

conspirators and Cæsarians were alike bewildered and perplexed: all believed that the conspirators had long been collecting money, troops and partisans for their attempt. Hence no one could decide which of the two parties to join. With great difficulty the conspirators succeeded in buying the support of a few agitators during the night, while Lepidus was recruiting a small band of soldiers. He was able, however, to occupy the forum with his little band on the morning of the 16th and enable Antony to appear and perform his consular functions as usual, together with a few officials who had taken no part in the conspiracy. On the other hand, the two prætors and the other magistrates who were in the Capitol did not appear, and events in the forum induced the public that morning to believe that the power was in the hands of the Cæsarean party. This was a definite advantage: indeed the sight of the soldiers and of the consul induced many veterans, heads of *collegia* and adherents of Cæsar to abandon their hesitation. Some ran home to get their weapons: others began to persuade their friends and the members of their *collegia* to join their cause. At that moment the first detachment of the demonstrators hired by the conservatives appeared in the forum and met the patrols of the veterans. This spectacle chilled the enthusiasm of the mercenaries forthwith and no one ventured to applaud Cæsar's murderers in the presence of his veterans. Only the prætor Cinna was bold enough to throw down his insignia and declare that he wished to hold them from the people and not from a tyrant: the trembling hearers barely ventured to cry, peace! peace! The crowd soon turned in different directions and dispersed, in fear that the veterans might begin some act of violence.

Once more the senators began to come and go between Antony's house and the Capitol. Antony had been able to examine the situation more calmly during the night and had come to the conclusion that the chief danger to his party was to be feared from Decimus Brutus, one of the most distinguished conspirators; if he should take over the command of Cisalpine Gaul, as Cæsar had arranged for that year, he would then be at the head of an army in the valley of the Po, a fortnight's

Negotiations  
between  
Antony  
and the  
conspirators.

Mar. 16,  
44 B.C.

march from Rome. Antony readily perceived that the army of Gaul would be the most solid of all foundations for the new government, and the instrument which would best enable the conspirators to terrorise the Senate into compliance with their wishes. Hence it is likely that during the night of March 15-16, he resolved to strain every nerve to induce Brutus to surrender his command. Although Cæsar's veterans and colonists had begun to come in from the surrounding country on the morning of the 16th, it seems that none of the leading Cæsareans could be found except Hirtius and that the others, Balbus, Pansa, Oppius, Calenus and Sallust were in hiding in the neighbouring country seats. Great astuteness would be required if Antony, in his present state of isolation, was to secure the required renunciation from the conspirators. It seems, indeed, that Antony proceeded during the morning to make friendly overtures to the conspirators, assuring them that he was disposed to give them such help as he could towards the restoration of the republic : he apparently added that they should appoint his old friend and comrade, Decimus Brutus, as their plenipotentiary, authorise him to leave the Capitol and come to the consul's residence. Antony perhaps thought that he would be able more easily to intimidate Brutus and induce him to resign his province, if he could separate him from the other conspirators. These overtures were well-timed ; though many leading men had gone to meet the conspirators in the Capitol during the morning, the party was discouraged by the failure of the first demonstration and the apathy of the people, and was also apprehensive of Lepidus and his veterans : their fears were increased by the constant arrival of veterans and colonists. Thus perplexity was again predominant in the Capitol. Many plans were discussed, including a proposal for sending Brutus and Cassius down to the forum to harangue the crowd : but much hesitation was displayed : there was a risk that they might all be torn in pieces. Hence, Antony's overtures were readily received : Decimus Brutus left the Capitol at once to begin negotiations, and the party walked blindly into the snare which the consul had laid. Neither party had the courage to take the offensive :

and both remained upon their guard, waiting for the gloom which obscured the situation to disperse. Mar. 16, 44 B.C.

It was, however, impossible for the conspirators to conceal their vacillation or the fears by which they were beset : Antony must have been surprised to find them and Brutus in so conciliatory a temper, and in the course of the morning his suspicion was confirmed and he realised that their attitude was dictated by their fears. But a little later in the morning the situation was further complicated by a wholly unforeseen event. Dolabella, Cæsar's favourite, suddenly appeared in the forum, with the insignia of consulship and accompanied by a crowd of veterans and agitators : he there delivered a speech in favour of the tyrannicides and then went up to the Capitol to pay his respects to them. This was an event of much significance : Cæsar had appointed Dolabella *consul suffectus* and he would have become consul on the dictator's death, if Antony had not prevented the performance of the religious ceremonies necessary to the validity of an election. Dolabella was not the man to abandon his consulship on a mere question of form, and had resolved during the night to ratify his election himself, hoping to maintain himself in office with the help of the conspirators and conservatives : they would have regarded a consul, however doubtful his title, as a valuable ally. Indeed, this little *coup-d'état* caused considerable excitement in the city and seemed to rouse the energy of the conspirators. The demonstrators, whose operations had failed that morning, now gathered courage and began a second demonstration in the forum, shouting for Brutus, Cassius and their friends. The spirit of the conspirators revived and they decided that Brutus and Cassius should go down and harangue the crowd ; this course of action would suspend the progress of the negotiations or deprive them of all reality. The question then arose, who would accompany Brutus and Cassius to the forum ? Upon this point discussion and hesitation seem to have been renewed. Eventually it was arranged that Brutus and Cassius should go down alone, and that the most distinguished of the senators and knights who were then in the Capitol should escort them in

Brutus and  
Cassius in the  
forum.

Mar. 16,  
44 B.C.

solemn form, as they had escorted Cicero at the time of Catiline's conspiracy, to protect them, if necessary, from popular violence. No sooner was their decision known in the forum, than it was regarded with general uncertainty and suspicion : no one could forget how many times the conservatives had intimidated the popular party by means of some such artificial demonstration. Antony and Lepidus had every reason to desire the failure of the demonstration, but could not venture to employ force, least of all after Dolabella's treachery : they, therefore, preferred to wait and watch the progress of events. Eventually the solemn escort was formed upon the Capitol during the afternoon, descended slowly to the forum and made its way through the crowd which had gathered to meet it. When the procession reached the rostra, Marcus Brutus mounted the steps and a great silence fell upon the multitude as he appeared before them. Brutus gave an explanation of the murder and the motives which had prompted it : he was allowed to speak without interruption. Though the mob hated the nobles in theory, they respected them in person : Brutus enjoyed high consideration, and the Cæsareans in the audience followed the lead of their political opponents. But the conclusion of the speech was marked neither by hisses nor by applause : the audience remained unmoved, the effect of the meeting was indecisive and the conspirators with their conservative escort returned to the Capitol.

Antony  
determines to  
convoke the  
Senate.

The uncertainties of the situation were now at an end. Every one was now as well aware as Antony of the fears to which the conspirators were a prey. For a whole day Rome had waited to see them take the initiative : but the majority of the conspirators had not dared to descend to the forum, while those who came had hurried back to their refuge upon the instant conclusion of the speech. On the other hand, a steady stream of veterans and colonists was coming in : the rabble adherents of Clodius and Cæsar were growing bolder and those about Antony had not only forgotten the defection of Dolabella but were even beginning to discuss the vengeance to be exacted for Cæsar's murder. Meanwhile the evening was approaching and with it the time-limit which Antony had fixed for the



conspirators' reply. Encouraged by the timorous attitude of the conspirators and by the enthusiasm of the veterans and colonists, the consul resolved to break off negotiations and to convoke the Senate for the next morning, not in the Curia, which was too near the Capitol, but in the temple of Tellus, which stood by his own house: he determined to send a friendly invitation to the conspirators, to call a meeting of the Cæsarean party before the session began, to send Hirtius to Decimus with a message regretting his inability to grant him his province in view of the hostility of the people and the veterans, and urging the conspirators for their own good, to leave Rome in a body. By thus precipitating a crisis, he hoped to intimidate the conspirators and prevent their appearance at the following day's session; he might then induce the Senate to approve such measures as he thought best calculated to weaken the power of the conservatives, while avoiding any open violence and sheltering himself behind the legal authority of the assembly. This menace was so opportunely delivered that the resolution of Decimus was shaken for the moment: believing that all was lost, he declared himself ready to leave Rome provided that a safe-conduct was forthcoming.

Night fell and all the narrow ways were growing dark: the feverish activities of day had given place, as usual, to the dark and silent solitude of a city without lamps, broken only from time to time by the passage of some company with torches, some solitary wayfarer with his lantern, or some one lost and groping his way in the darkness. But in the Capitol no one was inclined to descend to the temple of Tellus: all had instantly realised the meaning of the policy which had induced Antony to break off negotiations and suddenly to refer the whole question to the Senate, where it was impossible for the conspirators to appear. Spurred to greater resolution by the imminence of the danger, they determined in wrathful trepidation to strain every nerve in order to send to that session a majority favourable to themselves. At the same time Antony and Lepidus were equally determined to secure a majority for their own purposes: they proposed to station about the temple as many veterans and colonists as could be

Mar. 16,  
44 B.C.

Preparations  
for the meeting  
of the Senate.

Mar. 16-17, collected in order to intimidate the conservatives. Hence  
 44 B.C. it was necessary to continue throughout the darkness of the night the watchings and workings of the day : the Consul had great fires lighted in the squares, cross-roads and streets to give some light to those who had no slave torch-bearers : by this fitful glare could be seen the messengers of the conspirators in urgent haste upon their way to the houses of the senators to beg their attendance at the morning session ; belated troops of veterans arriving from the surrounding districts ; magistrates and eminent citizens on their way to meetings and consultations ; military patrols, bands of artisans, freedmen and plebeians gathering to their *collegia*. It was probably in Antony's house that the meeting of the Cæsareans was held at a late hour : apparently the only leaders of the party there present were Antony, Lepidus and Hirtius and the discussion was protracted. Some advised that the conspirators should be allowed to leave Rome, upon promising that they would make no attempt to foment disturbances : Hirtius advised that they should make peace and accept the proposal of the conspirators for united action and a joint attempt to restore the republican government, final decision being left to the Senate. Lepidus, on the other hand, who seems to have been unduly elated by the favourable events of the previous day, advanced a plan analogous to that which Cicero had proposed to the conservatives : he wished to attempt a *coup-d'état*, to storm the Capitol and to slay the conspirators, among whom was his brother-in-law, amid the plaudits of the people. As Brutus and Cassius had rejected Cicero's proposal, so Antony declined the plan of Lepidus in favour of that supported by Hirtius. He was aware that the rich and leisured classes throughout Italy favoured the conspirators and he thought that violent measures were highly imprudent, when the threats and outcries of the crowd of veterans made it possible to bend the legal powers of the Senate to his will.

The arrival of  
the senators.

Thus the solution of the problem was reserved for the Senate and there no one could say in which direction the majority would go. Lepidus and Antony believed that they had the game in their own hands and continued to bring up

Mar. 17,  
44 B.C

veterans and colonists to the temple of Tellus: the conspirators were still dominated by their fears and in dread of an adverse decision, earnestly besought their friends to be present at the session. Every party and every senator proposed to appear, though none had any definite proposal to offer or any concerted plan to pursue. The outcome of this perplexity and the possible results of the session were problems which harassed many a senator on the morning of the 17th as he made his way to the temple amid the soldiers which Antony and Lepidus had stationed to maintain order and amid the uneasy, seething crowd of Cæsar's admirers. The ferment broke out in cries and hisses as the senators passed by: within the temple they fell into groups and anxiously discussed the situation, with ears alert to the tumult without the building, and with forebodings of ultimate disaster. Suddenly a tremendous uproar broke out: doubtless some one had been torn in pieces. This commotion greeted the arrival of Cinna, the prætor who had insulted Cæsar's memory in the forum the previous evening. The crowd, however, had refrained from violence and Cinna reached the temple unharmed, as did all the senators. Dolabella arrived and boldly occupied the Consul's seat. Then, amid general applause, came Antony and Lepidus; but none of the conspirators ventured to appear.

The moment, however, that the session began, Antony was forced to realise that he had been mistaken. Notwithstanding the presence of the veterans and soldiers and the absence of the conspirators, a majority of the Senate was so obviously favourable to Cæsar's murderers that Antony deemed it impossible to secure the ratification of measures which would be objectionable to this majority and prejudicial to Decimus. The proposal to invite the conspirators to take part in the session, in other words, to sit among their judges, met with ready and immediate approval. Hatred of Cæsar was widespread and profound: republican traditions were still vigorous, even in this Senate which Cæsar had himself remodelled: not only were the tyrannicides a numerous body but they possessed very many friends and relatives among the senators. Antony and Lepidus had been able to surround the meeting with a

The debate in  
the Senate.

Mar. 15,  
44 B.C.

crowd of Cæsar's friends, but within the temple were practically none but his enemies : his friends had not come or would not venture to speak. However, when the murder came up for discussion, debate speedily became confused in the mass of conflicting opinions. Some senators, including Tiberius Claudius Nero, declared that the murder should be regarded as tyrannicide, and that rewards should be decreed to the authors of it, according to ancient custom, as exemplified in the case of the murderers of the Gracchi. Others, with greater prudence, were ready to admit that the conspirators had accomplished a notable exploit, but considered that the case was not one for rewards and that praise would suffice. Others again attempted to find a compromise between their horror of the assassination and their respect for the opinion of the majority, declaring that even praise was inadvisable and that immunity from punishment would be an adequate return. The first speakers replied by propounding an obvious dilemma : either Cæsar had been a tyrant or his murderers deserved punishment. This difficulty became the subject of long argument, a clear proof that the proposals of the extremists did not entirely satisfy the meeting, in spite of the applause with which they had been received : by degrees the course of the debate brought the disputants to the vital point upon which all else depended. Was Cæsar a tyrant or was he not ?

Was Cæsar a  
tyrant ?

The assembly eventually realised the importance of settling this vexed question and resolved to discuss it impartially, considering as null and void all the oaths which Cæsar had exacted from the senators. The debate was resumed : numerous orators spoke while the roar of the tumultuous crowd and its imprecations against Cæsar's murderers grew ever louder without the doors. The most divergent views were propounded and agreement seemed impossible. Antony, however, who had kept silence hitherto and allowed the speakers to wander as they pleased, now intervened and with great dexterity brought the debate back to the point at issue : if the Senate should declare that Cæsar had been a tyrant, it must consider the consequences of such a pronouncement : the law would require that the body should be thrown into the



Mar. 15,  
44 B.C.

Tiber and that all Cæsar's acts should be declared null and void. In other words, the State would resume possession of all the lands which Cæsar had sold or granted : all his official appointments, even in cases where his murderers were concerned, would be cancelled, and the very numerous body of senators whom Cæsar had chosen would lose their seats. This argument could not fail to make a great impression ; Cæsar's enemies, as well as his friends, had almost without exception made some personal profit during the last few years : Brutus himself, for instance, was prætor and his mother had accepted a huge estate in Campania from Cæsar. Antony's arguments were reinforced by the increasing uproar outside the temple : it was feared that the crowd might attempt to storm the building. Antony and Lepidus were obliged to come out to calm the people, and Antony began a speech : but his words were scarcely audible and a general shout arose, "To the forum ! To the forum !" Antony and Lepidus were obliged to go to the forum, where Antony continued his speech and promised the people that their wishes should be granted. However, the discussion in the Senate continued under the presidency of Dolabella : but Antony's well-timed intervention had encouraged various opportunists to make proposals, which, in spite of their absurdity, were capable of reconciling self-interest and animosity and were far more likely to satisfy the Senate as a whole than any extremist denunciations. Were they to throw into the Tiber the body of the man whose death the crowd was burning to avenge ? The aristocracy had been strong enough thus to treat the bodies of the Gracchi : but eighty years later vacillation and fear characterised this feeble club of business men, politicians and dilettanti, severally pursuing their own interests and ambitions ; moreover, Dolabella, fearing to lose his consulate for the second time, threatened to revert to his admiration for Cæsar, if the dictator's acts were not ratified. So strong was the feeling that vested rights must be respected, that at this moment the conspirators, impatiently awaiting the end of the session, circulated letters among the people, in which they promised to respect all Cæsar's measures. In vain did one irreconcilable

Mar. 17, propose to annul the grants which the tyrant had made and  
44 B.C. to have them restored by the people : after the first blush,  
the conciliatory party gained courage and the extremists  
lost ground.

The amnesty.

Antony and Lepidus had now returned, but the discussion was continued, though all were agreed that Cæsar's measures could not be annulled, whether his assassination were a criminal act or not. Some form of words was required which would remove the absurdity of this contradiction, and the task of finding it was by no means easy. At length Cicero, whose revolutionary ardour had cooled somewhat since the 15th, happened to remember that the Athenians used to bring their civil wars to an end by means of an amnesty, providing that all illegal actions should be forgiven and forgotten. He therefore proposed for the public welfare, to ratify all the measures of the dictator, not only those which had been already promulgated, but also such as might be found in Cæsar's papers, provided they were drawn up in legal form and justified by the powers which the Senate or the comitia had conferred upon him. He also proposed that the task of selection from the papers should be entrusted to Antony, that an amnesty should be proclaimed and all prosecutions arising out of Cæsar's murder forbidden. This proposal was adopted with an amendment referring to the colonies which Cæsar had projected. It seems that the *senatus consultus* declared, in order to pacify the veterans, that the foundation of these colonies would be carried out. The senators then dispersed : their decisions were communicated to the conspirators and approved by them, and towards the evening, when Antony and Lepidus had sent their sons into the Capitol as hostages, Brutus, Cassius, and the other conspirators came down.

Cæsar was dead : but though the conspirators had thus achieved what they considered the most difficult part of their enterprise, they had found their progress suddenly barred by an obstacle of his raising : this was the coalition of interests which had been formed during the civil war and the dictatorship. Unable to surmount this barrier, they had been obliged to circumvent it : but by what means ! The attempt to restore

the constitutional republic upon the ruins of the dictatorship, had been begun by so revolutionary a measure as an amnesty, an idea borrowed from Greece, alien from the laws and legal principles of Rome and introduced by the Senate with unconsidered haste, for the purpose of solving a political difficulty.

March 17,  
44 B.C.

## CHAPTER II

### CÆSAR'S FUNERAL

The Senate and the republic—Mark Antony—The senatorial session of March 19—Cæsar's will—His bequests to the people—The preparations for Cæsar's funeral—Anarchy during the days following the funeral—The general confusion of parties—Reappearance of Herophilus—His execution.

The republi-  
canism of the  
time.

ALL modern historians are agreed that the old republican institutions of Rome were decaying or dead in Cæsar's time, that his contemporaries should have appreciated this fact and that in consequence every attempt to restore the republic or even to show respect for its institutions and ancient traditions should be regarded as utter foolishness. This is, in my opinion, a very serious mistake, for the reason that it removes almost every possibility of understanding the last revolution of the Roman republic. I believe—and I hope to show proofs of the fact in the course of this narrative—that the republic possessed greater vitality than is supposed. Even admitting that it was dead, we must remember that men constantly fail to perceive the progress of social and political transformations until long after they have become accomplished facts and that people are always inclined to consider any existing institution as indispensable, especially in politics. It is therefore highly probable that the fundamental institutions of the old republic, which had proved so entirely successful, were regarded by contemporaries as immortal. Especially was this true of the Senate, which had conquered and governed an immense empire, was a visible symbol of the victorious power of Rome, and finally, had killed Julius Cæsar because, even after its many victories, he had failed to show due respect to



it at the close of his life. Surely any intelligent man was bound to realise that he could not afford to disregard so formidable an institution? Surely no man, whatever his audacity, would attempt to combat it under any compulsion but that of dire necessity?

Mar. 18,  
44 B.C.

It is, then, not surprising that the session of March 17 and the decision which ended the uncertainties and vacillations of the 15th and 16th should have left Antony in great anxiety. His position was by no means satisfactory. Notwithstanding his efforts and the absence of the conspirators, a majority of the senators had been proof against the menaces of the veterans and had approved the murder of Cæsar. The conspirators were now free to take their seats in the Senate, and would form a coalition with the remnant of the Pompeians: this new party would become supreme in the republic with the support of the upper classes, a consul, several prætors, numerous governors and the Senate. Among those of Cæsar's chief adherents who had taken no part in the plot, Dolabella had joined the opposition and the remainder had disappeared, with the exception of Hirtius. The Roman mob was uneasy and irritated: but neither Antony nor any one else could place much reliance upon this agitation, which he regarded as a mere flash in the pan, like many other commotions of the kind. In short, on March 17, Antony regarded the Pompeian party as masters of the situation. The conciliatory speeches delivered at the morning session had gained him the goodwill of the Pompeian leaders \* and he therefore began to consider whether he could not discover some means of recovering his influence with this party, which he had abandoned at the moment when it was recovering its old prestige.

Antony's  
position.

Antony was certainly one of the most remarkable figures among the politicians of the old and ruined nobility, who then entered political life as a career of glorious piracy. A man of powerful frame and active mind, daring and generous, but sensual, imprudent, proud and violent; intelligent but far from cunning, prone to commit the worst mistakes under the impulse of passion and impetuosity, he had hitherto led an

His character.

\* Plutarch, *Ant.* 14. See Plutarch, *Brut.* 19.

Mar. 18,  
44 B.C.

unsettled career of wild and lawless adventure, appalling danger and extraordinary turns of fortune, from the clandestine expedition of Gabinius in Egypt to the siege of Alesia, from the revolutionary tribunate of 49 to the passage of the Adriatic in 48, from Pharsalia to the Dictatorship of 47. But the most daring characters, if not utterly foolish, can realise upon occasion the necessity for prudence and self-restraint, when they find themselves upon the brink of the precipice. This was precisely Antony's position : he had to face the discouraging admission, that all his efforts, like the toil of Sisyphus, had hitherto failed upon the verge of success. He had amassed a large fortune, but had squandered it so effectually that on the Ides of March his possessions consisted chiefly of debts : he had risked his life upon several occasions for the popular party and also his reputation among his own adherents by sudden outbursts of extravagant or violent action ; one such occasion had occurred in 47 after the great victory of the popular party, when he had suppressed the disorders caused by Dolabella with an energy worthy of a consul in the time of the Gracchi. Thus at the age of thirty-nine \* he found his affairs embarrassed, his friends scanty and his enemies numerous, his popularity weak and threatening to disappear entirely amid the uncertainties of the situation. Age and misfortune had sobered him, as his final reconciliation with Cæsar proves : the sudden catastrophe of the Ides of March and the immediate danger of his position imperatively dictated the necessity of greater prudence. Contrary to his habits of rapid decision he therefore resolved to temporise and await the outcome of events : to declare war upon the new conservative party was inadvisable : it was better to use conciliation and preserve the possibility of retreat in that direction, in case the popular party seemed doomed to destruction. On the other hand, he must keep in touch with the popular party which might return to power at any time : so many strange and unexpected reversals of fortune had been seen in recent years.

On the 18th Antony and Lepidus invited Brutus and Cassius

\* Antony must have been born in 671-83. See Gardthausen, *Augustus und seine Zeit*, Leipzig, 1891, ii., p. 5, n. 22.

to a great dinner and on the 19th the Senate met once more \* Mar. 18-19, to discuss certain points which had inevitably arisen during 44 B.C. the last two days out of the amnesty proclaimed on the 17th. Cæsar's arrangements had been approved as a whole, but it was now necessary to ratify without delay those which dealt with the provinces and the magistracies: some of these had been already published and others were contained in the papers sent by Cæsar to Antony. Further, Cæsar's relatives, and especially Piso his father-in-law, though they had kept silence on the 17th, now recovered their courage and demanded that Cæsar's will should be opened and that a public funeral should be given him.† The demand was well-timed, as it thwarted the Pompeian plan of confiscating Cæsar's property, which had been almost entirely acquired from the spoils of the civil wars. It was, moreover, by no means easy to reject this demand when once it had been put forward. If Cæsar was not to be regarded as a tyrant why should his funeral be that merely of a private individual? If all his measures were ratified, how could his will be set aside? The Senate therefore proceeded to confirm the appointments of pro-consuls and pro-prætors, who were already in their provinces or on the way to them: Lucius Munatius Plancus in Gallia Comata, Asinius Pollio in Further Spain, Manius Acilius Glabrio in Achaia, Quintus Hortensius in Macedonia, Publius Vatinius in Illyria and possibly Lucius Statius Murcus in Syria. Similar procedure was followed with reference to the governorships for the coming year: the occupants of these were still at Rome and included certain of the conspirators in their number. Decimus Brutus was governor of Cisalpine Gaul, Quintus Cornificius of Africa, Tullius Cimber of Bithynia, Trebonius of

Confirmation  
of Cæsar's  
measures.

\* Plutarch, *Brut.* 19-20 gives much valuable information upon this session which Ihne, *Rom. Gesch.* Leipzig, 1898, vii. 265, considers with much probability to have taken place on the 19th. It ratified Cæsar's decisions regarding the provinces and the magistracies and discussed the question of the funeral. App. B. C., ii, 135, 136, places the debate upon the funeral in the session of the 17th, but he is by no means clear. Plutarch's date seems to me more probable, as the funeral must have seemed a secondary matter, until some general agreement had been secured.

† Suetonius *Cæs.* 83.

Mar. 19,  
44 B.C.

Asia, Lepidus of Gallia Narbonensis and of Further Spain. Cæsar's arrangements for future offices and commands were also confirmed: Hirtius and Pansa were to be consuls in 43, Decimus Brutus and Munatius Plancus in 42; other persons, including the conspirator Publius Servilius Casca, were to be tribunes in 43 or 42; Antony was to have the province of Macedonia and Dolabella that of Syria. Unfortunately, Cæsar had selected no provinces for Brutus or Cassius before his death. The questions of the will and the funeral were then considered. No one dared to propose that the will should be annulled: but Cassius and many other senators opposed the idea of a public funeral. They remembered but too vividly the riots which had accompanied the funeral of Clodius. If the plebs had raised such tumults for Clodius, what would they not do for Cæsar? \* Cæsar's relatives protested and Antony judiciously observed that the refusal of a public funeral was likely to rouse the mob to yet greater excesses. Brutus, of weaker fibre than Cassius, was at length persuaded; it was decided that Antony should open the will, which Cæsar had placed in the custody of the chief vestal virgin and that a public funeral should be held.†

Cæsar's will.

The same day, probably in the presence of Cæsar's friends and relatives, Antony opened in his house, before this astounded company, what was probably the most extraordinary will ever made in Rome. The chief heirs were Cæsar's three nephews, the sons of his two sisters, Caius Octavius receiving three-quarters of the property, Lucius Pinarius and Quintius Pedius the other quarter. Several conspirators were appointed guardians of his son, if one should be born to him: Decimus Brutus, Mark Antony and some others were named as legatees in case one of the nephews was unable to inherit. A huge legacy was left to the people, 300 (according to another authority, 120) sesterces to each individual and the vast gardens beyond the Tiber, with the artistic collections there gathered. Finally, in a codicil, Cæsar adopted Caius Octavius as his son.‡

\* See Cicero, A. XIV. xiv. 3, for the opinion of Atticus, which was certainly that of many other conservatives.

† Plutarch, *Brut.* 20.

‡ Suetonius, *Cæs.* 83; Vell. ii. 59; Liv. *Per.* 116; Dion, xlv. 35;



During the 17th, 18th and 19th, popular excitement seemed to have died away, but the publication of this will stirred it to extraordinary vigour.\* Nor is the fact surprising. The crowd of artisans, freedmen and small shopkeepers who led a hand to mouth existence in Rome, most of them without family cares, were never sure of food or lodging unless they could look to the public institutions to tide them over the difficulties of life: they had therefore very special and cogent reasons for excitement at such a will. To provide this plebs with the means of livelihood and amusement was henceforward an indispensable preliminary to assuring the peace of the world. The leaders of the popular party, especially Cæsar and Clodius, had fully realised this fact and to meet the necessity both at their own expense and at that of the State, had emptied the public treasury, plunged Rome into dangerous wars and demoralised the republican institutions. Apprehension of these dangers and hatred of the popular party had induced the conservatives to oppose even the most necessary measures of relief, such as the organisation of *collegia* and the distributions of corn. Hence, for the last twenty years these miserable galley slaves of the ship of State had been in receipt of intermittent relief, given sometimes with excessive lavishness, sometimes with niggard hand: they had come to regard the aristocrats as their natural enemies and the popular leaders, Clodius, Crassus, Pompey and Cæsar as their protectors. Cæsar had won the confidence of the mob by money, entertainments and great promises: of recent years he had been the only man able to restrain the anger and discontent of this plebs who were burning with animosity against the rich, poverty-stricken and galled by long-standing want and exasperated by the civil war. Their chief protector was now gone and the multitude found itself thrown upon its own resources,

Mar. 19,  
44 B.C.  
Effect upon  
the plebs.

Plut. *Cæs.* 68; *Brut.* 20; App. B. C. ii. 143; Cic. *Phil.* ii. xlii. 109. According to Dion, xliv. 35, Augustus, perhaps in his memoirs, said that the legacy was 120 sesterces. In the *Mon. Anc.* 3, 7, Augustus says, on the other hand, that he paid 300. Ihne, *Rom. Gesch.* vii. 263, n., attempts to reconcile the two statements by supposing that Augustus paid 300 sesterces to indemnify the people for the delay.

\* Plut. *Brut.* 20; Dion, xliv. 35; App. B. C. ii. 143.

Mar. 19-20, without leaders or other support than the feeble remnants of Clodius' associations, which were now devoid of vigour or coherence. Hence it is easy to imagine the impression which Cæsar's will made upon the people: they had been already stirred on the 16th by the intrigues of Antony and Lepidus and agitated throughout the following days by the colonists and veterans who had hastened to Rome to defend their rights. Never before had an aristocrat showered such wealth upon the people: apart from the magnificent gardens, there were 300 sesterces for each individual, a small fortune considering the prevailing scarcity of money and a highly appreciated and opportune help. Thus the last act of Cæsar's life had been the infliction of an additional rebuke upon the oligarchy, whom the people accused of avarice and ferocity, who had killed Cæsar as they had killed Clodius and the Gracchi, as they had proscribed Marius and persecuted every champion of the poor. The agitation fomented by Antony and Lepidus on the 16th swelled rapidly, with the special aid of the veterans: all bewailed the cowardly murder of Cæsar at the hands of men whom he loved, as his will declared: all uttered curses upon his murderers and began to declare that the poor should attend the funeral of their great benefactor in a body and give him such a burial as Clodius had had.\*

Arrangements  
for the funeral.

The conservatives were not slow to take alarm and Antony found himself in a most perplexing situation. If popular excitement increased and riots broke out, how was he to steer a middle course between the popular and the conservative parties? He therefore strove to reassure the conservatives by speeches and by expressions of the most respectful consideration for their interests during the proceedings of the Senate: he consulted the leading senators upon every occasion and did nothing without asking the Senate's approval: he was able even to satisfy those senators who questioned him upon the subject of Cæsar's papers. He assured them that there was no reason for anxiety: the papers dealt with nothing of serious importance; no amnesties had been granted by them, and of

\* Plutarch, *Brut.* 20, points out that the chief reason for the disturbances at Cæsar's funeral was the recollection of the funeral of Clodius, and the statement seems to me highly probable.

the numerous exiles banished by the conservative party after Mar. 20-30, the funeral of Clodius, one alone was recalled.\* At the same 44 B.C. time Antony was careful not to wound the feelings of Cæsar's relatives and friends, whose resentment increased as their fears diminished; he allowed them to make such arrangements for the funeral as would produce a great demonstration of sympathy for the victim and of hatred for the murderers. The corpse was to be placed upon an ivory bier, covered with a purple pall embroidered with gold: at the head upon a trophy, would be placed the blood-stained toga in which he had been slain: magistrates of long standing would bear the body from the *domus publica* to the rostra where the eulogy would be delivered; a vast procession composed of veterans, friends, freedmen and the people would then take the body and carry it to the Campus Martius, where it would be burned; those who were to carry the trophies of his campaigns would be sent beforehand to the Campus Martius in succession in order to shorten the procession: they would take their stand around the pyre and the body of the great captain would disappear surrounded by the trophies of his victories.† But who was to deliver the eulogy? Cæsar's adopted son, Octavius, was in Macedonia; the other heirs were men of no reputation and most of the secondary heirs had been involved in the conspiracy. Nor was it an easy matter to speak of Cæsar before his murderers and his veterans, after the amnesty had been agreed upon. It was finally decided that this pious duty should be undertaken by Antony, as consul, friend, and secondary heir, and Antony, much against his will, was forced to consent, lest he should lose the approval of the popular party. However, the audacity of the veterans and of the mob steadily increased: many wealthy and peaceable citizens resolved to abandon Rome to the mob during the day of the funeral. This event soon became the dominating thought of every mind and every one expected some grand or terrible display when the day arrived (the nearest date that can be given is one of the days between March 20-23).‡ Antony was aware that it would be an exhausting

\* Cicero, *Phil.* I. i. 2-3.

† Suet., *Cæs.* 84.

‡ Cæsar's funeral could not have taken place before the 20th, because the 19th was a day of *feriæ publicæ* when funeral ceremonies

Mar. 20-30, day for him : he had to deliver a eulogy under very difficult conditions and to repress undue disturbance without enraging the mob : the more conspicuous of the conspirators foresaw scenes of violence and fortified their houses ; \* the conservatives feared a revolution ; the mob were anticipating a glorious period of licence and a magnificent conflagration, at least equal to that which had been lighted for Clodius.

The funeral.

At length this day of hopes and fears dawned upon Rome. The forum, the steps of the temples, the monuments and the neighbouring streets were speedily thronged by crowds of people and veterans : it was an excited crowd, ready for violence, moved by no definite purpose but that of burning Cæsar's body in some public building, as the body of Clodius had been burnt. Some considered the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus most suitable for this purpose ; others preferred the Curia Pompeii. Cæsar's friends, however, gradually filled the *domus publica*, while without, between the *domus publica* and the *rostra*, those who were to form the procession were drawn up in such order as the narrow space permitted. It appears that Antony had stationed a small force hard by, though the spot is not precisely known. Eventually the ivory couch appeared in the forum, borne upon the shoulders of the friends, and the procession slowly advanced in much confusion, to the lamentations of the singers who repeated a verse of Accius, aptly chosen by the organisers of the ceremony, " I saved those who have given me death." Thus the body was carried to the rostra, the remains of which the Roman archæologist Boni believes have been recently discovered.† The moment had come for Antony to mount the steps and speak. The consul showed much adroitness in evading this difficult task : he ordered the public crier to read the decree passed by the Senate at the beginning of the year, detailing the numerous and splendid honours awarded to Cæsar and the form of oath

could not be held. After the 20th any date is possible, but as Cæsar was killed on the 15th, it is obvious that the 22nd or 23rd must be the latest day of burial.

\* Plutarch, *Brut.* 20.

† But there are strong objections to the theory. See Vaglieri, *Gli scavi recenti nel Foro romano*, Rome, 1903, p. 152, ff.

which the senators had undertaken to swear to the dictator. Mar. 20-30, He added a few words and left the rostra.\* By thus employing 44 B.C. the very terms in which the Senate had eulogised the dead man, he satisfied the popular party and gave the conservatives no pretext for dissatisfaction, as they had themselves approved these decrees some months previously.

It had been arranged that upon the conclusion of the speech The outbreak of riot. the procession should reform and proceed to the Campus Martius; the magistrates therefore prepared to raise the bier. But at that moment some of the spectators began to shout, "To the Temple of Jupiter Capitolinus! To the Curia Pompeii!" Answering shouts arose, the cries were taken up and soon all was noise and confusion; at length some one moved forward, others followed the example and speedily the whole crowd surged forward to the bier. The bearers and the escort offered resistance and a great tumult began: some one conceived the idea of building the funeral pyre in the forum itself, the people were driven back and pieces of wood were thrown into the space thus cleared. The crowd instantaneously grasped the nature of the plan: a rush was made across the forum in search of wood: benches, tables, chairs and anything combustible were carried off as material for the funeral pyre, which was speedily raised upon the spot

\* Suetonius, *Cæs.* 84. "*Laudationis loco consul Antonius per præconem pronunciavit Senatus consultum, quo omnia ei divina simul atque humana decreverat; item jusjurandum, quo se cuncti pro salute unius adstrinxerant; quibus perpauca a se verbis addidit.*" Suetonius thus gives a version very different from that of other historians, who represent Antony as delivering a long speech against the murderers which was a direct incitement to the riots which followed. It is, however, certain that Suetonius and no other gives the true account. Cicero makes no allusion to a great inflammatory speech by Antony in his letters of this time: he refers to it only in his Philippics, that is, after Antony had definitely broken with the conspirators' party. It is, moreover, highly improbable that Antony would have made a great speech at that moment: as consul he had more important matters to consider; nor could he possibly have given such clear provocation to the conspirators, at a time when he was anxious not to compromise himself with any party. In short, the disturbances which followed Cæsar's funeral were the result of long-standing political tension: when the conspirators' party had broken with Antony, they accused him of provoking the riot by his speeches and intrigues. Such is the origin of this legend, which was greatly embellished by later historians and especially by Dion Cassius.



Mar. 20-30, now marked by the remains of the Temple of Divus Julius.  
 44 B.C. Many of those around Cæsar's body retreated in apprehension of the temper of the rioters and the body was left in the hands of the mob, who carried it to the pyre: fire was applied, the flames rose and the people in wild frenzy began to hurl their property into them; the veterans cast in their weapons, the musicians their instruments and the rest their clothes.\* Soon the body of the conqueror of Gaul disappeared in a vast conflagration of fire and smoke, amid the shouts of the crowd which thronged the steps of the temples, climbing upon pillars and monuments to gain a sight of the spectacle. Excitement was increased by the success of these efforts, by the fire, the turmoil and the shouts; the funeral-pyre was not enough; bands of rioters left the forum and marched to the houses of the conspirators with the object of setting them on fire. Those who remained, overcome by increasing frenzy, continued to feed the flames with wood. Alarmed by the progress of events, the magistrates and dignitaries retired precipitately: the consul was left at the head of a few soldiers to confront a riot which seemed to have spread from the forum throughout the city. Antony did not wish to repeat his mistake of the year 47 by using violent measures: he resolved, however, to prevent such destruction of buildings as had happened at the funeral of Clodius and eventually ordered his soldiers to seize certain refractory rioters and to hurl them from the Tarpeian rock.† This severity intimidated the incendiaries to some extent: but at that moment furious bands were rushing to burn the houses of Brutus and Cassius and attempted to storm the doors, while the occupants of the neighbouring houses ran out among the crowd, begging them not to use fire, lest their houses should be destroyed with those of the conspirators.‡ With much difficulty these madmen were pacified and induced to disperse. One gang, however, happened to meet a tribune of the people, who, unfortunately for himself, bore the name of Cinna, the name of the prætor who had spoken against

\* Suet. *Cæs.* 84 gives the best account of the funeral. Dion, xlv. 50, gives important details. App. B. C. ii. 143-148 is full of inaccuracies.

† Dion, xlv. 50.

‡ Appian, B.C. ii. 147.

Cæsar in the forum on the 16th. Mistaking the tribune for the prætor, the rioters tore him in pieces and carried his head on the point of a pike.\* The funeral pyre continued to burn throughout the night, fed by the crowd which would not leave the forum,† and every quarter of the city was disturbed by outbursts of disorder and violence.

Mar. 20-30  
44 B.C.

The next day, Cæsar's freedmen came to seek the half-burned remains of the body among the ashes of the pyre; ‡ these were piously collected and placed in the family tomb,§ the situation of which is unknown. Thus Cæsar reached his last resting-place after a life of toil and danger, of errors and successes, and after so tumultuous a funeral. The mob, however, was by no means satisfied; its fury was stimulated by the rioting during the funeral and the night, by lack of restraint and by the support of the veterans, whose irritation increased daily under the fear of losing their promised rewards. The day after the funeral, disorder reigned throughout the city, though without leaders or organisation, without unanimity of method or design. A second attempt was made to storm the houses of the conspirators; || a vast crowd thronged to see the remnants of the funeral pyre and so general was the disturbance that the conspirators again deemed it more prudent to remain at home throughout the day. Antony, in pursuance of his policy to reassure the conservatives without provoking the popular party, issued a stringent edict, forbidding any one to wear arms except the soldiers: ¶ however, he took no serious steps to secure the enforcement of his orders. The riot therefore continued and assumed even greater proportions during the third and fourth days: the example of the citizens was followed by the foreigners, crowds of whom visited the spot where Cæsar had been burned, to do homage in their own way: in particular, the Jews came in numbers to show their respect for the memory of the man who had defeated Pompey, the conqueror of

Disorder  
continued after  
the funeral.

\* Concerning this Cinna, see Græbe, App. to Drumann, 1<sup>2</sup>, p. 420.

† Appian, B.C. ii, 148.

‡ Cicero, *Phil.* II. xxxvi. 91, *semustulatus ille*.

§ Dion, xlv. 51.

|| Appian, B.C. iii. 15.

¶ Dion, xlv. 51.

Mar. 20-30, Palestine, and had granted them numerous privileges.\* The conspirators waited in vain for an opportunity of leaving their houses in safety and what had seemed a temporary precaution now became forced confinement. Brutus, Cassius and the other conspirators who held magistracies were unable to appear in the forum to fulfil their duties and the public services were in many cases interrupted or suspended. By degrees every one began to realise the great perplexities of the situation. The leading members of the Cæsarean party had made their fortunes † and wished only to be left in possession of what they had gained : their fears daily increased that they might see the conservatives recover their power in consequence of these disturbances, as had happened in the time of Saturninus and Catiline : yet they had not the courage to offer any resistance, as they were both ashamed and afraid to confront Cæsar's party, which was now identified with the lawless rioters. Nearly all of them continued to absent themselves from Rome : the members of the college which Cæsar had formed for the annual celebration of the games of Victory could not venture to begin their celebrations.‡ Oppius asked Cicero for his support ; § Hirtius himself seems to have gone away very hurriedly : || even Lepidus was bewildered. One day he feared that he might be assassinated like Cæsar : the next day, under the entreaties of his wife Junia, the sister of Brutus, he wrote friendly letters to the leaders of the conspiracy.¶ Eventually Antony, in order not to lose his support, promised to secure his election as *pontifex maximus*, in place of Cæsar.\*\*

Perplexities of  
the situation.

Antony was thus left in isolation : he would not use repressive measures against the mob ; he did not wish to be crushed by a rising of exasperated conservatives, as had happened to Marius in the year 100. He therefore abandoned Rome to the rioters and the frenzied veterans and strove to win the

\* Suetonius, *Cæs.* 84.

† The wealth of Sallust was proverbial ; on that of Cornelius Balbus see Dion, *xlvi.* 32.

‡ Dion, *xl.* 6 ; Suet. *Aug.* 10. § Cicero, *F.* *XI.* *xxix.* 2.

|| After the notice of him in *Nic. Dam.* 27, we hear nothing of Hirtius until Cicero's letter to Atticus *XIV.* *xi.* 2 (of April 12), when Hirtius seems to have been at Puteoli.

¶ See Cicero, *A.* *XIV.* *viii.* 1.

\*\* Dion, *xliv.* 53.

favour of the nobles, by gifts of flowers to men who needed Mar. 20-30,  
swords. In the Senate he supported a proposal advanced 44 B.C.  
by Servius Sulpicius, to annul all privileges and immunities  
granted by Cæsar, unless these had been in force before March  
15; \* he went further and himself proposed a *senatus consultum*  
declaring the permanent abolition of the dictatorship to the  
great delight of the conservatives, who thus thought twice  
to slay the slain.† But while the Cæsarean party were thus  
afraid of the conservatives, the latter were no less agitated by  
the continuance of the riots. Forced confinement to their  
houses and long inaction destroyed the courage of the conspira-  
tors, especially of Brutus, who was a weak and impressionable  
character and had probably fallen by now from the heights of  
the enthusiasm which he displayed on the Ides of March to  
the depths of that depression in which we shall speedily find  
him. The disturbances in the city intimidated a large number  
of people and made interviews and discussion impossible:  
the senatorial sessions were few and far between; all parties  
were waiting for the agitation to die away, when calmer action  
in all matters of urgency might be taken: however, the days  
went by and nothing was done. Dolabella feared to meet  
Cinna's fate, doubtless in consequence of his treachery ‡ and  
went into hiding. Cicero's delight at the assassination and  
his subsequent excitement had now given way to impatience  
with these dilatory methods, although every party was attempt-  
ing to win his support. Numerous Cæsareans even altered  
their wills in order to leave him some bequest and were careful

\* Cic. *Phil.* I. i. 3; II. xxxvi. 91; Dion, xlv, 53. It should be said that the text of the *senatus consultum* is not identical in the two passages of Cicero; and Dion does not help us to a knowledge of the exact text or the object of the measure, which is by no means clear.

† Cicero, *Phil.* I. i. 3; II. xxxvi. 91; Liv. *Per.* 116. Historians have attempted to explain Antony's action as a clever device to deceive and pacify the conservative party; but it seems to me simpler and more probable to regard it as the effect of the disturbances which forced Antony, in doubt of his power to deal with them, to make further overtures to the conspirators, lest he should be suspected of supporting the rioters. A passage in Cicero, *Phil.* II., xxxvi. 91, shows that these decrees were issued subsequently to Cæsar's funeral.

‡ An inference from the fact that nothing more is heard of Dolabella until the end of April.

Mar. 20-30, to inform him of their action.\* In a word, the leading members  
 44 B.C. of either party were alike overcome by a sense of weariness, abandoning themselves to gloomy forebodings and selfish efforts to secure their property, while they concealed their fears beneath expressions of general disgust. "If Cæsar, with all his genius, was unable to solve the difficulty, who else would be likely to succeed?"† These are the words of a loyal friend to the dictator. In any case there was a general opinion that a governmental cataclysm was at hand. It was said that the news of Cæsar's death would induce the Gauls to revolt,‡ the Getæ to invade Macedonia § and the legions to mutiny in the provinces.

Arrears of  
 business.

Exasperation and despondency were general: in the universal fear of some great disaster, men thought only of saving what they could from the imminent wreck of their fortunes: Antony, who was left to govern the republic alone, became the object of numberless visits, flatteries and prayers. Cæsar's death and the ratification of his measures had brought crowds of men to Rome; some had suffered material loss by their support of Pompey and they now attempted to secure indemnity by intrigue with the restored conservative party and with the consul, who seemed inclined to listen. Others, and these were even more numerous, came to claim fulfilment of promises which Cæsar had made to them: proof of their statements might be found among the papers which Antony held. Atticus, for instance, required the abolition of the colony of Buthrotum and appealed to the papers. The representatives of Deiotarus, King of Galatia, and the citizens of Marseilles demanded the restitution of the territory which

\* Cicero, A. XIV., iii. 2. Another passage, A. XIV. xiv. 5, shows that these were chiefly Cæsareans.

† Cicero, A. XIV. i. 1. *Ille* is Matius, as is proved by Cicero, A., XIV. iii. 1. It should be noted that in the early days of April a devoted friend and a warm admirer of Cæsar admitted that Cæsar himself *exitum non reperiebat*.

‡ Cicero, A. XIV. iv. 1. See XIV. ix. 3.

§ App. B. C. iii. 25, where the facts are given out of order, since it results from the narrative that the rumour of an invasion of the Getæ gradually spread almost at the moment when Antony proposed the *senatus consultum* concerning the dictatorship, that is, at the time when the other alarming rumours reported by Cicero were in circulation.



Mar. 20-30,  
44 B.C.

Cæsar had taken from them, because they had declared for Pompey. Sicilian ambassadors, who had already obtained Latin rights from Cæsar, now required that the inhabitants of the island should be declared Roman citizens.\* The mass of claims, demands and protests increased daily; in the prevailing confusion the majority of the claimants were sent from one official to another and eventually found their way to Antony. Every one was entering claims, but no one was inclined to risk the smallest trouble or personal danger for the benefit of the republic: the governmental machinery, which had seemed to be in working order on the morning of the 17th, was completely deranged five or six days later. Antony worked single-handed and indefatigably from morning to night,† but was unable to cope with the mass of business before him, as no leading man would take the least initiative in the Senate and as the most urgent measures were neglected. Apparently no one had even thought of sending official information of Cæsar's death and of the change of government to the provincial governors.‡ Rumours of a Getic invasion of Macedonia seem, indeed, to have roused the Senate for a moment. Unable to leave the legions under the command of a pro-prætor in such a crisis, the Senate resolved to send a commission to Macedonia to study the situation; meanwhile the army which Cæsar had intended for the Parthian campaign was placed under the command of Antony, the consul, who was to be proconsul in Macedonia the following year.§ Thus, if the Getæ should

\* It seems probable to me that Antony's decrees upon this question during the second half of April were preceded by *pourparlers* which must have been held at this moment.

† Cicero, A. XIV. xiii. A. 1; a letter from Antony in which he refers to numerous *occupationes* which prevented him from seeing Cicero.

‡ See Cicero, F. X. xxxi. 4.

§ App. B. C. iii. 25, which is partly confirmed by a statement made in the pseudo-speech of Calenus in Dion, xlv. 24. I follow Appian's version which states that this *senatus consultum* was passed at that moment, *i.e.*, after the *senatus consultum* upon the dictatorship. It seems to me impossible that there could be any such connection as historians have attempted to find between the current rumours about the Getæ and the law which gave Gaul to Antony. In that case Antony would have been working against himself, for the fear of a Getic invasion of Macedonia would have been an excellent argument for the opponents of the law dealing with the Gauls. How could the legions

To April 10, invade the province, the consul would be able to take immediate  
 44 B.C. measures of defence.

Departures  
 from Rome.

It was soon felt that this painful uncertainty could no longer be endured : towards the end of March Antony saw that the dissolution of the two parties was imminent. A large number of the conspirators fled one after another from Rome ; Decimus Brutus and Tullius Cimber went to their provinces,\* rejoicing in so excellent a pretext for leaving the city. During the early days of April, many senators withdrew to their villas in Latium and on the bay of Naples : Cicero, the most important personage in the Senate, also started for Puteoli on the 6th or 7th. Contrary to the general expectation, there was to be no conservative reaction against the rioters on this occasion. The strength of the conservative party had been exhausted in the civil war by its losses of men and money and even more by the loss of that most precious possession, its self-confidence. The Cæsarean party was reduced equally low, for it now consisted merely of a band of rebels and infuriated veterans, without leaders or definite objects, spreading confusion through Rome. So true it is that Cæsar's foundations were devoid of all permanence and that when he passed away he left the State as a great ruin tottering on the edge of a precipice. To crown these misfortunes, when the disturbances were at their height, on the 8th or 9th, the mob succeeded in finding a leader. This was Herophilus, the pretended nephew of Marius ; he had been banished by Cæsar, but had returned to Rome immediately after the assassination, built an altar on the spot where Cæsar's body was burned and collected a handful of adventurers : with these he went about Rome calling on the mob to avenge Cæsar and to kill Brutus and Cassius.† The agitation became so vehement that Brutus and Cassius

be withdrawn from Macedonia, if the Getæ were about to invade the province ? Yet this measure was carried out at a time when Antony had no views concerning Gaul.

\* App. B. C. iii. 2, a passage which must be corrected by Cicero, A. XIV. x. 1, which shows that Trebonius started a little later at the same time as Brutus and Cassius. The fact that Decimus Brutus had reached his legions was known at Rome on April 19. See Cicero, A. XIV. xiii. 2.

† Cicero, A. XIV. vi. 1 ; Liv. *Per.* 116 ; Appian, B. C. iii. 2.

had fortified their houses : at length they grew weary of constant imprisonment and continual fear of attack and resolved to leave Rome, if Antony would promise to gain the necessary leave of absence for Brutus. As *prætor urbanus* he was unable to leave the city for more than ten days without the special permission of the Senate. They therefore sent for Antony, who showed himself well disposed towards the leaders of the conspiracy and promised to perform their wishes : \* before leaving Rome they made a further attempt to win over the most violent of the disaffected, namely the veterans. They issued an edict promising Cæsar's colonists relief from their obligation not to sell for a term of twenty years the grants of land which they had received.† This measure was no more effectual than a bucket of water upon a lava-stream. The popular adoration of Cæsar increased and actually degenerated into religious fanaticism. Among the Roman mob were many Orientals who were accustomed to worship kings as gods : during these days of madness their strange superstition infected even the Romans, so that crowds came daily to the altar to make vows, offer sacrifice and settle disputes by taking oaths upon Cæsar's name :‡ Cæsar thus became a tutelary deity of the poor and wretched. The disturbances increased and affairs became so critical, that after four or five days, probably on April 11 or 12, § Antony seized and executed

To April 12,  
44 B.C.

\* Cicero, A. XIV. vi. 1. *Antonii conloquium cum heroibus nostris pro re nata non incommodum*. That the authorisation to be asked of the Senate was discussed during this conversation is a supposition rendered probable by the fact that Antony secured the authorisation shortly afterwards, as we shall see.

† Appian, B. C. iii. 2.

‡ Suetonius, *Cæs.* 85.

§ Liv. *Per.* 116 ; Appian, B. C. iii. 3 ; Cicero, *Phil.* I. ii. 5. The date as given, the twelfth, is arrived at as follows. According to Cicero, A. XIV. viii. 1, Cicero received a letter from Atticus at Sinuessa on the fifteenth, announcing the death of the false Marius, but making no reference to the departure of Brutus and Cassius from Rome, of which fact Atticus informed Cicero in a subsequent letter : see Cicero, A. XIV. x. 1. Brutus and Cassius did not, therefore, leave Rome until the false Marius had been put to death, that is, at least one day later. For Atticus, between the letter which Cicero answers in his 8th, and that which he answers in his 10th, had time to write another letter, to which Cicero replied in his 9th. On the other hand, it is clear (Cicero, A. XIV. vii. 1), that by the morning of the 15th Cicero had learnt from other sources that Brutus and Cassius had been seen at Lanuvium, which implies their departure from Rome on the 12th

To April 12, Herophilus to prevent any more dangerous development of 44 B.C. the situation.

or 13th. See Ruete, *Die Correspondenz Ciceros in den Jahren 44 und 43*, Marburg, 1883, p. 18. Herophilus was therefore executed on the 11th or 12th. The 14th of April, the date assumed by Lange, *Römische Alterthümer*, Berlin, 1871, iii. 483, is too late.

## CHAPTER III

### GENERAL DISSOLUTION

Brutus and Cassius flee from Rome—Cicero at Puteoli—Lucius Antonius and Fulvia—Antony's change of front—First falsification of Cæsar's measures—The arrival of Caius Octavius—Brutus and Cassius in Campania—Antony collects the veterans—Brutus and Cassius at Lanuvium.

THE conservatives loudly praised the severity of Antony,\* who was congratulated by Brutus † on his action. The respite was, however, of short duration. Popular excitement increased; demonstrations were made against the murderer of Herophilus; the mob went so far as to burn the shop of a sculptor where the heads of Cæsar's statues were being changed. Antony was obliged to use further severity, and such slaves or freedmen as he caught openly rioting were crucified or thrown from the Tarpeian Rock.‡ However, these measures proved ineffectual; the next day, April 13, Brutus and Cassius, weary of living in a state of continual fear, and unnerved by the inactivity and solitude to which they were condemned, left Rome for Lanuvium. Antony proceeded to make further overtures to the conservatives, as he saw the disturbances in Rome increasing; he proposed that Brutus should be given leave of absence from Rome for a space of more than ten days.§ He also proposed that Lepidus should be commissioned to

Flight of  
Brutus and  
Cassius from  
Rome.

\* Appian, B. C. iii. 3.

† Cicero, A. XIV. viii. 1.

‡ Appian, B. C. iii. 3.

§ Cicero, *Phil.* II. xiii. 31. This passage would seem to show that this authorisation was given before the Ludi Apollinares. This was before July, as the catalogue of favours granted by Antony to Brutus evidently runs in chronological order. It seems to me probable that the authorisation was given at that time, as Brutus was never charged with illegal absence.



April 15-30, negotiate a peace with Sextus Pompeius, who was still all-  
 44 B.C. powerful in Spain with his seven legions, and should offer him the possibility of a return to Rome.\* He further pleased the conservative party by passing a *senatus consultum* to abrogate the election of the *pontifex maximus* by the people.† Lepidus was thereupon recognised as *pontifex maximus* by the College of Pontiffs. In spite of this, when Brutus and Cassius had gone, the exodus of the nobles became a precipitate flight, and the conspirators who remained secured one after another a safe retreat. Trebonius decided to start for his province, going thither unannounced and incognito, as he feared some violence from the mob.‡ Cleopatra also fled from Rome, and Lepidus, after his election as *pontifex maximus*, went off to Gallia Narbonensis. Antony was almost the only leader remaining at Rome to observe the smokings and rumblings of the volcano which seemed to menace a frightful eruption.

The situation  
 at Rome.

Great and unexpected had been the change during the last month, since the Ides of March. The project of a party reconciliation and the restoration of a reasonable republican government had utterly failed, and distrust and disorganisation reigned supreme. For a moment, indeed, this disorganisation, following a month of riot and disturbance, might bear an illusory appearance of calm, and induce the belief that peace was about to be restored. The conservatives who fled from Rome were hardly out of the city when they felt the relief of the traveller who reaches a mountain-summit and breathes ■ fresher and purer air after a day of overpowering heat.

\* Appian, B. C. iii. 4. The decision on the subject of the fleet was, however, taken at a much later date than he says, as we shall see.

† Dion, xlv. 53, gives some ground for supposing that the election took place at that moment, but no information whatever upon the manner of its accomplishment. I do not think, as Lange supposes, that Antony proposed a law to the people. Evidently he did not wish to see the *pontifex maximus* elected by the Comitia, as he could not trust the attitude of the people. How then could he trust them to pass so reactionary a law as this? Moreover, if the suspension of election by the people had been approved by law, it would not have been possible afterwards to assert that the pontificate of Lepidus was illegal. See Mon. Anc. (Gr.) 6, 1 and 2. For these reasons I assume that a *senatus consultum* was passed.

‡ Cicero, XIV. x. 1. Appian, B. C. iii. 6.

In such little Italian towns as Lanuvium the working classes were by no means numerous and did not possess the *collegia*, the leaders, or the turbulent audacity which made the Roman mob both numerous and powerful; the wealthy landowners and rich merchants were almost entirely supporters of the party of order, that is, of the conservatives and conspirators, particularly at this moment, when a revolution at Rome was to be feared.\* The conspirators, indeed, after the violent animosity to which they had been exposed at Rome, found themselves the objects in these towns of the respect and admiration which they desired, and were easily deluded into the belief that the danger was past. Brutus and Cassius themselves showed no great energy; they stopped at Lanuvium and confined themselves to sending a manifesto through all the municipia of Latium to the younger members of those families with whom they were connected by ties of relationship, friendship, and patronage, inviting them to form a kind of guard which would enable them to return to Rome.† Trebonius, Decimus Brutus, and Tullius Cimber were travelling. The other conspirators and leading conservatives were scattered about in the villas and small towns. They remained entirely inactive and did not even write.

At Rome also popular excitement gradually died away as the people found no objects remaining for their threats or persecution. The only man who gave any sign of life or activity was the old Cicero; after a pleasant journey of a week amid general acclamations he had reached "his domains of Cumæ and Puteoli!" There he found numerous members of the high society of Rome and almost all the leaders of Cæsar's party, Balbus, Hirtius, and Pansa.‡ He was, however, unable to enjoy the sunshine, the spring weather, and the flowers, by reason of his extraordinary agitation, which even at his age, and he was sixty-two, inspired him with all the

April 15-30,  
44 B.C.

Cicero at  
Puteoli.

\* See Cicero, A. XIV. vi. 2. Jullian, *Les transformations politiques d'Italie*, pp. 11-13, has shown with much detail that the wealthy classes in Italy were favourable to the conspirators throughout this crisis.

† A passage of Cicero, A. XIV. xviii. 4, shows that during the first half of May the friends of the conspirators were still hoping that Brutus and Cassius would return to Rome by June 1.

‡ Cic. A. XIV. xi. 2; F. IX. xiv. 1.

April 15-30, enthusiasm and impetuosity of a young and inexperienced man. With indefatigable energy he maintained a large correspondence, paid visits, received his friends and admirers, hastily wrote a book upon Divination, and another upon Glory; he read Greek books and ordered others from Rome, made notes, looked into his private business, projected a large treatise upon Duty, which was to expound a theory for the moral and political restoration of the republic in a framework of Greek philosophy; he discussed the political situation with everybody, both in private conversations and in letters. Now that the veterans were out of sight, he became the most furious, irreconcilable and fanatical of conservatives, retaining some prudence in public, but throwing off all restraint in his letters and conversation. He regretted that he had received no invitation to what he ferociously termed the "magnificent banquet of the Ides of March"; he invariably referred to Brutus and Cassius in Greek style as "heroes;"\* he would have liked to exterminate the riotous Roman mob to the last man; everywhere he saw the Cæsarean party preparing fresh carnage and plunder;† he suspected Antony of playing a double game and spoke of him as a "reckless gamester;"‡ he lamented that Cæsar's murder had produced no effect and that the wishes of the Dictator were still obeyed. Finally, he continually urged the necessity for arms and money, asserting that the republic was going to ruin with its indolent magistrates, its rebellious veterans, and with numerous Cæsareans in the State offices.§ He was infuriated by the sight of upstart landowners who had bought the property of his friends, and of Cæsar's centurions in the enjoyment of wealth;|| he was angry that Brutus and Cassius should have gone into semi-exile,¶ and strangely enough, he actually expressed his disgust with the legacies which Cæsareans had left him.\*\* From time to time, in depression and discouragement he thought of

\* Cic. A. XIV. iv. 2; XIV. vi. 1.

† Cic. A. XIV. iv. 1; XIV. xiii. 2.

‡ Cic. A. XIV. v. 1; *ab aleatore φυρμὸς πολὺς*.

§ Cic. A. XIV. iv. 2; XIV. v. 2; XIV. x. 1; XIV. xii. 1.

|| Cic. A. XIV. vi. 1; XIV. x. 2. ¶ Cic. A. XIV. x. 1.

\*\* Cic. A. XIV. iii. 2; XIV. xiv. 5.

taking refuge in Greece.\* But any trifle, the smallest scrap of good news or the least incident, was enough to change his temper and enable him to paint the future in more glowing colours. Upon such occasions things were going admirably; the legions were not in mutiny and Rome was not in revolt; † Antony was merely a harmless drunkard.‡ Cicero however did nothing but talk and write; these outbursts, invectives, and exaggerations did not go beyond the little circle of his intimate friends, and in no way contributed to revive the fire of civil hatred.

A superficial observer might have thought that the situation was improving. On the contrary, this apparent calm was merely the preparation for a decisive change in Antony's political intentions. There is every reason to suppose that the constant changes of the past month had persuaded Antony that neither party was capable of governing the republic. He then found himself at the head of a mutilated government, deprived not only of many magistrates, but even of the *prætor urbanus*; the members of his party had gone to the seaside, while his colleagues would not venture to appear in public; the Senate was timorous and vacillating, and its ranks were daily thinned not only by fear but by the attractions of spring. Thus, when Antony found himself master of the republic which all others had abandoned, he speedily resolved upon a new change of front even more audacious than any of the various manœuvres by which he had succeeded in keeping touch with the stronger party throughout the preceding month. Two persons who had hitherto been insignificant seem to have worked on this occasion to overcome his last scruples; these were his wife, Fulvia, and his brother Lucius. It has constantly happened that great historical figures like Antony have been overcome by hesitation when about to stake their fortunes upon one supreme cast, and that they have decided to act, merely under the persuasion of lesser known and less intelligent characters, whose obscurity and ignorance had enabled them to preserve greater coolness and courage at a critical moment.

Lucius,  
Antony and  
Fulvia.

\* Cic. A. XIV. xiii. 4.

† Cic. A. XIV. ix. 3.

‡ Cic. A. XIV. iii. 2.

April 15-30, Such was Antony's position at this moment. Lucius seems to

44 B.C.

have been a young man of very similar character to his brother, full of audacity and ambition, but less experienced and therefore less prudent. Fulvia, on the contrary, was one of those women who seem to be totally unsexed by the passion for power, a passion which merely accentuates the defects of such a character as hers. Self-willed, intriguing, avaricious, cruel, arbitrary and audacious, she had first been the wife of Clodius, then of Curio; both her character and her training had made her, so to speak, the stormy petrel of revolution; she had then married Antony, as if it had been her destiny to become the wife of every leading agitator in Rome in turn. She had soon gained that influence over him which such women invariably exert upon violent, ill-balanced, and sensual characters. Hence it is not surprising that in the last of these disturbances, something of the spirit of Clodius should have been aroused in her, and that she should have joined Lucius in the attempt to spur Antony onwards; she would not allow him to miss this opportunity of seizing a lofty and peculiar position in the State, as Cicero had done in 59. Herophilus, by merely flattering the ardent desires of the veterans and the mob to avenge the death of Cæsar, had been able to accomplish what every one had thought impossible a month before, and in a few days had driven the conservative party out of Rome at the moment when their grasp of the republic was generally thought secure. It is not likely that such a man as Antony would fail in the easier enterprise of reintroducing to the republic those who had formerly occupied the chief positions in it.

Antony's  
change of  
front.

Moreover, by a piece of good fortune, one of his brothers, Caius, was now prætor, while the other, Lucius, was tribune. It was impossible to follow Cæsar's example and to use the proletariat societies to overpower the republic. These associations were now too weak; but the veterans provided far more effective support. They were a numerous and resolute body, exasperated with the murderers of their general, and afraid of losing their rewards; they had in large measure been responsible for the disturbances of the preceding month,



and for the consequent rout of the conservative party. If April 15-30, Antony would appear as Cæsar's executor and possibly as his 44 B.C. avenger, he would be certain to secure the general support of the veterans. Rome was not indeed the empire, nor did possession of the metropolis imply possession of the provinces. But rumours were now in circulation calculated both to intimidate the conservatives and to encourage Antony and his counsellors; it was reported that the armies of the provinces, in a fury at the death of Cæsar, were upon the point of mutiny. Encouraged by the persuasions of Fulvia and Lucius, by his own ambition, and by the course of events, Antony speedily resolved about the middle of April, if not upon an open and entire change of policy, at any rate upon a series of manœuvres which are apparently confused and contradictory, but which become entirely clear when we assume him to have entertained these designs; he did not propose to continue Cæsar's dictatorship, which had latterly been almost monarchical, but to imitate, as far as he could, his first consulship, and to secure a wider and more permanent measure of power than a mere consul could command. To the prosecution of these designs he brought, however, a measure of prudence, which shows that he was not so certain of success as his advisers, and that he did not consider the conservative party definitely overthrown.

Between April 15 and 20 the conservative party observed The first indications of the change. A speech was addressed forgeries. to the people by the consul in which reference was made to Cæsar as "the most noble citizen";\* then two strange documents were said to have been found among Cæsar's papers about the 18th of the month. One of these granted the rights of citizenship to the Sicilians, and the other restored to Deiotarus the possessions which Cæsar had taken from him. No great penetration was required to conjecture that these documents were forgeries. Did Antony suppose that any one would believe in Cæsar's wish to restore what he had taken from Deiotarus, the faithful friend of Pompey? The fact was that

\* Cic. A. XIV. xi. 1; XV. xx. 2. Regarding this speech, see Græbe, App. to Drumann I<sup>2</sup>, p. 417 ff.

April 15-30, to follow the methods of Cæsar's first consulship a large amount of money was required; to procure this sum, Antony had eventually yielded to the solicitations of Fulvia, had induced Faberius, Cæsar's secretary, to forge these two documents, and had received in exchange a large sum of money from the Sicilians and from the representatives of the King of Galatia. These latter seem to have given him a *syngrapha* a bond in modern parlance, for ten millions of sesterces on the King's treasury.\* The imposture was so flagrant that Cicero was astounded when the news reached him at Puteoli,† while at Rome the senators immediately resolved that Cæsar's papers should be no longer left in the sole charge of Antony but should be handed over to two consuls assisted by a commission, and that nothing further should be issued until June 1 when the Senate could resume its sessions and thus keep an eye upon the commission: ‡ in short, Cæsar's papers were not to be touched during the vacation.

Arrival of  
Octavius.

However, on the Bay of Naples, where Rome was spending the vacation, the impression produced by this news had been somewhat diminished by the arrival of Caius Octavius, the adopted son of Cæsar, a young man not yet nineteen years of age. As soon as he heard at Apollonia of the events of the Ides of March, he had contemplated for a moment the possibility of raising the legions of Macedonia in revolt; then abandoning this project, he had started for Italy. Upon disembarking at Lupiæ, he heard of Cæsar's will and of his own nomination as adopted son. He had immediately gone to Brundisium, and from thence to Rome, accompanied by certain young friends.

\* Cic. A. XIV. xii. 1; Cic. Phil. II. xxxvii. 93 ff.

† Cic. A. XIV. xii. 1.

‡ Cic. A. XVI. xvi. 11; Cic. Phil. II. xxxix, 100; Dion, xlv. 53. I cannot agree with Græbe, App. to Drumann I<sup>2</sup>, p. 423, that this *senatus consultum* had been already issued in March. The motive for it is then by no means obvious, nor is there any explanation of the fact that the commission was to begin its functions on June 1. The circumstance can only be explained upon the supposition that the law was approved by the Senate during the days immediately preceding the vacation, and was an attempt to prevent abuses which might easily have been committed during the vacation of the Senate. Hence it seems to me probable that the *senatus consultum* should be placed at this time, and it should be regarded as a reaction against Antony's first abuses.

whom Cæsar had sent with him to Apollonia, including a certain Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa, and Quintus Salvidienus Rufus, both of obscure origin.\* Everybody was naturally curious to see Cæsar's heir, and to learn his intentions. As Cæsar's son, tradition would oblige him to prosecute his father's murderers; on the other hand, the amnesty of March 17 forbade any action of the kind. Was the young man inclined to accept the legacy and the name of the dictator? Did he understand the serious obligations which the amnesty laid upon him? Octavius reached Naples on April 18 and declared in a conversation with Balbus that he accepted the inheritance;† he went to Puteoli to see his father-in-law, Lucius Marcius Philippus and Cicero; he had already seen the latter at Rome on several occasions, and now showed him marked courtesy.‡ He either avoided the subject of the amnesty or referred to it with the greatest tact. But though the young man produced a good impression upon Cicero, a deplorable effect was made by the suite which he had collected during his journey; this was composed of a band of colonists and genuine or pretended freedmen of Cæsar, who displayed much discontent with Antony because he did not avenge the dictator, and urged Octavius to advance, appealing to him continually with the title of Cæsar, as if the name was already an object of adoration. On the other hand, Cicero and his father-in-law confined themselves to the use of the name Octavius.§ His father-in-law even advised him not to accept so dangerous an inheritance.||

Octavius, however, did not delay at the Bay of Naples, Cicero's  
attitude.

\* Nic. Dam. 17-18; Appian, B. C. III. ix. 11; Dion, xlv. 3; Velleius l. 59. The stories of the offers which the legions of Macedonia are said to have made to induce him to lead them, seem to me to be exaggerations fabricated in order to show his moderation. I regard as more probable the version of Suetonius, *Aug.* 8, which states that Octavius did not venture to rouse the legions in revolt: *consilium et præceps immaturumque omisit.*

† Cic. A. XIV. x. 3.

‡ Cic. A. XIV. xi. 2; XIV. xii. 2.

§ Cic. A. XIV. xii. 2; Appian, B. C. iii. 12.

|| Nic. Dam. 18; Suetonius, *Aug.* 8; Appian, B. C. iii. 13. Cicero's letters prove that Philippus was then at Puteoli; hence we may conclude that this advice was given to Octavius at Puteoli, and not at Rome, as writers say. At Rome Octavius found his mother.

April,

\* 44 B.C.

but continued his road to Rome, leaving Cicero to his books, to his changeable temper, and to the surprises which came to him from Rome. On April 19, Atticus had delighted him with a piece of good news; Decimus Brutus had been at once recognised as general by the legions upon his arrival in Cisalpine Gaul. Thus the rumour that the soldiers were about to mutiny against the conspirators was false. If Sextus Pompeius declined to make peace as Atticus expected, the conservatives would have two powerful armies at their disposal.\* Another surprise of a very different nature reached Cicero at the same time; Antony wrote him a very friendly letter, asking if he would authorise the execution of a measure on which Cæsar had decided, recalling from exile Sextus Clodius, the client of the Clodius after whose funeral he had been condemned.† The fact was that Antony had once again yielded to Fulvia, who wished for the pardon of her first husband's friend; at the same time he had thought it well to write this letter, lest for such a trifle he should rouse the anger of the old and powerful enemy of Clodius. Cicero was greatly astonished by this request that he would arbitrate upon a measure of Cæsar's, which, if genuine, only required to be put into force; though he might very well have learnt from Hirtius, Balbus, and Pansa that Cæsar had never contemplated this recall,‡ he graciously replied that he had no objection to offer.§ He also was not anxious to quarrel about a trifle. At that moment Atticus was in great perplexity, for Cnacus Plancus, who had been commissioned by Cæsar to found a colony at Buthrotum, was already starting. Atticus requested Cicero to plead his cause with Antony, and Cicero could not neglect so excellent an opportunity of obliging a man who had done him such numerous and important services. Thus he was forced to respect the consul's feelings. However, towards April 27, Atticus sent him more serious news; not only was Antony taking great sums from the public treasury laid up in the Temple of Ops and referring to pretended decrees of the Dictator as his authority, but a rumour was abroad that upon June 1 when the Senate reopened, he would demand

\* Cic. A. XIV. xiii. 2.

† Cic. A. XIV. xiv. 2.

‡ Cic. A. XIV. xiii.

§ Cic. A. XIV. xiii. B.

Cisalpine Gaul and Gallia Comata, in exchange for Macedonia, and the prolongation of his and of Dolabella's pro-consulship.\* April, 44 B.C.

Cicero once more deplored the fact that Cæsar's murder had led to so little result; he was convinced that without arms and supported only by legal fictions, nothing could be done; he abandoned his proposed journey to Greece and wrote to Atticus stating that he would be at Rome on June 1, if Antony made no objection.† He thought that Antony would alter his demands before the Senate. Antony and Fulvia, however, were working for very different ends. During Cæsar's lifetime, Antony had been satisfied with the province of Macedonia for two years; but, like Cæsar in his first consulship, he was now anxious to secure a longer term of administration in a larger province, and had marked as his own these provinces of Gaul which had formerly fallen to Cæsar, and which he had learnt to know very well during the long years of military service which he had passed in them. In other words, he wished the people to approve a new *lex Vatinia de provinciâ Cæsaris*. It was necessary first, however, to discover some method of organising the veterans as Cæsar had organised the people in 59, that their services might be more easily available for elections or forcible measures; their numbers must also be increased, as those who had come to Rome spontaneously were too few. Hence he must now take into his pay those veterans whom Cæsar had wished to settle in the colonies of Southern Italy and especially in Campania. These men, who were now waiting for their promised estates, must be brought to Rome and enlisted in some kind of military organisation with those who were on the spot. Antony further resolved to visit Southern Italy in person, and started probably on April 24 or 25 after the concluding session of the Senate.‡

This journey aroused general astonishment; even Cicero was surprised. No one could understand Antony's object, or the purpose of these movements. It was clear that the welfare or the service of the republic was not his aim.§ Antony's journey to Campania.

\* Cic. A. XIV. xiv. 1-5.

† Cic. A. XIV. xiv. 4-6.

‡ See Græbe, App. to Drumann, G. R. I<sup>2</sup>, p. 427.

§ Cic. A. XIV. xvii. 2.



April,  
44 B.C.

Atticus wrote that henceforward prudence was of no account, and that all depended upon chance; \* however, in his own business dealings he did not trust solely to chance, but attempted to turn Antony's journey to his own advantage, and wrote to Cicero asking him to meet the consul and speak to him upon the burning question of Buthrotum. Shortly afterwards, however, Antony and his journey were completely forgotten, as Dolabella profited by the absence of his colleague to emerge from his retirement and make an uproarious return to public life. On April 26 or 27 he appeared in the forum with a band of armed men, pulled down the famous altar which Herophilus had built, killed a large number of rioters, and gave orders that the place should be repaved. The conservatives were well satisfied with this action, and Cicero also wrote a most congratulatory letter to the "marvellous Dolabella," forgetting for the moment that this individual had shortly before robbed the State treasury of a considerable sum, by means of forged documents in Cæsar's name,† and that he still owed him the portion of Tullia's dowry which was payable in January. He also wrote a letter to Cassius in which he made no mention of Antony, but stated that the situation was improving, that they need only pluck up courage, and should not leave half-performed the enterprise begun upon the Ides of March.‡ But while Cicero was thus delighted by this small success, Antony, before beginning to recruit his veterans, had written to Brutus and Cassius requesting them politely but firmly to stop the recruiting of the friends whom they were attempting to collect as an escort for their return to Rome.§ Antony was in no way to blame for the departure of Brutus and Cassius from Rome; before his change of policy, their departure on April 13 had certainly caused him much trouble, as it increased his responsibility; but at the present moment their absence was necessary

\* Cic. A. XIV. xvii. 1.

† Cic. A. XIV. xv. 2-3. (This letter begins with §2 and the words *O mirificum Dolabella*; the first paragraph is obviously a post-script to the preceding letter.) Cic. A. XIV. xvii. A. Dolabella's action must have taken place on April 26 or 27, as Cicero knew of it on May 1, A. XIV. xv. 4.

‡ Cic. F. xii. 1, written on May 3, as has been proved by Ruete, *Die Correspondenz Ciceros in den Jahren 44 und 43*, Marburg, 1883, p. 20.

§ Cic. F. xi. 2.

May 1-10,  
44 B.C.

for his own designs, and he did not wish them to return. Then he proceeded to collect the veterans in Campania, frightening them with the announcement that Cæsar's decisions would be annulled if they were not careful.\* He declared that he was ready to support them in any attempt to secure the performance of Cæsar's promises and in proof of his zeal he busied himself with the foundation of a new colony at Casilinum where Cæsar had previously founded a colony. He offered money to those whom he could not immediately provide with land in Campania on condition that they would come with him to Rome, and support him in his defence of Cæsar's measures; they were to bring their weapons with them, to promise ready service, and to submit to an inspection every month by two inspectors who would see that they were keeping their promise.†

Brutus and Cassius, on the other hand, had yielded to the consul's request and had published an edict to the effect that they dismissed their friends of their own free will.‡ In reality they had not ventured to resist Antony by continuing attempts at recruiting which were extremely difficult, as the Italian middle classes, though conservative and republican in feeling, were very apathetic. Moreover, though Cassius was a far-sighted, resolute and energetic character, his friend was more fitted for study than for revolution. His vacillation

Brutus and  
Cassius at  
Lanuvium.

\* In my account of Antony's proceedings in Campania, I have passed over all the accusations brought against him by Cicero in his Second Philippic, accusations which are obviously so exaggerated that in the absence of other documentary evidence it is impossible to extract from them any measure of truth.

† Cicero, A. XIV. xxi. 2. In this passage I follow the emendation of Lambinus which seems to me very happy, *ut "arma" omnes haberent*. The reading *ut "rata" omnes* makes no sense. The reading proposed by Schmidt, Rh. Mus. I. iii. p. 223, *ut "rata omnia" haberent* seems to me impossible. It is probable that the veterans had sworn to observe all Cæsar's arrangements, but it seems ridiculous that they should have appointed two commissioners to inspect Cæsar's papers every month. Such continual oversight of Cæsar's archives was not necessary; on the other hand with "*arma*" the sense is quite clear; Antony was anxious that the veterans should have their weapons ready in any case, but as he could only bring them to Rome as private individuals, and could not subject them to the military oath, he thought it advisable to have the *duumviri* to see that they carried out their part of the bargain, to be ready with their weapons in any emergency.

‡ Cic. F. XI. ii. 1. The *edictum* in question is certainly that to which Cicero refers in A. XIV. xx. 4.

May 10-20, 44 B.C. and want of nerve continually hampered his associates, and in a fit of depression he would abandon an enterprise when it had hardly been begun. He asked advice of everybody, including his wife and his mother, and to the counsel of the latter he paid particular respect, a fact which greatly irritated Cicero, who would not trust Servilia, the old-time friend of Cæsar.\* At this moment Brutus was so despondent that Cicero received a letter from him in answer to one written to Cassius on May 3, in which Brutus told him that he was ready to go into exile.† With such a colleague the efforts of Cassius were wholly futile, and the conservative party remained without a leader. Their consternation was correspondingly increased towards May 7 or 8 ‡ when they learnt of Antony's proceedings in Campania, and the transitory delight which Dolabella's attempt had inspired disappeared entirely. If Antony succeeded in gathering a large number of these veterans, who might accuse him of indifference in the cause of vengeance, and demand the death of Cæsar's murderers, he would necessarily wish to annul the amnesty.

General  
apprehension.

This news produced a general panic at Rome which spread from Latium as far as Naples. Servius Sulpicius left Rome, telling Atticus that the situation was now desperate. Cicero was also panic-stricken, and once more contemplated the advisability of a journey to Greece; his correspondence, which might have been opened in transit, became more cautious, and he confined himself to vague allusions to Antony's actions, but he would not see him, and wrote to Atticus saying that he

\* Cic. A. XV. x. 1.

† Cic. A. XIV. xix. 1.

‡ On May 3, when he wrote the letter to Cassius, F. XII. i, Cicero did not know that Antony was recruiting; in his catalogue of the misfortunes of the republic in §1, he makes no allusion to the recruits, not even in the somewhat vague phrase which he uses further on: *arma ad cædem parantur*. On the contrary, in A. XIV. xix. Cicero says that Brutus is thinking of retiring into exile, that he himself longs for death, that Atticus thinks civil war probable (§1), that Servius was terrified and that *perterriti omnes sumus* (§4). In A. XIV. xviii. 3, he says that Servius has left Rome in despair; in A. XIV. xviii. 4, he says that he himself would like to go to Greece. That this alarm was caused by the recruiting of the veterans is certain, and the recruiting was therefore known at that time. The nineteenth letter was written about May 8 and the eighteenth letter about May 9. See Ruete, *Die Correspondenz Cicero's*, p. 8.

had never been able to meet him.\* “Old age is making me peevish; life is a burden to me, but fortunately draws to its close,” † he wrote to Atticus. Dolabella made a fierce reply to the “frightful speeches” of Lucius Antonius, ‡ who was paving the way at Rome for his brother’s new policy, but he was the sole opponent; the rest of the party, and especially the leading Cæsareans who had hitherto left Antony to himself now made overtures of friendship, thus playing a double game which disgusted Cicero. Pansa disapproved of Antony’s conduct in the affairs of Deiotarus and Sextus Clodius, but he also disliked Dolabella, who had ordered the destruction of Cæsar’s altar. § Balbus had no sooner heard of Antony’s enlistments than he hastened to Cicero in extreme anxiety to gain information and to complain of the unjust hatred which the conservative party cherished for himself; but he had been unwilling to break with Antony, at any rate, as openly as Cicero would have liked. || Hirtius had once more become a declared Cæsarean, and asserted that all these measures were necessary, because the conservatives would have annulled all Cæsar’s decisions if they had returned to power. ¶ He admitted that Antony’s enlistments constituted a danger to the public peace, but not more so than those of Brutus and Cassius. \*\* Cicero continued to blame everybody, and to declare that civil war was imminent; at the same time he lent a ready ear to certain disquieting rumours; the veterans were marching upon Rome to restore the altar which Dolabella had destroyed, and it would be very inadvisable for himself, for the conspirators, and for the leading conservatives to be present at the opening of the Senate on June 1, unless they were prepared to go at the risk of their lives. †† Atticus went

May 10-20,  
44 B.C.

\* Cicero constantly writes (A: XIV. xvii. 2; XIV. xx. 2; XV. i. 2) to Atticus saying that he has been unable to meet Antony because of the consul’s early departure. It may be assumed that he was by no means anxious for the meeting, and thus attempts to hide his reluctance from his friend.

† Cic. A. XIV. xxi. 3.

‡ Cic. A. XIV. xx. 2.

§ Cic. A. XIV. xix. 2.

|| Cic. A. XIV. xxi. 2.

¶ Cic. A. XIV. xxii. 1. The *meus discipulus* is certainly Hirtius as is shown by Cic. F. XI. xvi. 7.

\*\* Cic. A. XV. i. 3.

†† Cic. A. XIV. xxii. 2.

May 10-20, so far as to write on March 18 declaring that for the safety of the republic the *senatus consultum ultimum* and a state of siege must be proclaimed, as in 49 before the Civil War.\*

However, Antony returned to Rome on May 19 or 20 † bringing with him a final band of veterans apart from the thousands whom he had sent in advance;‡ but at Rome he found Caius Octavius already at work and waiting for him.

\* Cic. A. XV. iii. 1.

† The passage in Cicero, A. XII. iii. 1, 2, shows that Atticus sent him two letters, one on May 18, the other on May 21. There is no reference to Antony in the first but there is in the second, as may be seen by the brevity of the reply. Atticus was describing how Antony had been welcomed by public opinion on his return (*Antonio, quoniam male est, volo pejus esse*). The passage in Cicero, A. XV. iv. 1, shows that Atticus wrote to him on May 22 or 23, telling him of Antony's actions and intrigues at Rome; hence we may conclude that Antony returned to Rome on May 19 or 20.

‡ *Agmine quadrato*, says Cicero, *Phil.* II. xlii. 108, with habitual exaggeration.



## CHAPTER IV

### CÆSAR'S SON

The disorganisation of Italian society—Class antagonism—Cicero's financial position in 44 B.C.—Antony's return to Rome—The first interview between Antony and Octavianus—The last ten days of May—The senatorial session of June 1—The "lex de provinciis" approved on June 2—The meeting at Antium.

CAIUS OCTAVIUS was not yet nineteen years of age. It is difficult to say how far the fragmentary information which has reached us of his character and habits at this time may be correct. His actions, however, induce us to suppose that this favourite of Cæsar was not only a young man of keen intelligence, but also one of those νεώτεροι, as Cicero called them with complete disdain, one of the young men who affected a general scorn of old Roman tradition and an admiration for foreign manners and customs. Favoured by the most powerful man in Rome, given patrician rank and high office, even that of *magister equitum*, the young man might well have conceived lofty aims and have grown to consider many matters as easy and trivial, the difficulty and importance of which he could only learn by time and experience.

Character of Octavius.

Octavius had arrived at Rome most opportunely. The conspirators had fled, the most eminent senators were away, the Senate was in vacation, the conservative party had practically disappeared, and the veterans and the plebs, satisfied with their triumph and somewhat pacified thereby, were the masters of Rome. As he arrived during this short interval of peace and satisfaction, Cæsar's son was joyfully welcomed by all who had demonstrated against the conspirators, by Antony's

His action upon arrival.

May,  
44 B.C.

two brothers, who wished to curry favour with the veterans, and by the people who had been expecting the dictator's heir for some time as the man who was to pay each one of them the three hundred sesterces of Cæsar's legacy. At last the money would be forthcoming. The advice of his father-in-law, though repeated to him at Rome by his mother, had not shaken the resolution of Octavius.\* He lost no time in appearing everywhere as Cæsar's son; one morning he came before the prætor, Caius Antonius, with a large following of friends to declare his acceptance of the legacy and the adoption;† without waiting for the formalities of adoption, he assumed the name of Caius Julius Cæsar Octavianus (we shall henceforward call him Octavianus to avoid confusion between the father and his adopted son); he also desired to address the people. He held no office, but as he was to pay the three hundred sesterces to all the plebeians, Lucius Antonius had readily consented as tribune to present him to the people. Octavianus made a speech in which, without alluding to the amnesty, he exalted the memory of the dictator and declared that he would pay Cæsar's legacies without delay, and that he would immediately take in hand the preparations for the games in honour of Cæsar's victories to be held in the month of July; this was his duty, as a member of the College responsible for the celebration of these games.‡ Atticus and Cicero seem to have been vexed by the lack of allusion to the amnesty.§ But the speech, on the other hand, caused the utmost satisfaction to the mob. At last the three hundred sesterces were to be paid down. For this purpose ready money was necessary. Octavianus had a fortune of his own, for his grandfather, as we have said, had been a rich usurer of Velletri, and Cæsar's will gave him possession of three-quarters of the huge fortune which the dictator had accumulated in recent years by means of the plunder of the

\* Appian, B. C. iii. 13; Suetonius, *Aug.* 8; Dion, xlv. 3.

† Appian, B. C. iii. 14.

‡ Dion, xlv. 6. He is, however, mistaken in the name of the tribune and confuses this with later occurrences which we shall notice below. The tribune who presented Octavianus was Lucius Antonius, as is proved by a passage in Cicero, A. XIV. xx. 5.

§ Cic. A. XV. ii. 3.

May,  
44 B.C.

civil wars. This fortune probably included a large number of houses in Rome, vast estates in Italy, and perhaps more valuable still, numbers of slaves and freed-men, as the rights of their master passed to his heir. But the only ready money which Cæsar had left was the hundred millions of sesterces which Calpurnia had handed to Antony. Octavianus was therefore obliged to await Antony's return in order to ask him for the money.

The satisfaction, however, with which Octavianus had been received could not be of long duration. The struggle between the conservatives and the popular party had diminished in intensity since the flight of the conspirators, but suspicions and animosities had been revived by the recent tumults, and were soon to restore the former state of tension. The arrival of large numbers of veterans with many litter-loads of weapons\* and the plundering of the public treasury roused the anger of the conservatives; the good feeling towards Antony, which they had entertained after March 17, now became animosity increasingly violent and bitter.† Others, again, especially the numerous relatives and clients of the conspirators, had been exasperated by the initial action of Octavianus, and feared that he would not respect the amnesty. Thus, even during these days of comparative calm, events followed each other in rapid succession. One day Dolabella appeared in the theatre after the destruction of the altar, and was saluted by enthusiastic acclamations from the upper classes; ‡ another day Octavianus appeared at certain games which the ædile Critonius seems to have given a month later than was intended owing to the disturbances of the month of April; he then wished to bring Cæsar's golden chair, but was prevented by some tribunes, amid the applause of the senators and the knights.§ In short,

\* Cic. *Phil.* II. xlii. 108. *Scutorum lecticas portari videmus.*

† Cicero, A. XV. iii. 2, replying to a letter of Atticus of May 21, which informed him of Antony's return, says *Antonio quam est* (or, as emended, *male quoniam est*), *volo pejus esse*. It seems to me that these words allude to the general ill-feeling for Antony of which Atticus had spoken in a letter.

‡ Cic. *Phil.* I. xii. 30.

§ From the passage in Cicero, A. XV. iii. 2 (*de sella Cæsaris bene tribuni . . .*), we may assume that during the last third of May before Antony's return, or after his return and before his legal disputes with

May,  
44 B.C.

the situation was now so strained that though temporary intervals of peace might be possible, any prospect of a final pacification was out of the question.

Social  
instability.

The oligarchy, now supreme in the great republic, was composed of two hostile groups; one of these was discontented with its share of the booty, while the other was disturbed by the continual clamour of the malcontents; both were suspicious and ready for violent action; they were restrained merely by mutual fear and by a kind of malicious fanaticism, which induced them to interchange accusations and to regard one another as capable of the basest measures. The first group included the remnants of the small landholders from such districts as Apulia, who still farmed their lands by their own labour in the manner of the legendary Cincinnatus, the last representatives of a bygone age; \* it included also the free labourers from the country who were hired for the vintage, for the harvest, or for unhealthy occupations.† To these must be added the peasants, the *coloni*, or small farmers who cultivated the lands of others in different districts on a system of lease not unlike the modern metayer system; ‡ the poverty-stricken proletariat, *capite censi*, who lived at Rome and in the small towns by intrigues, shop-keeping or beggary, and included obscure victims of the Roman conquest and miserable freedmen of every nationality and every language. These were amalgamated with the residuum of the victorious nationality which had provided Cæsar with military power and votes for the comitia.

Octavianus, an incident respecting Cæsar's chair and certain tribunes of the people took place. To this Appian, iii. 28, may allude, when he speaks of the games of Critonius in honour of Ceres. This does not seem to me an improbable explanation, although these games should have been celebrated between April 12 and 19 (C. I. L., I<sup>2</sup>, p. 315); but it is more than probable that they were delayed during that year by the disturbances which occupied the month of April. Appian's narrative must therefore be corrected by Cicero's and we must admit that Antony was not concerned in the matter, and that it was not Critonius but certain tribunes of the people, as Cicero says, who thus opposed the action of Octavianus. The explanation is probable because Critonius was a Cæsarean. The tribunes acted alone under conservative influence. Appian may have confused this matter with the incidents of the *ludi victoriae Cæsaris* with which we shall deal later.

\* Varro, R. R. I. xvii. 2; I. xxix. 2.

† Varro, R. R. I. xvii. 2.

‡ Allusion is made to these *coloni* in Cic. *Pro. Cæc.* 94; *Cæs. B. G.* I. 34.

May,  
44 B.C.The  
aristocracy.

The other group included the true aristocracy of the triumphant nationality. In every country subjugated by Rome this society had taken possession of public lands on lease; it had bought vast estates in the provinces; it had lent large sums of capital to sovereigns, to cities, and to private individuals in every direction. This group held the State magistracies and commanded the legions; it possessed the larger part of the Italian lands and cultivated them either by slaves or colonists. At the same time it must not be imagined that this oligarchy was entirely composed of wealthy men. It was a society marked by numerous gradations and included small landowners, knights and merchants of good position living in the secondary towns; these rubbed elbows with the great landowners who composed the Senate, and with capitalists, who were either knights like Atticus or senators like Marcus Crassus or freed-men, like many of the wealthy usurers who set up business at Rome and plundered the plunderers of the world. Many members of the party, in their haste to acquire wealth and to enjoy it, had been caught in the network of debt and credit which enmeshed the whole of Italy. The great aristocratic families possessed vast estates, but for the most part were short of money, and not only Octavianus, but even Brutus, Cassius and their friends were greatly in want of hard cash; \* existing capital was almost entirely in the hands of a small group, and the shortness of money and the weight of debt was a heavy burden upon many of the knights and senators, in other words, upon the class of landowners, merchants, politicians and thinkers who should have formed what is now the upper middle class standing half-way between the plutocracy and nobility on the one hand, and the poorer classes on the other.

Cicero's financial affairs provide us with valuable information concerning the economic conditions in which the upper classes lived at that time. Cicero had increased his fortune by every means then possible within the limits of the law; he had accepted large gifts from sovereigns, foreign towns and clients whom his eloquence had defended before the courts; he had

Cicero's  
financial  
affairs.\* Cornelius Nepos, *Att.* 8.



May 20-30, received legacies from friends and unknown admirers. He  
 44 B.C. had also speculated in the sale and purchase of land and houses ; he had lent a little money, but rather to oblige his friends than to make profit ; he had also borrowed a great deal from regular money-lenders and from such friends as Atticus and Publius Sylla, who had required no interest.\* Thus he had a considerable fortune, including houses at Rome and valuable estates and rich villas in Italy. Yet he found himself entangled in a labyrinth of debt and credit from which he could find no issue, a task attempted with equal ill-success by his careless secretary and slave, Eros. This secretary had just presented him with a fine balance-sheet showing that on April 15, when his loans had been called in and his debts paid, he should have had a balance in his favour.† But either because the loans were not called in, or because the accountant was mistaken, Cicero was at that moment extremely short of money ; yet he had a number of debts to pay, including several instalments of Terentia's dowry, the fees for his son who was studying at Athens, and a debt to the inhabitants of Arpinum who were demanding a sum which they had previously lent him at a time when the town was looking for an investment.‡ Cicero however, could turn for help to his reputation and his friends ; but many other people were in similar straits, racking their brains to meet their difficulties and deprived of his resources ; most of them belonged to that middle class which should have been the mainstay of the republic and its defence against the irreconcilable conservatives and the revolutionary demagogues. As things were, its condition was becoming critical ; it was disunited and despondent, diminished in numbers, discontented with the situation, and without money, courage, or confidence in the future.

Antony's  
 return to  
 Rome.

Antony's return increased this agitation. Ten days yet remained before June 1 and every one was anxious to learn what were the real proposals of the consul for the first session of the Senate. Conjecture was rife, and Antony's every

\* On Cicero's fortune see Lichtenberger, *De Ciceronis re privata*, Paris, 1895. *La fortune de Cicéron* in the *Revue internationale de Sociologie*, 1896, p. 90 ff.

† Cic. A. XV. xv. 3.

Cic. A. XV. xv.

gesture was watched by anxious eyes. He, however, seemed May 20-30,  
anxious on his arrival to withdraw from public notice. He 44 B.C.

never appeared in public without an escort of veterans and Arabs of Ituræa, which latter he had bought in the slave market; a careful watch was kept on the gates of his residence, and strangers only secured admission with much difficulty.\*

The public were anxious to know the reason for these precautions. The uncertainty was great, and at the end of two or three days a serious rumour spread through Rome which terrified the conservatives and the relatives or friends of the conspirators. Antony, it was said, not only desired the provinces of Gaul, but wished to secure them immediately without even waiting until the following year; he was returning to his proposal of March 16 to deprive Decimus Brutus of his province and thus to deprive the conservative party of its chief support.† Rumour declared that in spite of the amnesty, Lucius Antonius was about to begin legal proceedings against Decimus Brutus for Cæsar's death and that others would accuse Brutus and Cassius.‡ The anxiety of the upper classes increased, every one forgot the intrigues of Octavianus, and began to ask if the real danger was not elsewhere, and whether Antony in his efforts to secure popularity was not working even more secretly than Cæsar's so-called son against the amnesty of March 17. These were, however, exaggerations which represented as definite projects the confused echoes of those discussions which had taken place in the consul's house since his return. It is probable that Lucius and Fulvia had been emboldened by the success of the enlistment, and were urging Antony to take advantage of the general disorganisation of the nobles to

\* Cic. A. XV. viii. 1; *aditus ad eum (Antonius) difficilior.*

† A passage in Cicero, A. XV. iv. 1, shows that Atticus wrote on May 23 to the effect that this intention was rumoured in Rome: *Si quidem D. Bruto provincia eripitur.*

‡ Cic. A. XV. v. 3 (written May 27 or 28; Ruete, *Corr. C.* p. 20): *Quod si, ut scribis, L. Antonius in D. Brutum, reliqui in nostros, ego quid faciam?* The excessive brevity of this phrase alludes to legal proceedings against the conspirators and not to war or expeditions. Why was Lucius Antonius to march against Decimus Brutus when everybody was saying that Marcus wished to secure the province of Gaul? And how could there be any question of making war upon Brutus and Cassius, who possessed no army?

May 20-30, disavow the amnesty, to bring the tyrannicides to judgment  
 44 B.C. and to come forward as Cæsar's avenger; in favour of this course they argued that if Antony could succeed in driving all the conspirators into exile, he would find himself, with the support of the veterans, even more powerful than Cæsar had been in 59 at the head of the *collegia* of Clodius. The moment, moreover, seemed admirably chosen, for Antony could dispose of the Macedonian legions which the Senate had placed under his orders; he could also recruit as many soldiers as he liked from Cæsar's veterans so soon as he chose to invite them to avenge their general and defend his work, if the conspirators ventured to use the army of Decimus Brutus for resistance.

Antony's  
 position.

Though Fulvia and Lucius thus urged him forward, Antony's hesitation was much greater than the public believed. His fear of the conservatives was still considerable; he regarded Dolabella's enmity as a great obstacle, and he knew that of the tribunes of the people some had declared against him, Lucius Cassius, Tiberius Cannutius, and even Carfulenus, one of Cæsar's bravest soldiers.\* He saw that the resolution of Hirtius himself had been shaken by his thefts from the public treasury,† while Fufius Calenus, who had been on bad terms with Cicero for some time, was now writing to him to propose a reconciliation.‡ Moreover, there was a rumour abroad that Brutus and Cassius were about to leave Italy and to raise a revolution in the provinces.§ Antony strove to win the confidence of Dolabella, and to spread discouraging rumours which might deter the senators from returning to Rome. But he could not help asking himself how many senators would be sufficiently intimidated, whether Cicero would come, and whether he could venture to annul the amnesty, in other words, to provoke a civil war at the end of seven or eight days, in the coming session of June 1. At an earlier date he would not perhaps have hesitated before so rash an action; now that he was alone at the head

\* Cic. A. XV. iv. 1; *Phil.* III. ix. 23 (it is, however, uncertain whether Cannutius and Cassius turned against him at this moment).

† Cic. A. XV. ii. 4. Πεντέλοιπος is Hirtius (notwithstanding the ambiguity of the term), as is proved by Cic. A. XIV. xxi. 4.

‡ Cic. A. XV. iv. 1.

§ A rumour transmitted by Hirtius: Cic. A. XV. vi. 2-3.

of the government, unexpectedly involved in danger and responsibility, and exposed to general criticism and hatred, his resolution wavered, and possibly for the first time in his life, he followed the dictates of prudence and common sense.

While engaged in these considerations, Antony received a request for an interview from Octavianus. Whether the young man had explained his purpose or not, it was one that Antony could easily guess. There is nothing to show that he was prepared to restore Cæsar's money to his legal heir, and it is not in the least likely that he regarded the young man with his claims and his intrigues as a serious factor in the situation. On the contrary, it is probable that the claims of Octavianus inspired him with another idea; Cæsar had appointed him and Decimus Brutus as secondary heirs; Decimus Brutus would never be able to prosecute his claim, and Antony hoped to induce Octavianus to abandon his inheritance, of which he would then take his share.\* He therefore attempted to intimidate the young man by some show of discourtesy; when Octavianus appeared at Pompey's Palace, he was kept waiting for a long time, and when he was at length admitted to Antony's presence, the consul barely allowed him to state his business, but sharply interrupted him, telling him that he was mad if he thought himself capable of accepting Cæsar's legacy at so early an age. Antony then went away without giving his visitor time to answer and leaving him confused and mortified.† Antony had something better to do than to trouble himself with the affairs of this young man. Days went by and the end of May arrived; Antony had succeeded in bringing over Dolabella to his side by the gift of a considerable sum from

May 20-30,  
44 B.C.  
The first  
interview  
between  
Antony and  
Octavianus

\* Florus IV. iv. 1:

† The story of his interview, given by Appian, B. C. iii. 14 ff. is drawn, according to Soltau, *Suppl. to the Philologus*, vii. p. 604 ff. from the Memoirs of Augustus, and the facts are therefore true, while the humiliating details are suppressed. The whole truth must be sought in Velleius II. lx. 3, and in Nicolas of Damascus, 28, where allusion is made to the first interview between Antony and Octavianus the narrative of which was given in an earlier text now lost, and in which Antony's rudeness was somewhat marked. The first interview is certainly that to which Velleius alludes. Plutarch *Ant.* 16, gives a summary of the conversation between Antony and Octavianus, which seems very probable.

May 20-30, the public treasury, and by the promise that his pro-consulship  
 44 B.C. should also be prolonged; though every one thought that he would propose his demands to the Senate on June 1, he had not yet decided so important a matter as the moment when his action should begin. At the end of May he received a letter from Brutus and Cassius asking for what reason he was recruiting the veterans; they asserted that the pretext of securing for the troops the rewards promised by Cæsar was futile, because no member of the conservative party had any anxiety to deprive them of these gifts.\* Antony was then anxious to calm their minds, and informed them through Hirtius and Balbus, that when the Senate opened, he would arrange that the provinces to which they had a right should be granted them; these provinces, however, he did not specify.† The fact is that he was not ready to begin open war with Cæsar's murderers, as he still feared the power of the conservative party. Cicero, however, wrote to Atticus to the effect that the conservative party was unfortunately not what it had been five years before when it had so boldly declared war upon Cæsar.‡

The last days  
 of May.

The orator judged the situation better than the consul. The presence of the veterans and the alarming rumours in circulation intimidated those who had remained; Hirtius, who had returned to Rome, left the city for Tusculum,§ on the advice of Balbus, to continue Cæsar's Commentaries;|| it was said that the consuls elect would not be present at the session of June 1.¶ All this was not likely to encourage those who had left Rome to return, and Cicero was urged from several quarters not to set foot in the city. However, he went in that direction; he had gone to Arpinum and then to Tusculum after the 25th, and wrote to Atticus saying that he wished somehow to gain an idea of what was likely to happen,\*\* at Tusculum

\* Cic. F. ii. 2.

† Cic. A. XV. v. 2.

‡ Cic. A. XV. iii. 1: *nec causa eadem est nec simile tempus. Causa* here means "political party" as in A. XV. vi. 1; *causæ* . . . *amicissimus*, and in A. VII. iii. 5, *causam solum illa causa non habet*.

§ Cic. A. XV. vi. 2; XV. v. 2, for which I follow the happy emendation, *qui quidem se afulurum*.

|| Hirtius, B. C. viii. *præf.*

¶ Cic. *Phil.* I. ii. 6.

\*\* Cic. A. XV. iii. 1.



however, he met Hirtius, who urged him to go no further.\* May 20-30, Brutus and Cassius were also in a state of great vacillation 44 B.C. during the last days of May and were swayed in contrary directions by the discrepant rumours in circulation. At one time they were told that Antony intended to give them the provinces they desired, and at another time that he was spreading a snare for them; they asked advice from everybody, brought Servilia from Rome, sent letters directly and indirectly to their friends, to Cicero, and to Atticus, urging them to come to Lanuvium for a conference; † at length they decided to ask Atticus to open negotiations with the rich knights of Rome for a loan to provide Brutus and Cassius with the sinews of war. A friend of Brutus, Caius Flavius, had gone to Rome to treat with the leading financier.‡ Cassius, on the other hand, wrote letter after letter to Cicero,§ urging him to use his influence on their behalf with Hirtius and Pansa, the two consuls for the following year. Cicero did not know what advice to give and was inclined to go to Lanuvium on the 29th or 30th,|| though he feared that his movements might give rise to excessive gossip; ¶ Atticus also consented to go; \*\* he had previously refused to open negotiations for a loan; †† possibly he was not anxious to compromise himself too far; possibly also he doubted the success of such an effort, because, though

\* Cic. A. XV. v. 2.

† Cic. A. XV. iv. 2 and 5.

‡ Cornelius Nepos, *Att.* 8. That these negotiations took place at this time is a matter of conjecture. The fact that the third party, Cassius Flavius, went to Atticus, seems to show that Brutus and Cassius were not at Rome. There is possibly an additional allusion to the refusal of Atticus in Cicero XV. iv. 5 (a letter written at this time which is certainly the opening part of a short letter mistakenly connected with the preceding letter): *quam vellem Bruto studium tuum navare potuisses!* Boissier, *Cicéron et ses amis*, Paris, 1902, p. 158, puts these negotiations at a later date, when Brutus was in Macedonia; but it seems to me improbable that he should have had recourse to Atticus at a time when he could have extorted money from the province as pro-consul or have asked it from the Senate.

§ Cic. A. XV. v. 1; XV. vi. 1.

|| Ruete, *Corr. Cic.* p. 23.

¶ Cic. A. XV. iv. 2. *Lanuvium eundem . . . non sine multo sermone.*

\*\* Cicero, XV. xx. 2. The conversation at Lanuvium to which this letter alludes, is certainly the present occasion, and is also referred to in the beginning of Cicero's letter A. XV. viii. 1, *post tuum discessum.*

†† Corn. Nepos, *Att.* 8.

June 1-2,  
44 B.C.

the capitalists were anxious for the maintenance of public order, they did not care to spend money for that purpose. When Atticus and Cicero met at Lanuvium, probably about May 30, for a conference with Brutus and Cassius, they were reduced, after long deliberation, to recognise the fact that Antony was now master of the situation, and could inflict any damage upon them that he pleased.\*

The session of  
the Senate.

Antony, however, was by no means inclined to pursue such formidable projects as were attributed to him; he did not perceive his mastery of the situation as announced by Brutus and Cassius some days previously, until June 1, when, to his astonishment, he saw that neither Cicero nor the consuls elect nor the leading men of the party were present in the Senate.† It was a day of surprises. Antony found no one at the session but obscure senators, whose subservience to himself was complete. There was therefore, general expectation that he would lay his claims to the provinces before the meeting, and there was no less astonishment when it was found that in this session the consul confined himself to ordinary business, and made no allusion to these supposed plans. The conservatives began to wonder whether Antony had been slandered, and their anxiety seemed to grow calmer towards the evening. After the session however, emboldened by the absence of the leaders, Antony resolved, as is often the case after a long period of hesitation, to act without delay and to convoke a popular meeting for the following morning in haste and without giving time for the legal interval of *trinum nundinum* between the announcement and the approval of it.‡ By this means he would prevent his adversaries from sending opposition tribunes to interpose their veto, while he would be able to propose, through certain friendly tribunes, the law prolonging for six years, including the consular year, the proconsulships of Syria and Macedonia for himself and Dolabella. Notwithstanding this precipitate haste, he continued to show a measure of prudence, and to spare the feelings of the con-

\* Cic. A. XV. xx. 2. *Lanuvii . . . vidi nostros tantum spei habere ad vivendum, quantum acceperant ab Antonio.*

† Cic. Phil. I. ii. 6.

‡ Cic. Phil. V. iii. 7 ff.

June 1-2,  
44 B.C.

servatives by offering them some compensation for this illegal method of procedure. He renounced for the moment his claim to the province of Gaul, and fixed for June 5 the session at which the decree would be proposed conferring their provinces on Brutus and Cassius. He also proposed, on the motion of the same tribunes and in the same comitia, to give legal force to the *senatus consultum* which provided a commission for the examination of Cæsar's papers. Instructions were therefore given to the veterans and their friends in the evening; in the morning the consul, the magistrates who supported him and a certain number of citizens gathered in the forum to represent the tribes; in the course of the day a large number of people who were not even aware that an assembly was being held, learned that the *lex de provinciis* and the *lex de actis Cæsaris cum consilio cognoscendis* had been hastily passed.\* During the same day, Balbus learned to his astonishment that Antony was thinking of sending Brutus to Asia and Cassius to Sicily to buy corn.† This was an extremely clever manœuvre; if the two conspirators refused to act, they could be charged with responsibility for the chronic scarcity of corn at Rome; if they accepted, they would be obliged to leave one another and abandon all their measures for the defence of the conservative party in order to haggle with corn merchants.

The anxieties of the last days of May had been succeeded by comparative calm among the conservatives and conspirators when they saw that the amnesty at least was respected. Cicero himself had no sooner arrived from Tusculum than he had asked Dolabella to appoint him his pro-consular legate, with permission to re-enter Rome when he would.‡ After his futile conversation with the leaders of the conspiracy, he seems to have thought that it was best to travel at the expense of the republic. When, however, Antony's intentions respecting the provinces of Cassius and Brutus were known, general indignation prevailed that so humble a mission should have been given to the two liberators of the country; § it was not

Dissension  
between  
Antony and  
Octavianus.

\* Cic. *Phil.* V. iii. 7

† Cic. A. XV. ix. 1; he received Balbus' letter with the news, on the evening of the 3rd, probably at Tusculum.

‡ Cic. A. XV. viii.

§ Cic. A. XV. ix.

June 1-10, a mission, but exile in disguise; Antony wished to remove them from Italy, and to deprive Decimus of his province.\* 44 B.C. Brutus once more sent messages to his mother, to Cicero, to Atticus, and to his friends on every side, inviting them to meet at Antium for a second conference. However, further dissension had broken out at Rome, on this occasion between Antony and Octavianus. Irritated by the affront which he had received, Octavianus had begun a popular agitation; he denounced the consul as the enemy of the people, recalling bitter memories of the year 47,† and accusing him of betraying Cæsar's memory and his party, and preventing the payment of Cæsar's legacies. This discourse was followed by a magnificent announcement to the effect that he would sell all Cæsar's property and his own family possessions with the object of paying the three hundred sesterces without delay.‡ Antony, by way of reprisal, proceeded to raise obstacles against the passing of the *lex curiata* which ratified the adoption,§ in which attempt he was supported by the relatives of the conspirators, who were not anxious to have a son of Cæsar at Rome. Octavianus replied by a more energetic pursuit of his agitation than before; he collected a band of partisans and repeating the practice of Herophilus, went about the streets of Rome, making speeches against Antony, attempting to arouse the veterans, calling once more for vengeance for Cæsar, and accusing Antony of lukewarmness in this cause and of treachery to his party.|| He also wrote to his friends among the legions in Macedonia, informing them of the infamous treatment which Antony had inflicted upon Cæsar's son.

The meeting  
at Antium.

Cicero, however, had received on June 7 ¶ a letter from Dolabella (possibly somewhat delayed), stating that the latter had appointed him as his legate on June 2, that is, immediately after the approval of the *lex de provinciis*, but for five years

\* Cic. A. XV. x. *Si vero aliquid de Decimo gravius . . . . Dionis legatio.*

† See Dion, xlv. 6.

‡ Appian, B. C. iii. 21.

§ Dion, xlv. 5. Appian's account, B. C. iii. 2 ff. seems to me to be greatly exaggerated.

|| Appian, B. C. iii. 28.

¶ Cic. XV. xi. 4; *id mihi heri vesperi nuntiatum est* (the letter is dated the 8th).

June 1-10,  
44 B.C.

and not for two, as Cicero had thought.\* Dolabella had thus hastened to satisfy the wishes of his former father-in-law that he might oblige him to recognise this law, the legality of which was doubtful. In fact, this nomination brought a certain philosophic calm to Cicero's anxious mind and the following day, the 8th, he yielded to the requests of Brutus and Cassius, and went to Antium. On that lovely shore he found Brutus and his wife Portia, Servilia, Tertulla, the wife of Cassius and sister of Brutus, Favonius, and many other friends. Atticus was not there, as he did not wish to leave Rome. Cicero was obliged to give his opinion before this gathering of men and matrons, and he advised that the mission should be accepted. Dolabella's legation had temporarily calmed the fury of the conservative leader and his desire to exterminate the popular party. Cassius, however, in great excitement, loudly declared that never at any cost would he go to Sicily and that he would rather go into exile in Achaia. Brutus, on the other hand, in spite of his discouragement, said that he wished to return to Rome where it was his duty as prætor to hold the Ludi Apollinares for the people. Cicero attempted to dissuade him; Servilia, who was anxious to save not so much the republic as her son and son-in-law, advised him to accept the legation, saying that she would arrange for the transference elsewhere of the unpleasant duty of purchasing corn. Discussion then wandered from the point; useless regrets were uttered regarding a number of things which should have been done, and of which no one had thought; the advice of Decimus Brutus should have been followed to kill Antony with Cæsar on the Ides of March. Argument seems to have grown so keen that Cicero and Servilia had a quarrel on this point. At last Brutus yielded and resolved not to go to Rome, but to arrange for the celebration of the games by his colleague, Caius Antonius, who was supplying his place. The question of the mission, however, still remained undecided; though Cassius no longer protested with the same energy, he would not declare himself ready to start. Brutus, on the other

\* Cic. A. XV. ix. 4.



June 1-10, hand, seemed to Cicero more inclined to accept the mission.\*  
 44 B.C. Cicero's journey had thus once more been futile; he consoled himself with the thought that he had at least performed his duty and decided to start for Greece.†

\* See the whole of Cicero's fine letter, A. XV. xi. with all the explanations and details added in the twelfth letter at the request of Atticus. The words of § 2, *amissas occasiones Decimumque Brutum graviter accusabant*, express, in my opinion, regrets that Antony had not been killed on the Ides of March on the advice of Decimus and not of Marcus, as is generally believed, following Plutarch and Appian. This is probable enough, because Decimus and Antony had been fellow soldiers, while Marcus Brutus and Antony hardly knew one another and it is clearly confirmed by this passage which is otherwise inexplicable. The words *amissas occasiones* can only refer to the inactivity of Decimus in Gaul with his legions; Antony showed little more activity at Rome and Decimus had still time to act.

† Cicero, A. XV. xi. 3.

## CHAPTER V

### THE LAND LAW OF LUCIUS ANTONIUS

Antony reorganises the Cæsarean party—Antony's friends—Financial difficulties of the conservative party—The conservatives incite Octavianus against Antony—The agrarian law is approved—The projects of Cassius.

ENCOURAGED by the initial success of the *lex de provinciis*,<sup>Legislative proposals.</sup> Antony resolved to reorganise the Cæsarean party, which had been shattered by the Ides of March, and in continuation of Cæsar's policy, to propose a series of popular laws to pave the way for his measure concerning the Gallic provinces. These two attempts were the necessary consequence of that new policy upon which Antony had entered after April 15. To reassure and to flatter the colonists and the veterans and to show that in matters of importance senatorial decrees were inadequate, he proposed that the *senatus consultum* of March 17, concerning the acts of Cæsar and the maintenance of his colonies, should be passed into two laws by the comitia; at the same time with the object of refuting those conservatives who accused him of a desire to make himself dictator, he proposed to pass into law the *senatus consultum* of April which abolished the dictatorship. On the other hand, Lucius Antonius proposed to follow the example of every leader of the popular party since Tiberius Gracchus, and to pass a comprehensive land law. Unfortunately our knowledge of its provisions is derived only from the scanty details given by Cicero and from his invectives; thus it is impossible to restore the text of the law and we must confine ourselves to stating that in order to accelerate the distribution of land to the veterans, the law provided for the draining of the Pontine

June,  
44 B.C.

Marshes, a project which Cæsar had already entertained,\* while it proposed a commission of seven,† which was to divide the public lands and to purchase private property in Italy.‡

Antony's  
reorganisation.

These bills were promulgated by Antony and his brother during the first half of the month of June. Antony, however, was not equal to the great efforts which their execution demanded, or to the task of governing the republic with a strong hand. His only supporters were his two brothers and the veterans, whereas he needed more powerful helpers and a larger body of officials; to supplement this deficiency he saw that his only resource was to reorganise, not the whole of Cæsar's party, but its left wing, which contained the popular and revolutionary elements. Antony could no longer count upon the famous Cæsareans, such as Hirtius, Pansa, Balbus, Piso, Sallust, and Calenus, who were now satisfied with their gains and unwilling to compromise themselves or to run any risks. Nor, again, could he hope to find supporters in the upper classes, which had produced so many leaders and champions of the popular party towards the year 70, after the death of Sulla. Times had changed; the upper classes were worn out by the great struggles of former agitations; they were decimated by the great civil wars and were themselves sterile; wealth, pleasure, and power had enervated them; disorganised, proud, and malevolent, they no longer possessed any power of self-defence; they provided no recruits for the conservative party, and left Cæsar's last contemporaries to wage this supreme contest alone. Even the sons of the great conservative leaders during the preceding generation, of Hortensius, of Lucullus, and of Cato, now stood aside and devoted themselves to their pleasures, their games, or their studies, while the destruction which menaced their order steadily approached. These classes were even less able to provide recruits for the popular party, which had become entirely revolutionary. Hence, Antony was forced to turn to the less wealthy and more

\* Dion, xlv. 9.

† Cic., *Phil.* VI. v. 14; VIII. ix. 26.

‡ This is proved by Cic. *Phil.* VIII. ix. 26.

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discontented elements in Cæsar's party, to the men of no account, the artisans, the small landowners, and merchants, the soldiers and centurions, the Italians and foreigners, from whom Cæsar had latterly preferred to draw his officers, magistrates, and senators. These men were naturally opposed to the conspirators, who were almost entirely of noble birth, and regarded them as intruders and usurpers of positions which rightfully belonged to themselves; they feared to see themselves deprived of the possessions or the property which they had acquired, or at any rate to see the overthrow of their hopes and ambitions. Thus, it was easier to secure an understanding with this section, and if any difficulties yet remained, Antony was in possession of two powerful levers, Cæsar's papers and the State treasury, on which he continued to draw heavily.

Thus by flattery, by promotion, by means of forged documents attributed to Cæsar, and by distributions of money, magistracies, and senatorial seats, he strove to gather round him the more intelligent of those Cæsareans who were still too discontented to join the conservative party. Such were Ventidius Bassus, a former muleteer and transport contractor, Decidius Saxa, a Spaniard to whom Cæsar had given the citizenship, a *metator castrorum* (the chief of the Sappers in those days), and a tribune of the people in that year; \* Tullus Hostilius, and a certain Insteius, both of whom were tribunes elect for the following year; the latter was said to have been an attendant in some baths at Pesaro; † a retired actor named Nucula; Cesennius Lento, an officer of Cæsar who had distinguished himself in the last Spanish War, but was of humble origin; Cicero asserts that he had been a mime; ‡ Cassius Barba, Marcus Barbatius Philippus, § Lucius Marcius Censorinus, || Titus Munatius Plancus Bursa. The last named had been exiled after the funeral of Clodius, had returned during the civil wars, and was much afraid that he might be driven out

 The new  
Cæsarean  
party.

\* Cic. *Phil.* XI. v. 12; XIII. xiii. 27.

† Cic. *Phil.* XIII. xiii. 26.

‡ Cic. *Phil.* XI. vi. 13; Dion, xliii. 40; Orosius, VI. xvi. 9.

§ Cic. *Phil.* XIII. ii. 3.

|| Cic. *Phil.* XI. v. 11.

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once more.\* To these men Antony added a considerable number of his friends and boon companions ; he was a Sybarite by nature, and at this very moment, in the intervals of business, if we are to believe Cicero's story, which may be somewhat exaggerated, he was spending Cæsar's money and the public funds in leading a life of pleasure and gambling, festivals and banquets, and keeping a court of parasites† in which some of his coadjutors were to be found ; among others, Seius Mustela and Numisius Tiro, who divided with Cassius Barba the command of his little guard of veterans.‡ There too was a certain Petissius of Urbinum who had squandered all his property,§ Publius Voluminius Eutrapelus, the patron of Citheris, who had been Antony's mistress before his marriage with Fulvia and who was then one of the most fashionable courtesans ; and an Athenian, Lysias, the son of Phædrus.||

Further  
agitation.

However, the promulgation of these laws had started a fresh popular agitation, which absorbed in its course the remnants of the movement begun by Herophilus. The veterans and the mob who had formerly threatened to besiege the houses of the conspirators, now crowded the meetings in which the land law was discussed. These meetings were entirely devoted to the praise of Cæsar and to the abuse of his murderers, and soon became extremely violent in character ; once more the richer classes, the conservatives, and the conspirators took alarm, and their panic increased as they began to understand the import of the land law, of the other legal measures and of the new popular agitation. The new movement was not merely an attempt to annul the amnesty, but also to lay violent hands upon the State revenues and to secure their possession to the Cæsarean party. The situation was serious. For three months the conservatives had secretly nourished hopes of using the sums accumulated by Cæsar in the public treasury to indemnify those families who had lost property in the civil war and

\* Cic. *Phil.* XIII. xii. 27.

† Cic. *Phil.* XIII. ii. 3.

‡ Cic. *Phil.* V. vi. 18.

§ Cic. *Phil.* XII. viii. 19.

|| Cic. *Phil.* V. v. 13.



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44 B.C.

whose estates could no longer be returned to them.\* On the other hand the Cæsarean party, which claimed to champion the cause of the poor, not only retained possession of this property and plundered the public treasury through the consul, but when the land law had been passed, would be in legal possession of the treasure at a moment when the financial embarrassment of the conservatives was increasing every day. By a strange reversal of fortune, the wealthy party would thus be in want of money at the decisive moment of the struggle, if the State chest should fall into the power of their adversaries. The resources of private individuals were almost exhausted, and numerous conservatives fled from Rome to the country not only under stress of fear, but because the friendship of the conspirators threatened ruin to all who had not the wealth of Atticus; not only Brutus and Cassius, but many of the conspirators demanded contributions from their friends and admirers for the defence of the good cause. Public resources were also running low. The friends of Decimus Brutus informed him of Antony's intrigues, and urged him to increase his army and to collect money in Cisalpine Gaul; † yet he was henceforward obliged to draw upon his own fortune for his soldiers' pay, and to ask help from all his friends.‡ It would have been dangerous to levy contributions from Cisalpine Gaul, as that country was no longer a province.

Thus the upper classes were utterly dispirited and discouraged. Society rumours at Rome asserted that the cause of the republic was lost.§ Pansa and Hirtius again began to equivocate when they saw the Cæsarean party once more forming about Antony; Cicero, wearied and disgusted by the situation,|| definitely resolved to start for Greece, and requested Dolabella to give him a commission, *pro forma*; ¶ Atticus abandoned all hope of recovering his lands at Buthrotum. At a time when the popular party was promising to found so many colonies, how was it possible to deprive it of territory which it had already seized? \*\* It was already known that Lucius Antonius

 Cicero's state  
of mind.

 \* See Cic. *Phil.* I. vii. 17.

† Appian, B. C. iii. 27.

§ Cic. A. XV. xx. 2.

¶ Cic. A. XV. xiv. 2.

‡ See Cic. F. XI. x. 5.

|| Cic. A. XV. xxii.

\*\* See Cic. A. XV. xix. 1.

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was opposed to his demands.\* “We are upon the verge of a massacre,” wrote Cicero.† The rumour then spread that Carteia, an important Spanish town near the straits of Gibraltar, had yielded to Sextus Pompeius. Pompey’s son had thus a harbour at his command; he would certainly embark his army without delay and sail to Italy to begin the war. This news, however, instead of reviving the courage of the party, inspired a general fear that Antony would precipitate events. Cicero, therefore, prepared to accelerate his departure;‡ rumour asserted that Brutus himself was about to start for Asia to fulfil his mission for the purchase of corn.§ Other conspirators also, such as Domitius Ahenobarbus, the son of the consul who had been killed at Pharsalia, held ships in readiness off Puteoli, that they might be ready to leave Italy as they had left Rome, if the amnesty were repealed.|| Cicero asked Atticus if he should embark at Puteoli or at Brundisium; Atticus, who seems to have been deeply irritated with Antony on account of his lands at Buthrotum, urged him not to go to Brundisium; the consul had stationed the Fifth Legion, known as “the Lark,” on the Appian Way; these troops were on the way to Macedonia,¶ and the roads did not seem safe with so many bands of fierce veterans wandering about.\*\* However, the days went by; the *trinum nundinum* was drawing to a close; the conservatives wrung their hands, but would not act.

The  
conservatives  
incite  
Octavianus  
against  
Antony.

The general gloom was relieved by one feeble ray of hope. Some members of the party began to wonder whether they could not bring discord among the Cæsareans by inciting Octavianus against Antony. Octavianus had continued his campaign against Antony, making speeches everywhere, and attempting to show the people that Antony was not to be trusted by reason of his inconsistent behaviour during the

\* Cic., A. XV. xv. 1; XV. xvii. 1.

† Cic. A. XV. xviii. 2; XV. xix. 1; XV. xx. 4.

‡ Cic. XV. xx. 3.

§ Cic. XV. xx. 3. *Brutus quidem subito* (“will depart” understood).

|| Cic. A. XVI. iv. 4.

¶ This is a conjecture by Domaszewski, *Neue Heidelberger Jahrb.* iv. p. 176, which seems to me justified, as otherwise the presence of this legion during the war of 43 is inexplicable.

\*\* Cic. A. XV. xx. 3; A. XV. xxi. 3; F. XVI. xxiii. 2.

June,  
44 B.C.

recent months; he reproached him with secretly favouring the conservatives and the murderers of Cæsar at the very time when he dared to claim the leadership of the Cæsarean party. However, Octavianus was related to the noblest families in Rome and, after spending the day time as a demagogue, he would return to his aristocratic society in the evening, and meet the friends of his family, who were all friends of the conspirators. These friends made remarkable proposals; Antony was indeed a dangerous adventurer, and his overthrow would be to the general advantage; if Octavius would show some confidence in the conservatives and conspirators, he would find them trusty and loyal helpers against the common enemy. Of these advisers the most zealous seems to have been Caius Claudius Marcellus, the irreconcilable aristocrat, who had provoked the civil war in the year 50 when he was consul, and who was, or would be, the brother-in-law of Octavianus by marriage with his sister Octavia.\* Marcellus believed that the young man was ready to lend a willing ear to his advice.† Antony was annoyed by these intrigues, but none the less the legal interval for the promulgation of the laws had elapsed, and the land bill and the other measures were approved during the second half of June, probably in the course of several days; there was no opposition, and therefore no violence. The commission of seven was also appointed; Marcus Antonius, Lucius Antonius, Caius Antonius and Dolabella formed the majority, their colleagues being Nucula, Cesennius Lento, and a seventh whose name is unknown;‡ thus this powerful weapon of gain and government was entirely in the hands of Antony and his family.

\* I infer this from the fact that their son Marcellus was born in 43; on December 20, when Cicero delivered the third Philippic, the marriage had already taken place. See *Phil.* III. vi. 17.

† See Cic. A. XV. xii. 2. I follow the reading *Si præcipit nostro et nostris*; that is, *si præcipit deditum esse nostro Bruto, nostris heroibus*. This reading, however, is not certain. These allusions to the advice given by Marcellus and others to Octavianus are important, because they show the origin of the intrigue which induced Octavianus to join the conservative party at the end of June. See Nic. Dam. xxviii.

‡ Lange, *Römische Alterthümer*, Berlin 1871, iii. 493; Drumann, G. R. I<sup>2</sup>, 82 ff.

June,  
44 B.C.  
Cicero's  
hesitation.

By the passing of these laws Antony had secured a great advantage over Octavianus and the party of the conspirators, which now fell into complete confusion. It was generally believed that Antony was master of the situation after the passing of the laws, that Octavianus could only be regarded as a harmless agitator, and that every one must make the best of the situation. Cicero had received his mission from Dolabella and could now start, but hesitation and scruples held him back.\* He would have liked to go, but he was detained by anxiety for his reputation, by the fear of missing some such magnificent opportunity as Catiline's conspiracy had offered, and by some remorse and shame. His departure might be regarded as flight. He began to ask advice of different people, to examine the situation carefully, and to consider if he might not go away with the intention of returning on January 1, when Antony would be no longer consul and the Senate could deliberate in freedom.† He was also detained by his private affairs,‡ which were greatly involved. A short time previously he had sent his faithful Tiro to try and disentangle the accounts of Eros; § he asked Atticus to help him out of his difficulties, although he did not dare to request any further pecuniary loan. Atticus was a wealthy man, but there were a large number of calls upon him. He was obliged to provide most of the expenditure for the Ludi Apollinares of Brutus.|| It is true that this boundless expenditure and generosity was about to receive a brilliant reward at that moment; the senatorial commission entrusted with the task of examining Cæsar's papers, declared towards the end of June, when Atticus had given up all hope, that his claims were well founded and Cnaeus Plancus was ordered to respect the territory of Buthrotum.¶ Atticus owed this agreeable surprise to the intervention of Mark Antony, whom he had abused so violently in his letters

\* Cic. A. XV. xxv.

† *Ibid.*

‡ Cic. A. XV. xx. 4.

§ Cic. A. XV. xv. 3; XV. xviii. 1; XV. xx. 4.

|| Cic. A. XV. xviii. 2.

¶ Cic. A. XVI. xvi. c. 11; A. XV. 14. This letter, as shown by Gruber, Q.C., p. 31, is out of place and was written on June 26 or 27. It enables us to determine the date of the resolution.

since the beginning of the month. Lucius, a rasher and more truculent character, had proposed to divide among the poor the large estates which the rich knight held in Epirus ; Marcus, however, was more prudent ; he successfully continued his task of reuniting the former Cæsareans and of gathering friends by concessions and promises ; he also strove to reassure the conservatives, lest the more energetic members of the party should attempt some sudden blow with the help of Decimus.

The upper classes displayed great satisfaction at the consul's consideration for Atticus ; moreover, after the passing of the laws the tension had been relaxed. The massacre and the other outrages which the conspirators had predicted had not occurred. Rome had become more peaceful ; July was approaching, the month of festivity when the Ludi Apollinares were to be celebrated and followed by the games in honour of Cæsar's victory. The spirit of peace seemed to descend upon the forum. Though in the middle of the month it was believed that Sextus Pompeius would attack Italy, it was stated towards the end of the month that he wished to lay down his arms, somewhat to the disgust of Cicero, who would have wished Sextus to keep his army for the use of the conservative party.\* Many people also began to hope that the land law was merely a bait to attract the people and that Antony would not push it to extremes. In short, the pacification spread apace, and Cassius was the only member who remained uneasy. More energetic and intelligent than Brutus, who was exhausted and enervated by inaction and mental strain, he not only procured ships to buy grain from Sicily, but patiently wove the most extensive combinations and tormented his friend with them in secret. He asserted that they should immediately take in hand the work of preparing refuges and armies in the provinces to meet the attack which Antony would make upon them at the head of the popular party, an attack which might be immediate, and was certainly inevitable. In Italy the state of affairs was hopeless, and there was no chance of recovering power with the help of the consuls appointed for the following year. On the other hand,

June,  
44 B.C.

The prospects  
of the  
conservatives.

\* Cic. A. XV. xxix. 1;



June,  
44 B.C.

Decimus Brutus was in Cisalpine Gaul ; though he was short of money, he was at any rate a faithful friend ; he had recruited the Third Legion and was preparing an expedition to certain valleys in the Alps to practise his troops and collect booty. It was also possible to count upon Plancus.\* In the East, their friends were yet more numerous and an understanding with them would be easy. Trebonius was governor of Asia, where he was gathering money ; Tullius Cimber was in command of the legions of Bithynia and was collecting a fleet. Four legions were stationed in Egypt and contained numbers of Pompey's old soldiers who had taken practically no part in the civil wars. In Syria his own reputation was by no means small, and Cæcilius Bassus was still in possession of a legion at Apamea, where he was secure from attack. If secret negotiations were begun and their friends in the east realised the danger which menaced their party, they would soon find an army to resist the popular revolution. Brutus, however, hesitated, deterred by the difficulty of sending trusty messengers ; he also told himself that if Antony happened to learn or even to suspect the progress of these intrigues, he might precipitate events ; in short, he had no hope that the conservative party could gather an army to defend the cause of Cæsar's murderers. The soldiers were too deeply inspired by Cæsar's spirit. This was a pessimistic impression, which was, however, general throughout the aristocratic party.†

\* See Cic. F. XI. iv. 1 ; A. XV. xxix. 1 ; *de Planco et Decimo, sane velim* possibly alludes to secret negotiations with Decimus Brutus and Plancus.

† With the exception of the few allusions already quoted from Cicero's letters, there is no evidence of the negotiations or discussions which preceded the departure of Cassius for Syria. At the same time, as will be seen in the course of the narrative, it is obvious that Cassius started for Syria with a well-defined plan for seizing the province. Hence it is likely that during this period Cassius and the more energetic members of the conspirators' party attempted to open negotiations with such governors as they might suppose favourable to their cause ; only on this supposition can the departure of Cassius be regarded as anything but a sudden and extravagant whim.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE "LEX DE PERMUTATIONE"

Cicero prepares to start for Greece—The Ludi Apollinares—War of intrigue between Antony and Octavianus—Cæsar's comet—The promulgation of the "lex de permutatione"—Cicero interrupts his journey—The reconciliation of Octavianus and Antony—The "lex de permutatione" is approved—Cicero returns to Rome.

CICERO had finished his book on "Glory" and had nearly completed his treatise on "Old Age," but had been informed by Atticus that to balance his accounts he would be obliged to borrow two hundred thousand sesterces for five months, that is, until November 1. On that date his brother Quintus was to pay him an equivalent amount.\* Atticus was ready to undertake the task of finding some one to lend the money, and Cicero was therefore free to start when he pleased. He returned to Puteoli towards the end of July, making the journey in short stages, and stopping at Anagnia,† at Arpinum,‡ and at Formiæ.§ He proposed to make Puteoli his starting-point for the east, but he was still in great indecision. Unable to decide upon his course of action, he asked advice from everybody, and was not even sure whether he should embark at Puteoli, or go to Brundisium by land. For a moment he had thought of making the voyage with Brutus, who like Cassius, proposed to start in a short time upon his mission for the purchase of corn; Brutus had established himself in the little

Cicero's  
preparations  
for departure.

\* Cic. A. XV. xx. 4.

† Cic. A. XV. xxvi. 1. *Tabellarius . . . in Anagninum ad me venit in ea nocte quæ proxima ante Kal. fuit.* On the difficulties of this passage see Ruete, *Correspondenz Ciceros*, p. 27.

‡ Cic. A. XV. xxvi. 5; *ex Arpinate.*

§ Cic. A. XV. xxix. 3.

July,  
44 B.C.

Cicero's  
indecision.

island of Nisida in the Bay of Naples, and lived in the villa of Lucullus, where he hired as many ships as the merchants of Puteoli and of Naples could provide.

Various rumours, however, came into circulation, and disturbed the peace which had followed the passing of Antony's laws. The report that Sextus Pompeius was inclined to make peace was confirmed, whereupon Cicero considered that the last hope of freedom was gone.\* On the other hand, disquieting rumours concerning Antony's intentions arose from time to time; it was even asserted that he was anxious to bring the Macedonian legions to Italy, and to disembark them at Brundisium; † there the Senate had placed them under his *imperium* in the month of March. Cicero regarded this possibility as very remote.‡ But his confidence was by no means complete, and he feared that a journey to Brundisium might bring him face to face with these legions. It was therefore, advisable to go by sea. There was, however, a further danger to be faced, as the coasts were said to be infested by pirates.§ Cicero told himself that if he sailed with Brutus and his little fleet he would be more secure; on July 8, therefore, he went over to Nisida, and was delighted to see in the roadstead of the beautiful little island the numerous vessels of Brutus, Cassius, Domitius Ahenobarbus and of other conservatives and conspirators who were in readiness to depart if the amnesty should be annulled. He tried to make Brutus understand his desire to accompany him. Brutus either did not or would not understand, and was indeed in greater uncertainty than Cicero himself. He was anxious to yield to the exhortations of Cassius, but he was also anxious for peace; he wished to make a start, but before he could resolve to weigh anchor he wanted to know the state of feeling in Rome on the occasion of the games, hoping that these festivities would produce a change in public opinion and that he might then be able to stay. At that moment the first accounts arrived of the performance of a Greek comedy, at which the spectators

\* Cic. A. XV. xxix. 1; XVI. 1. 4.

† Cic. A. XVI. iv. 4.

‡ Cic. A. XVI. iv. 4 *videtur . . . dicuntur.*

§ Cic. A. XVI. iv. 4; XVI. ii. 4.

were by no means numerous ; Cicero, however, explained the fact on the ground that such performances did not attract the Roman people, and that only at Latin comedies or at wild beast shows were there likely to be any public manifestations. Scribonius Libo then arrived with the first authentic letters from Sextus Pompeius, which a freedman had just brought from Spain ; Sextus declared that he was ready to lay down arms if his father's property were restored to him, and if the other leaders of the party would also resign their commands. It became obvious that he was more disposed to peace than war.\*

As Cicero was unable to make any arrangements with Brutus, he returned to Puteoli, where he remained during the 9th and 10th ; he still cherished the idea of accompanying Brutus, even if the latter did not start immediately ; † on the 10th he received a letter from Atticus saying that his voyage met with general approval at Rome, provided that he would return on January 1 ; ‡ the same day he revisited Nisida. There he found every one in delight at the news from Rome. The Tereus of Accius had attracted a very numerous audience, and the performance had been most successful. Cicero was also delighted, though he was of the opinion that the people could defend the republic better by taking up arms than by applauding actors ; § on his return to Puteoli he was again seized with a fit of impatience and wished to start immediately by way of Brundisium without waiting for Brutus. At that moment

July,  
44 B.C.

Cicero's  
movements.

\* Cicero, A. XVI. v. and XVI. iv. (these letters must be read in their entirety). In the early letters of the sixteenth book of letters to Atticus the arrangement is somewhat faulty. No. 5 was written before No. 4 ; in fact, in both of them Cicero's visit to Brutus on July 8 is discussed, but in the opening of No. 4 (*ita ut heri tibi narravi*) there is an allusion to No. 5. No. 4 was written on July 10 ; *hodie ; Quintus enim* (who left Nisida on July 8, Cic. A. XVI. v. 2) *altero die se aiebat*. Hence No. 5 belongs to July 9. Nos. 5 and 4 were therefore written after No. 1, but before Nos. 2 and 3, as No. 2 refers to the second visit to Brutus on July 10 : see § 1. VI. *Idus duas pistolas accepi . . . . § 3 : Fui enim apud illum (i.e., Brutus) multas horas in Neside, quum paulo ante tuas litteras accepissem*. A. XVI. 6 was written *conscendens e Pompeiano*, that is, a few days later. Hence the order is 1, 5, 4, 2, 3.

† Cic. A. XVI. iv. 4.

‡ Cic. A. XVI. ii. 4 ; XVI. vi. 2.

§ Cic. A. XVI. ii. 3.

July,  
44 B.C.

the legions seemed to him less formidable than the pirates.\* On July 11 he wrote to Atticus entrusting him with the general supervision of his property, begging him to make good his promises to all his creditors, and authorising him to contract loans, and even to sell property when necessary, for the payment of all claims.† Atticus was, indeed, an excellent friend, and even at that moment he was thinking of publishing a collection of the great orator's letters and had asked of him all the letters which he possessed.‡

Position of  
Antony and  
Octavianus.

Cicero started for Pompeii. Meanwhile the Ludi Apollinares had been concluded at Rome. The conservative party asserted that they had been highly successful, whereas the friends of Antony and the opponents of the conspirators declared that the public had shown no enthusiasm.§ Thus it seems that the destinies of the republic were thought to turn upon the success of an actor! On this occasion, however, the friends of Brutus were certainly right, because the Roman audiences would recognise no party at the theatre or the circus, and applauded any performance which pleased them. Octavianus threw the more energy into the preparations for the games in honour of Cæsar's victory, and attempted to arrange a great demonstration in favour of Cæsar's son which would rouse Antony to fury. The latter, however, was by no means inactive; he worked indefatigably to reorganise Cæsar's former party before presenting the law concerning the Gallic provinces. He granted favours, scattered money with a lavish hand, and continually produced supposed decisions from Cæsar's papers. He added to the Senate individuals popularly known as Charon's senators; these were obscure individuals, creatures of his own, and centurions of Cæsar's army whose nominations he declared had been found among the dictator's papers.|| By this means he had gathered round him all the capable members of the Cæsarean party who were of low birth; he had, moreover, attached to himself certain Cæsareans of higher rank and even a few conservatives, such as Lucius

\* Cic. A. XVI. ii. 4. † Cic. A. XVI. ii. 2. ‡ Cic. A. XVI. v. 5.

§ The first version is given by Plutarch, *Brut.* 21, and Cicero, *Phil.* I. xv. 36; the second by Appian, B.C. iii. 24.

|| Plutarch, *Ant.* 15.



July,  
44 B.C.

Tremellius, who, as tribune of the people, had vigorously opposed Dolabella's revolution in 47. Times were hard and Tremellius, like many others, was embarrassed by pecuniary anxieties; he had, however, decided to join Antony as had also the former ædile, Lucius Varius Cotila.\* Antony was also attempting to corrupt Cicero's nephew,† and, apparently, Cæsar's father-in-law, Piso himself;‡ it was possibly at that time that he opened negotiations with Lepidus for the engagement of one of his daughters to one of Lepidus' sons, neither of the parties being yet of age;§ in short, he made every possible effort to remain on good terms with the conservatives. His decision concerning the question of Buthrotum had so entirely secured the favour of Atticus that the rich financier had made a special journey to Tibur to thank him.|| Meanwhile, Lucius Antonius was busy putting the land law into operation; he had the public lands surveyed, and attempted to buy private estates at prices which varied with the ownership of the land by friends or by enemies. He soon had so many flatterers about his person that some one eventually proposed to arrange for the thirty-five tribes to erect an equestrian monument to him in the forum.¶ Supported as he was by so many different interests, Antony's power seemed impregnable, and the efforts of Octavianus seemed doomed to failure. He, however, enjoyed great popularity with the veterans and the mob, even with the friends of the consul, and with the whole of the popular party as reconstructed by Antony. Cæsarean fanaticism had grown so violent that the very name of Cæsar would have been enough to secure his popularity, apart from the dexterity of his efforts to gain sympathy on every side. Thus the Cæsarean party were inclined to regret the differences which had arisen between

\* Cic. *Phil.* VI. iv. 11.

† Cp. Cic. A. XV. xxi. 1 (though the passage is not clear).

‡ Cp. Cic. A. XV. xxvi. 1.

§ Dion, xlv. 53. He, however, confuses the dates by bringing together the offer of the pontificate and this marriage. Cicero F. XII. i. 2 (the letter is written in the last ten days of September) says, with obvious allusion to Lepidus, that *affinitate nova delectatur*; as Lepidus was in Gallia Narbonensis, negotiations concerning this marriage must have been begun about this time.

|| Cic. A. XVI. iii. 1.

¶ Cp. Cic. *Phil.* VI. v. 12.

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44 B.C.

the consul and Octavianus. It was even said that Antony had shown excessive severity. Was it possible that the Cæsarean party could refuse office to Cæsar's son, seeing that his presence would be a considerable source of strength to themselves? \*

Cicero's  
departure.

However, the political tranquillity remained unbroken and when Cicero left his villa at Pompeii on July 17 † to begin his journey at last, he was able to calm his conscience and to persuade himself that he was not taking flight. At that moment all was peaceful, and he proposed to return on January 1, at which time disturbances would probably begin. ‡ His plans, however, had undergone a further change in the course of his journey; he resolved to go not by land but by sea with three little ten-oared vessels which he had hired at Pompeii; § on his arrival at Rhegium he would attempt to secure a passage upon some large merchantman and sail directly to Patrae or follow the coast with his little ships as far as Leucopetra of the Tarentines; || then he would make straight for Corcyra; ¶ at the same time he was not entirely content and could not make up his mind upon the advisability of his action, while he was still harassed by many financial anxieties. His accounts had been balanced, thanks to the help which Atticus had given before his departure, but the money owed him by Dolabella on account of Tullia's dowry was still outstanding, and the prospects of payment were by no means certain, as Dolabella had given him a note of hand in lieu of ready money. He was so afraid that upon his departure the delicate balance of parties might be disturbed that he had been anxious to entrust the entire administration of his affairs to Atticus; he had also commissioned the rich financier, Balbus, to watch over the honour of his name. \*\* In any case, for good or for evil he began his journey, and

\* Nic. Dam. 29.

† Cic. A. XVI. vi. 1 says that he was at Vibona on July 24, the eighth day after his departure; he therefore started on the 17th.

‡ Cic. A. XVI. iii. 4; XVI. vi. 2.

§ Cic. A. XVI. iii. 6.

|| Cic. A. XVI. vi. 1 thus gives the name, but he certainly meant Cape Leuca, and not Leucopetra, near Rhegium, of which he speaks in the following letter.

¶ Cic. A. XVI. vi. 1.

\*\* Cic. A. XVI. ii. 2; XVI. iii. 5.

July,  
44 B.C.

shortly afterwards, during the last ten days of July, the games in honour of Cæsar's victory were celebrated at Rome. This event had been preceded by a sharp dispute between Antony and Octavianus. The latter had been anxious to bring Cæsar's golden chair to the theatre, and certain tribunes in Antony's pay had opposed this design. Antony had applied to the consul who not only supported the tribunes but threatened to imprison Octavianus if he attempted any disturbance.\* None the less the people and the veterans, who regretted these scandals, made great demonstrations in favour of the young man during the three or four days that the games continued.† On the evening of the last day a great comet was seen in the sky, and Octavianus, to stimulate the religious adoration in which the name of Cæsar was held at Rome, asserted that the comet was the soul of Cæsar, which had risen to the sky and taken its place among the gods. In the temple of Venus he placed a statue of Cæsar, the head of which was decorated with a golden comet.‡

But on the conclusion of the games, the tranquillity which apparently prevailed at Rome was rudely broken before the end of the month. Antony and Dolabella suddenly promulgated a *lex de permutatione provinciarum* § depriving Decimus Brutus, Cæsar's murderer, of Cisalpine Gaul, which province was immediately transferred to Antony with the legions in Macedonia; he was also to hold Gallia Comata || from the outset of the following year. In return, Decimus received Macedonia for the rest of the year. As Cicero had gone and Decimus was marching with his army towards the Alps, Antony had chosen this moment to secure the Gallic provinces until the year 39, and to reply at the same time to the accusations of Octavianus by satisfying the veterans who were indignant with the amnesty of March 17. Antony, however, was not

The *lex de permutatione provinciarum*.

\* Dion, xlv. 6; Appian B.C. iii. 28; Nic. Dam. 28; Plut. *Ant.* 16.

† Nic. Dam. 28. Cp. Schmidt, *Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie und Pädagogik*, 1883, i. p. 864.

‡ Dion, xlv. 7; Suet. *Cæs.* 88.

§ Livy, Per. cxvii.

|| Not merely Cisalpine Gaul, as Krause thinks: see Schmidt, N.J.P.P. uppl. vol. xiii. p. 714.

July,  
44 B.C.

anxious to provoke a further civil war, and while he yielded to the force of the Cæsarean and revolutionary movement, he strove to spare his adversaries as far as possible. He did not now propose to annul the amnesty, but simply to deprive Decimus of his command for the few remaining months of his term of office. While intending to represent this action to the veterans as a great humiliation for the conspirators, he also hoped that the conservatives would accept the change, as Decimus was to have Macedonia by way of compensation; he seems also to have entertained some hope that he might secure a secret understanding with his comrade of the Gallic War and induce Decimus to agree to the change.\* As a matter of fact, though this change of province was by no means favourable to the conservative party, it was much less serious than the repeal of the amnesty. Antony, however, was speedily undeceived; as soon as the law was known, a wild political and financial panic broke out at Rome. Once more alarm for the maintenance of the amnesty was general, and Antony was credited with the most sinister intentions. Civil war was thought inevitable and money could not be borrowed at any price; † a few of the leading members of the conservative party who were still at Rome awoke from their long inaction and attempted to combine both among themselves and with Brutus and Cassius. Certain leading Cæsareans then joined the conservative side, including Piso, Cæsar's father-in-law, who declared himself ready to support in the Senate a proposal which seemed likely to settle the question of Cisalpine Gaul for ever; as the right of citizenship had been granted to the inhabitants of that district, it was time to secure its complete amalgamation with Italy, when neither pro-consul nor pro-prætor would be there required. It was agreed that on August 1 a large number of senators should be present at the session to refuse *auctoritas* to the proposal if Antony demanded it, and if he did not, to beg the two or three tribunes opposed to Antony to use their veto.‡ During these prepara-

\* Such is apparently the meaning of Dion, xlv. 14: καὶ αὐτοῦ (Decimus) ὁ Ἀντωνίου ἐλπίδα πολλὴν εἶχεν . . .

† Cic. A. XVI. vii. 6, *mirifica enim dyschρηστία est propter metum armorum* . . .

‡ Appian, B.C. iii. 30.

tions the public, who realised that the consul's audacity had been largely increased by Cicero's departure, displayed great dissatisfaction with the orator, and asked how he could have gone to see the Olympic games at so critical a moment. That this was the object of his journey was generally believed throughout Rome, and every one began to wonder whether the former consul had lost his reason. Atticus wrote to him in a panic, urging him to return, and sent the letter with the utmost speed to Leucopetra, hoping that it would reach him in time.\*

August,  
44 B.C.

Cicero's  
return.

Cicero, however, who knew nothing of all this, was coasting along the shores of Southern Italy, and spending his time on board in writing books in the intervals of constant self-examination. He wondered whether he had been wise in departing, he was torn with regrets and doubts, ashamed to turn back, and yet afraid that evil might result if he went on. Thus he reached Syracuse on August 1 and Leucopetra on August 6, but hardly had he left this latter town when a violent gale obliged him to disembark almost at once at the villa of Publius Valerius, one of his friends, and to wait there for a change of wind. It was soon known throughout the neighbourhood and even in Rhegium that Cicero was in this villa, and numerous citizens of the upper middle classes, whose sympathy with the conspirators was real, if not practical, came to call upon him. They had left Rome on July 29, or 30, and related events since his departure, the promulgation of the law, the panic, public opinion as affecting himself and an improvement in the situation which had since become manifest. Antony seems to have been alarmed for the moment by the agitation of the conservative party, the extent of which he could not foresee, and also by the intervention of Piso. He had, indeed, delivered a most conciliatory speech, had hinted that he would give Brutus and Cassius more important provinces in place of their mission for the purchase of corn, and that he would try to arrange a compromise upon the question of the Gallic provinces. Brutus and Cassius had then published a manifesto declaring that they were ready to resign their offices and go

\* Cic. A. XVI. vii. 2.



August,  
44 B.C.

into exile, if such action would conduce to the public peace; this was intended as a refutation of those Cæsareans who supported the law while accusing the conspirators of fomenting a fresh civil war.\* Thereupon the general hopes began to rise, and these were communicated to Cicero by the inhabitants of Rhégium, who had returned from Rome. Antony was ill-advised, but he was careful; hence it was probable that peace would be secured, and that Brutus and Cassius would return to Rome.† Cicero, however, had received the letters from Atticus,‡ and he immediately resolved to return.

The situation  
at Rome.

While he was travelling with this object in view, affairs at Rome began to run a very different course from that which he had expected. Antony's hesitation was but short-lived, for he had been impelled to action, not only by the continual incitement of Fulvia and Lucius,§ but by the enthusiasm of his veterans. The latter had interpreted the *lex de permutatione* in the light of their own desires and interests, without consideration for Antony's intentions. They told themselves that the pro-consulship of Gaul, as essential to the domination of Italy, was the best guarantee for the maintenance of the Cæsarean party; that if this province were taken from the conspirators and given to a Cæsarean, they could feel sure that their interests would be protected, while the task of avenging Cæsar would be an easy matter; Antony, the faithful friend of the dictator, would accomplish this vengeance and would re-establish the power of the conquerors of Pharsalia and Munda. This outburst of enthusiasm swept away the consul, the Senate, and every one else. On August 1, Piso delivered a vigorous speech against Antony in the Senate, and brought forward

\* The manifesto of Brutus and Cassius to which Cicero refers, *Phil.* I. iii. 8 and *A.* XVI. vii. 1, is probably that of which Velleius II. lxii. 3, gives a part, and the gist of which may be inferred by comparing this passage with Cicero *F.* XI. iii. Groebe, App. to Drumann, *G.R.*, I<sup>2</sup>, p. 430, supposes that in the manifesto they demanded the provinces which they should have had as prætors for the following year. This, however, seems unlikely, as the object of the manifesto was to force Antony to resign his claims to Gaul.

† *Cic. Phil.* I. iii. 8; *A.* XVI. vii. 1.

‡ *Cic. A.* XVI. vii. 2, *lectis vero tuis litteris*.

§ *Cic. Phil.* I. iii. 8, *malis suasoribus*, an obvious allusion to Fulvia and Lucius.

August,  
44 B.C.

his proposal for dealing with Cisalpine Gaul; the Senate, however, overawed by the veterans, received the speech coldly,\* and contented themselves with giving new provinces to Brutus and Cassius, which were no better than those they had had before. One of these was Crete and the other seems to have been Cyrene.† On his side, Antony found further equivocation impossible; in order to content the veterans he was obliged to declare open war upon the conspirators, and he replied to the generous proposals of Brutus and Cassius by a letter and a manifesto both of equal violence, in which he reproached them with wishing to desert their posts and to begin a civil war. On August 4, Brutus and Cassius replied with similar vehemence; they were not fomenting a civil war nor were they afraid of Antony; their action was inspired by patriotism.‡ But during the progress of this quarrel, the enthusiasm of Cæsar's veterans for the dictator increased with such rapidity as to involve Antony in further embarrassments. It became necessary to elect a tribune of the people in place of that Cinna who had been killed on the day of Cæsar's funeral; Octavianus, encouraged by the success of his games, had conceived the idea of offering himself as a candidate, although he was a patrician. Antony opposed this design, and eventually postponed the election to a later date.§ The veterans, however, continued to deplore the dissension between Antony and Octavianus; some of them in the delight which the *lex de permutatione* had inspired, asserted that it was time to stop these fatal quarrels and that the veterans should intervene in the interests of peace. Consequently one day during the first fortnight of August, Octavianus was informed that a band of soldiers were marching to his house. His servants and friends were terrified, and the doors were hastily closed; Octavianus mounted to the roof to observe the situation without being seen. The crowd, however, began to cheer; Octavianus was emboldened to show himself, and was received with loud applause. The soldiers

\* Cic. *Phil.* I. iv. 10; I. vi. 14; A. XVI. vii. 7.

† That these provinces were assigned at this session is a conjecture.

‡ Cic. *F.* xi. 3.

§ Suet. *Aug.* 10; Dion, xlv. 6; Appian, B.C. iii. 31. The date, however, is a conjecture.

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were anxious for a final reconciliation between him and Antony, and had come to look for him, while others had gone to fetch Antony.\*

Reconciliation  
between  
Octavianus  
and Antony.

Neither Octavianus nor Antony could venture to reject a reconciliation arranged in such a manner and by such well-wishers, the less so as the time for voting upon the *lex de permutatione* was close at hand. Peace was therefore made; Antony and Octavianus exchanged visits and compliments, Octavianus even declared himself ready to support the law, which was approved shortly afterwards in the second half of August. Such tribunes as were opposed to it were probably bought over,† while those who remained incorruptible were kept away by barricading the entrance to the forum and allowing none but friends to pass.‡ Cicero learnt of these events at Velia where he met Brutus, who was slowly moving along the coast of Italy with his fleet, having definitely decided to depart. Their conversation was melancholy in the extreme, for Brutus was utterly discouraged. When once the *lex de permutatione* was approved, Cæsar's friends would be masters of the republic and could deal with the amnesty

\* Dion, xlv. 8; Nic. Dam. 29; Plutarch, *Ant.* 16, speak of only one reconciliation between Antony and Octavianus; according to Appian iii. 30 and 39, there were, on the contrary, two reconciliations. Even if Appian is correct, the second reconciliation is of little importance, as can be seen from his own narrative. The important reconciliation was the first, and the date of this can be determined, for the narratives harmonise if it be admitted that the *lex de permutatione* was approved in the month of August. Dion puts it after the Ludi V.C.; Appian, iii. 30, shortly after the vote on the *lex de permutatione*; so also does Nicholas of Damascus, contrary to the idea of Schiller, *Geschichte der Römischen Kaiserzeit*, Gotha, 1883, i. 29, n. 5. Nicholas does not put this reconciliation before Antony's journey to Brundisium, but before the *exchange of provinces* (chap. xxx.); he refers to it only in a few words because in his biography of Augustus he gives nothing more than the outline of any such event as does not immediately concern his hero. Plutarch, *Ant.* 16, is evidently wrong in putting this reconciliation at the time when an agreement was concluded between Octavianus and Cicero. Thus the question of this date becomes a difficulty. The texts, however, harmonise with wonderful consistency if the *lex de permutatione* be placed in the month of August, which is a fresh argument in favour of this hypothesis.

† Appian, B.C. iii. 30.

‡ Livy, *Per.* 117: *quum . . . legem . . . per vim tulisset*. Cp. Cic. *Phil.* V. iv. 9.

as they pleased, while the only resource left to the conspirators and the conservatives was the supreme expedient of civil war ; but it was doubtful if the conservatives could find an army. Brutus did not share the optimism of Cassius ; the latter with confident audacity and in agreement as it seems, with Servilia, had shortly before the end of July sent secret messengers to Trebonius, to the officers of the Egyptian legions, and to Cæcilius Bassus, proposing that a great army should be prepared in the east for the defence of the conservative cause, and also informing them that he, at any rate, was ready to go to Syria. With the consent of Brutus, some complicity in this plot was given to Marcus Scaptius, an intriguer whom he had used to make his loans in Cyprus and who had many friends and relatives in the east. Brutus himself abandoned the struggle and having procured about 100,000 sesterces from Atticus for the expenses of his journey,\* was going into voluntary exile in Greece, thus sacrificing himself to the cause of peace. When, however, he found that Cicero was inclined to enter the fray once more, he made no attempt to dissuade him ; indeed, he congratulated him upon his intentions and explained the bad impression which his departure had caused ; he advised him to go to Rome without delay, and to lead the opposition against Antony.† However, Cicero's enthusiasm was beginning to cool, and he was once more beset by doubts. With what purpose could he go to Rome ? Could he make head against Antony ‡ in view of the present condition of the Senate ? After the law upon Gaul the question of the amnesty would come forward, and to oppose Antony and his veterans on this subject would be no easy matter. At this moment Hirtius, whose health had long been feeble, became so seriously ill as to cause fresh anxiety to the conservative party.§ If Hirtius were to die, Antony would certainly secure the appointment of a declared Cæsarean as consul for the year 43.

However, the laudations which Piso had received, the desire to efface the impression caused by his recent journey, and the exhortations of all who stated that he alone could save the

August,  
44 B.C.

Cicero reaches  
Rome.

\* Cornelius Nepos, *Att.* viii. 6.

† Cic. A. XVI. vii. 7.

‡ Cic. A. XVI. vii. 5 ff.

§ Cic. *Phil.* I. xv. 37.

August,  
44 B.C.

republic, largely determined Cicero's action; he was also anxious to be at Rome in view of the anxiety caused by his private affairs. The panic produced by the *lex de permutatione* had hopelessly confused the balance-sheet which Atticus had prepared with such care; Atticus had written to him a short time before stating that he could only pay his debts by calling in outstanding loans, as it was impossible to borrow money at any price; \* amid the uncertainties of the situation Cicero could hardly insist upon the repayment of the whole of his loans unless he met his debtors in person. Thus he conquered his remaining hesitations and reached Rome on August 31 where he was rapturously received by his friends and admirers.† Fortunately he found that Hirtius was out of danger upon his arrival.

\* Cic. A. XVI. vii. 6.

† Cic. *Phil.* V. vii. 19 says that on September 1 was held the session at which he was not present to hear Antony's threats against him. Plut. *Cic.* 43, says the session was held the day after his arrival. Hence he reached Rome on August 31.



## CHAPTER VII

### THE VETERANS TO THE HIGHEST BIDDER

The "lex judiciaria" and the "lex de vi et majestate"—The economic and moral crisis in Italy—Scandal during the senatorial session of September 1, 44—Fictitious attempts at assassination attributed to Octavianus—Antony starts for Brundisium—Octavianus starts for Campania—Antony and the Macedonian legions—Octavianus requests an interview with Cicero.

WHEN Cicero reached Rome, Antony had already promulgated two further laws, a *lex de tertia decuria*, and a *lex de vi et majestate*. He had ordered four of the Macedonian legions, the Second, the Fourth, the Thirty-fifth and the Martian legion, to cross the Adriatic. When these troops were added to the legion of the "Lark," he would have a considerable force at his disposal in Italy, if Decimus did not agree to recognise the laws on his return from the Alps. He had, however, made no proposal on the subject of the amnesty; in other words, he continued to flatter the people and the Cæsarean party without as yet attacking this question, which he regarded as extremely dangerous. Much as the conspirators feared that he might proceed to abolish the amnesty, he was himself no less afraid of any such action. By the first of these laws he conciliated the soldiers, as he thereby destroyed the aristocratic reform of the courts, which Cæsar had carried out in 46; the list of citizens from whom judges, or jurymen, as we say to-day, were drawn for the *quæstiones*, would no longer be limited to the senators and knights, in other words, to the upper classes, but would also include the centurions and lower military officers, whose names would be enrolled without any pecuniary qualification. The

The situation  
at Rome.

Sept.  
44 B.C.

second of these laws provided that every citizen condemned for *majestas* or *vis*, and all offences against the public peace fell under these two heads, should have the right of *provocatio* or appeal to the *comitia*, a right which Sulla and Cæsar had abolished.\* By this law Antony condemned the punishment of Herophilus and the massacre of 47, by making the rapid suppression of riots almost impossible. Finally, to provide a further harmless satisfaction for the people, though from a certain point of view it was a most audacious proposal, Antony intended to propose to the Senate on the following day, September 1, that in addition to the funeral honours which Cæsar's family would annually perform, public supplications should be added, such as were offered to the gods; this was tantamount to a proposal for Cæsar's deification.† This Oriental superstition, so hateful to the Romans, had made great progress within the last two months. The ignorant mob had begun by making simple offerings upon the altar erected by Herophilus; a month later, Octavianus had followed with his declamations upon the comet and the dictator's soul, while now at the end of another month, a proposal was made for the official inauguration of Cæsar's worship.

Antony's  
difficulties.

The popular party seemed once more to be victorious, and its triumph to be even more complete than that of 59. Antony, however, did not possess that energy with which his master Cæsar had pushed his triumph to the furthest point without leaving the enemy a moment's rest. Hitherto he had acted with great circumspection, hesitating, equivocating, and contradicting himself, but taking infinite precautions to secure his personal safety;‡ the least opposition caused him nervous anxiety; fatigue, excitement, and debauchery had made him more irritable than ever.§ Not only were the two leaders themselves different, but the situation also had changed since Cæsar's first consulship, and the change was not to Antony's advantage. At the time of Cæsar's first consulship the recollections of the civil war of Sulla and Marius had almost died away; Catiline's conspiracy, a danger in any case exaggerated,

\* Cic. *Phil.* I. viii. 19; I. ix. 21.

† Cic. *Phil.* I. vi. 13.

‡ Cic. *A.* XV. xx. 4; *iste qui umbras timet* (Antony).

§ Cic. *Phil.* I. xi. 27; *eum* (Antony) *iracundum audio esse factum*.

had been crushed ; the triumphs of Lucullus and of Pompey in the east were of recent occurrence ; the wealth of the nation was rapidly increasing, while its intellectual vitality was no less vigorous. Complaints were customary and habitual, but there was confidence in the future, and no apprehension of any great catastrophe ; such immediate difficulties as debt, administrative disorganisation, political corruption and instability were accepted with no undue misgivings. Thus the revolution accomplished by Cæsar had met with no opposition or was even greeted with admiration on the part of the middle classes, who were rapidly transforming the social life of Italy.

Sept.  
44 B.C.

Great was the difference at the present moment ; every class and every party had been bitterly deceived and grievously harassed ; rich and poor, conservative and democrat were alike weary, mistrustful, and exhausted ; the social and political life of Italy was utterly disorganised. The whole country was more than ever inspired with the conservative spirit, with the fear of a revolution, hatred of mob rule, and the love of social order ; at the same time, there was, correctly speaking, no conservative party. The upper classes were sunk in brutal selfishness, the spirit of which appears in a letter written at this time by Atticus to Cicero ; " If the republic is lost, at any rate save our property." \* Selfishness of this kind implied the risk of losing not only the republic, but also the property. Of the younger generation no individual was willing to take the risk of a struggle against the revolution ; the old champions, their numbers thinned and scattered, unequal to the task of defending the interests of the wealthy classes, could discover no recruits, and but few of the bolder and more energetic citizens thought of defending themselves. At the same time, paradoxical as it may seem, the projects advised by these individuals amid the general disorganisation of their party were rash even to the bounds of madness. Cassius was ready to start alone with a few ships for the conquest of the East, and at the same time, another, whose name is unknown, was supporting a yet more audacious and difficult plot, with the help of the less enlightened conservatives ; this plan was nothing less than

The  
conservative  
party.

\* Cic. A. XVI. iii. 1.

Sept.  
44 B.C.

to rouse a revolt of the legions in Macedonia against their general by any and every means; by accusing Antony of disloyalty to Cæsar and of lukewarmness in his cause, and by applying not only to the many officers of those legions who were friendly to the conservatives, but to Octavianus himself, who was to be used for the conversion of his friends, a yet more numerous body. The first attempts to embroil Octavianus with Antony had failed because the veterans had intervened, but neither Marcellus nor the other noble friends of the family had ceased their efforts to undermine the confidence of Octavianus and to persuade him that he could not trust Antony, the reconciliation notwithstanding, and that he should help them to sow sedition among the troops of the overbearing consul.

The popular  
party.

Though the action of the conservative party was confined to such disconnected intrigues, the popular party could boast no greater solidarity. It undoubtedly enjoyed the sympathies of the mob, who were constant in their admiration for Cæsar and their hatred of his murderers; it was also supported by a strong coalition of interests and by the veterans and colonists of Cæsar who were anxious either to keep what the dictator had given them or to receive what he had promised. The veterans eagerly demanded a further appeal to arms, and offered their leaders anything they desired in exchange, even to the empire of the world. But no one could be found to grasp the sword without hesitation. No one could forget the cowardice of the Ides of March, or Cæsar, the conqueror of Gaul, the founder of many colonies, dictator for life, stabbed by his friends and debtors openly in the Senate, before the eyes of other partisans, not one of whom dared to come to his help. No one could forget the appalling disorganisation which overtook the popular party on the death of its leader, or the speedy dissolution which, in a few months, had reduced a party of supreme power to a gang of desperadoes, bandits, and adventurers. No one could throw off the general depression which beset every thinking man. Nor did any one believe in the possibility of success as before; it seemed unlikely that the prevailing state of debt could be relieved without difficulty, or that the political and economic crisis by which Italy was

torn asunder could ever come to an end. In desperation, the country had recently sought a remedy for these evils ; the only consequence of the civil war had been to accentuate them. Values had been diminished, and many vast estates such as those of Pompey and Labienus had been confiscated and divided. Many of Cæsar's tribunes, centurions and soldiers had secured comfort or even wealth ; \* but if the multitude was not poorer than before, it was certainly less contented, while the middle classes found their burdens in no way lightened. For a time the powerful revolutionary dictatorship had crushed the former conflict of party ; a few dagger-thrusts had overthrown it one morning and the last state of the Roman world was worse than the former. The governmental power was not even in the hands of one of the old factions, but was wielded at one time by Herophilus, at another by Fulvia. Amid such uncertainties, it was impossible for Antony to cherish illusions. True, monuments were erected to his brother Lucius not only by the tribes but by the joint efforts of the knights and usurers ; his wife Fulvia was able in these critical periods to buy vast estates which obliging vendors were ready to sell on credit ; † and the Senate was blindly obedient to his orders. But Antony had seen Cæsar slain by his dearest friends ; he had seen many politicians continually changing front and contradicting on one day their avowals of the day before ; though events had forced him to take command of the gang of adventurers who now constituted Cæsar's party, he distrusted them far too deeply to begin a decisive action with their support, except after the utmost consideration. He was forced to climb a steep and slippery slope, upon an uncertain surface which gave way at every step, and his mistrust of men and things was necessarily universal.

Even Cicero's return and the joyful welcome which he received caused the consul keen irritation. It seemed that the opposition were about to discover a leader, and a man, too, of high authority. Brutus and Cassius had gone, but Antony benefited little in consequence, as Cicero had come back, and had, moreover, returned in time for the session which was

Sept.  
44 B.C.

NOTICE  
TO  
READERS  
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LXXV  
PART  
I  
1905

\* Cp. Cic. A. XIV. x. 10, 2.

† Corn. Nepos, *Att.* ix. 5.



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44 B.C.

to be held the following day in the Temple of Concord. Cicero however, did not appear in the Senate on September 1, and sent a friend to inform Antony that the fatigue of his journey would not allow him to leave his house.\* It is much more probable that Cicero did not venture to oppose the deification of Cæsar because he was afraid of the veterans; and that as he could not go to the Senate and sit in silence, he had invented this excuse. In any case Antony should have been delighted. Yet the state of his mind is difficult to explain. Violent by nature, and at this time even more irritable than usual, he may have yielded to a sudden access of fury, or again, may have pretended a show of wrath, to intimidate Cicero, and induce him to leave the country. Either supposition is possible. The facts are that when this message was delivered to him, Antony flew into a violent rage and thundered before the Senate that Cicero was hinting at some attempt upon his life, was slandering and insulting him, that he would use all his consular rights and bring him to the Senate by force, and that if he resisted, he would send soldiers and smiths to break down the doors of his house.† These words caused a great sensation; the senators immediately rose and begged him to be calm. Antony either perceived that he had gone too far, or his fury was merely a pretence; he eventually annulled the order for bringing Cicero to the Senate by force.‡ The law was then approved concerning the honours to be rendered to Cæsar.§

The first  
Philippic,

Antony had doubtless intimidated Cicero by these threats, but he had also insulted the most illustrious member of the Senate, and that so openly that the orator, notwithstanding his weakness and his advanced age, could not fail to resent the affront. In fact, the aged orator showed his resentment, not-

\* Cicero, *Phil.* I. v. 12; Plutarch, *Cic.* 43. Plutarch asserts that he did not come because an ambush was laid for him, but this cannot be true. Neither Antony nor any one else would have conceived such an outrage. This was the explanation given by Antony's enemies, and the consul for that reason *χαλεπῶς μὲν εἶχεν ἐπὶ τῇ διαβολῇ*: "He was indignant at such a calumny"; hence I have assumed that Antony protested against the calumny in his excitement.

† Cicero, *Phil.* I. v. 12; Plutarch, *Cic.* 43. The smiths were intended to break down the doors, and not to destroy the house, as some historians explain.

‡ Plut. *Cic.* 43.

§ Cic. *Phil.* I. vi. 13. *Quod vos inviti secuti estis.*

withstanding his fear of Antony and the veterans, in a weighty and dignified speech which he wrote the same day; this was the first of the speeches against Antony, to which he afterwards gave the title of Philippics, by which they are still known, a name given half in jest and half seriously in memory of Demosthenes.\* In this speech he first explained the reasons for his journey and for his absence the preceding day; he regretted Antony's invectives, but briefly and with a certain gravity, as if it ill-became him to discuss a matter so little consonant with his dignity. He then proceeded to consider the condition of the republic; he criticised Antony's policy, but with moderation and from a strange point of view, accusing him of insufficient respect for Cæsar's laws and decisions, as though he would indicate to the veterans that he was ready to respect the dictator's wishes even more sincerely than Antony himself. Finally, he objected to Antony's laws, not for their provisions, but for the irregularity of his procedure, and concluded with advice to Antony and Dolabella to reconsider their intentions, avoid any disloyal ambitions, and to put into practice the classical theory of the constitution propounded by Aristotle and popularised by himself: *libertate esse parem ceteris, principem dignitate*, to be the first citizen in a republic of citizens with equal rights.† In short, by this speech he seemed to indicate that he was ready to receive an apology if it were forthcoming. On September 2, however, Antony did not appear in the Senate;‡ possibly he feared Cicero's eloquence as much as Cicero feared the veterans, and thought he might be unable to make a fitting reply. In any case his absence was a fresh insult to Cicero. He left the Senate as Antony's declared enemy; he declined to greet him when they met in the street;§ he referred to him, not in public, but in private and in his letters as a madman, a gladiator, and a desperado;|| he accused him of preparing a general massacre of senators and nobles which was to begin with himself,¶ and

Sept. 2,  
44 B.C.

\* Cp. Cicero, *ad Brut.* II. v. 4.

† Cic. *Phil.* I. xiv. 34.

‡ Cic. *Phil.* I. vii. 16; I. xiii. 31.

§ Plut. *Cic.* 43.

|| Cic. *F.* XII. ii. 1; *homo amens et perditus.* *F.* XII. iii. 1.

¶ Cic. *F.* XII. ii. 1.

Sept. suspected the motives of all who did not openly declare their  
44 B.C. hostility to Antony.\*

Antony's reply  
to Cicero.

This tendency to impute evil motives, this frenzy for mutual persecution, which in times of great social crises may pervade every party and every class, is the most dangerous of maladies, for the reason that the politician who exaggerates the numbers and the fury of his enemies often makes real adversaries of imaginary opponents. Such was the case in the present instance. None of the conspirators was able to realise Antony's perplexity and hesitation; all imagined that as soon as the Macedonian legions reached Italy, he would annul the amnesty, and in view of the imminent danger which seemed to threaten every member of their party, they began yet more vigorous intrigues with the Macedonian legions and with Octavianus. Whether the latter was won over is a doubtful question; probably he declined to listen, but it appears that about this time Antony perceived the web of intrigue which centred about the Macedonian legions. No other theory will explain why Antony at this moment suddenly abandoned all prudence without apparent motive and began a violent attack upon the conspirators, the conservatives, and Octavianus. After a silence of seventeen days, when every one began to think that he would make no answer to Cicero, he suddenly convened a meeting of the Senate for the 19th and delivered a most violent speech against the great orator, accusing him of having organised a conspiracy against Cæsar.† Cicero, divided between his anger and his fear of Antony, of his machinations and of his veterans, remained at home on that day.‡ Thereupon during the second half of September news arrived that Decimus Brutus was returning from his expedition in the Alps, and that he had been greeted as imperator by his soldiers.§

Supposed plot  
of Octavianus  
against  
Antony.

On this news the conservatives recovered courage, and Antony strove to arouse Cæsarean enthusiasm among his own

\* Cic. F. XII. ii. 2-3.

† Cic. *Phil.* II. xii. 30; F. XII. ii. 1.

‡ Cic. *Phil.* V. vii. 20.

§ Sternkopf, in *Philologus* lx. pp. 303-304, supposes with good reason that Cicero's letter F. xi. 4 was written in September, and that the letter F. XI. vi. 1 is the reply, placed by mistake at the beginning of another letter consisting of §§ 2 and 3.

party; upon the pedestal of a statue of Cæsar on the rostra, he inscribed the words "*parenti optime merito*"; \* on October 2 at a popular meeting he delivered so violent a speech against the conspirators that the conservatives believed he had already annulled the amnesty of March 17; † finally he laid a snare for Octavianus a few days later, on the 4th or 5th.‡ A rumour suddenly arose about that time that Antony had discovered assassins in his house, who had admitted that Octavianus had sent them to murder him. Excitement in Rome was keen and opinions widely divergent. Few gave full credence to the report; Cicero and the most violent enemies of Antony went so far as to congratulate the supposed author of the attempt and regretted its failure. The mother of Octavianus, however, was afraid; she hastened to her son and begged him to leave Rome for a time until the storm had passed. Octavianus then displayed great resolution; not only did he decline to leave Rome, but he gave orders that his house should be open to every one as usual at visiting-times and continued to receive clients, petitioners, and veterans. Antony, however, had gathered a group of friends to narrate to them the confessions of the assassins, and to request their advice. A curious scene was then played in the presence of the consul. Upon the conclusion of his speech every one understood that he was asking them, under colour of obtaining their advice, to share the responsibility of a false accusation and of a prosecution aimed at Cæsar's son. The responsibility was serious, and a painful silence ensued; no one ventured to offer an opinion. Eventually some one broke the silence by suggesting that the assassins should be brought and questioned before the auditors. Antony replied that that was not necessary, and turned the conversation; his friends in great embarrassment offered no reply to his remarks and he soon dismissed them.§ Nothing more was heard of the assassins.

October,  
44 B.C.

\* Cic. F. XII. iii. 1.

† Cic. F. XII. iii. 2; xxiii. 3.

‡ According to Nic. Dam. 30, the attempt took place on the 4th or 5th, before Antony's departure, which took place on October 9. Cic. F. XII. xxiii. 2.

\* This is one of the most obscure points in the history of Octavianus. The account given by Nic. Dam., though somewhat coloured by the

October,  
44 B.C.  
Antony goes  
to Brundisium.

Though the plot had been cleverly conceived, it had none the less failed. The Macedonian legions remained the subject of great anxiety among the consul's friends. Uneasiness became so great that Antony and Fulvia \* resolved to go to Brundisium to meet the legions; in fact, they started on October 9 † in a frame of mind which can easily be imagined, expecting to find intriguers and murderers on every hand. On this occasion Octavianus followed them a few days later. The snare which Antony had laid for him not only proved to Octavianus and his friends that the conservatives were right, and that Antony wished to monopolise Cæsar's inheritance, but also gained for Octavianus the favour of the conservative opposition to Antony; ‡ their hatred induced them to believe that Octavianus was ready to become a second Brutus in the case of Antony. Octavianus had in fact been overwhelmed by the praises and congratulations of the aristocrats as a worthy rival of the conspirators, and this for participation in a plan of which he had never even dreamed; he had heard universal wishes uttered that on this occasion Antony might not escape his death, that his soldiers would revolt, and that some one would have the courage to snatch the power from him by a bold *coup d'état*. Octavianus was a prudent and almost a timid character; moreover, at the very outset of his political career, it is most unlikely that he

spirit of the courtier, has been here followed, because of its full probability. It is impossible, as Appian observes, B. C. iii. 39, that Octavianus should have planned the murder of Antony; this would have been a difficult and dangerous enterprise, and its audacity would be in complete contrast with the habitual hesitation and prudence of Octavianus. If Antony, who was much stronger and bolder, would not run the risk of assassinating Octavianus, it is impossible that the feeble Octavianus should have made a similar attempt upon Antony. The whole story was invented by Antony. Besides, Cicero, F. XII. xxiii. 2, says that no one at Rome seriously believed the accusation. The statement of Suetonius, *Aug.* 10, and of Seneca, *De Clem.* I. ix. 1, cannot hold ground against the other authorities and the probabilities of the case.

\* The story of the punishment of the centurions at Brundisium proves that Fulvia accompanied Antony. See Cicero, *Phil.* III. ii. 4, and V. viii. 22.

† Cic. F. XII. xxiii. 2.

‡ Cic. F. XII. xxiii. 2; *prudentes et boni viri et credunt factum et probant . . . magna spes est in eo* (Octavianus). *Nihil est quod non existimetur laudis et gloriæ causa facturum.*



October,  
44 B.C.

would have attempted so audacious an enterprise as that which we shall shortly narrate if he had not felt sure of the help, or at least the approbation, of powerful personages. We may thus assume that not only did he receive these praises as his due and accepted the position of a man who had plotted Antony's destruction, but we may also consider that the violent speeches of the conservatives, especially those of his brother-in-law, Caius Marcellus, gave him the idea of recruiting a body-guard from Cæsar's veterans in Campania, as Antony had done in the month of April, an idea which met with the full approbation of his conservative friends when he laid it before them. All were of the opinion that in so desperate a situation it would be advisable to have two bodies of veterans at Rome, to act as counter-balancing forces in case of a conflict. This advice was dictated by hatred for Antony and given with the carelessness of men who feel that their responsibility is not involved. The danger was already so great that Octavianus and his friends eventually resolved upon this step, notwithstanding its unparalleled audacity. They gathered their servants and clients, loaded all the money they could procure upon mules, and went off to Capua in a large body, under the pretext that they were intending to sell the estates belonging to the mother of Octavianus.\* At this moment Cicero also left Rome.† He had begun to write his second Philippic in reply to Antony's speech; this invective is a marvellous caricature which many historians have wrongly regarded as a portrait, and into it the orator poured all the fury with which the recent affront had inspired him. He did not propose, however, to publish this Philippic; so often had he asserted that his enemy proposed a general massacre that he was really afraid of the approaching arrival of the Macedonian legions. He therefore went away to Puteoli to resume his studies and begin his "De Officiis."

Thus during the second half of October, while Cicero was working at a description of the perfect manners to be found

Octavianus in  
Campania.

\* Nic. Dam. xxxi.

† The letter F. XII. xxiii. 2 shows us that he was still in Rome on October 9; A. XV. xiii. 1 that he had reached Puteoli on October 25.

October, in an ideal republic, the agents of Octavianus and of Antony in  
44 B.C. southern Italy were struggling to secure Cæsar's veterans and new recruits. Antony had gone to Brundisium, where the four legions, with a large body of Gallic and Thracian cavalry, had disembarked in two detachments between the Nones and Ides of October.\* The temper of these troops was by no means reassuring. The letters which Octavianus had written to his friends in Macedonia during the preceding months denouncing Antony as a traitor to Cæsar's party had had their effect, especially among the old soldiers of the dictator who were numerous in the Fourth and in the Martian legions; irritation had been revived by the intrigues of those officers who were friendly to Octavianus and the conservatives, while the soldiers possibly found a fresh cause for discontent in the fact that they were not allowed to take part in the Parthian campaign which was generally regarded as imminent and as likely to be very profitable, but were to be sent to Gaul where they would remain in poverty and inaction. They therefore expected to receive a considerable *donativum* by way of compensation. For these various reasons Antony met with a cold reception and gained no applause when he mounted the tribunal to harangue the troops. Irritated by this lack of enthusiasm, he committed the mistake of blaming it at the opening of his speech; he made a second and more serious mistake in explaining and perhaps exaggerating his suspicions and regretting that the soldiers should have tolerated instead of denouncing the agents of Octavianus, who had come to raise a revolt. After the bitterness of reproach he gave them the honey of fair promises, and undertook to distribute four hundred sesterces. The soldiers expected a great deal more, and the conclusion of the speech was greeted with loud laughter, cries and abuse. Antony's irritable character then allowed his imperious instincts to rise; he made an inquiry; certain centurions who had been noted as seditious by private black marks (the practice is as ancient as the phrase is modern) † were seized and carried to the house

\* See Schmidt, *Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie und Pädagogik*, Suppl. 13, pp. 720-721.

† Appian, B. C. iii. 43.

where Antony was staying; if the facts are not exaggerated by his enemies they were put to death in the presence of Fulvia. According to Cicero this terrible woman insisted upon witnessing the bloody spectacle, and her clothes were said to have been stained with the blood which spurted from a centurion's throat.\*

October,  
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The legions in Italy held their peace, but Antony, by his very suspicions had suggested the idea of a revolt, and as though he wished to urge the project yet more firmly, he changed all the officers and ordered a strict investigation to discover the agitators sent out by Octavianus. These could not be found for the simple reason that they did not exist.† Unfortunately, it was not only to the soldiers that Antony had suggested the idea of a revolt, but to Octavianus himself; he learnt of these events in Campania while he was gathering some three thousand veterans ‡ in the neighbourhood of Casilinum and Calatia; while recruiting, it was his practice to make speeches on behalf of Cæsar, whom he declared himself ready to avenge, and also to use the money which he had brought on his mules, making offers of two thousand sesterces to each individual. Since Antony regarded him as so formidable, it seemed possible to induce the Macedonian legions to revolt, and the soldiers now had some real cause for discontent, exasperated as they were by the punishment of the centurions. It was indeed a most audacious and dangerous enterprise, but Octavianus had been

Antony's  
action  
stimulates  
Octavianus.

\* Appian, B. C. iii. 43 and 44. See Cic. A. XVI. viii. 2. The account of this event, as given in Appian, is fairly probable; he is, however, wrong in assuming that the agents of Octavianus were already at work. It is difficult to say exactly what punishment was inflicted at Brundisium; Appian's details are too brief, while Cicero's are too fragmentary and suspicious. Is it possible that Antony could have put three hundred persons to death? Cicero, *Phil.* III. iv. 10. Did these centurions belong to all the legions, or merely to the legion of Mars, as would appear from Cicero, *Phil.* XII. vi. 12, XIII. viii. 18? Moreover, according to Cicero, Antony performed two executions—one at Brundisium, the other at Suessa Aurunca, and the date and reasons of this latter are unknown.

† Appian, B. C. iii. 44.

‡ Suet. *Aug.* 10; Dion, xlv. 12; Appian, B. C. iii. 40; Cic. A. XVI. viii. 1. Cicero's statement that Octavianus collected 3000 veterans is more certain than Appian's assertion that 10,000 were recruited.

October,  
44 B.C.

driven to it by Antony's reproaches, by the ease with which he could procure recruits and by the encouragement which came to him from Rome. He therefore resolved upon the attempt, and as Antony had sent three legions along the Adriatic coast to Cisalpine Gaul,\* intending himself to return to Rome with the other legion and with the "Lark," Octavianus sent agents to these very legions promising them also two thousand sesterces a man if they would declare for him. At a distance from Antony, they would be more inclined to mutiny.† The enterprise, however, though favoured by events, was so much beyond the powers of a few inexperienced young men without influence, that Octavianus and his friends were beset by doubts and irresolution during those days. They did not know what to do with their three thousand men, whether to leave them at Capua or to take them to Rome; they asked whether Octavianus should visit the other colonies of Cæsar or follow the Macedonian legions who were marching upon Ariminum.‡ They desired the help and counsel of influential men who would share the responsibility and take some of the weight from their shoulders. Having heard that Cicero was at Puteoli, Octavianus resolved to try and win him over, and wrote to him asking for a private interview at Capua or elsewhere.§

\* Cic. A. XVI. viii. 2.

† Cic. A. XVI. viii. 1-2; *quas sperat suas esse.*

‡ *Ibid.*

§ *Ibid.*

## CHAPTER VIII

### THE "DE OFFICIIS"

The "De Officiis"—The ideal of a perfect aristocracy—Correspondence between Octavianus and Cicero—The return of Antony and of Octavianus—Speech of Octavianus to the people : its failure—A critical day for Octavianus—The revolt of the two Macedonian legions.

THIS letter reached Cicero at Puteoli on November 1 ; \* Cicero at Puteoli. he seems to have received secret information a few days previously from Servilia upon other important matters. Marcus Scaptius and a servant of Cæcilius Bassus had arrived from the east bringing the news that the Egyptian legions were well inclined, and that Cassius was expected in Syria ; † encouraged by this information, Cassius resolved to start at once with a little fleet, ‡ with the object of wresting Syria from Dolabella. § But if this news had caused the old orator some pleasure, it had none the less been inadequate to overcome the profound despondency under which he had laboured for some time. || Antony seemed to him henceforward invincible, and he saw no prospect of checking his progress. Weary and disillusioned, Cicero thus resigned himself to his fate ; he declined to interfere with public business, and would not even publish

\* Cic. A. XVI. viii. 1.

† Cicero, A. XV. xiii. 4. It is generally admitted that this letter has been erroneously placed among the letters of June, and that the opening date should read viii. Kal. Nov.

‡ Cicero's letters, F. XII. ii. and iii, show that Cassius was still in Italy during the first half of October ; he must then have started in October, as is assumed by Schmidt, *Rhein. Mus.* 1898, 235. The vague expression *paucis post diebus*, employed by Cicero in *Phil.* X. iv. 8, is no ground for objection. It is likely that Cassius started without receiving the letters to which Cicero refers, A. XV. xiii. 4.

§ Cic. *Phil.* XI. xii. 28.

|| Cic. A. XV. xiii. 4 and 7.



November, the second Philippic which he had finished and sent to Atticus.\*  
 44 B.C. Elsewhere social order seemed likely to be engulfed in an abyss of avarice, luxury and debt, while Cicero in his solitary villa on the shore of the bay, amid the November winds and snow, worked anxiously at the task of constructing an ideal republic on paper. He had now finished the first two books and was proceeding with the third of his treatise upon duty, which, after some hesitation, he had entitled, "De Officiis." †

The "De  
Officiis."

As concerns the theory propounded of good and evil, there is nothing striking in the book ; it is merely a hasty compilation from the works of Panætius and of Posidonius, interspersed with reminiscences of Aristotle and Plato, with reflections and personal recollections of earlier and contemporary Roman history. The book, however, deserves to be read with close attention by historians, who will find amid its philosophical discussions an important theory of the possibility of social and moral regeneration for Rome. It must be constantly remembered that this book was written during the autumn of 44, under the stress of the reaction caused by the bitterness of the Civil War, by the moving tragedy of the Ides of March, and by the apprehension of coming disaster ; the reader who does not know the history of that terrible year, and of the daily life of Cicero during those months, will erroneously regard as one of many other mediocre philosophical treatises this most important document for the political and social life of Rome. Like all deep thinkers in Rome after the second Punic War, Cicero had been profoundly struck by the pitiable contradiction which he saw before him ; while gaining in knowledge Italy also increased in corruption, wealth made her still more insatiable, her birth-rate declined as men were needed, she provoked war and lost her military capacity, extended her power over other peoples and bartered away her own freedom. He therefore proposed to make one more search, as his predecessors had done, for the hidden means of conciliating imperialism with

\* Cic. A. XV. xiii. 1 and 2.

† Cic. A. XV. xiii. 6 ; XVI. xi. 4. The true interpretation of A. XVI. xi. 4 seems to me to be that of Remigio Sabbadini, in the introduction to his commentary on the *De Officiis*, Turin, 1889, pp. viii.-ix.

November,  
44 B.C.

liberty, progress with prosperity, luxury and wealth with social and political discipline, and intellectual culture with morality; he resumed the consideration of a problem already examined in the *De Republica*, but on this occasion from the moral and social rather than from the political point of view. In short, he wished to discover what virtues were necessary to the ruling classes in this ideal republic, the institutions of which he had already described. He had reached the conviction that a general pacification could only be secured by an inversion of the moral principles of life; wealth and power, which so easily corrupted men, were to be regarded not as the highest benefits of life, to be sought and desired for themselves, but as heavy burdens to be borne for the welfare of all, and especially for the welfare of the people.\* What beneficial revolution, then, could introduce this new principle into social and political life? The nobles would eventually understand their private and public duties which Cicero enumerates and analyses in the course of his work; they were to live with dignity but without extravagance,† occupied with agriculture or wholesale trade; ‡ they were to take their share of public duty, not in order to enrich themselves and to corrupt the people, but in the zealous service of the interests of the poor and middle classes; § they were to undertake such public works as were useful, the construction of walls, harbours, aqueducts and roads, and not of theatres, porticoes, temples or other monuments of luxury.|| They were to support the people in time of famine without impoverishing the public treasury,¶ and to help innocent debtors without abolishing debt by revolution; \*\* they were to give land to the poor but not to take it from its legitimate owners.†† Thus the object of government would be the general welfare,‡‡ and this object would be reached by scrupulous respect for law, by the intelligent generosity of the great, and by the practice of such austere virtues as faith, honesty, and economy. "Woe to the republic in which the governing class is overwhelmed with debt and financial embarrassments," wrote

\* De Off. I. viii; I. xix. 65.

† I. xxxix.

‡ I. xlii.

§ II. xxii.; II. xv. and xvi.; II. xviii. 63.

|| II. xvii. 60.

¶ II. xxi. 72.

\*\* II. xxii. 78; II. xxiv.

†† II. xxii. 78.

‡‡ I. xxv.

November, the friend of Atticus, forgetting his own difficulties and struggles with this very question of debt.\*

The ideal  
republic.

Thus the ideal republic which he imagined could not be absolved of responsibility towards the nations under its sway. Its rule should be just, and should rather aim at the welfare of the governed than at its own aggrandisement; † such aggressive wars as those which Cæsar, Crassus, and the popular leaders had undertaken in recent years should not be waged; ‡ there should be no acts of useless ferocity, such as the destruction of Corinth; § in short, the Empire was to be as we should say to-day, “a pacific force,” so far as the conditions of the ancient world would permit. The Empire would use war merely as a means to secure peace, which is the greatest blessing and object of life; || great orators and lawyers, wise and generous citizens, learned men and philosophers would be preferred to great warriors, ¶ but upon the condition that a life of study should not turn the citizen from his duties of citizenship, which were to be the supreme and constant object of his every effort. The division of labour which now prevented many citizens from undertaking the manifold functions of orator, lawyer, general, and administrator, the growing variety of individual objects and inclinations which caused the downfall of the old republican institutions, were regarded by Cicero as signs of decadence. The old encyclopædic unity was his ideal; \*\* he thus proposed an attempt to combine the austere and vigorous past with the refinement and magnificence of the present, to remove from the present its elements of corruption and from the past its lack of refinement; such was Cicero’s idea of an aristocratic republic in which there would be neither ambitious demagogues nor violent conservatives, no Sullas or Cæsars or Gracchi, all of whom he judged with the same impartial severity.††

\* De Off. II. xv. 16.

† III. xxii. 87, 88.

‡ I. xi. 36; I. xii. 38; II. viii. 27.

§ I. xi. 35.

|| I. xi. 35; I. xxiii. 80.

¶ I. xxii.

\*\* I. vi. 9; I. ix. 28–29; I. xx.; I. xxi. 71.

†† I. xiv. 43; I. xxii. 76; II. vii. 23; II. viii. 27; II. xii. 43; II. xxi. 72; II. xxiv.; III. xxi. 82.

In the enthusiasm of these great ideals and in his disgust with public affairs, Cicero replied to Octavianus refusing his request for a private interview.\* No sooner had he despatched this letter than a messenger from Octavianus arrived, probably on November 2. This was one of his clients, a certain Cæcina of Volterræ; he brought news that Antony was marching upon Rome and that Octavianus was hesitating whether to go to Rome with his three thousand veterans, or to attempt to bar Antony's passage at Capua, or to join the Macedonian legions. The aged and inconsistent orator, prone like his friends to exaggerate the power of Cæsar's name with the people, felt some revival of his courage and of his illusions at this news. While Cassius was advancing to the conquest of the east, it might be possible for Octavianus to carry with him the people and the upper classes, if he made a loyal resistance to Antony.† It might be possible even to overthrow Antony and to save the amnesty. Cicero therefore advised Octavianus to go to Rome. But on the 3rd, he received two more letters from Octavianus, urging him to come to Rome, declaring that his soldiers should be placed at the disposal of the Senate and promising to submit to Cicero's guidance upon every occasion. Cicero then recovered hope and began to take more interest in the course of public affairs. On the 4th and 5th other letters arrived with the same proposals and exhortations couched in more earnest form. Octavianus went so far as to say that the Senate must convoked immediately.‡

November,  
44 B.C.  
Correspondence between  
Octavianus  
and Cicero.

In short, the adherence of Cæsar's son to the conspirators party had been suddenly confirmed, and the plan of Marcellus, fantastic as it had seemed, appeared to be upon the point of success. It was a sign that events were now proceeding rapidly. Antony, in fact, was keeping a watch upon his adversaries and was aware that Cassius had started for the east with the intention of conquering Syria.§ He knew that the con-

Antony's  
return to  
Rome.

\* Cic. A. XVI. viii. 1.

† Cic. A. XVI. viii. 1. As the letter was written on the 12th at latest he must have received the visit of Cæcina on that day.

‡ Cic. A. XVI. ix. 1: *binæ uno die mihi litteræ ab Octaviano* (the letter was perhaps written on the 3rd); A. XVI. xi. 6: *ab Octaviano quotidie litteræ* (letter of November 5, as is proved by § 1).

§ We know that Antony suspected the intentions of Cassius by a

November, 44 B C. spirators were sending letters and messages to Decimus urging him not to recognise the *lex de permutazione* and that certain Cæsareans such as Pansa, were inclined to follow this policy ; \* he also knew that Octavianus was now working in earnest to corrupt the legions, and that he was plotting with the conservatives and, in particular, with Cicero. At the outset of November he had, however, ordered Dolabella to start immediately for Syria, and to secure his possession of the wealthy province of Asia ; he was then hastening to Rome with two legions, one of the Macedonian legions and the "Lark," resolved to rend the web of intrigue woven by his enemies and to settle his account with Octavianus. The moment seemed to be well chosen, as the imprudent young man had committed a grave delinquency in arming soldiers against the consul. Antony would demand his proclamation as *hostis republicæ* by the Senate ; the Senate would be forced to pass condemnation, and Octavianus would destroy himself if he attempted to evade the consequences. However, this instant march to Rome had inspired Octavianus and his friends with the keenest alarm ; they had easily guessed Antony's intentions and had resolved to go to Rome themselves with their three thousand veterans ; they had redoubled their efforts to secure the support of the conservatives who would surely defend them openly after their encouragements of the previous month.

Octavianus  
reaches Rome.

On November 10,† Octavianus reached Rome before Antony with his three thousand veterans, and encamped them near the Temple of Mars, where the baths of Caracalla were to rise at a later date ; ‡ however, he speedily perceived that the congratulations and encouragements offered him did not imply practical support. Public opinion at Rome was not in his favour. The fiercer conservatives approved Octavianus in private conversation and attacked Antony, whom they accused of desiring to raise a massacre throughout Rome ; but many other conservatives,

letter which he wrote in March 43, under the walls of Modena, to Hirtius and to Octavianus before the letters of Cassius had arrived. See Cicero, *Phil.* XIII. xv. 30 ; in *Syriam Cassium misistis*.

\* Cp. Cic. F. XI. v. 1.

† See Ruete, *Correspondenz Ciceros*, 36.

‡ Gardthausen, *Augustus und seine Zeit*, Leipzig, 1891, I. 70.



more prudent and far-sighted, such as Varro, Atticus,\* and the relatives and friends of the conspirators mistrusted Octavianus, and thought that the defence of the amnesty could not possibly be left in the hands of the son of the victim. Moreover, the majority of the Senate, the magistrates, and the aristocracy were afraid of Antony. They told themselves that with so many legions at his disposal he could not be intimidated by a young man who held no office and commanded only three thousand veterans, and they further considered that the military measures of Octavianus were both foolish and criminal.† In short, the majority of the Cæsareans and not merely those who had hitherto followed Antony, were furious with Octavianus, accusing him, and with some reason, of betraying their party to the advantage of their enemies. Every one, indeed, was stupefied by his audacity, and even those who had secretly urged him to enlist soldiers would not venture to support him in public. Octavianus wished to make a speech to explain his action and to remove popular apprehension, and after numberless conversations and promises he induced the tribune Canutius to convoke a meeting in the forum. The enterprise, however, was extremely difficult, as the prejudices of either party were both numerous and hard to overcome. Octavianus found himself in a hopeless dilemma; he had denounced Antony as a traitor to the Cæsarean cause and had invited the veterans to come and defend his father's memory; he was now proposing to use these soldiers on behalf of the conservative party to defend Cæsar's murderers and to annul Cæsar's measures. To avoid discontenting either the popular party or the conservatives, the young man spoke very ambiguously; he delivered an emphatic eulogy of Cæsar but did not venture to assert that he had recruited these troops to take that vengeance for his father which Antony had declined to pursue; nor again could he venture to admit that he had opened negotiations with Cicero. He contented himself with saying that he placed his troops at the disposal of the country, with the

November,  
44 B.C.

\* Cp. Cic. A. XVI. ix.; A. XVI. xiv. 1; A. XVI. xv. 3.

† Cic. A. XVI. xi. 6: *Quis veniet? (in senatum): Si venerit, quis, incertis rebus, offendet Antonium?*

November, consequence that the speech left the soldiers spiritless and  
44 B.C. undecided, and caused much dissatisfaction to the conservatives  
whose aid he desired and to Cicero in particular.\*

Difficulties of  
Octavianus.

The distant thunder of the storm could even then be heard ; Antony was approaching and was promulgating edicts of extreme violence against Octavianus as he went, reproaching him for his low birth, insinuating that Cæsar had adopted him in consequence of their immoral relations and referring to him as a second Spartacus ; † he also issued an edict convoking the Senate for November 24 to deal with matters *de summa republica* and warning the senators that all who did not appear would be considered as the accomplices of Octavianus.‡ The family and friends of Octavianus found themselves abandoned by every one, though his brother-in-law, Marcellus and his father-in-law, Philippus, did their best to help him. These two men § and Oppius, whom Octavianus had contrived to win over, || begged Cicero to intervene. Cicero, however, had hoped too much of Octavianus, and was now terrified by the threats of Antony ; once again he began to distrust every one and Octavianus more than any one ; ¶ while approaching Rome he sent excuses for his inaction, urging that nothing could be done until the following year when Antony would be no longer consul ; he demanded pledges of sincerity from Octavianus and offered his support, when he could prove that he was really the friend of Cæsar's murderers. This proof might be given on December 10 when the new tribunes entered upon office ; among them was Casca, the conspirator who had given the first dagger-thrust to Cæsar. Oppius vainly attempted to assure Cicero that Octavianus was really the friend of Casca, and of all Cæsar's murderers,\*\* but Cicero would attend to nothing at the moment but his pecuniary affairs and the *De Officiis*. However, the attempts of Octavianus and his friends to raise the people against Antony met with

\* Appian, B. C. iii. 41-42 ; Dion, xlv. 12 ; cp. Cic. A. XVI. xv. 3.

† Cic. *Phil.* III. vi. 15 ; III. viii. 21. The coarse accusations of Antony to which Suetonius alludes (*Aug.* 68) are possibly those uttered on this occasion.

‡ Cic. *Phil.* III. viii. 19.

§ Plut. *Cic.* 44. Cp. Cic. A. XVI. xiv. 2.

|| Cic. A. XVI. xv. 3.

¶ Cic. A. XVI. xiv. 2.

\*\* Cic. A. XVI. xv. 3.

little success ; the veterans enrolled in Campania were themselves wavering ; they were intimidated by the knowledge that they might be declared public enemies and also realised that many members of Cæsar's party had become hostile to Octavianus.\* Their numbers were only three thousand, and with no one but a young man to lead them, they were not likely to revolt against the consul with success. Desertions began, and the force melted like snow in summer.

Antony at length arrived at Rome after sending his two legions to Tibur; he did not find Dolabella, who had already started for the east. The 21st and 22nd were days of alternate hope and fear. On the 23rd it was suddenly learned that the session had been postponed till the 28th,† because Antony had gone to see his legions at Tibur, for reasons which we do not know.‡ Antony seems for some time to have been uneasy as to the effect produced by the silent machinations of the agents of Octavianus among his legions, supported as they were by the conservative party; he may have heard that his soldiers were already discontented, and, ill-informed as to the real intentions of Octavianus, were blaming the fresh persecution instituted against him. Was it possible that one of Cæsar's favourite generals should threaten the dictator's son simply because he had recruited a handful of veterans to take a speedier vengeance for his father's murder? Was it with the object of crushing Octavianus that Antony had returned with such haste to Rome? No doubt at the last moment Antony had been alarmed by some worse news and had hastened to secure their allegiance by fresh promises before delivering his mortal thrust at Cæsar's son. In any case the postponement was fortunate for Octavianus, as many events were possible within those four days. In fact, before Antony's return, Octavianus

† Cic. *Phil.* III. viii. 19-20.

† *Vino atque epulis retentus* ; so says Cicero, *Phil.* III. viii. 20, but this is evidently an invention. We see from Cicero, *Phil.* XIII. ix. 19, *rediit ad milites ; ibi pestifera illa Tiburi contio*, that the object of the delay was a journey to Tibur, which, though the fact is not certain, may have been undertaken to calm the hesitation and anxiety of the soldiers. Appian, B. C. iii. 45, only speaks of the session of the 28th and of the journey to Tibur after that session, and makes no reference to the journey between the 24th and 28th.

November, 44 B.C. was informed that the news of the fresh persecution to which he was exposed, the anger caused by Antony's executions, and the attraction of the two thousand sesterces which he had promised, had conquered the Martian legion, which had declared in his favour and was about to leave the other two legions and establish itself at Alba.\* He could at least find a refuge from his danger amongst these soldiers, now that the three thousand veterans had almost entirely abandoned him. Moreover, Cicero, who could not remain inactive, had eventually yielded to the exhortations of Oppius, Marcellus and Philippus, and had resolved to come to Rome, where he arrived on November 27.† Antony also returned on that day; while at Tibur, he had heard of the revolt and had immediately hastened to Alba, had attempted to gain entry to the town in order to restore the allegiance of his troops, but had been refused admittance.‡ He therefore returned in greater anger with Octavianus, and resolved to take vengeance the following day. Fortune saved Octavianus for the second time, for at daybreak of the 28th, it seems that news reached Antony that the example of the Martian legion had been followed by the Fourth legion; these troops had been chiefly influenced by the quæstor, Lucius Egnatuleius, who had zealously espoused the cause of Octavianus,§

\* The passage in Cicero, *Phil.* XIII. xix, *nam Martiam legionem Alba consedisce sciebat*, shows that Appian, B. C. iii. 45, is wrong in placing his announcement of the revolt of the two legions in succession at an interval of a few moments, in somewhat melodramatic style. Antony heard of the revolt of the Legion of Mars between the 24th and 28th, when he was on his way to Tibur.

† The date given by Cicero, F. XI. v. 1, *a.d.v. Idus decem.*, should be corrected as proposed by Ruete, *Correspondenz Ciceros*, xxxvii. ff., to *a.d.v. Kal. decem.* It is true that Sternkopf, *Phil.* vol. lx. p. 299, has overthrown several ingenious arguments by Ruete, by showing that the first paragraph of Cicero's letter, F. XI. vi. is a separate epistle, written probably in September; but in my opinion the decisive argument is the fact that letter v. written after Cicero's arrival at Rome, was composed before he knew of the revolt of the legions; otherwise Cicero would have mentioned this revolt to Decimus as an argument in favour of resistance; as is shown by letter vii. Cicero therefore wrote the letter before the revolt of the legions. The fact that he often declares that he will not come to Rome while Antony is there is of little importance, for he continually contradicts himself at this time.

‡ The journey to Alba which Appian, iii. 45, puts after the 28th, must have taken place before that date for reasons already advanced.

§ Cic. *Phil.* III. iii. 7; XIII. ix. 19; Appian, B. C. iii. 45.

for reasons unknown to us. The prevailing confusion was thus extraordinary ; Octavianus had assured the conservatives of his good feeling towards his father's murderers ; Cæsar's two former legions were leaving Antony for Octavianus, and accusing Antony of lukewarmness in the cause of vengeance, though even then he was preparing to dismiss Decimus.

November,  
44 B.C.

This second revolt threw Antony into such alarm that he abandoned his design of crushing Octavianus without delay. He feared revolts among the other legions if he continued his persecution, and in this event he would be at the mercy of the conservative party. Thus the situation had been entirely transformed in a few hours. With a sudden change of plan Antony appeared in the Senate, but made no reference to Octavianus or his military enterprises ; he announced on the contrary that Lepidus had finally concluded peace with Sextus Pompeius, on condition that Sextus should receive an indemnity for his father's property which had been confiscated ; he even proposed a supplication in honour of Lepidus ; \* this motion was passed and the indemnity for Pompeius was approved ; Antony then dismissed the senators and called a meeting of his friends to discuss the situation. It is not unlikely that he was even disposed to make overtures for a reconciliation, but his wife and brother were awaiting him at his house, disillusioned, exasperated and resolved to drive him to desperate measures. He must immediately secure possession of the rich and populous province of Cisalpine Gaul before the conservative party had time to realise the position, and to use its momentary advantage. Once again Antony yielded. The Senate, however, had not yet drawn lots for the provinces in which Cæsar had assigned no commands for the year 43. It would have been foolishness on Antony's part to permit his adversaries to distribute them to their friends. The senators were therefore hastily convoked to an evening meeting, contrary to custom ; hurriedly and without formality the provinces were divided in such a manner that Antony's friends were highly benefited by a judicious management of the drawing. Thus, for instance, Caius Antonius gained Macedonia, and

Consequences  
of the revolt of  
the legions.

\* Cic. *Phil.* III. ix. 23.



November, Calvisius Sabinus Ancient Africa.\* During the night Antony  
 44 B.C. gathered the larger part of such veterans as he had been able to  
 recruit, and went away to Tibur to take command of the  
 legion.†

\* Cic. *Phil.* III. x. 24 ff. On the names of the governors then chosen,  
 as given by Cicero, see Groebe, App. to Drumann, G.R. 1<sup>2</sup>, 439.

† Cic. *Phil.* V. ix. 24 ; Appian, B. C. iii. 45.

## CHAPTER IX

### THE PHILIPPICS

The situation at Rome after Antony's departure—The conservative party is reorganised—Cicero's last doubts—The third and fourth Philippics—The first news of the siege of Modena—The sixth Philippic and the embassy from the Senate to Antony—The seventh Philippic—Antony's proposal—The eighth and ninth Philippics—The despatch of Marcus Brutus from Macedonia—His counter-revolution in Macedonia—The tenth and eleventh Philippics—The correspondence between Octavianus, Hirtius, and Antony during the siege of Modena—The twelfth Philippic—The thirteenth Philippic—The beginning of dissension between Marcus Brutus and Cicero—The battle of Forum Gallorum—The fourteenth Philippic and the battle of Modena.

WHEN the news of Antony's departure was learned the following day, the first impression among the senators, the knights and the rich plebeians of Rome was one of panic. Since the year 49, a space of five years, five civil wars had taken place, and it seemed that the sixth was about to begin. It was already announced, in fact, that Decimus Brutus had recruited four new legions, and that he was thus at the head of seven legions.\* As he saw that events were moving rapidly, he probably did his best to accelerate the recruiting which he had begun. Accordingly, many influential citizens went to Tibur to attempt a reconciliation.† At first it seemed that Antony, who had as great a horror of civil war as the conservatives, would resolve to return to Rome. Unfortunately, Lucius once again intervened and succeeded, according to report,‡ in dissuading him by using threats. In the early days of December, Antony set out for Cisalpine Gaul followed by two legions, the præ-

The situation upon Antony's departure.

\* Cp. Cic. *Phil.* V. xiii. 36. F. XI. vii. 3. † Appian, B. C. iii. 46.

‡ Cic. *Phil.* VI. iv. 10: *nuper quidem dicitur ad Tibur, ut opinor, cum ei (L. Ant.) labare M. Antonius videretur, mortem fratri esse minitatus.*

December, 44 B.C. torian Cohort, the cavalry and the veterans, who left Rome almost to a man. He also carried with him all the money that was left in the public treasury.

The Cæsarean party.

Together with the veterans a large number of Cæsareans joined Antony, who was now the only leader of the party after the treachery of Octavianus had become apparent. These included Decidius Saxa, T. Munatius Plancus, Censorinus, Tremellius, and Volumnius, whom Antony wished to make his chief engineer officer. Several of them were travelling with the help of money borrowed from Atticus,\* who was lending to both parties at the same time, and while supporting the conservatives, did not neglect to pay this insurance money against the dangers of a revolution. Thus the Cæsarean party which had driven the conservatives from Rome in the month of April, was now obliged by an unexpected reversal of fortune to make a hasty evacuation of the metropolis; this retreat was equivalent to abandoning the reins of power, and the conservatives could re-enter as they pleased and seize the government. The relatives of Pompeius and of the conspirators, the remnant of the irreconcilable conservatives, immediately understood that a unique opportunity was thus given them to secure the destruction of the Cæsarean party and the deliverance of the republic from its most dangerous enemies. Unfortunately Brutus, Cassius, and the most influential conspirators had started for Sicily, while the helpless majority in the Senate, now left to itself, was inclined to take an indulgent view and to pardon Antony's numerous illegal acts. The command of Decimus would lapse in a few days, and they thought that Antony might very well govern Gaul for five years in spite of the small informalities involved. It seemed better, therefore, to give way.† On the other hand, even among Antony's enemies, no one ventured to begin hostilities in the Senate.

Decimus and Octavianus.

Thus at the outset of December the republic was abandoned by all, and left in indescribable confusion. There were no consuls and several prætors too few, while all the offices would speedily lapse; this was an excellent pretext for postponing action and waiting for December 10, on which day the new

\* Cp. Corn. Nep. *Att.* ix. 3.

† Cp. Cic. *Phil.* V. ii. 5.

tribunes would take up office; delay became the watchword of all those timid spirits who formed the majority. In the meanwhile they would have the advantage of seeing what Decimus proposed to do, and whether he would yield or resist. This was a matter of much importance, as a great deal depended on his action. Private correspondents urged him vigorously to resist, and some members of the party even went to seek a personal interview. No one, however, ventured to propose a meeting of the Senate in which Decimus Brutus should be legally authorised to declare war upon Antony; on the contrary many people still hoped that he would yield. One man alone was still working actively on behalf of the conservatives and of Cæsar's murderers; this was Cæsar's son, Octavianus, who was well pleased with his miraculous escape from danger, and had hastily taken shelter at Alba with the two revolted legions. Though Octavianus had been abandoned by almost the whole of Cæsar's party, the little group of irreconcilable conservatives none the less continued to encourage and flatter him, and to regard him as a hero; this sympathy on the part of the aristocracy had induced the ambitious young man to consider the possibility of securing some official authority in the midst of this confusion by bringing war to pass at any price. He sent messages to Decimus offering his help and alliance if he would resist the consul; \* he flattered the soldiers and induced the legions to offer him the insignia of a proprætor, which he refused with pretended modesty; † he made overtures through his friends and relatives to the nobles who were most bitterly opposed to Antony and to the relatives of the conspirators, offering to prepare an army for the help of Decimus, to form a legion of new recruits, to march to Arretium with the two legions at Alba, or to meet his father's veterans and to reorganise Cæsar's seventh and eighth legions if he was given the necessary legal authority.

December,  
44 B.C.

Those conservatives, however, who were not blinded by their hatred of Antony returned but cold answers to these manifestations of zeal. The revolt of the two legions had rather increased than diminished their mistrust and dislike of Cæsar's

The  
conservative  
party.

\* Dion, xlv. 15.

† Appian, B. C. iii. 48.

December, son. There was, moreover, a greater obstacle in the way;  
 44 B.C. to begin a life and death struggle with Antony as Octavianus desired, a leader of tried worth, capable of assuming supreme command, was indispensable. Overtures were made to Cicero, but he hesitated and continued to cherish his project of deferring his appearance in the Senate until January 1.\* However, the departure of the veterans brought general relief; many of the conservatives recovered their courage and began to discuss the possibility of combined action. Cicero had not forgotten the insult which Antony had inflicted on him on September 1, and felt a certain desire for action after his long philosophical contemplations. At this point a certain Lupus arrived in Rome; he had been sent by Decimus to question the most capable men and to ask their advice. A gathering which included Servius Sulpicius and Scribonius Libo, the father-in-law of Pompeius, was held at the house of Cicero himself, who by this time had certainly learned Octavianus' proposals. They decided to urge Decimus to act for himself and not to wait for orders from the Senate; † a certain M. Seius immediately started to carry this answer. None the less, during the early days of December, the situation remained uncertain; Cicero did not believe that Decimus would venture to assume the responsibility which everybody at Rome was attempting to decline, and hastily wrote to him saying that he should not regard Octavianus' recruiting and the revolt of the two legions as ridiculous, seeing that it was approved by all good citizens.‡

Decimus'  
edict.

At length on December 10, the new tribunes of the people took up office, and about the same time, Caius Antonius started with a noisy company of his friends for Macedonia, resolving to hasten his journey as much as possible. The new tribunes, however, in their turn, allowed several days to pass without action,

\* Cic. F. XI. vi. 2.

† Cicero, F. XI. vii. 1. On the question of the date of this letter and interview, which has given rise to much discussion, see Sternkopf in *Phil.* vol. lx. p. 297; he places the interview on December 12. If it be admitted that Cicero returned to Rome on November 27, the date may be anywhere within the first ten days of the month.

‡ Cic. F. XI. vii. 2.



and finally resolved to convoke the Senate for December 20, December,  
not for discussion upon the position of Antony or of Octavianus, 44 B.C.  
but to consider what measures were necessary to enable the

new consul to enter office without danger,\* as if the veterans still thronged the streets of Rome. People found it difficult to realise that the veterans had already gone. The same day, however, probably the 14th or 15th, it was learned at Rome that Decimus had published an edict declaring that he would not recognise Antony as governor of Gaul, and would continue to hold the province for the Senate.† This news made a great sensation at Rome, and Cicero, in particular, was extraordinarily disturbed. Should he pursue his intention of not reappearing in the Senate until January 1, or should he go to the session of the 20th? The friends and relatives of Octavianus strenuously urged him to appear; the discussion could not be confined to the colourless orders of the day as defined by the tribunes, and would deal with the edict of Decimus. In that case Cicero might lose the opportunity of some great exploit, even more glorious than his overthrow of Catiline, the opportunity of destroying Cæsar's party and finally restoring the republic. Every noble element in his ambitious character, his sense of duty to his country, his ideal love of the republic, and particularly his hatred of Antony and his affection for the many friends who had perished in the civil war or were in danger, urged him to act. The difficulties before him, however, were countless and the danger most serious.

Once more Cicero was overcome by his natural timidity, Cicero decides, as though he had a presentiment that his decision at this moment was a matter of life or death. His indecision was probably increased by the arguments of the agents, the friends and the relatives of Octavianus. The offers of alliance which the young man had made to Decimus might have conciliated the more mistrustful of his opponents; ‡ it seemed imprudent, when war was so probable, to reject the support which five

\* Cic. F. XI. vi. 2.

† Cicero, *Phil.* III. iv. 8; Appian, B. C. iii. 49, who says that Decimus thus acted in consequence of an order from the Senate, is directly contradicted by Cicero's third Philippic.

‡ Dion, xlv. 15.

December, 44 B.C. legions could provide ; on the other hand, it was a most serious matter to give official authority to a young man of twenty bearing Cæsar's name. Harassed by the difficulties of decision, Cicero was unable to make up his mind before the 19th ; on that day, however, he was bound to decide one way or the other. None the less, on the evening of the 19th, he still hesitated, and when he rose on the morning of the 20th, was not certain whether he would go to the session or not.\* This was the decisive hour of his life, the moment of supreme audacity, of final self-sacrifice, of permanent glory. That morning he took the decisive step ; at the age of sixty-two, more capable of wielding the pen than the sword, the leader of that political world in which equivocation had reigned supreme for eight months, he plunged into the vast and unknown dangers which barred the progress of his generation, with an audacity which can only be regarded as heroic when his natural timidity and the terrible uncertainty of the situation are remembered. He went to the Senate,† where Hirtius and Pansa, however, did not appear,‡ and delivered the third Philippic ; this was a moderate speech intended to try the nature of the ground, and proposed that the Senate should decree a eulogy to Decimus Brutus for his edict, to Octavianus for his enlistments, and to the two revolted legions for their rebellion. He also proposed that Pansa and Hirtius should be ordered to assign on January 1 the rewards to be given to those who had deserved well of the republic, from the leaders to the soldiers, and that this should be done before anything else ; finally he proposed that the distribution of the provinces as made by Antony on November 20 should be annulled, and that the governors now in office should be allowed to remain until the Senate could send successors.§ It was a clever speech, for it did not contemplate

\* This is shown by the passage in Cicero, F. XI. vi. 3. Cicero tells us it was only on the morning of the 20th, when he was seen going to the session, that any of the principal senators followed his example. Hence we may infer that on the preceding evening his mind had not been made up.

† Cicero, *Phil.* III. i. 1 ; V. xi. 30, says that he daily urged a convocation of the Senate ; but he contradicts himself in the more faithful and more sincere admission which he makes in F. XI. vi. 2.

‡ Cic. *Phil.* V. xi. 30.

\* Cic. *Phil.* III. xv. 37 ff.

either peace or war as necessary alternatives; Varius Cotila December, was the only senator who replied in a feeble speech, and as the 44 B.C. majority were anxious not to compromise themselves unduly, all these proposals were approved.\* The same day Cicero delivered his fourth Philippic to the people in which he repeated his proposals.

However, the first news of war began to arrive, if we may characterise as war a struggle in which the two adversaries were doing their best to avoid a collision. Antony and Brutus had begun to exchange letters, politely urging one another to yield for their respective benefit. Brutus had been requested by Antony to leave Cisalpine Gaul in virtue of the *lex de permutatione provinciarum*; Antony had been urged by Brutus to respect the province in the name of the Senate. Antony had then established his headquarters and the greater part of his army at Bologna and had allowed Decimus Brutus to lead his forces to Modena, and to make all arrangements for a long siege.† Neither was anxious to begin hostilities. Decimus did not feel strong enough to confront Antony's practised legions with his hastily recruited army; he wished to protract the struggle as much as possible, to give his friends at Rome time to send him reinforcements. Antony, on the other hand, though he might perhaps have surprised and crushed Decimus,‡ wished first to repair the losses which the revolt of the legions had caused, by organising a numerous army which would be useful whether civil war broke out, or whether some arrangement was secured. During the last ten days of December he sent a few troops to surround Modena and make a show of besieging the place; § while waiting at Bologna for the spring,

Outset of the  
Modena war.

\* Against the view of Nake and Bardt, who consider that they were not approved. See Cic. *Phil.* IV. ii. 6; IV. iv. 8; V. xi. 28; X. xi. 23; F. XII. xxii. 3. See also Sternkopf in *Phil.* vol. lx. p. 285 ff. Dion, xlv. 29, mistakes the date when the law upon the provinces was annulled.

† Appian, B. C. iii. 49.

‡ *Ibid.*

§ Cp. Dion, xlv. 36. He says that Brutus παντελῶς ἀπετειχίσθη, that is to say, was entirely blockaded only when Antony had given up hope of withdrawing the allegiance of his troops; on the other hand, Cicero, F. XII. v. 2, says that until the second half of February Antony's forces were all at Bologna and at Parma; he cannot, therefore, have spared many for the blockade of Modena.

December, he sent Lucius Piso to Macedonia to bring over the legion there  
44 B.C. stationed, and Ventidius Bassus with a large supply of money to southern Italy, where he was to recruit the veterans of Cæsar's Seventh and Eighth Legions, who had abandoned Octavianus, and also those of the Ninth Legion.

Antony's  
intrigues.

Thereupon, instead of attempting the immediate capture of Modena, he applied his energies to the task of gaining some hold upon Rome. He had not lost all hope of securing this object by political intrigue instead of war. As things had gone, Antony henceforward represented the traditions and interests of the Cæsarean party, to which a triumphant aristocratic restoration would be fatal. Thus the party which he had reorganised in June and July had every interest in preventing his fall. Even Fufius Calenus, who inclined to Antony's enemies upon several occasions during the preceding months, now joined Antony's side, possibly under the influence of very tangible arguments. He had given hospitality to Fulvia, \* and was preparing to lead the old Cæsareans in the Senate, together with all whom Antony had appointed as senators or had otherwise favoured. His purpose was to secure Italy, to prevent the despatch of reinforcements, to give Antony time for intrigue with Lepidus, Plancus and Pollio, and to await events. Antony had everything to gain by this policy. On the other hand, the interest of his enemies lay in crushing him without delay. For that reason the first news of the war was exaggerated at Rome by the irreconcilable conservatives, by the relatives of the conspirators and by the friends of Octavianus who were already encouraged by the session of December 20. It was said that Decimus had been enclosed in an iron circle; public opinion was frightened by these exaggerations and a general reaction in favour of Octavianus took place. It was asserted that Rome would have been pillaged by Antony if Octavianus had not seduced the legions; Octavianus was praised as the saviour of Rome; though a few days previously Cicero had modestly requested that his actions should not be considered ridiculous, all were now asserting that his audacity had been sublime; † the alliance between Octavianus and the conserva-

\* Cic. *Phil.* XII. i. 7.

† Cp. Cic. *ad Brut.* I. xv. 7; I. iii. 1.

Jan. 1-4,  
43 B.C.

tives against Antony was finally confirmed under the impression produced by this first and very exaggerated news from the seat of war. Octavianus was to take command of the army, while the conservatives would induce the Senate to provide the necessary money, to give him the dignity of a senator and proprætor, and the privilege of applying for the consulship eighteen years before the legal time. Marcellus and Philippus, Antony's fiercest enemies, induced two men of age and influence, Servius Sulpicius and Publius Servilius, to propose the grant of these gifts to Octavianus; \* Cicero was also induced to make a great speech in support of the proposal.

The fifth  
Philippic.

On January 1 of the year 43, at the first session of the Senate after the speeches of the new consuls Hirtius and Pansa, Fufius Calenus rose to speak; with great moderation he attempted to deprecate any serious view of the situation; he asserted that Antony did not wish for war, and finally proposed to send ambassadors to begin peace negotiations.† Servius Sulpicius and Publius Servilius then spoke; they proposed that Octavianus should be given the rank of proprætor, and the command of the army with which he had prevented Antony's proposed massacre; that he should be considered as a commander with the rank of prætor and should be eligible for offices as if he had already held a quæstorship. Then Cicero rose. It sometimes happens that men of letters, however timid, vacillating, or even indolent, may be inflamed by passion to the brilliancy, impetuosity, and indefatigable energy of heroes. A change of this nature had been at work in Cicero during the eleven days which had elapsed since the last session of the Senate. Overcoming his presentiments of evil, throwing aside all fear and hesitation, the author of *De Republica*, the philosophical doctrinaire, had realised that the conservative cause could only be defended by revolutionary methods. He proceeded to deliver the fifth Philippic, a furious attack upon Antony, in which he recklessly exaggerated all his shortcomings, declaring that it was not a matter of fighting Cæsar's party, but of opposing a band of brigands; he repeated the proposals of Servius and Servilius, and added suggestions of his own.

\* Cic. *ad Brut.* I. xv. 7.† Cic. *Phil.* V. ix. 25.



Jan. 1-4,  
43 B.C.

He urged that levies should be raised, that a *tumultus* and state of siege should be proclaimed, that a golden statue should be raised to Lepidus in recognition of his republican opinions, that Egnatuleius should be allowed to solicit office three years before the legal date,\* that the soldiers should be given the sums promised by Octavianus, while other rewards of land, money, and privileges should be held out to them. After this speech, the struggle between the two parties began. The declared friends of Antony were certainly not numerous in the Senate, but there were many eminent men, such as Piso and the two consuls,† who were opposed to war; the proposal of Calenus was thus calculated to win the favour of many. For this reason Antony's friends were able to prolong the discussion upon this first day, and to postpone a decision until the morrow.‡

The close of  
the debate.

The next day the debate was resumed; during the night, however, the more vigorous of the conservatives had arranged to secure a majority in this session, and the friends of Antony, fearing that they might be out-voted, succeeded in obtaining a postponement of the vote by the intervention of a tribune.§ This policy of obstruction infuriated the majority, which immediately retaliated by approving, though with some modifications, the honours requested for Octavianus. He was to be admitted to the Senate among the senators of consular and not of prætorian rank; he might apply for the consulship, not eighteen years, which seems exaggerated, but ten years before the legal time.|| Antony's partisans did not venture to veto these proposals, but spent the night in working for their friend, and went so far as to send the aged mother of Antony and Fulvia from house to house to use her influence with those senators who were hesitating.¶ On January 3 the discussion

\* Cic. *Phil.* V. xvii.-xix. 46-53; *Phil.* VI. i. 2.

† Dion, xlv. 35.

‡ Dion, xlv. 29; Appian, B. C. iii. 50.

§ Appian, B. C. iii. 50.

|| Mon. Anc. i. 3-5 (Lat.); i. 6-7 (Gr.); Appian, B. C. iii. 51; Livy, *Per.* cxviii. The statement of Dion, xlv. 29-41 is thus erroneous. Hence, according to Appian, these honours were approved on January 2; according to Dion, on January 3. See Groebe, *App. to Drumann*, G. R. 1<sup>2</sup> p. 443.

¶ Appian, B. C. iii. 51.

was resumed with increasing warmth. Cicero made another speech and was enthusiastically applauded by his friends who thus strove to bring over the waverers to their side; \* others also spoke, but once again no decision was secured for reasons unknown to us.† It was therefore necessary to meet again on the 4th and then, after a speech from Piso, a compromise was arranged; an embassy was to be sent out composed of Servius Sulpicius and Lucius Marcius Philippus, not to treat for peace, but to command Antony to leave Cisalpine Gaul, and to return to Italy; if he did not obey, the *tumultus* would be proclaimed. Meanwhile military preparations were to continue, and one of the consuls would take the supreme command of the army which Octavianus was already preparing at Arretium, and would lead it towards Gaul.‡ On the proposal of Lucius Cæsar, the agrarian law of Lucius Antonius was also revoked.§

January,  
43 B.C.

On the same day before an immense crowd in the forum, <sup>The sixth Philippic.</sup> Cicero delivered his sixth Philippic and gave an account of these events; he warned the people that war was inevitable and, in imitation of Aristotle's letter to the Greeks of Alexandria, he said that though other people might be able to live in slavery, Romans could not exist without their liberty.|| Thus, after five days' struggle, was concluded the first engagement in the Senate; this conflict was, as it were, the prologue to that civil war which was soon to break out in the valley of the Po. After this engagement, as is often the case, there was a short truce during which Hirtius, as appointed by lot, left Rome, though he was barely convalescent, to join Octavius; Pansa remained at Rome to recruit four new legions and to raise money if he could, while Cicero became, in fact if not in law, head of the republic. After the great speeches of December 20 and January 1 the audacious figure of the old orator stood out amidst the universal vacillation like a huge erratic boulder in the midst of a plain. He was requested upon every side to unmask dangers and to advise upon precautions, and was himself obliged to intervene

\* Appian, B. C. iii. 54.

† Cic. *Phil.* VI. i. 3.

‡ Cic. VI. iii. 9; VII. iv. 11-14; VII. ix. 26.

§ Cic. *Phil.* VI. v. 14.

|| Cic. *Phil.* VI. vii. 19.

January,  
43 B.C.

in public business to secure the execution of his decrees, which otherwise would have been dead letters. Thus, though upon his proposal the Senate had annulled the division of the provinces as arranged on November 27, Caius Antonius had already started for Macedonia, while Calvisius Sabinus had left Rome and was sending legates to his province. Cicero was on the alert and uttered several protests in the Senate against the usurpation of Calvisius, but was unable to secure the passing of any vigorous measure.\* He also maintained a voluminous correspondence with Octavianus. He realised that the responsibility for the extraordinary honours granted to the young man would rest upon himself, rather than upon Servilius and Sulpicius, in view of the great speech of January 1, when he had loudly eulogised Octavianus and guaranteed his action. He therefore attempted to exert some control over him, sending him an infinite number of letters full of wise advice, and thus indirectly assuming responsibility for the conduct of the war.

The seventh  
Philippic.

Such, indeed, was the general confusion that Cicero was forced to undertake the duties of many missing officers of state. These labours roused his energy, and his strength was redoubled by his enthusiasm. Never had he been forced to receive so many visitors, to read so many letters, or to make so many speeches,† but he felt his youthful powers revive and his indefatigable vigour grow daily stronger, while his enthusiasm became almost an obsession. Thus in the second half of January, when Pansa convoked the Senate to deal with certain administrative questions concerning the Appian Way, the coinage of money and the festival of the Luperalia, the old orator seized the opportunity in a violent speech, his seventh Philippic, to turn the energy of the Senate from the coinage to the inevitable war. "On no condition," said he, "will I make peace with Antony."‡ "If we cannot live in freedom, let us die."§ Unfortunately, this enthusiasm was by no means universal. The two consuls were writing friendly letters declaring themselves inclined for peace;|| senators

\* Cic. F. XII. xxv. 1; XII. xxx. 7. Cp. Cic. Phil. III. x. 26.

† Cic. F. X. xxviii. 3; *eram maximis occupationibus impeditus*.

‡ Cic. Phil. VII. iii. 8.

§ Cic. Phil. VII. v. 14.

|| Dión, xlv. 35.

who loudly praised Cicero's courage were secretly following the example of the consuls ; the ambassadors, who had accepted their mission as a means of concluding the long and wearying senatorial debates, were inclined to make their ultimatum an occasion for beginning negotiations for peace. The eldest of the three, Servius Sulpicius Rufus, was already ill and died upon the journey.\* Only Piso and Philippus appeared in Antony's camp, where they were able to see the extraordinary method of siege operations pursued by the man whom Cicero had described as a beast thirsting for Roman blood. He had extended his army from Claterna to Parma, and appeared purposely to be blockading the town with very few soldiers and with such feeble energy that provisions were constantly brought in.†

January,  
43 B.C.

Antony was waiting for spring and for reinforcements to begin the war in earnest if war should be necessary ; meanwhile he was attempting to increase his forces by proclaiming himself the avenger of Cæsar and the champion of his soldiers' rights. He had sent emissaries to the legions of Asinius,‡ and possibly also to the legion of Plancus in an attempt to secure their desertion by a promise of two thousand sesterces. He was also attempting by letters and messages, to induce Lepidus and Plancus to join him ; he was recruiting a new legion in Cisalpine Gaul, and had even sent agents into Modena to tell the soldiers of Decimus that he did not wish to fight with them, but only to punish Decimus Brutus, who had shared in the dictator's assassination. If they were willing to abandon Brutus and to make common cause with Cæsar's veterans, they would be rewarded.§ But all these manœuvres were secret and the ambassadors could only see the slackness with which Antony conducted the war. Philippus and Piso naturally did not wish to exasperate so agreeable an opponent. They introduced

The embassy  
to Antony.

\* Cic. *Phil.* IX. i. 1.

† Dion, xlv. 36.

‡ Cp. Cic. *F.* X. xxxii. 4.

§ This is shown by a comparison of Dion, lvi. 36 with Antony's letter to Hirtius and Octavianus. Cic. *Phil.* XIII. xvii. 35 ; *Nihil moror eos* (the soldiers in Modena) *salvos esse et ire quo lubet, si tantum modo patiuntur perire eum qui meruit* (Decimus Brutus). Cp. also Dion, xlv. 35.

February,  
43 B.C.

themselves with all the respect due to so great a personage, and instead of presenting the Senate's ultimatum, began a friendly discussion of the situation. Antony, on his side, was no less friendly, and if he did not authorise them to transmit the decisions of the Senate to Decimus Brutus, he none the less made reasonable proposals for peace.\* He was ready to give up Cisalpine Gaul, but wished to retain Transalpine Gaul for five years with the three legions which he had and with the three which Ventidius was recruiting; his actions and those of Dolabella, were not to be annulled; the *lex judiciaria* was not to be repealed, and there should be no inquiry into the sums taken from the treasury by the members of the commission entrusted with the execution of the agrarian law of Lucius; his six legions, his cavalry, and his Pretorian Cohort were to receive lands.† So true it is that Antony desired nothing more than to secure a rich province. Piso and Philippus went away delighted with his proposals and accompanied by Lucius Varius Cotila, who was to represent Antony during the negotiations. However, Hirtius and Octavianus left Arretium, crossed the Apennines, and reached Ariminum; they followed the Via Æmilia as far as Forum Corneli in the neighbourhood of Imola, where they encamped to wait for spring.‡ Hirtius even drove Antony's outposts from Claterna a few days later.§

Antony's  
proposals to  
the Senate.

The ambassadors reached Rome in the early days of February || and Pansa immediately convoked the Senate. Cicero had up-

\* Cicero himself recognises this fact; *Phil.* XII. v. 11; *videbantur . . . aliquo modo posse concedi.*

† *Cic. Phil.* VIII. viii.-ix.

‡ *Dion.* xlv. 35.

§ Cicero, *Phil.* VIII. ii. 6. The ancient Claterna is the modern Quaderna, nineteen kilometres from Bologna, where Professor Brizio made interesting excavations in 1890. See E. Rosetti, *La Romagna*, Milan, 1894, p. 625.

|| It seems to me that the date of the tenth Philippic is reasonably placed in the Ides of February by Schmidt; *De epistolis et a Cassio et ad Cassium datis*, p. 27, provided that the date be accepted only as approximate. The arguments of Ganter, *Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie und Pädagogik*, 1894, p. 613 ff., are very ingenious and in a large degree acceptable; they seem, however, to me to leave too little intervening time between events, and his theory will not hold water unless we admit that such great events as the revolution of Brutus in Macedonia occurred with mathematical exactitude. It is better, in my opinion, to leave a little more room for the unforeseen and to place the dates a little further apart; the more so as the tenth



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braided the two ambassadors in his private letters,\* and trusted that this session would be decisive. Considering, in fact, that a speech was hardly necessary, he briefly stated his opinion and declared that as Antony had not obeyed the Senate, he should be declared *hostis*.† In his enthusiasm, however, he was mistaken as to the intentions of the rest. A large number of the consulars no longer despaired of an understanding with Antony after this embassy; ‡ Fufius Calenus proposed to send fresh ambassadors; Lucius Cæsar, Antony's aged uncle, was perhaps persuaded by his friends to urge a modification of Cicero's proposal; he wished for a declaration, not of war, but of the *tumultus*, which would be an admission that public order was disturbed, but not that civil war had actually broken out. Pansa, who was constantly paying court to the Cæsareans, and who was even anxious to submit a law to the *comitia centuriata*, to confirm Cæsar's decisions,§ supported the proposal of Lucius Cæsar, and led the debate with such dexterity that the measure was approved.|| Cicero in exasperation, prepared for a more vigorous attack in the next day's session, at which Pansa was to communicate the despatch of Hirtius upon the skirmish of Claterna, and to propose a measure for restoring to the people of Marseilles the territory which Cæsar had taken from them in 49,¶ and which they had continually reclaimed during the last few months. Without confining himself to this question, Cicero pronounced the eighth Philippic; he criticised the deliberations of the previous day; pointed out that a war and not the *tumultus* was the question at issue, made a violent attack upon Calenus, two consulars and the ambassadors, and predicted confiscations and massacres if Antony

Philippic might very well have been delivered about the middle of February, and not upon the fourth.

\* Cic. F. XII. iv. 1.

† We have no speech delivered by Cicero in this session, in which, however, *dixit sententiam*: Phil. VIII. i. 1; *victa est . . . propter verbi asperitatem . . . nostra sententia*.

‡ Cic. F. X. xxviii. 3; *habemus fortem senatum, consulares partim timidos, partim male sentientes*. F. XII. v. 3: *partim inertes, partim improbos*: Cic. Phil. VIII. vii. 20.

§ Cic. Phil. X. viii. 17; cp. XIII. xv. 31.

|| Cic. Phil. VIII. i. 1.

¶ Cic. Phil. VIII. vi. 18.

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gained the upper hand. He also regretted that such culpable inaction should allow the zeal of Italy and the Gallic towns to cool, favourably inclined as they were to the Senate. In conclusion he proposed that Antony's soldiers should be given the opportunity of leaving him until March 18, after which date they should be considered as rebels. This vehement speech proved effective and the proposal was passed. Pansa, however, who possibly wished to compensate the conservatives whom he had betrayed the preceding day, advanced another proposal; he urged that a small funeral monument should be raised to Servius Sulpicius at the expense of the State and an equestrian statue in the forum, as was usual in the case of ambassadors who had been killed in the service of their embassy. Servilius, however, who was a scrupulous adherent to small points of law, objected that Servius had not been killed but had died of illness. Thereupon the enthusiastic orator delivered the ninth Philippic in support of Pansa's proposal, arguing with considerable sophistry that the causes of his death and not the nature of it were the question at issue. Nothing was decided upon the question of Marseilles.\*

The situation  
at Modena.

As a matter of fact, Cicero was the only man with a whole-hearted desire for war. The rest spoke with hypocritical reserve, or acted under the secret determination that matters should not be driven to extremities. So much is true, not only of Hirtius but of Octavianus himself, though he would gladly have seen Antony crushed and though his arrival at the seat of war made the position most unfavourable to Antony. With three legions and one cohort, Antony was now besieging two legions of veterans and five legions of new recruits; at the same time he had to oppose an army of four legions of veterans and one legion of new recruits; if Hirtius and Octavianus attacked he would be caught between their forces and those of Decimus, and would be crushed, or forced to flee northward.† None

\* This is proved by Antony's letter to Hirtius and Octavianus, written in March. *Cic. Phil.* XIII. xv. 32: *Massiliensibus jure belli adempta reddituros vos pollicemini*. It is reasonable to assume with Ganter, *Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie und Pädagogik*, 1894, p. 616, that the 8th and 9th Philippics were delivered on the same day.

† Cicero, *F.* XII. v. 2, however, rightly points out that in February

the less, after the skirmish of Claternum, Hirtius and Octavianus had led back their soldiers to the camp and had remained inactive; Antony had paralysed both them and Decimus with the sight of what was then the Head of Medusa for every politician of the day, the vengeance to be taken for Cæsar's murder. The feeling of the veterans throughout Italy had again become so favourable to Antony that Ventidius had been able without difficulty to re-enlist almost all the disbanded soldiers of the seventh, eighth and ninth legions, so that there were then two legions known as the seventh and two known as the eighth legion of Cæsar; these were the legions of Ventidius and of Octavianus. At this moment the favour of the veterans was worth as much to Antony as the command of a large army. Decimus, disturbed by the secret intrigues of Antony, was too much occupied with the task of preventing a revolt among his soldiers \* to venture any attack; Hirtius, weakened by disease, would not venture to cross swords with his old friend, who was besieging Decimus to avenge their common benefactor; Octavianus was also intimidated by the vague danger of a military revolt, and was embarrassed by the inactivity of Hirtius; in complete indecision, he spent the time in his favourite literary exercises, writing and declaiming the whole day.†

A few days later, however, public attention at Rome was diverted from Modena by a bolt from the blue. One day towards the middle of February, the senators were unexpectedly informed that Pansa had convoked the Senate for the following day; letters of such importance had been received from Brutus that the matter could not possibly be postponed.‡ The Senate was thronged the following day, and amid general amazement letters were read containing the following incredible narrative. Brutus had reached Athens in the autumn, had taken up his quarters with a friend and proceeded, like any private individual, to attend the lectures of two philosophers,

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43 B.C.

Marcus Brutus  
in Macedonia.

Antony was at the mercy of Decimus Brutus, of Hirtius, and of Octavianus.

\* Dion, xlv. 36.

† Suet. *Aug.* 84.

‡ Cic. *Phil.* X. i. 1.

February, Theomnestes and Cratippus, with many other young Roman  
43 B.C. students ; \* these included Cnaeus Domitius Ahenobarbus, Cicero's son, and a young man of twenty, a native of Venusia, by name Quintus Horatius Flaccus. The father of this latter was an honourable and intelligent freedman ; his profession as a customs official had enabled him to save some money ; he had bought a little estate and as he took great pride in his son, had sent him to study at Athens. These young men, who were almost all members of noble families, had extended the warmest of welcomes to the tyrannicide ; he had been welcomed with equal readiness by Athens, the decadent republic which showered its honours readily upon every distinguished guest. The feeling of this party soon grew warm and a revolutionary conspiracy was hatched amid their regrets, their enjoyments, and their conversations. Who first mooted the idea will never be known ; it is not probable that Brutus was the author, † though he was eventually obliged to lead the movement. His personal authority, the part that he had played in the conspiracy, and finally an incident which occurred shortly after his arrival, obliged him to take the lead whether he would or no. The younger men among the friends of Brutus had heard that Trebonius was sending sixteen thousand talents from Asia to Rome, ‡ and that the official in charge of this tribute would touch at Greece. They pointed out to Brutus the necessity of intercepting this sum, which would certainly fall into the hands of their enemies when it reached Italy ; they further explained that he alone had the necessary authority to induce the messenger of Trebonius to hand over the treasure. Brutus was persuaded ; he met the envoy in Eubœa, and induced him to hand over the money ; § but once in possession of this large sum, he felt bound to use it in the interests of the conservative party.

Brutus takes  
the offensive.

At this moment, in November of the year 44, Dolabella was hurrying through Macedonia with furious speed ; part of his cavalry were ordered to precede him ; he had one legion

\* Plut. *Brut.* 24.

† Cp. Boissier, *Cicéron et ses amis*, Paris, 1902, p. 370.

‡ About £320,000.

§ Plut. *Brut.* 24.

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43 B.C.

with him, and the cavalry which remained had been ordered to follow him to Asia in two detachments.\* As soon as Dolabella had gone, the young friends of Brutus began to bribe the soldiers with the money of Trebonius; Domitius won over a body of cavalry, while a certain Cinna seems to have induced another body to join Brutus; Cicero's son also induced the last Macedonian legion to declare for Brutus, the legion which the legate of Marcus Antonius had come to take over.† Thus in December Brutus found himself at the head of a small army and surrounded by a band of young admirers, among whom was Horace; with these he had gone to Thessalonica, where Hortensius, the governor of Macedonia, who had no troops at his command, had recognised Brutus as his successor. Brutus had even sent troops without delay to seize the arsenal which Cæsar had established at Demetrias and, with the help of Hortensius, attempted to recruit a fresh legion from the numerous veterans of Pompey who had remained in Macedonia and Thessaly after the battle of Pharsalia.‡ In the midst of these preparations in the early days of January, he heard that Caius Antonius, the new governor of Macedonia, had disembarked at Dyrrachium.§ Fearing that Caius Antonius would make war upon him in concert with Vatinius, the governor of Illyria, who was a Cæsarean, Brutus forthwith braved the rigours of winter with his little army and by forced marches traversed the two hundred and seventy miles which separate Thessalonica from Dyrrachium, reaching the shore of the Adriatic about January 20. || Fortunately for him, Vatinius was ill; he was also an incompetent commander and detested by his soldiers, while after Cæsar's death he had been unable to prevent a general revolt of the population of Illyria, who declined to pay further tribute; he had lost five cohorts in an ambush and his army, which had received no pay, was in a state of complete exasperation.¶ The arrival of Brutus and his supplies of money produced a revolt; two of the three legions of Vatinius went over

\* Dion. xlvii. 26 and 29; Cic. *Phil.* X. vi. 13; Plut. *Brut.* 25.

† Cic. *Phil.* X. vi. 13.

‡ Dion. xlvii. 21; Plut. *Brut.* 25.

§ Plut. *Brut.* 25; Dion. xlvii. 21.

|| Ganter, *Neue Jahrb. für Phil. u. Päd.*, 1895, p. 620 ff.

¶ Appian, iii. 13.



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43 B.C.

to the side of Cæsar's murderer; the other had followed Caius Antonius, who was attempting to retreat towards Epirus. He, however, had lost three cohorts on the road, and eventually had thrown himself into Apollonia with the remaining seven, where Brutus was besieging him. Brutus concluded his despatch with the request that his actions should receive the approval of the Senate.\*

The tenth  
Philippic.

The sensation produced in Rome by this news can well be imagined. Its importance was in fact enormous, for it did more than any victory to raise the courage of the conservative party. The military command and the government of the province had been overthrown by a fugitive from Italy with a few ships, a few friends, and a hundred thousand sesterces borrowed from Atticus; the fact demonstrated to the conservative party their error in believing that every arm of the service was so thoroughly imbued with the Cæsarean spirit as never to be likely to serve themselves. Now they had an army at their disposal composed of troops both tried and faithful. For similar reasons this news shattered the confidence of Antony's friends. During the night they hastily resolved upon a desperate effort to prevent any approval of the acts of Brutus by the Senate. The following morning after the despatches from Macedonia had been read, Calenus requested to speak; he began by warmly praising the style of the despatch;† he proceeded to explain that it was impossible to approve Brutus' action because it was illegal; he also tried once more to use the veterans as a threat, asserting that they had no confidence in Marcus Brutus; if the Senate yielded to his demands, it would run the risk of alienating the sympathies of the veterans entirely.‡ Cicero, however, delivered the tenth Philippic, an emphatic eulogy of the revolution which Brutus had accomplished; he had no difficulty in securing the approval of a proposal to invest Brutus with pro-consular command over Macedonia, Illyria, and Greece, coupled with a recommendation that he should remain in the neighbourhood of Italy.§ More serious

\* Cic. *Phil.* X. vi. 13; Liv. *Per.* 118; Dion, xlvii. 21; Plut. *Brut.* 26; Appian, B. C. iii. 79; iv. 75.

† Cic. *Phil.* X. ii. 5.

‡ Cic. *Phil.* X. vii. 15.

§ Cic. *Phil.* X. xi. 25-26.

was the fact that probably in that same session the Senate was encouraged by the success of Brutus to annul all Antony's laws.\* March,  
43 B.C.

While this news revived the courage of the conservatives, Dolabella. it also spurred Antony and his friends to redoubled activity. The probability of a compromise was, indeed, vastly diminished and preparations must be made for a struggle. Antony was beginning to lose hope in the possibility of inducing the legions of Decimus to revolt; towards the end of February he left Bologna and concentrated his forces about Modena, intending to begin a strict blockade; he ordered Ventidius Bassus who was moving upon Ancona, to bring up his three legions quickly; in short, he resolved to begin the war in earnest, and to capture Modena.† At the same time, his friends redoubled their efforts at Rome to hinder the departure of Pansa, who was preparing with great deliberation to lead reinforcements to Modena. At that moment, at the outset of March, probably on the 1st or 2nd, news arrived that Dolabella had entered Asia with his legion and his body of cavalry, had treacherously seized the person of Trebonius at Smyrna, and had put him to death after torturing him for two days to discover the whereabouts of the money.‡ This, at any rate, was the account of the despatches, though they may intentionally have exaggerated Dolabella's wickedness. The loss of the province of Asia, the richest source of wealth to Rome, was a misfortune for the conservative party; but it was counterbalanced by the atrocity of this murder which raised a storm of public indignation and consequently injured Antony's cause, for every one knew that he was in concert with Dolabella, and many even accused him of instigating this murder. Calenus, with his usual dexterity, attempted to make capital even from this incident; at the next meeting of the Senate, he delivered a violent speech against Dolabella, asserting that he was ready to declare him a public enemy; § at the same time he proposed that the

\* Cp. Cic. *Phil.* XII. v. 2. On the question of the date, see Lange, *Römische Altertümer*, Berlin, 1871, iii. 515. † Dion, xlv. 36.

‡ Dion, xlvii. 29; Livy, *Ep.* 119; Appian, B. C. iii. 26; Orosius, VI. xviii. 6; Cic. *Phil.* XI. ii. 4; iii. 9.

§ Cic. *Phil.* XI. vi. 15.

March,  
43 B.C.

conduct of operations against him should be entrusted to the two consuls when they had relieved Modena.\* By means of this speech, Antony's party disavowed the compromising connection with Dolabella, and attempted to hamper the action of the consuls by thus authorising them to make preparations for a new war. The proposal roused keen opposition; other senators demanded that a general with an extraordinary command should be sent against Dolabella.† Cicero advanced a yet more audacious proposal, which was the subject of his eleventh Philippic; he urged that the war against Dolabella should be entrusted to Cassius, together with the pro-consulship of Syria, including powers over Asia, Bithynia and Pontus. As yet, he knew nothing definite concerning the movements of Cassius, but in his excitement at the favourable news from Brutus, he felt no doubt that Cassius had also succeeded in the project which he had formed upon leaving Italy, and in support of his proposal he boldly asserted that Cassius was already master of Syria, that he had already recovered Asia, and that official news of this success would soon be at hand.‡ However, upon this occasion Pansa, who supported the conservatives but did not wish to see them too powerful, offered a vigorous opposition, and prevented a vote upon the question. Cicero then sought to overpower the hesitation of the Senate by raising a popular outcry; he induced a tribune to convene a popular meeting, and again explained his plan amid loud applause. Pansa, however, intervened, and renewed his opposition, stating that the proposal was displeasing to the mother of Cassius, to his sisters and to Servilia.§ After several days of lengthy discussion, the proposal of Calenus was eventually adopted.|| Cicero, in exasperation with Pansa, again accused him of betraying the conservative cause; this charge was not entirely unjustified; the cunning consul, who did not desire to see the conservatives masters of the situation, had refused for some time to send Brutus a detachment of the

\* Cic. *Phil.* XI. ix. 21 ff.

† Cic. *Phil.* XI. vii. 16 ff.

‡ Cic. *Phil.* XI. xi. 26 ff.

§ Cic. *F.* XII. vii. 1.

|| Cic. *F.* XII. xiv. 4: *Consulibus decreta est Asia*: Dion, xlvii.

new recruits levied in Italy, and also attempted to prevent many people, especially the young men of the leisured classes, from going to serve under the orders of the leader of the conspiracy; \* however, many went, including Marcus Valerius Messala Corvinus, the sons of Lucullus, of Cato, of Hortensius, and of Bibulus.

This failure somewhat discouraged the old orator and correspondingly roused the energy of Antony's friends, who straightway attempted a fresh manœuvre. On March 7 or 8, Antony's best friends were suddenly seen with sad and gloomy countenances talking together in groups, receiving and despatching messages in haste, and asking individual senators what they would do if Antony were to raise the siege of Modena. Everybody believed that Antony was resuming his pacific attitude; Pansa was anxious to begin immediate negotiations for peace, and exhaustion robbed Cicero himself for the moment of his usual penetration. There was a moment of general hesitation; and the Senate resolved to send a fresh embassy to Antony composed of five members of all parties, including Cicero himself.† However, Octavius, fearing that Modena would fall, induced Hirtius, who still hesitated, to leave his winter quarters, to seize Bologna, and advance to Panaro in sight of Modena, in order to encourage Decimus by their presence,‡ though no attack upon Antony was proposed. Neither party would begin vigorous action. Their embarrassments were increasing, for the events of Macedonia, the repeal of Antony's laws, and the decisions of the Senate on the subject of Marcus Brutus, decisively confirmed Antony's accusations, that Hirtius and Octavianus were defending the cause of Cæsar's murderers against the cause of the veterans. Octavianus decided to pacify the scruples of the Cæsareans among his soldiers by a promise of twenty thousand sesterces apiece instead of two thousand;§ but notwithstanding this magnificent present,

\* Cicero, *ad Brut.* II. vi. 1. I may here point out, once for all, that the two letters *ad Brut.* II. iii. and v., are two parts of one letter written by Brutus to Cicero on April 1, and that the two letters *ad Brut.* II. iv. and vi., are two parts of the same answer written on April 12.

† Cic. *Phil.* XI. i. 1 ff.

‡ Dion, xlv. 36.

§ Dion, xlv. 35.

March,  
43 B.C.

Hirtius and  
Antony.

March, he did not venture to lead them out to battle; instead  
 43 B.C. of attacking Antony, he began almost to flatter him, in conjunction with Hirtius. Thus Hirtius, who might have cut Antony's communications with his friends at Rome from his position at Bologna, was so unusually kind as to send to Rome all the letters of Antony which he intercepted.\* When he and Octavianus learned on the 12th that a new embassy to Antony had been despatched from Rome, they hastily wrote him a most obsequious letter. They referred to the death of Trebonius, and to the horror which it had caused; they informed him that the senators had resolved to send a new embassy; they almost apologised for their opposition, stating that their object was not to injure him or to help Decimus, but merely to save such of Cæsar's soldiers as were besieged in Modena; they begged him not to force them to begin the attack, for they were not his enemies and would leave him in peace if he would raise the siege of Modena, or simply allow corn to be brought into the town.† It was impossible to be more conciliatory; they might have crushed him; yet they begged him to be reasonable, and to be kind enough to allow provisions to enter Modena while awaiting the arrival of the ambassadors.

Antony's reply  
 to Hirtius and  
 Octavianus.

Antony, however, who understood the reasons for this moderation, seized the opportunity to proclaim himself once again to the soldiers of Hirtius and Octavianus as the one and only avenger of Cæsar's murder; he replied in a violently insulting letter, which has come down to us and shows that Antony possessed remarkable literary talent, if indeed he was actually its author. In this letter he eulogised the assassination of Trebonius as a magnificent exploit, and declared that he would remain faithful to Dolabella to the last in his desire to punish Cæsar's murderers; he reproached Hirtius and Octavianus with treachery

\* Appian, B. C. iii. 48. He is wrong, however, regarding the date of the increased offer when he puts it before the senatorial vote of January 2. This is an obvious mistake, as otherwise the subsequent friction between Octavianus and the Senate would never have occurred respecting the sum due to the soldiers, of which we shall speak in the next chapter.

† The contents of this letter can be deduced from Antony's reply, fragments of which are given in the 13th Philippic.



March,  
43 B.C.

to the Cæsarean cause and with their support of the murderers and of the party who wished to rob the veterans of their reward ; he declared himself ready to permit the soldiers to leave Modena if they would surrender Decimus, stating that Lepidus and Plancus were in full agreement with him ; he expressed his willingness to receive the ambassadors if they came, as his desires for peace were unchanged, but added that he did not think their arrival probable. Hirtius and Octavianus accepted this insulting letter and contented themselves with sending it to Rome ; by the time of its arrival on the 18th or 19th, some of Antony's prophecies had already come to pass. The embassy had been annulled, probably between the 10th and 14th ; Antony's friends were too busy to make any demonstration of delight. Cicero and the rest realised that they had been duped ; \* treachery was already whispered at Rome, and at the next meeting of the Senate Cicero had already delivered the twelfth Philippic, in which he admitted that he had been deceived. The Senate had revoked its earlier decision. However, with the return of the fine weather, letters from the provinces began to come in more frequently, and as Pansa had no fresh pretext for delay, he was obliged to fix his departure for March 19. On that day, however, before starting, he presided at a session of the Senate, where letters were read from Cornificius, in which he complained of the difficulties thrown in his way by the legates of Calvisius. The Senate ordered that the governor of Numidia, T. Sestius, should provide Cornificius with one legion to re-establish order, and that he should send two other legions to Italy to support the operations about Modena ; when, however, the Senate proposed to punish the pretended legates of Calvisius, Pansa objected.† He then started at the head of four new legions, taking the Via Cassia in order to avoid Ventidius ; this route passed by Fiesole and the Apennines, and joined the Via Æmilia below Bologna. Added to the three legions of Octavianus and the four of Decimus, there were now fourteen legions on foot which had been newly recruited or re-enlisted within a few months ; the thirty-six legions which Cæsar had left had become fifty

\* Cic. *Phil.* XII. vii. 18.

† Cic. *F.* XII. xxv. 1.

April,  
43 B.C.

within Italy itself, which had furnished no soldiers for so long a time. It seemed as if the military energies of the Italian people were about to revive. The example of Cæsar's soldiers, who had grown wealthy in war, and the dangerous illusion of chimerical hopes added to constant poverty, attracted to the army many artisans who could find no work at Rome or near the towns, many young colonists who were weary of their fathers' poverty, and many more of the working classes reduced to desperation by debt. The political rivalries of the Roman oligarchy provided their only means of livelihood at this crisis. No one, however, asked how the rapidly increasing expense of these preparations was to be met, and there was some difficulty in finding weapons for so many soldiers. In Antony's camp, for instance, the new recruits from Cisalpine Gaul were without weapons; Antony had thought for a moment of sending for munitions from Demetrias,\* while Pansa was obliged to recruit all the armourers he could discover in Rome.†

The thirteenth  
Philippic.

The situation, however, remained extremely uncertain. In the absence of the consuls, the prætor Aulus Cornutus on March 20 read letters from Lepidus and Plancus to the Senate expressing their great desire for the restoration of peace. Plancus in particular had written most prudently, urging C. Furnius, the bearer of his despatch, to add the most explicit declaration of his loyalty to the constitution.‡ Everybody knew that Lepidus was on Antony's side; but the two men were attempting to blind the eyes of every party and to avoid compromise with either. Lepidus indeed, had done more; he had re-enlisted the tenth and sixteenth legions, which Cæsar had established at Narbonne and at Arles, and was also forming a third legion, of what soldiers we do not know.§ He had even sent reinforcements to Modena, under Marcus Junius Silanus, the son of Servilia and consequently his brother-in-law; this officer had received most equivocal orders, capable of interpretation in a sense opposed to Antony.|| Exasperated by these letters, every line of which betrayed an anxiety to

\* Plut. *Brut.* 25.

† Cic. *Phil.* VII. iv. 13.

‡ Cic. *F.* X. vi. 1.

§ Kromayer in *Hermes*, vol. xxxi. p. 1 ff.

|| Dion, xlv. 38.

April,  
43 B.C.

avoid decision, and feeling that they would encourage the vacillation of the Senate, Cicero strove to rouse the Senate to war and to secure the decree of the honours for Sextus Pompeius by means of the thirteenth Philippic, a masterpiece of furious and tremendous eloquence. Then he wrote two very curt and cutting epistles to Plancus and Lepidus.\* He wondered whether any one would attempt to raise further obstacles in the way. However, the last days of March and the first of April were days of uneasiness and anxiety for every one. No one knew what was happening about Modena, or what Dolabella and Cassius were doing in the east. Rome was from time to time in despair; Modena was thought to be at the last gasp and it was said that the consuls were betraying the Senate.† Cicero was forced to assume an outward calm in public, to reassure everybody, and to display an assurance which he probably did not himself possess. On April 7,‡ further letters from Plancus were read to the Senate;§ on learning that Pansa's reinforcements were actually starting, he had hastened to say that his republican sentiments had hitherto been concealed in order to secure the fidelity of his legions, which Antony was attempting to seduce. When Cicero proposed to confer certain honours upon him, the question was vehemently debated for two days in the Senate, because Servilius, with obstinate hatred, declined to give honours to one of Cæsar's former partisans.||

Fortunately, on April 9, good news from Cassius came in from different quarters. He had disembarked in the province of Asia in advance of Dolabella, had received money from Trebonius, and a detachment of cavalry sent in advance by Dolabella had also been surrendered to him by Lentulus, whom he had intercepted. He had then recruited fresh troops in Asia, collected money and invaded Syria, where the five legions of the governors of Syria and Bithynia, who were then besieging Cæcilius Bassus at Apamea, had gone over to him, an example speedily followed by the legion of Cæcilius Bassus. Thus

Despatches  
from Cassius  
and Brutus.

\* Cic. F. X. vi. ; F. X. xxvii.

† Cic. *ad Brut.* II. i. 1.

§ Cic. F. X. 8.

‡ Cic. F. X. xii. 2-3.

|| Cic. F. X. xii. 3-4.

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the conservative party had now a fresh army in the east, and Dolabella was ruined. On the other hand, two days after this good news, Cicero received a strange letter from Brutus, dated April 1. The famous conspirator displayed alarm, and asked for advice; as he had lost Asia and its subsidies, he was without money, for the sixteen thousand talents were exhausted; he added that he thought the information from Cassius should only be published after mature reflection; he finally admitted that he did not know how to deal with Caius Antonius, the brother of Marcus, who had surrendered to him a short time before at Apollonia. The prayers of Caius had "touched him too deeply." \* The fact is, that Brutus was a scholar who had drifted into a life of action; his power of penetration was of the lowest order, and whilst he amused himself by striking coins ornamented with the Phrygian cap, with daggers and with the inscription *Eid-Mar* (Ides of March), the clever Caius Antonius had befooled him with a thousand flatteries and was attempting to embroil him with Cicero, telling him that Cicero was reducing the Cæsareans to despair, and destroying every possibility of an understanding; that it was absurd to trust to Octavianus instead of attempting to secure an arrangement with Mark Antony. In short, he had aroused the old mistrust of the conspirator for Cæsar's son. Thus the feeble Brutus had become his friend, and had even begun to think of an alliance with Antony against Octavianus; one of his actions he did not dare to repeat to Cicero; he had given Caius a command as governor of Illyria in place of Vatinius. Cicero sent a dry answer the next day, stating that there was no money to send, and that no more soldiers could be enlisted; that he must keep Caius Antonius as a hostage until Decimus was relieved; † that as for the news from Cassius, it should be published far and wide and that secrecy was out of place.

The following morning, however, April 13, Cicero received a yet greater surprise in the Senate; two messages, one from Caius Antonius, and the other from Brutus, had arrived that

Tension  
between  
Brutus and  
Cicero.

\* Cic. *ad Brut.* II. v. 2.

† Cicero's letters *ad Brut.* II. iv. and II. vi. are one reply which has been divided into two letters.

morning, and had been brought directly to the Senate, before they could be delivered as usual for Cicero or some other leading man to read. In these letters Caius demanded peace for himself and his brother; and Brutus not only recommended the Senate to welcome this request but had allowed Caius to style himself pro-consul at the head of his letter. Cicero, though utterly astounded, was able to control himself; but on the conclusion of the session he held a hurried conference with other senators, and an extreme measure was resolved. The next day the senator Labeo declared that he had carefully examined the seals of Brutus' despatch, and was certain that they were forgeries. The same day Cicero wrote a long letter to Brutus couched in polite but determined language; he told him everything and hinted that Labeo's statement must not be denied; he finally informed him that in a war where victory and death were the only alternatives, relentless energy and not feeble moderation was the quality desired.\* This was a warning which Brutus was soon able to appreciate; for Caius Antonius returned his kindness by attempting to raise his soldiers in revolt against him, though the plot was fortunately discovered and crushed in time.†

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On the same April 14 or the following day, for the date is not precisely known,‡ the two armies at length met at Castelfranco, then known as Forum Gallorum. Antony had no great forces at his disposal, but sure of the support of Lepidus after Silvanus had brought his soldiers, and confident in his prestige as Cæsar's avenger, he ventured to take the offensive. Some time before, he had left part of his troops to continue the siege of Modena, and had pitched his camp near that of Hirtius and Octavianus, whom he harassed by skirmishes; but upon the approach of Ventidius, when he knew that Pansa was about to leave Bologna to rejoin Hirtius and Octavianus, he conceived the idea of attacking him on the road, arranging for his brother Lucius to distract the attention of Hirtius and

The battle of  
Forum  
Gallorum

\* This is Cicero's letter *ad Brut.* II. 7. I think, with Gurlitt, that it was written on the 14th, not on the 19th as the MSS. give it, nor on the 16th, as Schmidt and Meyer suppose. Cp. *Supp. Phil.* iv. 564.

† App. B. C. iv. 79; Dion, xlvii. 23.

‡ See Cic. F. X. xxx. 1; Ovid, *Fast.* iv. 625.



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Octavianus by a feint upon their camp. Hirtius, however, had sent a certain Galba to meet Pansa and urge him to haste; he suspected Antony's intentions and during the night of the 13th and 14th sent Carfulenus to meet him with the Martian legion and two Pretorian cohorts. Carfulenus passed Forum Gallorum during the night and continued his march to meet Pansa; some hours later, Antony, who was unaware of this movement, reached the spot, and concealed two legions and two Pretorian cohorts in Forum Gallorum; he then sent his light cavalry and infantry along the Via Æmilia to meet Pansa. This plan was successful, but he drew on the attack, not of one or two legions of recruits as he thought, but of the twelve veteran cohorts under Carfulenus, who was marching at the head of the army some distance from the new legions. As the Via Æmilia runs between woods and marshes, it was impossible to come to close quarters for a time; but in the neighbourhood of Forum Gallorum the ground becomes more open, and the twelve cohorts then deployed in battle array; thereupon Antony's cohorts left the village and attacked the Martian legion. A fierce engagement took place. Pansa ordered two of the four new legions to throw up a hasty encampment and sent on the two remaining legions as reinforcements; he also sent out messengers to Hirtius asking for support and himself entered the thickest of the fight. The new legions, however, proved useless; Cæsar's Pretorian cohort was destroyed, and Pansa was wounded; the Martian legion was also obliged to retire upon the camp pursued by the enemy, and lost a great number of veterans and recruits. Antony's soldiers were rejoicing in their complete victory; but when they had obliged the enemy's army to take refuge in the camp, Hirtius suddenly appeared with two legions of veterans in the afternoon as they were retiring upon Modena in exhaustion; it was impossible to begin a new battle against fresh troops, and the two legions scattered in disorder throughout the forests and marshes of the neighbourhood. Fortunately nightfall and the want of cavalry had prevented Hirtius from pursuing the fugitives, and during the night, Antony collected them with his cavalry, and brought them back to their encamp-

ment at Modena. Octavianus, meanwhile, had successfully defended the camp against the feints of Lucius. This was his first deed of arms, and though a matter of no great difficulty, secured for him an ovation from the army, which the two consuls also received.\* Thus neither party was able to claim a complete victory.

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Great was the anxiety at Rome. About the 17th or 18th a rumour was current that the senatorial army had been annihilated.† Eventually despatches from Hirtius came in. Antony's partisans shut themselves up in their houses in despair; a great popular demonstration took place before Cicero's house; he was escorted to the Capitol and obliged to make a speech amid loud applause;‡ many of the usually prudent or apathetic citizens were now carried away by the popular enthusiasm and demonstrated their hatred of Antony. In the session of April 21, Cicero delivered the fourteenth and last Philippic, in which he demanded that a supplication of forty days should be decreed, a monument erected to the soldiers who had fallen in the battle, and that their parents should be given the sums and privileges promised to the senatorial army. Every one believed that the conservative party had won a great victory. The engagement, however, had not been decisive; Antony had become more prudent after this check and kept his army within the camp to continue the siege; Ventidius was approaching on the Via Æmilia in the rear of Hirtius and Octavianus. They had been emboldened by the knowledge that their veterans would fight, and resolved upon April 21 to try and break the investing lines in order to send a convoy of provisions into the town. Antony first sent out his cavalry to drive them back, and supported this force with two legions. Hirtius took advantage of the opportunity to attack with the Fourth Legion the camp which was defended by the Fifth Legion, while Decimus Brutus at length ventured to send a few cohorts out of Modena under the command of Pontius Aquila. Two terrible conflicts then took place in the camp and the trenches. Hirtius and Pontius Aquila were

The battle of  
Modena.

\* Cic. F. X. xxx. ; Dion, xlvi. 37 ; Appian, B. C. iii. 67-70.

† Cic. *ad Brut.* I. iii. 2.

‡ *Ibid.*

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killed, and the Fourth Legion was in retreat when Octavianus came up to its support; the battle was renewed with such fury that Octavianus found himself in the forefront of the fray, and was forced to fight like a common soldier. He recovered the body of Hirtius, but was unable to retain his hold on the camp, and gave orders for retreat. The soldiers of Decimus therefore returned to Modena, and it appeared in the evening that the investing lines remained intact. However, Antony's army had suffered severely; in the course of the night he summoned a council of war where the general opinion was in favour of continuing the siege. If Antony had known of Hirtius' death, he would certainly have attacked the army the next day; Octavianus was now the only commander and possibly Antony might have been able to crush Cæsar's son once and for all with the help of Ventidius, who had reached Faenza. During revolutions, however, the fates of men often depend upon slender threads. Antony was unaware of the facts and feared to be overthrown by a fresh attack on the next day before Ventidius could arrive; he remembered what Cæsar had done beneath the walls of Gergovia and resolved to fall back upon Lepidus in Gallia Narbonensis. During the night he sent messengers to Ventidius Bassus ordering him to cross the Apennines and to rejoin him in Gallia Narbonensis; he gave orders for raising the siege and retreated during the night.\*

\* The best reconstruction and chronology of the second battle of Modena appears to me that given by Schmidt, *Neue Jahrb. für Phil. u. Päd.*, 1892, p. 323 ff.

## CHAPTER X

### TRIUMVIRI REIPUBLICÆ CONSTITUENDÆ

Antony is proscribed—Interview between Decimus Brutus and Octavianus—Antony's retreat—Further discord among the conservatives at Rome—Initial dissensions between Octavianus and the conservatives—The mistakes of the conservative party—Antony reaches Vado and joins Ventidius—Octavianus again falls back upon the popular party—Tactics of Decimus Brutus—Lepidus—Antony and the army of Lepidus—Agreement between Lepidus and Antony—Octavianus demands the consulship—Attempt to reorganise the Cæsarean party—The *coup d'état* of Octavianus—Octavianus as consul; the amnesty is annulled—The reconciliation of Antony and Octavianus—Triumviri reipublicæ constituendæ.

News of the events at Modena reached Rome apparently on April 25 in very exaggerated form; the Senate met on the 26th. Under the impression of this news the exile of Antony and his partisans was decreed without opposition; \* and the

News of the  
battle at  
Rome.

\* Comparison of the passages in the letters *ad Brut.* I. v. and I. iii. seems to me to show that Antony's proscription was decreed on the 26th, as is stated by Lange, R. A. iii. 524. The letter I. iii. is composed of two letters, as pointed out by Schmidt, J. P. P. 1892, p. 331; one letter is composed of §§ 1 to 3, and was written after the battle of Forum Gallorum, the date possibly being placed at the foot of the complete letter; the other letter is composed of § 4, was written after the news of Pansa's death had arrived, and mentions Antony's proscription. In letter I. v., under date May 5, Cicero speaks to Brutus of a session of April 27, when the methods of pursuing Antony were discussed, which is apparently not the session at which Antony was proscribed. Hence I assume that there was a session on the 26th and another on the 27th, the latter being rendered necessary by the news of Pansa's death, which arrived between the 26th and 27th. Appian iii. 74, says, as a matter of fact, that at the first session there was a disinclination to give the supreme command to Decimus. Cicero's letter *ad Brut.* I. iii., paragraph 4, was therefore written after the session of the 26th and before the session of the 27th, when the news of Pansa's death, which was not known in the morning, had just arrived—that is to say, in the course

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most divergent proposals were made by different senators. In honour of Decimus Brutus the most extravagant decrees were proposed, as his obstinate resistance seemed to have been the chief factor in the victory; these proposals included a supplication of fifty days, a triumph, and the inclusion of his name in the calendar to commemorate the day when the news had reached Rome, which happened to be the birthday of Brutus.\* Public opinion was thus greatly misled.† It was also resolved to honour those who had fallen on the field of battle, and some one urged that the soldiers of Modena should be made eligible for the rewards promised to the troops of Octavianus;‡ Cicero, who thought that no time was to be lost, proposed to confer the supreme command upon Decimus as Hirtius was dead and Pansa had been left wounded at Bologna;§ naturally, these proposals did not meet with complete approval; the idea of including Brutus' name in the calendar was opposed,|| and Cicero's motion respecting Pansa was certainly rejected.¶ In the course of the day, however, news arrived that Pansa

of the 26th. This evidently shows that the news of Pansa's death reached Rome on the evening of the 26th.

\* Dion, xlv. 39-40; Appian, B. C. iii. 74; Cic. *ad Brut.* I. xv. 8.

† Modern historians, in dealing with these events, have been deceived by partisan accounts which were given by the friends of Augustus, and of which numerous traces may be found in Livy, *Per.* cxix.; Velleius, ii. 62; Dion, xlv. 39-40; and Appian, B. C. iii. 74. These stories are attempts to justify the disgraceful behaviour of Octavianus to the conservative party, and regard his attitude as a consequence of senatorial disloyalty and opposition. We shall see that this is only partly true; we also observe a tendency to represent the honours voted to Decimus Brutus after his liberation as a slight upon Octavianus. This, however, is ridiculous, and it is absurd for ancient historians to assert that Decimus Brutus had done nothing, seeing that he had held out courageously instead of capitulating. In every war, when an army is sent to the relief of a besieged force, it is to the besieged that honour is chiefly paid; there is a sense that their endurance should be rewarded and their sufferings consoled. Thus these honours to Decimus Brutus were by no means intended as an affront to Octavianus.

‡ Dion, xlv. 40.

§ This is the statement of Appian, B. C. iii. 74, and it seems to me very probable. In fact, Decimus Brutus (F. XI. x. 1), in a letter dated from Tortona, May 5, complains that certain citizens are opposed to any mark of distinction to himself, and even attempted, as he says, to secure *quo minus respublica a me commode administrari possit*, which is probably an allusion to the proposal of Cicero, which was not approved.

|| Cp. Cic. *ad Brut.* I. xv. 8.

¶ See note † above.



had died in the night of the 22nd and 23rd.\* It was necessary to convene a Senate on the 27th to discuss the movements of the legions and the war against Dolabella which had been entrusted to the consuls. April, 43 B.C.

In this session Servilius successfully attempted to secure approval of a former proposal of Cicero, to the effect that Cassius should be entrusted with the war against Dolabella, with the proconsulship of Syria and full control over all the governors of the Asiatic provinces; † it was resolved that Marcus Brutus should be relieved of his obligation to remain near Italy, and should be permitted to go to the support of Cassius if he judged such action advisable. Ventidius was also proscribed; his case had been forgotten in the delight and excitement of the previous day.‡ Italy was now secure; at least such was the general belief, as Antony was flying with troops exhausted and defeated.§ It also appears that with reference to the war against Antony a compromise was arranged, and that Pansa's four legions were placed under the command of Decimus, a proprætor of longer standing than Octavianus, though the latter was left in command of his five legions.|| Every one at Rome thought that Decimus Brutus and Octavianus had already started in pursuit of Antony,¶ and were persuaded that in a few days he would meet the fate of Catiline. Once more the conservative party seemed to be masters of the republic, as during the days immediately after Cæsar's murder; the friends, relatives, and the wife of the defeated consul were

\* Cic. F. XI. xiii. 2.

† Cic. *ad Brut.* I. v. 1; Dion, xlv. 40.

‡ Cic. *ad Brut.* I. v. 1. § Cp. Cic. F. XI. xii. 1; XI. xiv. 3.

|| Livy, *Per.* 120. Dion, xlv. 40, says that the command of his legions was not withdrawn from Octavianus, and the statement is confirmed by Cicero's letters F. XI. xiv. 2 and XI. xix. 1, which show that the proposals of Drusus and of Paulus were not approved. On the contrary, it appears from Cicero's letter F. XI. xx. 4, that three of Pansa's four legions were sent by Octavianus to Decimus Brutus, who complained that the fourth had not also been sent; this implies that his right to the command of the four legions had been recognised even by Octavianus, and that the Senate had placed them under the command of Decimus Brutus. Such, at least, is the statement of Dion, xlv. 40, and of Appian, B. C. iii. 76. Here again the decision was in no way a slight upon Octavianus.

¶ Cic. *ad Brut.* iii. 4.

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overwhelmed with insults, with threats and with persecution ; Fulvia, who was obliged at that moment to find money for the purchase of an estate she had bought, would not have been able to borrow a sesterce without the help of the obliging Atticus, who continued his custom of lending money to everybody.\*

Action of  
Brutus and  
Octavianus.

No one at Rome suspected that these optimistic views by no means reflected the facts of the case ; contrary to the general opinion, Decimus Brutus and Octavianus had not started in pursuit of Antony on the day when the siege was raised. On April 22, Decimus Brutus had entered the camp of the relieving army to pay his respects to Hirtius ; when he heard of the death of the consul and was informed by Octavianus of the military position,† he immediately realised that Ventidius Bassus would attempt to rejoin Antony while avoiding contact with their armies, and would therefore cross the Apennines at once and descend into Liguria ; he had therefore attempted to induce Octavianus to cross the mountains with his legions and bar the road to Liguria, while he himself pursued Antony and attempted to drive him into the desolate regions of the Apennines.‡ Octavius, however, had received but a hesitating obedience from his legions, even when he enjoyed the partial support of so illustrious a Cæsarean as Hirtius ; it would have been impossible for him to lead them now in conjunction with one of Cæsar's murderers to deal a final blow at Antony and his veterans.§ Thus Decimus had been unable to convince him on that day ; || he had possibly resolved to start alone on the next day when he received a letter from Pansa during the night calling him to Bologna. On the morning of the 23rd he therefore started for Bologna. On the road, however, he heard that Pansa was dead ; he then turned back and carried out

\* Corn. Nepos, *Att.* 9.

† Cicero, F. XI. xiii. 1. Appian's account of this conversation in B. C. iii. 73 is pure invention, or at least exaggeration from a partisan of Augustus. The fact becomes plain by a comparison of Cicero's letter F. XI. xiii., which clearly shows the falsity of the account.

‡ Cic. F. XI. x. 4.

§ Decimus Brutus plainly states the fact : Cic. F. XI. x. 4 ; *sed neque Cæsari imperari potest, nec Cæsar exercitui suo.*

|| Cic. F. XI. xiii. 1.

his former plan, starting with his legions in pursuit of Antony on the 24th. Thus Antony had a start of two days,\* and only one general was in pursuit of him; on this point, therefore, Roman opinion was deceived. Yet more serious was another disappointment which Antony himself prepared for his enemies at Rome, proving to them by facts that he was neither crushed nor resigned to his fate like Catiline, although he was abandoned and supported only by a weak body of troops. Fury at his defeat and the imminence of his danger had suddenly aroused Antony's strength of will and imaginative power, vacillating though he had been during the last few months. He conceived and immediately put into execution a truly Cæsarean plan; to reach Gallia Narbonensis, he resolved to take the Ligurian road, to cross the wild and precipitous Apennines between Tortona and Vado, where Decimus Brutus wished to drive him to bay like a wounded stag. It was a bold enterprise to expose his army among these desolate mountains to the possibility of famine, an army, too, which had certainly suffered in the recent engagements, if it had not been so entirely defeated as was believed at Rome. The man, however, who had fought with Cæsar against Vercingetorix did not hesitate to choose this road which, though more difficult, was shorter than that of the little St. Bernard, and facilitated a junction with Ventidius, whom he had ordered to cross the Apennines. By taking the Ligurian road he would be going to meet Ventidius, might join hands with him at Vado, and would shorten the journey which his general would otherwise be obliged to make alone; in other words, he would spare Ventidius the most dangerous part of the march when soldiers and leader might most easily be discouraged by a sense of their distance from himself.

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With the four legions and the cavalry, which were still in a state of efficiency, and with other troops which he had recruited but had not yet organised into legions or armed, he therefore marched the thirty miles between Modena and Parma on the 22nd and 23rd. On the evening of the 23rd, he descended on Parma like a whirlwind and abandoned the town to the soldiers

Antony's  
march.

† Cic. F. XI. xiii. 2.

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who were guilty of some pillaging ; \* on the 24th and 25th he marched the forty miles between Parma and Placentia ; on the 26th he had advanced along the Via Milvia towards Dertona (Tortona) some hundred kilometres away ; here he probably arrived on the 28th, gave his soldiers a day's rest, and began on the 30th the ascent of the mountains which separated him from Vada Sabazia (Vado). Decimus, on the other hand, had presumed too far upon the strength of his army, which was partially composed of recruits, was exhausted by the privations of the siege, and was deprived even of mules and horses,† as these had all been devoured during the siege ; ‡ thus during the first days his advance was slow. During this time Octavianus was marching to Bologna with his army to prepare for the solemn escort of the remains of Hirtius and Pansa.

Further  
dissension  
among the  
conservatives  
at Rome.

These facts were known at Rome in the first days of May at the moment when the false belief in Antony's overthrow had created fresh confusion. The victory of Modena had actually diminished the authority of the man to whom it was chiefly due, a curious contradiction which shows what ravages political dissolution had made among the upper classes in Rome. Cicero realised that the great confusion of the Cæsa-rean party should be turned to account without a moment's delay, and that the annihilation of Antony was the first step towards crushing the party. He was, however, torn by impatience and harassed the Senate and the senators lest they should be lulled to apathy by the delusion that the victory was anything more than temporary. As, however, the consuls were dead, the government was in the hands of an obscure proprætor, Aulus Cornutus ; in other words, there was no one at the head of affairs. During the siege of Modena, the imminence of the danger had inspired the wearied assembly with some energy ; now, however, the greater part of the senators who had reluctantly consented to the war and were anxious merely to convince

\* Cicero, F. XI. xiii. a. See Cicero, F. X. xxxiii. 4, *Parmam direptam*. Antony's enemies must have exaggerated events to represent him as a brigand and a suborner of slaves ; he had no time to waste in the pillaging of towns or the robbing of the *ergastula*.

† Cic. F. XI. xiii. 2.

‡ Appian, B. C. iii. 49.

themselves that there was no further reason for uneasiness, for effort, or for struggle, no longer paid the same attention to the author of the Philippics, and regarded his speeches as the wild ravings of an excited old man. Moreover, personal rivalry, petty individual quarrels, and individual sensitiveness became once more predominant. Thus it was impossible to take any serious steps, as the Senate was always able to prolong discussion or to postpone it, and would approve no measures but those of delay. Cicero no longer felt that he had the Senate in hand as during the previous months; he realised that the death of Pansa was a misfortune for himself, that the illustrious consul, notwithstanding his equivocations, was, at any rate, a man of energy and common sense.\*

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43 B.C.

As soon as news reached Rome that Decimus was marching alone in pursuit of Antony, fresh difficulties arose. The old discord between the partisans of Octavianus and his enemies, which had died away during the war, broke out afresh. Many members of the Senate were indignant with Octavianus, who remained inactive at Bologna; † the relatives of the conspirators who were uneasy as usual, and the jealous opponents of the young man who were numerous, took advantage of this ill-feeling to injure his cause. Two senators, Lucius Æmilius Paulus, the brother of Lepidus, and Livius Drusus, proposed to give Decimus command of all the veteran legions which Octavianus had recruited.‡ This was a vigorous policy which might, if pushed with energy and consistency, have deprived Octavianus of any power for harm. Others, on the contrary, including Cicero, realising that the victory was by no means decisive, recommended prudence and advised that Octavianus should be

Increased  
difficulties.

\* Cic. F. XI. xiv. 1; *ad Brut.* I. x. 1.

† Ancient historians, too prone to accept accounts favourable to Augustus, have failed to realise that the refusal of Octavianus to join in the pursuit of Antony was the first cause of discord between the Senate and Octavianus.

‡ See Cicero's letter F. XI. xix. 1, which was written on May 21. These proposals were therefore advanced in the first ten days of May and not immediately after the news of the victory of Modena. This fact proves that the proposal was not a gratuitous provocation as represented by Dion, xlv. 40, but that it was made in the first days of May, when the Senate knew that Octavianus was not starting in pursuit of Antony.



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flattered and used for the defence of Italy.\* Cassius himself, the most capable of the conspirators, seems to have been inclined at that moment to begin negotiations for an agreement with him.† This policy again, though opposed to the former, might have resulted favourably if it had been courageously pursued, but in the universal apathy the Senate was unable to decide for either course and adopted a compromise which secured the danger without the advantages of either proposal. The proposal of Æmilius and of Livius was considered too venturesome, and the Senate refused its approval, fearing that the soldiers would not be willing to obey;‡ on the other hand, no negotiations were opened to secure the support of Octavianus, who was left to himself without orders at the head of his legions.

Position of  
Octavianus.

The Senate, however, was greatly deluded when it considered that it had thus relieved itself of all possible trouble arising from Octavianus and his army. At the end of some days, letters were received at Rome from Octavianus requesting the Senate to give his soldiers their promised rewards;§ these presents included not only the two thousand sesterces which the Senate had resolved to give to the revolted legions on January 24, but the twenty thousand promised to each soldier

\* Cicero, XI. xiv. 1, *mirabiliter, mi Brute, lætor mea consilia measque sententias probari de decemviris, de ornando adolescente*. This letter was written at the end of May in reply to a letter of Cicero's despatched about the beginning of May. It proves that the proposal of the *decemviri* was made by Cicero, consequently that at the beginning of May Cicero considered that it was necessary *ornare adolescentem*, and that he met with opposition, as he congratulated himself on the fact that Decimus Brutus agreed with him.

† This seems to follow from Dion, xlvii. 28, according to which Cassius τῷ τε Καίσαρι περὶ τῶν συναλλαγῶν ἐπέστειλε.

‡ So Dion, xlv. 40, confirmed by Cic. F. XI. xix. 1, and XI. xiv. 2.

|| Appian, B. C. iii. 86 and 88, speaks of two embassies of Octavianus' soldiers to Rome, the first of which arrived at this moment. I can hardly believe, however, that he had recourse upon two occasions to so revolutionary a proceeding, or that he adopted this method on the first occasion, when the situation was by no means desperate. As, however, it is unlikely that the Senate, in its inactivity after the relief of Modena, would take the initiative of sending such a message to the soldiers, I assume that the message was determined in consequence of steps taken by Octavianus.

by Octavianus in case of victory, and this not merely to the two revolted legions, but to every soldier of the five.\* Octavianus was now inactive at the head of a useless army confined to a little town in Gaul, unwilling to revolt against the Senate, which was equally unwilling to give him orders; he was thus in a most embarrassing position at Bologna, and did not in the least know what to do with his army. He prepared Pansa's four legions for their transference to Decimus; † at the same time he left Ventidius a free passage across the Apennines. He merely wished to show the soldiers by his application to the Senate that he felt a keen interest in their welfare. Precisely for this reason it was very difficult for the Senate to give a direct answer. Negotiations both long and fruitless began. Eventually those who wished to give nothing to the soldiers and those who wished to act generously, agreed upon arrangements which were both incomplete and contradictory; they resolved that only the revolted legions, according to the letter of the *senatus consultum*, should be rewarded, and should receive not twenty thousand but ten thousand sesterces; they also resolved that this decision should be communicated directly to the legions by an embassy from the Senate as an indication that they depended upon the Senate and not upon Octavianus; ‡ as a compensatory measure, on the proposal of Cicero, who was anxious not to irritate the soldiers, they resolved to appoint a commission of ten members, including Cicero, to pay out the *donativum* and to find land for distribution among the four legions. Two of these legions were certainly those which had revolted; the two others may have been those of Decimus Brutus, but the point

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\* Dion, xlv. 40, and Appian, B. C. iii. 86, practically give the same account, each supplementing the narrative of the other. Dion says that it was decided to give ten thousand to some of the soldiers and nothing to the others; Appian says that half of the promised *donativum* was sent to the two revolted legions. It must, then, be admitted that disputes arose concerning the interpretation of the *senatus consultum* of January 3, that the Senate applied the act literally as regarding the number of those who had the right to the *donativum*, but that with reference to the amount some arrangement was made, in virtue of which they resolved to give only half.

† Cic. F. XI. xx. 4.

‡ Dion, xlv. 40; Appian, B. C. iii. 86.

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is uncertain.\* Possibly to show its interest in the veterans, the Senate in this session commissioned Lepidus and Plancus to found the colony at the confluence of the Rhone and the Saône which afterwards became Lyons; in short, the Senate replied to the soldiers by equivocal decisions which were bound to inspire suspicion, and by fair promises which it was unable to carry out, for there was very little land to distribute in Italy, unless it was to be bought at an extremely high price; moreover, the public treasury was empty, as the tribute from the rich eastern provinces had been intercepted by Brutus, Cassius, and Dolabella. Cicero was horrified to find that these promises could only be met by imposing upon Italy the *tributum*, or forced war loan, and this at a moment when gold and silver were scarce in Italy, and credit was very difficult; many people at that time, even among the wealthy classes, could only procure ready money by selling at reduced prices their houses, farms, villas, works of art, and promissory notes.

Progress of  
Antony.

While the Senate was thus occupied at Rome, the indefatigable Antony had crossed the Ligurian mountains on April 30; in the course of six days he had advanced along the road from Aquæ Statiellæ to Vado, amid the wild and desolate mountains of that region, harassed by the idea that Ventidius would not stop, that he might be defeated, or that he would betray him on the road. His fate partly depended on Ventidius and the success of his journey. At length on May 5 Antony reached Vada Sabazia (Vado), but he did not find Ventidius there; he had a longer journey by fifty miles to perform and therefore could not yet have arrived; however, Antony probably found a message from him which decided him to despatch Lucius Antonius with a body of cavalry † and some

\* Decimus Brutus, in the letter F. XI. xx., written from Ivrea on May 25, speaks not only of the *decemviri*, but also of the distribution of land and payments of money, and refers to the complaints of the soldiers upon this question. That seems to show that all these decisions were made at the same time in the first ten days of May, and for that reason I bring them into connection with the action of Octavius. Appian, B. C. iii. 86, also says that the *decemviri* were to undertake the task of paying out the money.

† Cic. F. X. xxxiv. 1; F. X. xv. 3. *L. Antonium, præmissum cum equitibus.*

cohorts; they were to wait at Vado and to prevent Decimus from throwing his army between Antony and Ventidius if he should reach Vado before the latter. This was now the great question; would Ventidius arrive before Decimus? Decimus had reorganised his army as well as he could while upon the march and had accelerated his progress. On May 5, shortly before Antony reached Vado, he was at Tortona, where he heard a false rumour, intentionally or accidentally spread, that Ventidius had joined Antony at Vado.\* Decimus believed the story at the moment and wrote a despairing letter to Cicero, adding a request for the immediate despatch of money, of which he had run short.† During the night, however, he was doubtless informed that the news was false, for the next day he advanced his troops in the direction of Aqui, and on May 6, 7 and 8, he marched without a halt, arriving within thirty miles of Vado on the 9th.‡ There he gained more exact information concerning Antony. Ventidius had arrived, probably on the 7th, and Antony for the moment had been able to think himself secure. In a few hours, however, he was bitterly undeceived; the three legions were greatly exhausted and when Antony addressed them on the 8th, declaring his intention of joining Lepidus, the prospect of more than one hundred miles additional march through these wild regions discouraged them; they refused obedience and loudly asserted that they preferred to return to Italy, even at the risk of death. Antony was obliged to promise that they should retire upon Pollenzo the next day, while he went on with his own troops into Gallia Narbonensis.§ Decimus Brutus had been informed of this transaction, and changed his route for a hasty march upon Pollenzo; he reached the town an hour before the advance guard of Ventidius, and thereby rendered a great service to Antony.|| When the three legions found themselves driven from Pollenzo, they resigned themselves to the journey into Gaul and followed Antony at an interval of two days' march.¶

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\* Cic. F. XI. x. 3.

† Cic. F. XI. x. 5.

‡ Cic. F. XI. xiii. 3.

§ *Ibid.*

|| Cic. F. XI. xiii. 4.

¶ Cic. F. XI. xiii. 4. Cp. F. X. xvii. 1. *Ventidius bidui spatio abest ab eo.*

May,  
43 B.C.  
Octavianus and  
the Senate.

When these facts were learned at Rome during the last ten days of May, Cicero was confirmed in his opinion that Octavianus must be won over; however, the enemies of Antony and the rivals of Decimus accused that general of carelessness in allowing the fugitive to escape.\* Their exasperation was the keener at the end of several days when further despatches from him arrived, in which, like Cicero, he advised that every courtesy should be shown to Octavianus, and that Marcus Brutus should be recalled to Italy.† This proposal had been advanced at Rome during those days to calm the anxiety caused by the news of Antony's movements; it was also desired to transport the legion in Sardinia to Italy, and to hasten the progress of the African legions.‡ At this moment it was learnt that Lucius Antonius had reached Forum Julii on May 8.§ The rising irritation was further increased at the end of May when the ambassadors returned who had gone to address the soldiers in the camp of Octavianus. Cæsar's son had prepared a most unusual reception for the ambassadors. They had been brought into the camp and the soldiers had been assembled, but the latter had declined to listen to the ambassadors unless Octavianus were present; to this demand they had been obliged to yield. Octavianus therefore came forward and the ambassadors explained the decisions of the Senate; but the sense of comradeship was at that moment so powerful among the soldiers that there was an outburst of general protestation, and those to whom rewards were offered were even more exasperated than those who had been deprived of them.|| The soldiers were also dissatisfied with the Land law and complained that Octavianus had not been appointed to the commission.¶ This was a premonitory hint that Octavianus might be a dangerous force. Notwithstanding the illusions cherished by many politicians at Rome, it was impossible for him to remain longer inactive. Apart from the pressure of circumstances he would be drawn

\* Cic. F. XI. xiv. 3.

† Cic. F. XI. xiv. 2. The letter must have been written at the end of May.

‡ Cic. F. XI. 26 proves that Decimus Brutus knew on June 3 that this proposal had been mooted.

§ Cic. F. X. xv. 3.

|| Dion, xlv. 41; Appian, B. C. iii. 86.

¶ Cic. F. XI. xx. 1.



into action by those about him, who were, without exception, old soldiers and officers of Cæsar's army. Though they had taken up arms against Antony, their hatred for the conservatives was violent and deeply rooted and they feared that a conservative restoration might take place upon the ruins of the Cæsarean party. Many of them attempted to embroil Octavianus with Cicero; they went so far as to tell him that Cicero had said he should be killed,\* and they advised him to display some boldness.† He was told that the conservatives who had made him a proprætor were attempting to be rid of him, and were already seeking to discredit him on account of his youth. As Antony had been almost crushed by ill-fortune, Octavianus should forthwith lead the Cæsarean party, which was now deprived of guidance. He himself, following the example of Herophilus, had stirred up the movement to avenge Cæsar which Antony had continued with such success. As Cæsar's adopted son and heir, he was precisely the man to continue this movement with vigour. The two consulships were vacant: legal difficulties and the intrigues of an excessive number of candidates had delayed the election. Octavianus, therefore, should appear as a candidate for the consulship, should come forward as Cæsar's son and tell the people that for their good and for the welfare of the army, he was ready to continue all the plans which the conspiracy had prevented his father from accomplishing. A consul nineteen years of age had not yet been seen at Rome, but it was a time of change. He would certainly be elected and would thus become the head of the Cæsarean party.

Octavianus was not insensible to this flattering advice; he had retained one of Pansa's legions under his command, and was busy recruiting two more; none the less he hesitated. He realised the disturbing fact that certain conservatives were attempting to deprive him of his army.‡ Was it, however, possible for him to lead Cæsar's party in Italy, unless he was helped by at least one of the more powerful governors of the

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43 B.C.

Antony evades  
Decimus.

\* Cic. F. XI. xx. 1. Cp. Velleius, II. lxii. 6.

† Cicero *ad Brut.* I. x. 3, says that it was the friends of Octavianus who urged him to claim the consulship, and the statement seems very probable.

‡ Plut. *Cic.* 45.

May,  
43 B.C.

provinces around Italy ? He began to consider the possibility of a reconciliation with Antony ; he showed kind treatment to those of Antony's soldiers whom he had captured ; and released some of his officers after allowing them to see that he would be ready to consider proposals for an agreement.\* At Rome, however, very few people suspected anything of the kind ; on the contrary, they regretted the young man's forced inactivity at Bologna, and towards the end of May all hope was lost that Decimus would inflict the fate of Catiline upon Antony. His project of preventing a junction between Antony and Ventidius had failed, and he had not ventured to advance into the wilds of Liguria with his freshly recruited legions, telling himself that if the fugitives were welcomed by Lepidus, then Lepidus also must be declared an enemy ; he had decided to rejoin Plancus in the Gallic provinces, returning through Cisalpine Gaul, and crossing the district now known as Piedmont. Plancus was to be consul with him the following year ; they might therefore regard one another as colleagues, and act in common. He had written to Plancus without delay, and had remained a short time at Pollenzo as his army was suffering from dysentery ; † then towards the end of May he turned his back on Liguria and marched towards the Valley of the Po. Thus it was certain that Antony might reach Lepidus without hindrance.

Lepidus.

General anxiety, however, prevailed at Rome as to the attitude of Lepidus. Would he treat Antony as an enemy as he had affirmed in his letters, ‡ or was he already in agreement with him as malicious gossip affirmed ? § It was extremely difficult to divine the intentions of the pro-consul from his acts. As Lucius Antonius advanced, his officer Culleo, who was guarding the frontier, had joined Lucius instead of opposing his passage ; || yet, at the same time, Lepidus had written to Plancus stating that he was resolved to oppose Antony, and asking for reinforcements of cavalry. What then, did he propose to do ? Plancus, on the other hand, was

\* Appian, B. C. iii. 80.

† Appian, B. C. iii. 81.

‡ Cic. F. X. xxxiv. 1.

§ Cic. F. X. xxxiv. 3.

|| Appian, B. C. iii. 83, confirmed by Cic. F. X. xxxiv. 2.

regarded by the conservatives as a sure ally ; he had gone down the Valley of the Isère as far as Cularo (Grenoble) ; he had constructed a bridge and crossed the river with his army on May 12, hastily sending on four thousand cavalry in advance as soon as he had been informed of the arrival of Lucius at Forum Julii.\* But while attention at Rome was centred upon Lepidus, Octavianus had realised that every moment was now precious ; as he could not formulate a plan, he attempted once more to play a double game. He wrote to Lepidus and also to Asinius to learn whether they would be inclined to recognise him as the head of the Cæsarean party.† He also wrote to Cicero urging him to secure the consulship and accept him as a colleague ; adding that in view of his youth he would be guided by Cicero in every respect, and would help him to save the republic!‡ This proposal was not displeasing to Cicero, but he felt himself discouraged and paralysed by the increasing scorn and hatred of the conservatives for the young man and he could not venture upon a definite reply.

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Amid such universal confusion no one was sure of his intentions. Antony alone resolutely pursued a definite object. While Decimus Brutus, who had been joined by three of Pansa's four legions, was slowly marching towards the Little St. Bernard by way of Vercelli and Ivrea,§ Antony had reached Forum Julii (Fréjus) on May 15,|| and boldly proceeded towards the army of Lepidus which was composed of seven of Cæsar's old legions, and was stationed at Forum Voconii, twenty-four miles away.¶ The critical moment was approaching. Were these legions likely to take up arms against their old general who was coming to join them with many of their old comrades, coming as the proscribed avenger of Cæsar, to ask help for himself and for the party which claimed the

Antony and  
Lepidus.

\* Cic. F. X. xv. 2-3.

† Appian, B. C. iii. 81.

‡ Appian, B. C. iii. 82 ; Plutarch, *Cic.* 45. Appian puts these overtures before the meeting of Antony and Lepidus, while Dion, xlv. 42, places them later. Dion is confirmed by Cicero's letter *ad Brut.* I. x. 3, which was written after the treachery of Lepidus. However, the two accounts can be harmonised, if we assume that the negotiations were begun, then broken off and afterwards resumed.

§ Cp. Cic. F. XI. xix., XI. xx., XI. xxiii.

|| Cic. F. X. xvii. 1.

¶ Cic. F. X. xvii. 1 ; X. xxxiv. 1.

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43 B.C.

performance of former promises and was ready to make further offers ; this, too, at a time when the sense of comradeship had become so powerful among the dictator's old armies ? In reality, the pro-consul of Gallia Narbonensis thought the possibility of opposing Antony with his legions was quite hopeless ; he was, however, a weak and ordinary character, and wished his soldiers to force his hand that he might delude himself and others with the belief that he was acting under compulsion. Antony was ready to support the secret desire of his colleague, and proceeded to play a strange comedy when the two armies met between May 15 and 20 upon the banks of a little stream called the Argenteus.\* Antony did not even order his soldiers to entrench, baring his breast, so to speak, to the dagger, if his enemy had the courage to strike ; Lepidus, on the other hand, entrenched himself in a camp as if he were facing a second Hannibal.† When Silanus and Culleo appeared in the camp, Lepidus reprimanded them severely for the help they had given to Antony ; their punishment, however, was confined to this mark of displeasure, out of pity, as Lepidus wrote to the Senate.‡ He made overtures to Plancus who had stopped at Grenoble to wait for Decimus after receiving his letter ; at the same time he allowed a bridge of boats to be built between the two camps ; § he welcomed a large number of supposed deserters who, under pretence of abandoning Antony, came to intrigue for him in the camp of Lepidus. He pretended to regard them as real deserters ; he even wrote to the Senate that Antony's army was visibly melting away ; || and hopefully asserted that the the legions would not fail in their duty.¶ At the same time he permitted certain officers, in particular Canidius and Rufrenus,\*\* to incite them to revolt, and allowed messages from Antony to circulate among

\* Cic. F. X. xxxiv. 1.

† Plut. *Ant.* 18 ; Appian, B. C. iii. 83.

‡ Cic. F. X. xxxiv. 2 ; Dion, xlv. 51, with some inaccuracies which are corrected by the letter from Lepidus which is quoted.

§ Appian, B. C. iii. 83.

|| Cic. F. X. xxxiv. 1.

¶ Cic. F. X. xxxiv. 2.

\*\* Cic. F. X. xxi. 4 ; *corrupti etiam per eos qui presunt, per Canidios Rufrenos et cæteros* . . .

the soldiers. These were mysteriously brought, were whispered in the darkness, and excited fresh enthusiasm.\*

June,  
43 B.C.

One day when Antony doubtless thought that the moment had come, he appeared with dishevelled hair, untrimmed beard and in mourning dress on the banks of the Argenteus at the narrowest part of the stream, and began to harangue the soldiers of Lepidus who were on the other bank. They ran together and a great uproar took place in the camp; Lepidus, however, was afraid of such manifest treason, and hastily ordered the trumpets to be sounded, so that it was impossible for the soldiers to hear a word of Antony's speech.† Intrigues between the two camps began more vigorously than before and the soldiers of the Tenth Legion did their utmost to win over their comrades; ‡ the only officer who sincerely supported the conservative cause, Juventius Laterensis,§ continually warned Lepidus of the danger of a mutiny, and urged him to take now one step, and now another.|| Lepidus pretended fear, thanked him and promised to follow his advice but did nothing. On the contrary he wrote to Plancus, who had started on the 21st without destroying the bridge which was to serve for Decimus, requesting him not to come to his help; ¶ he allowed his soldiers to make demonstrations in favour of Antony, even in his own presence, without punishment.\*\* At length on the morning of May 29,†† Antony forded the stream with a little band of soldiers; the soldiers in Lepidus' camp broke down the palisading, came to meet Antony and carried him in triumph to the tent of Lepidus; he was still in bed, but without waiting to dress himself, came out to embrace Antony.‡‡ In the midst of the tumult Laterensis committed suicide before his soldiers.§§ The next day Lepidus wrote a brief letter to the Senate, which might be regarded as a sarcasm; he stated that his soldiers and himself had been overcome by

Lepidus joins  
Antony.

\* Dion, xlv. 51.

† Plut. *Ant.* 18.

‡ Appian, B. C. iii. 83.

§ Dion, xlv. 51; Appian, B. C. iii. 84.

|| Appian, B. C. iii. 84.

¶ Cic. F. X. xxi. 2.

\*\* Cic. F. X. xxi. 4.

†† Cic. F. X. xxiii. 2; Appian, B. C. iii. 84.

‡‡ Appian, B. C. iii. 84; Plut. *Ant.* 18. The two accounts supplement one another.

§§ Dion, xlv. 51.



June,  
43 B.C.

pity, and that he trusted their compassion would not be regarded as criminal either in his legions or in himself.\*

Public feeling  
at Rome.

This news reached Rome about June 8 and aroused extraordinary indignation and uproar. The Senate, in affright, hastily passed a large number of measures which had been urged upon them long before. Marcus Brutus and Cassius were summoned to Italy with their troops; messengers were sent to the African legions to hasten their progress; Sextus Pompeius was placed at the head of the fleet with the title of *præfectus classis et oræ maritimæ*, and with all the powers which his father had held during the war against the pirates; † a *tributum* or forced war loan was decided, and finally Octavianus was given the command of the war against Antony. ‡ A further difficulty arose on the question of the proscription of Lepidus. This measure had been straightway demanded by Cicero, who was ever ready for energetic action, but Lepidus had too many relatives and friends at Rome and his mother-in-law, the powerful Servilia, strove her utmost to save him. § At length the debate upon the matter was postponed, and thus the advantage of immediate action, the most powerful factor in revolutions, was lost. However, news soon arrived; Plancus had retreated on learning the events of May 29 on the banks of the Argenteus; || Decimus had gone up the valley of Aosta by way of Vercelli and Ivrea, where the cunning Salassians had

\* Cic. F. X. xxxv.

† Dion, xlvi. 51. See Appian, B. C. iv. 84. It is true that Dion, xlvi. 40, says that a similar decree in favour of Pompeius had been voted after the battle of Modena, together with the decree which gave the command of the war against Dolabella to Cassius and Macedonia to Brutus. Dion however has already confused, in reference to Brutus, the decision of February with the powers then given to him to take part in the war against Dolabella, and he is equally wrong on the subject of Sextus. In fact, Cicero's letter, *ad Brut.* I., v. 1 and 2, says that in the session of April 27, when the decisions respecting Brutus and Cassius were passed, Pompeius was not discussed at all. Cicero would certainly have referred to the fact in writing to Brutus, as it was important for him to know that they could rely upon a fleet. The official title of the office given to Pompeius has been preserved to us by coins; see Cohen, M.R. i. pp. 19 and 20. On the subject of the African legions, see Appian, iii. 85.

‡ Appian, B. C. iii. 85; Dion, xlvi. 42 and 51, confirmed by Cic. F. X. xxiv. 4.

§ Cic. *ad Brut.* I. xii. 1.

|| Cic. F. XX. xxiii. 3.

made him pay a drachma for every soldier under threats of barring his passage ; \* he had passed the Little St. Bernard and had effected a junction with Plancus at Grenoble during the first half of June.

June,  
43 B.C.

At that moment an unexpected scandal arose, and Octavianus committed what was a very serious error at this crisis ; he reconsidered the prospect of an agreement with the conservatives, and thinking that he might induce the Senate at such a moment of panic to authorise his candidature for the consulship, he urged Cicero to propose the idea once more.† Cicero was attracted by the possibility of a further consulship for himself and agreed. On this occasion, however, the new ambition of Octavianus was so ill-received, not only by the conservatives, but by all the impartial public, that no magistrate would venture to support him. Cicero was forced to abandon the plan, and attempted to dissuade Octavianus from his designs upon the consulship.‡ Popular dislike to the young man turned into irritation ; rumour even affirmed that he had assassinated Hirtius in the battle, and had poisoned Pansa when wounded that he might have a better opportunity of securing the consulship.§ But when this scandal had been forgotten, the former apathy speedily supervened and continued until the end of June. Plancus and Decimus were waiting for Octavianus ; when he realised that he could not expect the consulship at that moment, he wrote that he would come immediately, but did not stir.|| Antony was reorganising his legions with the help of Lepidus, and was waiting in Gallia Narbonensis. The arrival of Brutus and Cassius at Rome was expected daily, but Cassius was far distant and occupied in opposing Dolabella. Brutus was in a state of complete physical and mental prostration ; he was suffering from a stomachic disorder,¶ and allowed himself to be guided by the cunning Caius Antonius instead of enforcing the decree of proscription passed against his brother's partisans on April

Octavianus  
demands the  
consulship.

\* Strabo, IV. vi. 7 (205).

† Dion, xlvi. 42.

‡ Cic. *ad Brut.* I. x. 3.

§ This was probably the origin of the rumours in circulation, to which reference is made by Suetonius, *Aug.* II.

|| Cic. *F. X.* xxiv. 4.

¶ Cic. *ad Brut.* I. xiii. 2.

June,  
43 B.C.

26; the misrepresentations of Caius induced him to discountenance Cicero's kindness to Octavianus.\* He continued to urge that the best policy was to secure an agreement with Antony. He was also greatly disturbed by the imminent proscription of Lepidus, and wrote to his friends at Rome, requesting them to look after his sister and nephews, who would be ruined by it;† finally, instead of making preparations for the voyage to Italy, he projected an expedition against the Bessi. Cicero's chief enemies were thus amongst his closest friends, including Brutus himself. On June 30 Lepidus was at length proclaimed a public enemy; but a further interval elapsed between the threat and the punishment; it was thought desirable to give the soldiers an opportunity of securing their pardon, and they were given until September 1 to abandon the pro-consul.‡

Prospects of  
either party.

Matters, however, had reached a point at which some issue became inevitable, notwithstanding all fears and vacillation and all efforts to avert the crisis. Antony and Lepidus had good reason for prolonging their stay in Gallia Narbonensis. The conspirators and conservatives, notwithstanding their panic, had reconquered almost the whole of that empire which Antony seemed to have taken from them in the previous July and August. In Europe they had the ten legions of Decimus whom they could trust entirely, the five legions of Plancus and the three of Asinius which seemed bound to remain faithful to them; they had also conquered the east, where Brutus had recruited fresh soldiers, bringing the number of his legions up to seven, and where Cassius with his ten legions would soon overthrow Dolabella. Moreover, Sextus Pompeius at Marseilles was concentrating ships from every harbour in the Mediterranean; he was buying and enlisting sailors in Africa, and preparing a fleet. Against these powerful forces Antony and Lepidus could only set fourteen legions. It was necessary to reorganise the great Cæsarean army in the west, and to persuade most of the generals in Europe

\* Cp. his letter to Atticus, in Cic. *ad Brut.* I. 17. Cp. also Cic. *ad Brut.* I. iv. 4 ff.

† Cic. *ad Brut.* I. xiii.

‡ Cic. F. XII. x. 1.

to join them or to seduce their legions if they refused. Hence it was impossible to show further hostility to Octavianus. Fortunately, Lepidus \* was able to play the part of go-between in this great political bargain, and to reconcile the two rivals. He was the eldest of the three, had been a close friend of Cæsar, and had not been involved in the quarrel. Overtures were therefore made to Plāncus and Asinius, who had also been Cæsar's friends; agents were sent to their armies to disseminate doubt, suspicion, and promises, and to bring over the soldiers by means of the generals and the generals by means of the soldiers. At the same time, in the early days of July, Lepidus took steps for a reconciliation with Octavianus.

July,  
43 B.C.

The moment was entirely opportune. Octavianus had been disappointed in his hopes of the consulship, and had realised that he could no longer rely upon the conservatives or the Senate; he remembered once more that he was Cæsar's son, and prepared to show himself the rival of Antony in his zeal for the Cæsarean cause. His soldiers, moreover, had been gradually overcome by a kind of Cæsarean fanaticism which then pervaded the armies and made constant demonstrations, in which they asserted that they would never fight against Cæsar's soldiers.† If Octavianus felt any remaining hesitation, it would speedily have been dispelled by his soldiers. He therefore welcomed the proposals of Lepidus; he made inflammatory speeches to the soldiers in praise of his father, and promised them that when he was once elected consul, he would secure them the promised rewards. In this way he induced the troops to send a deputation of soldiers and centurions to Rome demanding the election of Octavianus as consul, and the repeal of the proscription against Antony.‡ The embassy reached Rome about July 15,§ at a time when the conservatives were uneasy, as they had heard nothing concerning the return of

Attempts to  
reorganise the  
Cæsarean  
party.

\* Livy, *Per.* 119 and Eutr. vii. 2 tell us that Lepidus was the means of reconciliation.

† Dion. xlvi. 42.

‡ Dion. xlvi. 42-43; Appian, B. C. iii. 87-88; Suetonius, *Aug.* 26.

§ Plāncus, in Gaul, was informed of this attempt on July 28. Cicero F. X. xxiv. 6. There is, perhaps, a further allusion to it in Cic. *ad Brut.* I. xiv. 2, which was written on July 11. Cp. Cic. *ad Brut.* I. xviii. 4.

July,  
43 B.C.

Brutus to Italy; at a moment, too, when Cicero had been entirely discredited by the suspicious intrigues of Octavianus, and when the *tributum* \* was known to have caused the utmost discontent among the wealthy classes throughout Italy. Thus the deputation reached Rome without hindrance, and the centurions were able to make their way into the *curia*, where the Senate had met to receive them in a spirit of fear and distrust. The insults of the embassy, however, revived the energy and even the courage of this pusillanimous Senate, which abruptly dismissed the centurions in irritation.† Octavianus was informed of this refusal towards the end of July, and emboldened by the possibility of an agreement with Antony and Lepidus, he ventured a supreme act of audacity. When the soldiers came to him to offer him the consular insignia, he accepted, though he pretended that he acted under compulsion, and marched away with his eight legions.

Octavianus'  
*coup d'état.*

As the action of Lepidus and Antony had driven Octavianus to re-adopt the principles of a Cæsarean and democrat, this bold and determined proceeding on his part similarly spurred Antony and Lepidus to make every effort to win over the armies of Plancus and of Asinius, and to induce the troops of Decimus to mutiny. They would not be outstripped by their former rival, who had suddenly become their friend. In every army the silent energy of the democratic emissaries was redoubled; Cæsarean fanaticism grew fierce; the fidelity of the legions was undermined and wavered. One shock was enough to cause the final overthrow, and this shock was given by the expedition of Octavianus to Rome. If he were to succeed in securing the town and his election as consul, Cæsarean fanaticism would burst forth throughout the armies with overwhelming violence. Hence Rome was seized with panic on the approach of the army. Women and children were sent away to the neighbouring villas, houses were closed,‡ and the Senate attempted to stop the legions by sending delegates with the promised money. On July 25, Casca, Labeo, Scaptius and Cicero, who was in despair when he

\* Cic. *ad Brut.* I. xviii. 5.

‡ Appian, B. C. iii. 89.

† Dion, xlvi. 43.



realised that he had been the true founder of Octavianus' power,\* met in the house of Servilia to discuss the situation; she was the Niobe of the last revolution at Rome, and symbolised with her family the tragical disruption of the Roman aristocracy. At that moment her son-in-law and son were respectively leading and serving in the Cæsarean army, which desired to revenge the death of her great friend; another son and son-in-law were leading the conspirators' party. At this meeting it was decided to make a further appeal to Brutus, and induce him to return to Italy.† Octavianus, however, was able to persuade the senatorial delegates to return by telling them that numerous assassins were in waiting upon the road.‡ The majority of the Senate was thus seized with such panic that it turned against the Pompeian party, and basely yielded every demand. It was resolved that the twenty thousand sesterces should be given, not merely to the Fourth and the Martian Legions, but to all without discrimination; Octavianus was to be nominated to the commission for the distribution of lands, and he might also become a candidate for the consulship without visiting Rome. Messengers were hastily despatched to inform the young general of these measures.§

July,  
43 B.C.

However, the messengers had no sooner started when the news arrived that the African Legions had reached Ostia; the Sardinian Legion had doubtless been at Rome some time before. Suddenly the Pompeians, the relatives of the conspirators and Cicero recovered their ascendancy over the cowardly majority, and so far intimidated them as to secure the repeal of the measures already passed. A levy of soldiers was ordered, and the town was fortified; search was even made for the mother and sister of Octavianus that they might be kept as hostages.|| Hardly had the first messengers from the Senate reached the army when they were rejoined by others

Octavianus at  
Rome.

\* Cic. *ad Brut.* I. xviii. 1-3.

† Cic. *ad Brut.* I. xviii. 1-2.

‡ Appian, B. C. iii. 88.

§ Appian, iii. 90; Dion. xlv. 44. Dion is certainly wrong in saying that the Senate appointed Octavius consul.

|| Dion, xlv. 44, and Appian, iii. 90, both state this reversal of the Senate's policy, but give no reason. Drumann, G. R. I<sup>2</sup>, 244, correctly sees the reason in the arrival of the African legions, of which Appian speaks B. C. iii. 91.

August,  
43 B.C.

who countermanded all that the first had said, with the sole result that they increased the exasperation of the soldiers ; \* Octavianus then sent emissaries to Rome who mingled with the people in the taverns, in the forum, and in the back streets of the lower quarters to reassure the masses upon his intentions, to make great promises to the African legions, which were composed of Cæsar's old soldiers, and to urge them to revolt. Upon the arrival of Octavianus beneath the walls of Rome, the African and Sardinian legions declared for him,† and the population followed. The town surrendered, the leaders of the conservative party took flight, and the next day Cæsar's son was able to enter Rome with an escort. In the forum he embraced his mother and sister, who had been concealed by the Vestal Virgins; he offered sacrifice to Jupiter Capitolinus, gave an audience to numerous senators and to Cicero himself, whom he seems to have received somewhat coldly, and then returned to his army outside the town, while the Senate made preparations for his election as consul. On August 19 the formalities were hurried through, and Octavianus and Quintus Pedius were elected consuls.‡

Octavianus  
annuls the  
amnesty.

The fears which the conservatives had entertained during the last twelve months had thus been realised. Octavianus secured the ratification of his adoption by the *comitia curiata* ; paid with the public money some part of their reward to the soldiers and some part of Cæsar's legacy to the people, and pursued to the uttermost that course of action which Antony had only half supported ; through Quintus Pedius, he passed without difficulty through the comitia a law subjecting all Cæsar's assassins and their accomplices to the jurisdiction of a special court, which was to condemn them to the *interdictio aqua et igni*, and to confiscation of their property.§ The caprice of fortune had once again raised the one party to the

\* Appian, B. C. iii. 92.

† *Ibid.* This revolt must have happened as soon as Octavianus arrived ; otherwise we cannot understand why his entrance to Rome was unopposed.

‡ Dion, xlvi. 45-46 ; Appian, B. C. iii. 92-94. The date, Aug. 19, is given by Dion, lvi. 30, and Tacitus, *Ann.* i. 9. This will also be the date of Augustus' death. Velleius, II. lxxv. 2 is wrong. Cp. C. I. L. x. 3682.

§ Dion, xlvi. 47-48 ; Appian, B. C. iii. 95 ; Livy, *Ep.* 120 ; Velleius, II. lxxix. 5.

humiliation of the other; the amnesty of March 17, 44, Cicero's political masterpiece, was annulled; Herophilus, the obscure veterinary surgeon of Magna Græcia, who had been the first to rouse the people to vengeance for the assassinated dictator, was now completely triumphant. Within a few days, the friends of Octavianus, attracted by the fact that the accusers were to receive a proportion of the property of the condemned, divided the conspirators among themselves as their prey, and each undertook to accuse this or that member. All were speedily condemned for contumacy. No exceptions were made even in the case of Casca, who was a tribune, nor of Brutus, who was then fighting against the Bessi, nor of Cassius, who was accused by Agrippa, nor of Decimus, who had joined Plancus and was waiting reinforcements from Octavianus to oppose Antony, nor of Sextus Pompeius, who had not been concerned in the assassination, but was even more to blame for accepting the extraordinary powers which his father had held in the war against the pirates.\* The Cæsarean party was master of Rome and Italy, with Octavianus at the head of an army of eleven legions, and commanded Gallia Narbonensis with the fourteen legions of Lepidus and Antony.

August,  
43 B.C.

The results of this success were speedily apparent. The soldiers of Asinius Pollio were already wavering; his gratitude to Cæsar inclined him to support Octavianus, while he was powerless in isolation with three legions in the depths of Spain. He therefore resolved to come over, and during September divided his legions between Antony and Lepidus, giving two to the former and one to the latter.† The two armies of Brutus and Plancus now remained. Plancus had remained faithful to the Senate hitherto, for fear that he might lose the consulship in the following year; if, however, he did not wish to quarrel simultaneously with Antony, Lepidus, Octavianus, and Asinius, he felt bound to abandon Decimus Brutus after his condemnation.‡ He himself and Decimus had only fifteen legions between them, while their adversaries' force amounted

Fate of  
Decimus  
Brutus.

\* Plut. *Brut.* 27; Velleius, II. lxix. 5; Dion, xlvi. 48-49.

† Appian, B. C. iii. 97.

‡ Plut. *Ant.* 18; Dion, xlvi. 53; Velleius, II. lxiii. 3.

September, 43 B.C. to twenty-eight ; it seemed impossible to continue the struggle in view of this disparity. Plancus therefore followed the example of Asinius. Three of his five legions were taken over by Antony and two by Lepidus.\* Decimus, now abandoned by Plancus and proscribed, attempted to rejoin Brutus in Macedonia by an overland march with his army ; the promises, however, which had shaken the faith of so many armies, the force of example, and a kind of Cæsarean mania which came over the troops, attracted his legions in the opposite direction ; they were, moreover, dismayed by the long and painful journey which lay before them. During the march the soldiers began to desert Decimus in small bodies and in cohorts, to join Antony and Octavianus. At length the army broke up and the four original legions which were the most capable, started to rejoin Antony and Lepidus, while the other six set out for Octavianus. Decimus, thus abandoned, wandered on with an escort of a few men, and was captured in the Alps by a barbarian chief, who put him to death at Antony's orders, though Decimus had saved Antony's life during the conspiracy.† Thus the conservative party had lost the last army and the last remaining general in the west ; Italy and the European provinces were gone for ever unless discord should embroil the leaders of the new Cæsarean revolution.

Reconciliation  
of Antony and  
Octavianus.

This hope, however, if it was ever entertained, soon disappeared. Something stronger than personal will or caprice obliged these leaders to act in concert, and this influence was the armies of Brutus and Cassius. Cassius had overcome Dolabella, who had committed suicide at Laodicea in the month of June ; he had taken two legions from him and brought the number of his forces up to twelve legions. Hence Brutus and Cassius had nineteen legions, and were masters of the east, which was the richest part of the Empire. Throughout the month of September, a large number of messages must have passed between Lepidus, Antony, and Octavianus, and by degrees a concerted course of action was sketched out. Though unable to meet, they readily agreed to re-establish Cæsar's dictator-

\* Appian, B. C. iii. 97.

† Dion, xlv. 53 ; Appian, B. C. ii. 97-98 ; Velleius, ii. 64.

ship, which was to be divided between them, they being *triumviri reipublicæ constituendæ*, with the full powers which Cæsar had enjoyed during the last years of his life. After thus agreeing upon their general plan of action, it was necessary for them to secure confidence by the interchange of pledges; there were, moreover, a large number of secondary questions which urgently required settlement, and for these reasons a meeting was necessary. This was not easily arranged, as Antony and Octavianus distrusted one another. The place and manner of meeting thus formed a difficult problem. Overtures, however, were begun. Octavianus left Rome with his eleven legions, asserting that he was going to oppose Antony and Lepidus by the orders of the Senate;\* Lepidus and Antonius left Varius Cotila with five legions in Transalpine Gaul and marched southward into Italy with seventeen legions and ten thousand cavalry.† While they were advancing Octavianus, through Quintus Pedius, proposed and induced the Senate to approve a law annulling the proscription issued against Antony and Lepidus.‡ This was in itself a considerable guarantee of good faith. At the same time, the difficulties of arranging a meeting where neither suspicion nor fear should be possible, were considerable. At length the place was found, and a meeting was arranged near the Via Æmilia and Bologna in the little island formed by the confluence of the Reno and Lavino, which was then doubtless a tributary of the Reno, not of the Samoggia. This little island was joined to the banks by two bridges.§ The three leaders were thus able to enter the island, leaving their soldiers beyond the bridges, and to hold their discussion under the eyes of their legions without any fear of violence or surprise. Towards the end of October, the two armies were facing one another on either side of the

Sept.-Oct.  
43 B.C.

\* Dion, xlvi. 52; Appian, B. C. iii. 96.

† Plut. *Ant.* 18; Dion, xlvi. 54.

‡ Dion, xlvi. 52; Appian, B. C. iii. 96.

§ The ancient texts which describe the meeting are: Suet. *Aug.* 96; Plut. *Ant.* 19, and *Cic.* 46; Dion, xlvi. 55; Appian, B. C. iv. 2; Florus, iv. 6. Much has been written concerning this meeting-place: see *Giornale Arcadico* for 1825; Borghesi, *Œuvres*, Paris, 1865, vol. iv. p. 91; Frati, in the *Atti della Deputazione di Storia patria delle Romagne*, 1868, p. 1 ff.



October,  
43 B.C.

river; their camps were pitched at a prescribed distance; a tent was pitched on the island or peninsula and one morning Octavianus on one side and Lepidus and Antony on the other advanced with an escort towards the two bridges which gave access to this insignificant spot of earth. Lepidus was the first to cross, and looked about him alone to see whether all was secure; then he made signs to Octavianus and Antony to proceed. They advanced, greeted one another, carefully felt one another's persons to assure themselves that no concealed weapons were carried, and then entered the tent with Lepidus.\*

\* Appian, B. C. iv. 2; Dion, xlv. 55.

## CHAPTER XI

### THE MASSACRE OF THE RICH AND THE BATTLE OF PHILIPPI

The triumvirate—The convention of Bologna—The fortune of Lepidus—The “lex Titia”—The proscriptions—The confiscation of the property of the wealthy—The death of Cicero—The true historical importance of Cicero—Further confiscations and new imposts—Divus Julius—The panic of Octavianus and his cruelty—Brutus and Cassius in the East—East against West—The beginning of the war—The plain of Philippi—Disorderly condition of both armies—The first battle of Philippi—The death of Cassius—The second battle of Philippi—The suicide of Brutus.

THE discussion lasted two or three days,\* and what exactly <sup>The</sup> passed between the leaders was not known to contemporaries, <sup>triumvirate.</sup> and is, therefore, unknown to us. Exact information could only have been provided by the leaders themselves, and in the course of after events, each of them had every reason for throwing the responsibility of the resolutions passed upon the shoulders of the others. We are, therefore, confined to relating the results of the conference, which are but too well known. The situation must have seemed terrible to the three generals, and so indeed it was. They had set themselves, as the ancients said, to solve “the problem of Archimedes,” or in modern phrase, to square the circle. After the *lex Pedia*, and the revolt of so many legions, war was inevitable with Brutus and Cassius, that is to say, with the last army of the conservative party. It was therefore impossible to disband any single legion of the forty-three which they led. They were obliged

\* Two days, according to Appian, B. C. iv. 2 ; three days according to Plut. *Cic.* 44.

Oct.-Nov.  
43 B.C.

to keep the extravagant promises which had been made to these two hundred thousand men in the excitement of the struggle; they had also to provide for the maintenance of the thirty or forty thousand auxiliary troops and cavalry who followed their army; this by their calculation implied an expenditure of more than eight hundred millions of sesterces, a sum of eight million pounds in our money.\* The triumvirs were penniless. The public treasury, which Octavianus had plundered in August to pay the soldiers and the people, was empty. The richest provinces of the east, and Asia in particular, were in the hands of the enemy; the poor provinces of Europe could not meet such heavy war expenses, nor was it possible to rely upon Italy, where for more than a century the custom of paying taxes had disappeared, and where the *tributum* re-established by the Senate had proved extremely unpopular. In short, this great revolution and the military command of the European provinces had only been possible by means of promises lavishly scattered by the three leaders, promises which they could not possibly keep if they were limited to ordinary resources. They feared that their soldiers would desert if they ran short of money; they were spurred by that instinct which most easily produces rashness, the instinct of fear; they were also driven by the fatal necessity which suddenly obliges revolutionary leaders to rush on because they cannot retreat, and they therefore decided on a terrible course of action, which would doubtless have horrified the three of them a few months before. They resolved to seize and to divide the sovereign power, and when their mastery of the State was absolute, they would confiscate the property of the wealthy classes, and thus pay their soldiers by fair means or foul; then they would hasten to carry the war into the east against Brutus and Cassius, supposing, as was likely, that the latter did not commit the mistake of coming to attack them in Italy to escape from the dangers of the situation.

These decisions were strictly kept; confiscation was impossible unless they held the dictatorial power, and war was impossible without confiscation. It was arranged, therefore,

\* Appian, B. C. iv. 31.

Oct.-Nov.  
43 B.C.

that Octavianus should resign the consulship, and that all three of them should assume, not the title of dictators,\* but that of *triumviri reipublicæ constituendæ*, for a space of five years from the end of the year in progress until January 1, 37.† They would assume the power to make laws,‡ and would claim criminal jurisdiction without right of appeal or form of trial,§ the sovereign power of consuls over the whole state,|| the right of imposing taxes, ordering levies, appointing senators and officials in Rome and in the towns, and the governors of provinces,¶ the right of expropriating owners and distributing lands, of founding colonies,\*\* and of striking coins with their images and superscriptions.†† They arranged to divide the provinces, but Rome and Italy would be governed by the three of them in conjunction. Octavianus, whose army was the smallest, and whose authority was the weakest by reason of his age, was to take the least attractive share,‡‡ namely, Africa, Numidia, and the islands; Antony would have Gallia Comata and Cisalpine Gaul; Lepidus, Gallia Narbonensis and the two Spains.§§ Lepidus, who was the brother-in-law of Brutus and Cassius, was unable to join in the war against the two conspirators; Antony and Octavianus would therefore com-

\* Appian, B. C. iv. 2.

† Fasti Colotiani in C. I. L. p. 466.

‡ Mommsen, *Röm. Staatsrecht*, iv. 451. Others deny it, as Ganter, *Die Provinzialverwaltung der Triumviri*, Strasburg, 1892, p. 49.§ Mommsen, *Röm. St.* iv. 461.|| Appian, B. C. iv. 2; iv. 7. Cp. Mommsen, *Röm. St.* iv. 449.¶ Appian, B. C. iv. 2; Dion, xlv. 55; Mommsen, *R m. St.* iv. 456-464.\*\* Mommsen, *Röm. St.* iv. 465.‡‡ Mommsen, *Röm. St.* iv. 454; Herzog, *Geschichte und System der römischen Staatsverfassung*, Leipzig, 1891, ii. 96.

‡‡ Pliny, H. N. VII. xlv. 147; Gardthausen, *Augustus und seine Zeit*, i. 130. On the other hand, Drumann, G. R. I<sup>2</sup>, 264, and Schiller, *Geschichte der römischen Kaiserzeit*, i. 60, attribute this choice to the foresight of Octavianus, who was anxious for a fleet, which was, in fact, very useful to him at a later date in his struggle with Antony. This is exaggerated praise of him. The haste with which Octavianus formed his fleet, a work only begun several years later, is positive proof that he had no idea, at that time, of making himself a sea power, and that he was content, on the contrary, to take the provinces which Antony left to him. "In the light of after events, we are too often inclined," says M. Viollet, in the *Revue Hippique*, vol. xl. p. 14, with great truth, "to construct prodigies, I might say monsters of foresight and penetration which have never had any real existence."

§§ Dion, xlv. 55; App. B. C. iv. 2.

Oct.-Nov. 43 B.C. mand forty of the forty-three legions at their disposal, which they would divide equally, while Lepidus would be left with three legions to watch over Italy. A list was then drawn up of one hundred senators and about two thousand knights chosen from the richest men; a certain number of political opponents were added in order to deprive the conservative party of the few men of energy and capacity yet remaining in Italy. All were to be condemned to death and to the confiscation of their property.\* This point seems to have been warmly debated, as each leader wished to save his friends and relatives, but Antony was too full of hatred, while Lepidus and Octavianus were too panic-stricken. Eventually, they drew up a list out of which they chose, some say twelve, and others seventeen,† victims, who were to be put to death first, without hope of pardon. The list included Cicero, whom Octavianus abandoned to Antony. They even gave orders to Quintus Pedius to execute these proscribed men without delay, before the law concerning the triumvirate had given them the right to condemn citizens to death. They also decided to issue a solemn promise that when the war was concluded, they would give the lands

\* The proscriptions of the years 43 and 42 are wrongly regarded as political vengeance on the part of the triumvirs. Their chief object was to plunder the richest landowners of Italy. It is remarkable that the list of the senators, though this varies with historians (300, Appian, B. C. iv. 5, and Plutarch, *Ant.* 20; 140, Florus, iv. 6; 132, Orosius, VI. xviii. 10; 130, Livy, *Per.* 120; and 200, Plutarch, *Cic.* 46, *Brut.* 27) is much less than that of the knights. The number, according to Appian, B. C. iv. 5, is two thousand, and according to Livy, *Per.* 120, *plurimi*. In Orosius, VI. xviii. 12, there is certainly a mistake. Dion says that the enemies of the triumvirs, as well as the rich, were also the victims of the proscription (xlvii. 5, οἱ ἐχθροὶ αὐτῶν ἦ καὶ οἱ πλούσιοι), and he says (xlvii. 6) that the triumvirs became the enemies of the rich from want of money. Kloeveborn, *De Proscriptionibus*, a. 43, Königsberg, 1891, gives the names of ninety-eight proscribed persons, almost all senators, of whom fifty-four were afterwards spared; this is a further proof of the fact that the triumvirs did not fear their action and had no great animosity against them, seeing that they spared their lives when they had abandoned part of their property. Finally, a certain number of senators could only have been proscribed because they were rich men—Verres, for instance, who had retired into private life at the age of twenty-seven, and Varro, who was very old and almost helpless.

† Appian, B. C. IV. vi. These twelve or seventeen names were probably political enemies and nothing else.



promised by Cæsar to the veterans who had hitherto received nothing ; it is, however, unlikely that they then decided the details of that distribution which afterwards took place. Finally they chose magistrates for the following year from their respective friends ; Ventidius Bassus was to take the consulship for the few remaining months of the year after the resignation of Octavianus ; \* Plancus and Lepidus were to be consuls the following year. It was also agreed, apparently at the request of the soldiers, that Octavianus should marry the daughter of Clodius and Fulvia.†

Oct.—Nov.  
43 B.C.

Thus the military despotism which had been wielded two years previously by a man of lofty intellect, was now re-established in the hands of three men, of whom, notwithstanding his defects, Antony was the one remarkable personality. Octavianus was only a young man of twenty, while Lepidus was an ordinary unknown character, who owed his position to a stroke of fortune. A mediator had been required to reconcile Antony and Octavianus, and to re-establish the union of the Cæsarean party ; Lepidus was alone in a position to perform that service, and was rewarded by a position in the triumvirate. It is remarkable, however, that the three accomplices did not venture to take the title of dictators, though they proclaimed themselves the re-organisers of the State, and that their power was assumed for a space of five years, as if they wished to indicate that their despotism would be nothing more than an incident in the long constitutional history of Rome. Thus they would not venture to outrage the republican superstition and the attachment to the constitution which had grown even keener among the upper classes with the death of the dictator ; for that reason, even when they overthrew the republic, they rendered formal homage to republican traditions by respecting the recent law of Antony which had abolished the dictatorship. The public, however, had little time to consider these subtleties. The nomination of Ventidius Bassus as consul became at first a subject for jest ; he had begun life as a muleteer, and never had a man of such low birth reached a consulship. Shortly afterwards, when Ventidius raised a statue to

The respective  
characters of  
the triumvirs.

\* Appian, B. C. iv. 2.

† Dion, xlvi. 56.

Nov. the Dioscuri in the temple, a wit wrote a biting parody against  
43 B.C. him upon the famous poem of Catullus :

Phaselus ille quem videtis, hospites. . . .\*

The *lex Titia*.

Laughter, however, was forgotten about November 15, a few days after the news of the triumvirate had been received ; Quintus Pedius, though himself dismayed by the cruelty of the order, was then obliged to send assassins to kill the twelve doomed politicians ; four were found and were put to death immediately. This first premonition of the coming storm filled Rome with wild panic. Pedius was obliged to leave his house, and to spend the night in the streets to calm the populace ; in the morning, at his wits' end to restore confidence, he published on his own initiative, an edict proclaiming that only twelve citizens had been condemned. The next day, however, Quintus Pedius suddenly died.† Then the storm burst in all its fury. On November 24, 25 and 26, Octavianus, Antony, and Lepidus entered Rome in succession, each with a legion and the pretorian cohort ; on the following day, the 27th, they secured the passing of the *lex Titia* on the proposal of Lucius Titius, without previously promulgating it ; this measure established the triumvirate until December 31 of the year 38.‡ They appointed one of Cæsar's former officers, Caius Carrinas, consul in place of Pedius ; they then proceeded to publish the list of the proscribed, promising large rewards to all freedmen or slaves who should denounce them or put them to death ; those who might help them to hide or escape, were threatened with death and confiscation of property, however close their relationship ; in a word, every tie of fidelity, respect and affection binding master to servant, patron to client, friend to friend, husband to wife, or father to children, was shattered at one blow. The veneer of educated self-restraint, of unconscious hypocrisy, or of studied dissimulation vanished, and every man followed his own instincts. As upon a dark night the sudden glare of a great lightning flash displays the stems and branches of a forest, so did this fulmination suddenly bring to light the new

\* No. viii. of the *Catalecta* attributed to Virgil.

† Appian, B. C. iv. 6.

‡ C. I. L. i. 466.

vices and new virtues which had sprouted from the vigorous stock of the old Roman life, transformed as it was by wealth, by power, and intellectual culture.\* Selfishness, want of nerve, and the clinging to life produced by a complex civilisation with its multiplication of intellectual pleasure and sensual amusement, were suddenly manifested in deeds of unparalleled cruelty and cowardice. Proud senators who had worn the consular cloak, who had governed vast provinces with the power of kings, disguised themselves as vine-dressers and slaves, clasped the knees of their servants begging them to be faithful, hid themselves under floors, in sewers and in abandoned graves. Some burst into sighs and lamentations of bewilderment and awaited capture. Others ran upon their executioners, to be the sooner freed from the horrors of anticipation, which exceeded the pains of death itself. Servants killed their masters with their own hands, wives inserted in the fatal list the names of husbands whom they hated, or delivered their husbands to the executioners with their own hands under pretext of securing their safety. Sons even betrayed the hiding-places of their fathers, and the younger generation in particular displayed abominable cowardice amid these appalling scenes.† The generation subsequent to the year 60, the generation of Octavianus, was far weaker than the men of Cæsar's day in its fear of death and poverty, and displayed a corresponding timidity and cowardice.

On the other hand, there were men in whom the danger roused some remnant of the old Roman ferocity; these barred themselves in their houses, armed their slaves and slew their opponents before meeting death themselves. An old Samnite, who had taken part long ago in the Social War and was now

The massacres

\* It would be impossible to examine in detail the numerous stories of the escapes or captures of different proscribed persons. During the following ten years a large number of books were written on these adventures (Appian, B. C. IV. xvi.), and in these stories truth was interspersed with fiction. It is possible, however, from the totality of these accounts to gain a tolerably clear idea of what must have happened; an authentic document for these proscriptions is the "Eulogy of Turia" (C. I. L. vi. 1527), though this is incorrectly so called, as Vaglieri has pointed out. See *Notizie degli Scavi*, October 1898, p. 412 ff.

† Velleius, ii. 67: *fidem . . . filiorum nullam.*

Nov.-Dec.

43 B.C.

proscribed at the age of eighty by reason of his wealth, ordered his slaves to throw into the street all the gold, silver and valuables which he possessed, and thus to rob his executioners of their spoil; then he set fire to his house, and threw himself into the flames. In other cases, kindness, generosity and self-sacrifice were prominent, with those generous virtues which civilisation intensifies by deepening the sense of duty in certain chosen minds. Servants of low degree, inexperienced children and timid wives were seen to meet force with cunning; at the risk of their lives they hid their masters, their fathers, or their husbands, prepared their escape, secured their pardon from the triumvirs and sometimes sacrificed themselves for their loved ones. One faithful servant even assumed his master's dress and met death in his stead at the hands of the hurrying executioners. The majority of the proscribed attempted to fly and to reach the coast, where they might find some ship to take them eastward; or they attempted to reach Sextus Pompeius, who had come to Sicily with his fleet with the object of persuading the government to recognise his powers on the seaboard as given him by the Senate; \* he did his best to help the proscribed and for this purpose he published in every Italian town edicts promising those who should save a proscribed person double the reward promised for his death. He even sent along the Italian coasts numerous ships to collect the fugitives, or to guide boats under the control of inexperienced pilots.† Notwithstanding his help, a large number of the proscribed were captured on the road. Bands of soldiers arrived daily from every part of Italy, bringing in sacks the heads of noble senators or rich financiers, on their way to the forum to expose the frightful trophies of this appalling civil war. Those who secured their escape and found a temporary refuge after many vicissitudes, in Sicily or in the east, knew that their lands were confiscated, their houses plundered by the usurpers and their families dispersed, while their only prospect of return to Italy lay in a fresh civil war.

The great landowners and the plutocracy were almost

\* Appian, B. C. iv. 84; Dion, *xlvi.* 17.

† Appian, B. C. iv. 36.

entirely exterminated; the property of the wealthy classes, which comprised a considerable part of the plunder gathered by Rome throughout the world, fell into the hands of the victorious revolutionaries. The widows of the proscribed were left in possession of their dowries, while their sons were allowed to retain a tenth part of their fortune and their daughters a twentieth part.\* Throughout Rome and in Italy the triumvirs collected plunder of enormous value, including all the gold and silver found in the houses of the rich knights; other objects of value, such as pottery ware, statues, vases, furniture, valuable carpets, and slaves, a large number of mansions and houses at Rome, the finest villas in Latium and Campania, an infinite number of estates scattered throughout Italy and cultivated by colonists, the great estates of Southern Italy and Sicily belonging for the most part to the rich knights of Rome; the extensive lands owned by senators and knights in Cisalpine Gaul and elsewhere beyond Italy, especially in Africa; beasts of burden and tools, oxen, carts, horses, slaves who had been trained in certain arts and trades; finally, the credit notes, which many of these knights held at three per cent., were also confiscated. All this property was to be sold by degrees. The triumvirs, however, were the first to use the situation, and all three proposed to secure a large fortune for themselves within a few days by the process of driving competitors from the auction sales and buying in for almost nothing whatever properties they pleased.† When they were satisfied, the serious business of sale was to begin. The example of the triumvirs was imitated by the most influential officers, such as Rufrenus and Canidius, who had risked their lives to induce the legions to revolt. Imitating the example of their leaders, they sent soldiers to the sales to drive away unknown purchasers; if any tactless person persisted in his efforts to purchase, they ran up the price to force him to buy at a ruinous rate.‡ The triumvirs were obliged to wink at this abuse, as they could not afford to exasperate the soldiers; § bands of joyful and insolent soldiers, drawn from every part of Italy, from the little flourishing

Nov.—Dec.  
43 B.C.  
Results of the  
proscription.

\* Dion, xlvii. 14.

† *Ibid.*

‡ *Ibid.* and cp. Appian, B. C. iv. 35.



Dec.  
43 B.C.

towns of Cisalpine Gaul, from the mountains of Apulia or Lucania, from the dying townships of Southern Italy, soon surrounded the public criers who announced in every quarter of Rome and in many Italian towns the auction of the spoils of those aristocrats and financiers who had plundered the domains of the republic by force and by usury. Those who had spoiled the world were now despoiled; a retired muleteer held the consulship, an outward and visible sign of the political triumph of the poor over the rich; while the vast fortunes amassed within the circuit walls of Rome and drawn from the ruin of many a shattered civilisation were abandoned to a horde drunk with the lust of plunder.

Death of  
Cicero.

But some few nobles escaped. The families of the Roman aristocracy were so widely united by ties of friendship and relationship that in many cases it was possible to find secret protectors even amid these freebooters, who pretended a furious animosity for the benefit of the simple public. Thus it was that Calenus saved Varro,\* and Octavia, the sister of Octavianus and wife of Marcellus, a beautiful, gentle and accomplished woman, interceded with her brother to save the lives of numerous proscribed persons. Atticus, the faithful friend of every one, was undisturbed; Antony was grateful to him for help given to his wife and friends in moments of difficulty, and had personally opposed his proscription.† But neither Verres nor Cicero was equally fortunate; accuser and accused thus met once more after twenty-seven years, upon the edge of the same abyss. Verres was proscribed by reason of his wealth, though he was an old man and for many years had lived in retirement, peacefully enjoying the fruits of his earlier capacity.‡ Cicero's name and fame could not protect either himself, his brother, or his nephew from Antony's hatred. If his son had not been in Greece at that moment, the family would have been annihilated at one blow. As it was, he met his death; he had finished his work and had secured the claim to be regarded with Cæsar as the greatest figure in this great epoch of Roman history. Modern historians have an easy task when they proceed to point out the

\* Appian, B. C. iv. 47.

† Corn. Nepos, *Att.* 10.

‡ Pliny, N. H. XXXIV. ii. 6.

weaknesses, the vacillation and the inconsistencies of Cicero ; they forget, however, that the same observations would equally apply to any one of his contemporaries, even to Cæsar himself, and that they are the more obviously true in Cicero's case only because he has himself exposed them to our view. Cicero's personality and the part in history which he played are of greater significance than this. In a society where for centuries noble birth, wealth, or military talents had been the only openings to political power, Cicero had been the first, though he possessed none of these advantages, to enter the governing class, to hold the highest offices, and to govern with nobles, millionaires, and generals, simply by reason of his admirable literary and oratorical style, and of the lucidity with which he was able to expound to the public the deep complexities of Greek philosophy. In Roman history and in the history of that European civilisation which began with Rome, he was the first statesman belonging to the intellectual class ; he was, however, the first of a dynasty as corrupt, as vicious, and as degrading as can be conceived, but which any historian must admit, whatever his disdain, has lasted longer than the dynasty of the Cæsars ; for from Cicero's time to our own, for twenty centuries it has never ceased to dominate Europe. Cicero was the first of those men of letters who have been throughout the history of our civilisation either the pillars of state or the workers of revolution ; the great company of rhetoricians, lawyers, and publicists under the Pagan Empire are succeeded by the apologists and fathers of the Church ; monks, lawyers, theologians, doctors, and readers appear in the Middle Ages, humanists at the time of the Renaissance ; Encyclopædists appear in the eighteenth century in France ; barristers, journalists, political writers, and professors in our own day. Cicero may have made many a grave political error, but none the less, his historical importance can compare with that of Cæsar, and is but little inferior to that of St. Paul or St. Augustine. He had, moreover, all the fine qualities of the dynasty which he founded, and of their defects only the most venial. He was one of those unusual characters rarely to be found even in the world of thought and of letters, who have no ambition for power, no

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43 B.C.

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thirst for wealth, but merely the far nobler desire, whatever the vanity which it implies, to become the objects of admiration. Of all the men who governed the Roman world in that day, Cicero, alone amid the frightful political debasement of his time, had not wholly lost that sense of good and evil which may not raise a man above petty weaknesses, but at any rate withholds him from criminal excesses and extravagance. He alone attempted to govern the world, not with the foolish obstinacy of Cato, or with the cynical opportunism of others, but upon a rational system based upon loyalty to republican tradition amid the prevailing disorder, based upon the effort to harmonise the austere virtues of the Latin race with the art and wisdom of the Greeks and to disseminate throughout the Roman aristocracy that sense of equity and moderation which can often mollify the constitutional brutality or blindness of the principle that might is right. Historians have jested lightly upon Cicero and his Utopias; his contemporaries must have thought more of them, seeing that fifteen years later they attempted to put many of them into practice.

Further  
confiscations  
and imposts.

When, however, the great orator was slain by the assassins of the *triumvirs* at Formiæ, but few citizens had time to lament his fate in secret. Amid this appalling tempest the prevailing thought was self-preservation, and little consideration could be spared for the struggles of a drowning neighbour. The actual danger was exaggerated by panic-stricken imagination, and the most alarming rumours were in circulation. It was said that the three tyrants were meditating a system of universal pillage, and Octavianus, who had attained his power with a rapidity unparalleled in Roman history, became in popular imagination a monster of cruelty. It might be possible to tolerate the dictatorship of a man like Antony, who had long before given proof of greatness, or of a great lord such as Lepidus, but what right to dominate Rome could a young man of one-and-twenty possess, the son of a usurer (for the universal hatred confused his father with his grandfather)? The streets of Rome were soon covered with insulting remarks upon his ancestors and himself; \* the most frightful stories were repeated concerning

\* Suet. *Aug.* 70.

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him; it was stated that he dictated death sentences at table in a state of intoxication; \* that he had opposed the conclusion of the massacre against the wish of the two remaining triumvirs; † that he had added to the list of the proscribed the names of certain rich men, merely because he wished to steal their magnificent Greek vases.‡ These are doubtless exaggerations, but most people believed them, and for that reason a large number of citizens who had not been proscribed, but possessed wealth or title, fled from Italy, such as Livius, Drusus, Favonius, and many others. Though they had been spared hitherto, the perils which they had witnessed made the inference probable that more and worse was to follow. Their fears were but too well founded; the triumvirs, unable to restrain their soldiers, were forced to follow their lead, and were thus swept away by the force of circumstances, which, especially in revolutions, produces results far beyond human intention, though human agency afterwards has to bear the shame or the glory, as if it had been the real cause. When the triumvirs proceeded to sell the houses, the lands, and the furniture of the proscribed persons, they speedily discovered that the confiscations would not produce as much money as they required for the war, and that the commercial value of their immense plunder was little or nothing. Possibly many of the proscribed were not so rich as was supposed; possibly also, they had succeeded, in the midst of the general panic, in hiding their money or entrusting it to sure hands or in depositing it with the Vestal Virgins.§ Much money was also doubtless seized by the slaves, the freedmen, the relatives and the assassins, and the general scarcity of ready cash enabled very few people to buy the property put up for sale. There was also a general hesitation to bid for the goods of the proscribed; would-be buyers feared persecution, popular hatred, or the opposition of the officers who had arranged to monopolise the best for themselves and to drive away dangerous rivals.

Thus, though the confiscations continued, and though an increasing number of properties were put up at auction, the Further extortion.

\* Seneca, *De Clem.* I. ix. 3.§ Plut. *Ant.* 21.† Cp. Suet. *Aug.* 27.‡ Suet. *Aug.* 70.

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number of serious purchasers grew less and less,\* while the sales produced such scanty profits that the triumvirs speedily suspended them and left these vast properties to wait for better times. Money, however, must be found. As no better means was to hand, the triumvirs resolved upon further spoliation at the outset of the year 42. They confiscated the sums which private individuals had deposited in the Temple of Vesta; † they increased the *tributum* already imposed by the Senate, they ordered that all citizens, foreigners, and freedmen possessed of more than four hundred thousand sesterces should make a declaration of their property and lend to the State a sum equal to two per cent. of their value and a year's income, which seems to have been calculated in doubtful cases as equivalent to the tenth of the capital sum. In these calculations they even included the houses inhabited by the property holders, though here they were so benevolent as to assess only the probable income for six months; ‡ those who possessed less than four hundred thousand sesterces were obliged to make a contribution equivalent to half of their income for one year; § they even went so far as to request thirteen of the richest ladies in Italy to declare the value of their dowries. || Pitiless extortion was necessary to extract all the gold and silver from Italy which might still be left in the country. The triumvirs, therefore, decided to confiscate the property of those who, though not proscribed, had taken flight, in the hope of arresting the exodus of *émigrés* at this time. ¶ Amid all these thefts and murders, Rufrenus, the officer

\* Dion, xlvii. 17; Appian, B. C. iv. 31.

† Plut. *Ant.* 21.

‡ Appian, iv. 34, states that a forced loan was made of a fifteenth and a forced contribution was ordered of a year's income; the view given in the text is a possible way of reconciling this statement with that of, Dion xlvii. 16, who says that every one, even freedmen, was obliged to surrender the tenth part of his property. This tenth part was perhaps the supposed revenue for a year, and it also seems likely to me that the house tax of which Dion speaks (xlvii. 14) was included in this same arrangement.

§ The vague phrase in Dion, xlvii. 14, seems to indicate that in certain places property holders were obliged to give the "half" of their income. || Appian, B. C. iv. 32.

¶ An inference from the clause in the treaty of Misenum, which restored their property to ὅσοι κατὰ φόβον ἔφευγον.



who had seduced the legions of Lepidus, proposed to the comitia a law declaring Julius Cæsar to be *Divus*,\* and decided, not merely to restore the altar of Herophilus,\* but to close the Curia Pompeii, and to raise a temple in the forum to Cæsar on the spot where his body had been burnt. Thus the victorious party satisfied the vague aspirations of the mob who had worshipped the spot where Cæsar's funeral pile had been raised. The measure, however, introduced a novelty of an extremely serious nature; a citizen whom all had known in his lifetime was now worshipped as kings were adored in the east.†

The extent of the social upheaval produced by the proscriptions was appalling. The triumvirs themselves, apart from Antony, were horrified. Antony, however, intoxicated by success and greedy for wealth and vengeance, squandered the profits of the confiscations in festivities and orgies with actresses, singing girls, and courtesans, while Fulvia avenged herself for the humiliations she had suffered by giving free vent to her instincts of pillage and tyranny. A contemporary document also displays Lepidus as a choleric and brutal character, overwhelmed by his own disgust and fear.‡ Octavianus seems to have been seized with a transport of madness marked by alternating fits of mildness and ferocity. Nor is the fact difficult to explain in the case of a young man unused to violent scenes. From an early age he had been one of those nervous and delicate children brought forth by a corrupt, refined and exhausted civilisation; his health was sickly and feeble, his intelligence precocious, and his mother and grandmother had watched over him with most careful attention. At the age of thirteen, he had been regarded as a prodigy of learning and had even made a speech in public; so he quickly developed into a thoughtful and studious young man, careful of his health, drinking little wine,§ and unwilling to leave his books and his favourite teachers, Athenodorus of Tarsus and Didymus Areus. This delicate and sickly youth, brought up under

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Effect of the  
disturbances  
upon the  
triumvirs.

\* The ruins of it have been disclosed in the forum by the excavations of the archæologist Boni.

† Dion, xlvii. 18-19; C. I. L. vi. 872; ix. 5136.

‡ C. I. L. vi. 1527, p. 335, v. 10-15.

§ Suet. *Aug.* 77.

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female guidance, was suddenly thrown by chance into the midst of the revolution; whereupon he became what we should call at the present day a ferocious "hustler," one of the young men produced without number by a rich and refined civilisation, who can be induced to commit the utmost cruelty and the basest atrocities by their ambition, their anxiety to succeed, their instability and their cowardice. Weak and impressionable as Octavianus was, it is not surprising that his behaviour should have been the subject of most contradictory accounts by different historians; yet these accounts are in every case probable, because they are contradictory. We can understand that in his calmer moments, his favourite sister may have induced him to spare the lives of certain proscribed persons, while on the contrary, in moments of passion or fear, he may have displayed cruelty and even have caused the death of people whom he suspected of designs upon his life.\*

Preparations  
for war.

In any case the situation soon became so serious that even Antony was obliged to turn his attention to it. After this terrific scene of pillage it was obvious that the triumvirs could only overcome their profound unpopularity throughout Italy by crushing the army of Brutus and Cassius without delay. This was the only success likely to appease the violent discontent of the Italian towns, which could have weakened and paralysed the triumvirate government, even if unable to secure its overthrow. At the outset of the year 42, Antony had already sent eight legions to Brundisium under the command of Lucius Decidius Saxa and Caius Norbanus Flaccus; these officers were ordered to invade Macedonia in the spring. At the end of the year,† Brutus had evacuated this province after putting Caius Antonius to death by way of reprisal; he had then marched into Asia with his army, probably with the object

\* Suet. *Aug.* 27.

† Plutarch, *Brut.* 28. According to Gardthausen, Brutus went to Asia at an earlier date, and his second meeting with Cassius took place at Sardis at the beginning of the year 42. (*A. Z.* i. 669.) Apart from the fact that this statement contradicts Plutarch's narrative, it is improbable for the reason that the battle of Philippi did not take place until the end of October, and so long a period of inactivity before it is difficult to explain.

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of collecting money and of taking up winter quarters in a richer country and at a greater distance from Italy. It was clear that the main body of troops must be sent to support this advanced guard and that a much greater effort must be made; this necessitated the abandonment of Italy to the forces of anarchy and discontent. Under stress of this danger the triumvirs resolved upon an act of tyranny which Cæsar would never have dared; they entirely abolished the electoral rights of the comitia and nominated in advance the magistrates who were to hold office during the five years of the triumvirate.\* This was one method of attaching the interest of many people to the stability of the triumvirate.

While Decidius and Norbanus were disembarking in Macedonia, Brutus and Cassius with their armies had met at Smyrna. Brutus, who by reason of his proximity to Italy had been better informed of the course of events, had arranged this meeting in a letter to Cassius, urging that they should combine their armies for a joint struggle with the triumvirs, as they were authorised to do by the decrees of the Senate.† Cassius had thought of marching upon Egypt to punish Cleopatra, who remained faithful to the Cæsarean party; he had, however, agreed to the plan of Brutus, had left a little garrison in Syria under the orders of his nephew, and sent a large detachment of cavalry into Cappadocia, to put to death the treacherous governor of the province and to collect gold and silver;‡ then, with the main body of his army, he had gone to meet Brutus at Smyrna.§ A council of war was held. Brutus proposed that Cassius should return with him to Macedonia, to destroy the eight legions of the advanced guard and to prevent the arrival of others;|| Cassius, on the other hand, proposed a more comprehensive, more deliberate and easier plan, which Brutus eventually accepted. They were not yet certain of their hold upon the east; Rhodes, the republics of Lycia and other towns were still doubtful; in Syria a Parthian

Brutus and  
Cassius in the  
east.

\* Dion, xlvii. 19; Appian, B. C. iv. 2.

† Appian, B. C. iv. 63; Plut. *Brut.* 28.

‡ Appian, B. C. iv. 63; Drumann, G.R. ii. 133.

§ Plut. *Brut.* 28.

|| Appian, B. C. iv. 65.

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invasion and in Egypt fresh intrigues were always dangerous possibilities. If great disturbances took place in the east while they were fighting in Macedonia, or if the enemy with his larger numbers should attempt an attack upon their rear from Egypt, their prospects would be shattered. It was better to abandon Macedonia to the enemy, to negotiate for Parthian neutrality, to secure their hold upon the sea and the east, to collect a large fleet and subjugate Rhodes and Lycia, while gathering the largest possible supply of money from the east; then they could make themselves masters of the sea, cut communications between Italy and Macedonia, and invade the latter province. It would be impossible for the triumvirs to throw forty legions into Macedonia if their communications by sea were cut or threatened, as they could only maintain the small force for which the province of Thessaly could provide subsistence, and these districts were barren, depopulated and impoverished by the recent wars. Moreover, if hostilities were prolonged, the lack of money would be felt; Italy was already suffering from this cause, and the discontent of the soldiers would increase if their wants were not satisfied.\* Brutus accepted this plan and Cassius handed over part of his treasure; Labienus, the son of Cæsar's former general, was sent to the court of the Parthian king.† It was decided that Brutus should begin the conquest of Lycia, while Cassius would subjugate the Island of Rhodes.

Antony's  
movements.

These expeditions obliged Antony to delay the war against Brutus and Cassius.‡ This was a dangerous course for Antony to pursue; the inactivity to which he was condemned enervated his soldiers, fostered public discontent, and increased

\* See Appian, B. C. iv. 65, and the speech of Cassius, Appian, B. C. iv. 90 to 100. This speech is so exactly suited to the conditions of the moment that it must contain the actual thoughts of Cassius.

† Dion, xlviii. 24. It is asserted that Cassius asked the Parthians for help, but this was probably an invention of his enemies. It was so impossible an idea that I cannot believe Cassius ever conceived it.

‡ Dion, xlvii. 36, says that the triumvirs sent Norbanus and Decidius into Macedonia to profit by the expeditions of Cassius and Brutus in Asia. It seems to me more correct to put the expedition of Octavianus to Sicily about this time, though it is more probable, as Appian says, that the eight legions were already in Macedonia.

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the political and financial difficulties with which the triumvirate was struggling. At all costs it was necessary for the triumvirs to perform some exploit which might impress Italy with their power. Antony, then conceived the idea of sending Octavianus with a part of the fleet to recapture Sicily. Pompeius had put the governor to death at the beginning of the year 42, had seized the whole island, and was now becoming troublesome; he collected ships, recruited sailors, and organised legions; devastated the Italian coast and intercepted the grain cargoes intended for Rome; he might easily support the fleets of Brutus and Cassius and prevent the transport of troops and provisions to Macedonia across the Adriatic. Thus during the spring of 42 war began in Sicily and in the east. Between the spring and the beginning of summer Cassius conquered Rhodes; \* in the public and private treasuries he found 8500 talents, which he confiscated; † he made the Asiatic towns pay a ten years' tribute; ‡ he collected the ships which had come in from every side and organised a great number of garrisons by sea and land throughout the east; he sent Murcus with sixty ships to Cape Tanarum to intercept the reinforcements which Cleopatra was sending to the triumvirs. § Meanwhile, Brutus had carried out a successful campaign and had conquered the republics of Lycia, levying forced contributions upon the principal towns. Thus, at the beginning of the summer the two leaders of the republican army were able to meet at Sardis, and to make arrangements for invading Macedonia.

The East  
against the  
West.

On the other hand, the expedition of Octavianus had been a miserable failure, and Sicily remained unconquered at the moment when Brutus and Cassius were marching upon Abydos to throw their army across the Bosphorus and to take the Via Egnatia at Sestos which led to the heart of Macedonia. The failure of Octavianus must have been very embarrassing to Antony, as the movements of Brutus and Cassius obliged him to send help to Norbanus and Decidius. At length, hoping that Octavianus would eventually succeed, Antony resolved to

\* Appian, B. C. iv. 66-67.

† Plut. *Brut.* 22.

‡ Appian, B. C. iv. 74.

§ *Ibid.*



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leave him in Sicilian waters, and to cross to Macedonia by himself with twelve legions ; \* there he would begin the last act of this supreme struggle, which was not only the struggle of the Cæsarean and popular party against the aristocratic and conservative party, but of the east against the west. Brutus and Cassius, who had made the Asiatic provinces their base of operations, could dispose of less troops than Antony and Octavianus, for the reason that fewer soldiers were to be found in the civilised east, the country of merchants and capitalists, peaceable and deprived of political independence. Brutus and Cassius, however, could wield the great power which the civilised and manufacturing east represented in the ancient world—the power of money ; they carried with them upon their march against the enemy the precious metals gathered upon their expeditions and now enclosed in great amphoræ and placed upon carts ; during the forty years of comparative peace and order that had followed the great Mithridatic war, the eastern world had succeeded in accumulating much treasure, notwithstanding the extortions of the governors, and had even recovered a considerable part of the wealth which the Italians had stolen, in exchange for agricultural products or manufactured wares exported to Italy.† Italy, on the other hand, for two centuries had been gathering the most useful commodities and the most precious metals from every part of the world ; none the less, the general poverty was extreme, and gold and silver were especially scarce, so vast was the amount of wealth swallowed up by public and private pleasures, by the revival of agriculture, by the increase of luxury in every class, by rash speculations, revolutions, and civil war, by a domestic policy based upon intrigue and patronage, and a foreign policy of plunder and conquest. Italy had almost more soldiers than she needed ; she could send formidable armies to the east, but

\* It is clear that Antony sent twelve legions into the east, because at Philippi the triumvirs had nineteen and had left one at Amphipolis (Appian, B. C. iv. 107 and 108). As there were already eight under the command of Norbanus and Decidius, twelve further legions must have disembarked in Macedonia at the time of this expedition.

† Cp. Appian, B. C. iv. 73.

she was forced to send them beyond the sea almost in rags, without money, without the necessary munitions of war, and without a fleet adequate to defend their communications or to bring them supplies. The result of the war was to show which metal was the more valuable in this civil strife, gold or iron.

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The early stages of the campaign were easily performed and the spirits of Brutus and Cassius rose correspondingly. They brought their armies across the Bosphorus without difficulty, and led them along the coast to Cape Serrheion, and to the narrow passage between the mountains and the sea which Norbanus was holding; they forced him to retreat without difficulty by sending Tullius Cimber with a fleet to menace his rear. Norbanus was obliged to fall back upon the pass of Burun Calessi, then regarded as the only entrance by which a great army could pass from Asia to Europe and also considered of impregnable strength.\* Antony, on the other hand, had been stopped at the outset of his expedition by an unforeseen obstacle, the fleet of Murcus. Cleopatra's reinforcements had been scattered along the African coast by a storm, and Murcus had immediately proceeded to block Brundisium and to prevent Antony from crossing the Adriatic; Antony made several attempts to force a passage, but after a succession of failures, he called Octavianus to his help, thus interrupting his Sicilian campaign which was by no means concluded.† It was inadvisable to leave Sextus Pompeius in possession of the island in his rear, but there was nothing else for him to do. When Octavianus appeared in the Adriatic, Murcus who had only sixty ships, was obliged to retreat,‡ and the two triumvirs were thus able to disembark their twelve legions at Dyrrachium. The trials and dangers of the enterprise then began. Urgent despatches from Norbanus and Decidius announced that they had been forced to abandon the impregnable position which they had occupied. A Thracian chief had shown Brutus and

The beginning of the war.

\* Heuzey and Daumet, *Mission archéologique de Macédoine*, Paris, 1876, p. 99, have identified the col of Burun-Calessi with the Sapæicus pass of ancient times.

† Appian, B. C. iv. 82; Polyænus, *Strat.* VIII. xxiv. 7.

‡ Appian, B. C. iv. 86.

42 B.C. Cassius another passage narrower and steeper, by which the army could cross the mountain in three days if they carried their water-supply with them. Norbanus, who was expecting a frontal attack, had suddenly learned that the enemy was about to deploy in the plain of Philippi on his rear, and had been forced to make a precipitate retreat to Amphipolis to avoid being cut off. In a word, the entrances to Macedonia and the communications with Thrace were in the hands of the enemy, while Amphipolis, which was only defended by eight legions, might be attacked at any moment by an army almost twice that size.

Antony  
marches to  
Philippi.

The situation seemed highly critical and the danger was increased by a sudden illness which forced Octavianus to remain at Dyrrachium. Resolved to defend Amphipolis, Antony left his colleague at Dyrrachium and marched upon the town with his legions at all speed ; no sooner had he arrived than he perceived that the fears of his subordinates had been wholly imaginary, as is often the case in war. Brutus and Cassius had not attempted to pursue Norbanus and Decidius ; they had halted below Philippi in a strong position and were entrenched in two camps upon the Via Egnatia. Brutus was at the north below the Panaghirdagh range of hills ; Cassius was upon the south coast, and was separated from the sea by a vast and impassable marsh and entrenched at the foot of the hill of Madiartopé.\* The two camps were united by a palisade behind which flowed a pure and abundant stream, the Gangas ; the Via Egnatia was their line of communication with Neapolis, to which port provisions, munitions of war and money were brought by ships from Asia and from the island of Thasos, which the conspirators had chosen as the spot for their stores. Established in this strong position Brutus and Cassius proposed to await the attack of the enemy and to prolong the war until their adversaries were reduced by famine, shut up as they were in a narrow and barren district ; they also attempted to hamper their communications by sea, sending a fleet under Domitius Ahenobarbus to support Murcus. As soon as Antony realised

\* See the map of Philippi (from Heuzey-Daumet) in Duruy, *Histoire des Romains*, Paris, 1881, iii, p. 483.

that he would not be attacked at Amphipolis, he left one legion in that town and marched to the Plain of Philippi with the remainder of his forces ; there he encamped in the face of the enemy, and waited for Octavianus who was now convalescent and arrived in a few days in a litter. Cassius then joined his camp to the marsh by means of a palisade lest Antony should attempt to cut his communications with the sea.

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Days and nights of weary anxiety now began for the two armies confronting one another on the Plain of Philippi, throughout the winds and rain of the grey October weeks of the year 42.\* The supreme moment of the long struggle was at hand, and the combatants should have gathered their energies for one final effort, and have patiently submitted to the greatest sacrifices in order to gather the fruit of their many toils. They were, however, animated by no such spirit. At this supreme moment, the general disruption of law and tradition, of national and social ties, of property tenure and morality, which had shaken the empire, swept away with it the two armies and destroyed the authority of their leaders. The disunion, the hatred, and the weariness of the leaders increased the impatient and mutinous temper of the soldiers, and led to such confusion and disorder that no supreme will could be found in command on either side. The confidence which united Brutus and Cassius was absolute ; but none the less, their views were often divergent. Brutus was a weak and peaceable student ; thrown by a strange course of destiny into a life of action, he was exhausted by the long strain, by the weight of responsibility, and by the continual struggle between his philosophical and his political instincts ; every moment he was obliged to abandon action in apparent consonance with his duty and to follow an opposite course. He had become nervous and impressionable, was continually in tears and suffered from insomnia, while at night in his tent vague shadows appeared to him by lamplight until he thought he recognised the spirit of his victim. Cassius, an ardent disciple of Epicurus,

The opposing  
leaders at  
Philippi.

\* The two battles of Philippi are fairly well described by Plutarch, *Brut.* 40 ff. ; not so well in Appian, *B. C.* iv. 108 ff. ; and very carelessly in Dion, *xlvi.* 42 ff. Many obscure points and gaps in the narrative still remain.

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attempted to persuade him that these were nothing more than the hallucinations of a wearied brain. But such energy as he had was now exhausted;\* and his only desire was to conclude the business as speedily as possible, and to be rid of the weight of responsibility without any obvious display of cowardice or flight; this deliverance he was prepared to buy at the cost of any sacrifice. He therefore proposed to give battle immediately; if they were defeated, the last refuge and conclusion of death would still remain to him. Cassius, on the other hand was a strong man intent upon victory, and advised that the forces of the enemy should be exhausted by prudent delay.† If they had the patience to wait, they could rely upon two allies, sedition and famine.

Unfortunately, the army agreed with Brutus, and was anxious to conclude the war before the winter, and to return as quickly as possible to Italy with the money gathered in the east during months of plundering. Only by dint of the most desperate efforts was Cassius able to induce his colleague and his army to submit to his wishes. Antony and Octavianus led the more practised troops, but Octavianus, exhausted by his illness and deterred by the desperate nature of their enterprise, abandoned the army to its officers and spent his time in long excursions from the camp under pretext of regaining his strength. Antony was therefore obliged to act for himself and to take the whole responsibility of the war. With the fear of famine before his eyes, he continually offered battle and attempted to force an engagement which Cassius obstinately refused.‡ The days followed in monotonous and enervating succession, undermining the resolution of every combatant; they have been admirably described by the youthful Horace who then held a post in the army, in a poem composed at a later date, but probably conceived in the idleness of these days.

A fearful tempest has overclouded the sky, and Jupiter rushes down in rain and snow; the wind of Thrace roars over the sea and through the forests. Friends, let us seize the fleeting hour, and while our knees are strong and our strength remains, let us wipe the gloom of

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\* Plut. *Brut.* 36-37.

† Plut. *Brut.* 39.

‡ Appian, B. C. iv. 109.



age from our brows. Bring forth the flask of wine laid down the year when I was born, and cease to talk of aught else ; some god perhaps will change the progress of events to greater fortune and restore all things in order.\*

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Antony eventually conceived the idea of building a road with faggots, earth, and hurdles to cross the marsh separating the camp of Cassius from the sea ; thus he would reach the Via Egnatia, threaten the enemy's rear and force him to give battle. By deploying his forces every day in the plain as if to offer battle with a large proportion of his own soldiers and those of Octavianus, who took long rides to recover his health, he was able to distract the attention of the enemy, and his sappers were enabled to work for ten days among the high roads of the marsh without interference.† Suddenly, however, on the eleventh day, the armies of Brutus and Cassius made a sortie, and the force of Brutus on the right wing attacked the legions of Octavianus. Probably Cassius, having perceived Antony's preparations and their meaning, had given way to the advice of Brutus and resolved to attack.‡

The first battle.

The course of events from that moment is by no means clear. It seems that Octavianus was taking a ride for the benefit of his health in the neighbourhood of the camp ; and that the officers of his legions had no orders and were routed by the sudden attack of Brutus. The Fourth Legion alone is said to have offered a vigorous resistance. Antony, on the other hand, who was on his guard, made a furious charge upon the left wing commanded by Cassius, drove it back and pursued it to the camp, where a fierce combat began beneath the palisades. By that time Brutus had defeated and almost annihilated the Fourth Legion ; § if he had returned in time to help his colleague and had attacked Antony's army in the rear,

\* Horace, *Epod.* xiii.

† Appian, B. C. iv. 109 ; his account is confirmed by Plutarch, *Brut.* 41.

‡ On this point it is impossible to reconcile the story of Appian, B. C. iv. 110, with that of Plutarch, 40 and 41. According to Appian, Antony was the first to attack, while Plutarch asserts that Brutus and Cassius began the action. The latter version seems to me the more probable, for it is difficult to understand from Appian's account how Antony could have forced Cassius to give battle.

§ Thus Appian, B. C. iv. 117 ; Plutarch says *three* legions.

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the battle would have been won. Brutus, however, was unable to restrain his legions, which set off in pursuit of the fugitives, swept their officers away with them and invaded the camp of the triumvirs, where they began to plunder; they so terrified Octavianus, who was riding at a short distance from the spot, that he fled for refuge to a neighbouring marsh.\* Antony was thus able to storm the camp of Cassius, but his soldiers, like those of Brutus, had no sooner entered the camp than they refused to obey orders, and scattered in search of plunder, like so many brigands. Every soldier hastened to carry his booty to his own camp; the battle soon became a number of petty skirmishes between little bands of soldiers returning to their camps loaded like porters; the result was wild confusion in which friend and foe were inextricably mixed, and in which Cassius met his death. Tradition relates that he was unable to distinguish the course of the action from the height upon which he stood, by reason of the clouds of dust which rose, thought that Brutus had been defeated, and mistook for enemies the detachment of cavalry which Brutus had sent towards him to announce his victory. Thereupon he is said to have ordered a freedman to kill him. Historians, however, unable to understand why so capable a general as Cassius should have lost his head so easily, have assumed that he was killed in the confusion by some freedman whom the triumvirs had suborned. Thus by some unknown death perished the most intelligent of the conspirators.† He alone had declined to give way to the despondency which overwhelmed the whole conservative party in 44; he alone realised, and the event proved that he was right, the possibility of recruiting an army to confront the Cæsarean party; to him is due the credit of the two years' defence of his party which he maintained. It was a magnificent effort, and if Cassius eventually failed, it should not be forgotten that though he might have been one of the best rewarded of Cæsar's servants, he none the less preferred to die in the defence of republican liberty; this was a liberty which had become little more than an ideal and included a large

\* Pliny, N. H. VII. xlv. 148.

† Appian, B. C. iv. 110-114; Plut. *Brut.* 41-45.

number of class interests, but, none the less, remained a great tradition. 42 B.C.

The issue of the battle was, however, by no means decided. Result of the first battle. Antony's losses were double those of his enemies ; the whole of his camp had been plundered, while his soldiers had only pillaged the camp of Cassius ; \* his position would probably have become utterly untenable if the death of Cassius had not inflicted an irreparable loss upon the enemy's power. This first battle decided the war merely because it caused the death of Cassius. The anxious days of waiting in the Plain of Philippi began once more for the two armies. Persuaded by the result of the battle that Cassius was right, Brutus followed his plan, and now attempted to hold his troops in check by large distributions of money. If the troops had had the patience to wait, they would have won a victory without striking a blow. Famine was beginning to be felt in the enemy's ranks ; an early winter with icy winds froze the soldiers in their encampment, while many of them had lost all that they possessed in the pillage ; the generals were short of money and could offer nothing but promises. † An additional disaster speedily followed which the triumvirs strove to conceal from Brutus ; the convoy of provisions and reinforcements expected from Italy had been attacked by the fleets of Murcus and Domitius Ahenobarbus and had been sent to the bottom of the Adriatic ; two legions, one of which was the Martian, had perished in the sea-fight. ‡ Fortunately for the triumvirs, Brutus, unlike Cassius, was no disciplinarian ; § he was too inclined to yield to the soldiers and to argue with them instead of enforcing obedience ; and though he was liked, he was not feared by the troops. This weakness in the commander became immediately obvious in a relaxation of discipline ; former jealousies and discords between the old soldiers of Cassius and Brutus were revived. The troops had hardly recovered from the shock of the first conflict than they were anxious to make an end of the war ;

\* Plut., *Brut.* 45 ; Appian, B. C. iv. 112.

† Dion, xlvii. 47 ; Plut. *Brut.* 46-47 ; Appian, B. C. iv. 122.

‡ Appian, B. C. iv. 115 ; Plut. *Brut.* 47.

§ Appian, B. C. iv. 123.

42 B.C. the leaders of the eastern allies were anxious to return home, and continually urged the general to lead them out to battle.\* Brutus was unable to check these outcries or to calm the prevailing impatience. Although he displayed his habitual and aristocratic serenity of bearing, he was utterly worn out. The crushing round of daily business was only confronted by an extraordinary effort of will; he was harassed by insomnia and hallucinations, and gave way to the fatalist resignation which is the last paralysis of will power in men over-sensitive and exhausted by excessive mental fatigue. He had written to Atticus that he felt happy because the end of his trials was approaching; if he won the victory he would save the republic, while if he lost he would kill himself, and thus leave a life which had become intolerable to him.†

The second  
battle.

Though thus prepared for death, he yet took the lead in the preparations for that final struggle which he had in reality already abandoned; he allowed himself to drift, and daily offered a feeble resistance to Antony's desperate efforts to provoke a conflict. While the triumvir sent his soldiers outside the *vallum* to abuse the enemy as cowards and poltroons, and to send in notes urging them to revolt, Brutus was making fine speeches to the troops and persuading them to hold out a little longer; he merely increased their exasperation, as inevitably happens when attempts are made to calm the passions of a maddened crowd by appeals to reason. The officers, the eastern kings, and the common soldiers were soon unanimously urging Brutus to give battle; Brutus realised that the order was a mistake, but he was exhausted and was thus eventually persuaded to yield against his will. Antony's troops were harder than his own, while their leader's energy was infinitely greater, and Brutus was defeated.‡ Cæsar's murderer withdrew with some friends to a little valley in the neighbouring hills, and committed suicide without a murmur and with his habitual calm; the blow was given by a Greek rhetorician, Strato, who had been his tutor.§ Brutus was neither a fool

\* Appian, B. C. iv. 123-124. † Plut. *Brut.* 29.

‡ Appian, B. C. iv. 128 ff; Plut. *Brut.* 49.

§ Plut. *Brut.* 50-53; Appian, B. C. iv. 131.

nor a man of genius, nor a ruffian nor a hero, as historians have attempted to paint him in accordance with their party leanings. He was a scholar and an aristocrat, driven by the force of circumstances to a position which demanded infinitely greater energies than his, and to an enterprise far beyond his strength. He could boast that he had borne the weight of responsibility till his death, but beneath that weight he was crushed. His sacrifice, however, was not in vain. At the supreme moment he could tell himself that the great ideal republic was now dead, and that the world which he was leaving had grown too corrupt for any adherent of this ideal. Brutus could never have divined the man who was destined to resume this ideal and to adapt it to the new conditions of political life. Yet that man was near at hand, and had fought at Philippi, though in the ranks of the enemy.



## CHAPTER XII

### THE DEATH OF AN ARISTOCRACY

The convention of Philippi—Grant of lands to Cæsar's veterans—Antony's reasons for choosing the East—Fulvia and the revolutionary spirit—New currents in literature—Virgil's *Eclogues* and Sallust's *Catiline*—The return of Octavianus to Italy—Confiscations of land in eighteen Italian towns—First dissension between Fulvia, Lucius and Octavianus—Lucius undertakes the defence of the expropriated landowners—Virgil's first *Eclogue*—Antony in the East—First meeting of Antony and Cleopatra—New struggle between Fulvia, Lucius and Octavianus—Fulvia and Lucius prepare for a revolution—The new civil war—The parody of the social war—The siege of Perugia.

The defeated  
army.

A GREAT number of illustrious Roman families had perished on the battle-field of Philippi; Brutus had left no children, and with him died the only son of Cato, the only son of Lucullus, the only son of Hortensius, and Lucius, the nephew of Cassius. A certain number of proscribed and conspirators who had been captured, were massacred on the spot, including Favonius.\* The greater part of the defeated army withdrew to the sea while its officers took ship and sailed to the island of Thasos. Here they might have settled for a time to recover from their discouragement, for their adversaries had no fleet. The shock, however, had been too great, and it was impossible to overcome the universal feeling of depression. Many illustrious men committed suicide, such as Livius Drusus, Quintilius Varus, Labeo, and many others.† Those who were not so utterly dispirited thought only of saving themselves and the army was disbanded. Cnæus Domitius seized a certain number of ships at Thasos; he invited many of the soldiers of the defeated army

\* *Dion*, xlvii. 49.

† *Appian*, B. C. iv. 135; *Velleius*, ii. 71.

to embark with him, and sailed away with a determination to become a pirate \* if he found no other means of safety. Cicero's son escaped to the east, where a detachment of the fleet and the army still remained on the coast of Asia under the orders of Cassius Parmensis; a second detachment was at Rhodes under the orders of a certain Clodius and of Turullius, while a third detachment was at Crete under the command of a certain Manius Lepidus.† Lucius Valerius Messala Corvinus and Lucius Bibulus, the son-in-law of Brutus, remained at Thasos; they refused to take the command which was offered them by such soldiers as were left in the island and surrendered to Antony, who spared their lives when they had given up the treasure and provisions of the army.‡ Subordinate officers were pardoned more readily and were able to return to Italy with more or less difficulty, as did Quintus Horatius Flaccus. The majority of the troops surrendered or dispersed.

After this victory every one regarded opposition to the popular and Cæsarean government as hopeless. It was inconceivable that the few desperate men who had put to sea or that Sextus Pompeius, who held only Sicily, could change the fortunes of the war. The battle of Philippi thus confirmed the result of Pharsalia. Liberty was dead; the armies would now recognise the triumvirs, and, in particular, Antony, who therefore seemed in secure possession of the power. After the battle, when the senators who had been captured were led before the triumvirs, many of them abused Octavianus, but all saluted Antony respectfully. In this they anticipated the general opinion, while at the point of death. The soldiers knew that the victory was due to Antony, and that Octavianus had done nothing. It was considered that Antony had reached his position by virtue of tenacity and endurance deserving of so great a result, while Octavianus was regarded as a hateful intruder, as cruel, perverse, self-seeking, and favoured by undeserved good fortune. Lepidus had utterly discredited

The position of  
the triumvirs.

\* Velleius, ii. 72; Appian, B. C. v. 2.

† Appian, B. C. v. 2. This Lepidus is perhaps the same as the person to whom reference is made in the inscription reported in the *Bull. Corr. Hell.* 1879, 151.

‡ Appian, B. C. iv. 136.

§ Suetonius, *Aug.* 13.

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himself during the war by allowing the arrogant and intriguing Fulvia to usurp his power as triumvir, to govern Italy in his place, and to enforce her will upon the Senate and the magistrates.\* The conservative party being thus annihilated and the last battle won, Antony was now the supreme arbiter of a greater and stronger power than that of Cæsar after Thapsus; even though he was obliged to share this power with his discredited colleague, he could at least bend him to his will. † He therefore, was doubtless the moving spirit in the numerous important decisions which the two triumvirs passed after the battle of Philippi.

The difficulties  
of the  
situation.

Though the victory had been won, the triumvirs were confronted by many difficulties. They had to pay the soldiers the twenty thousand sesterces which they had promised, and the arrears of their pay. For this purpose they were short of money. It was necessary to disband part of the army, as the expense of maintaining forty-three legions was prohibitive. Finally, Cæsar's veterans, who had received nothing up to the Ides of March, required performance of the promises which the dictator had made to them and to which the triumvirs had pledged themselves, as the successors to Cæsar's policy. Hence it was urgently necessary to re-establish the authority of Rome in that part of the empire whence money could be drawn, that is, in the east, which had been thrown into utter confusion by the civil war. The petty princes of Syria and Phœnicia, whom Pompeius had dispossessed, had reappeared in increasing numbers during the last two years; some had been encouraged by Cassius, others had acted for themselves and had profited by the general disorganisation. The province was thus divided into a large number of petty states at war with one another; one of the most important, the town of Tyre, was at war with Palestine, and had seized part of its territory, in agreement with Ptolemæus, Prince of Chalcis, and with the help of Antigonus, son of the Aristobulus from whom Pompey had taken the government of Palestine to transfer it to Hyrcanus. Thus civil war had broken out again in Palestine, apparently between the adherents of the two claimants, but in reality

\* Dion, xlviii. 4.

† Appian, B. C. v. 14.

between the nationalists and the Roman party. Asia was less disturbed, though greatly unsettled by reason of war and pillage. In almost every monarchy and principality dependent upon Rome, class discord, family or faction rivalry, and even small revolutions had broken out. 42 B.C.

It was thus impossible to rest upon the laurels of Philippi. Antony and Octavianus first resolved to remove Lepidus; he had done nothing but blunder in Italy while they were winning the victory, and he could not think of resistance, as he had only three legions at his command. The army had lost three whole legions during the war, and was thus reduced to forty legions. The triumvirs resolved to disband eight legions of Cæsar's veterans who had been re-enlisted; that is to say, the three legions of Ventidius, the three of Lepidus, and two of Octavianus. Thus the army was reduced to thirty-two legions; of these, the eleven who had fought at Philippi were to remain under arms in Macedonia and would be reinforced by the soldiers of Brutus and Cassius. Antony was to have six of these and Octavianus five; the latter was also to have the three legions of Lepidus. Antony would thus be in command of seventeen legions, eleven in Italy, and six in Macedonia; Octavianus would command fifteen legions, seven in Italy, five in Macedonia, and the three of Lepidus. With regard to the provinces held by Lepidus, Antony proposed to take Gallia Narbonensis; Octavianus would take Spain, while he would exchange the province of Africa with Antony; \* a petty civil war had broken out in Africa while the triumvirs were fighting at Philippi. Cornificius had refused to recognise the power of the triumvirs; Sextus, the governor of New Africa, had declared for Antony; and in the consequent war Cornificius had been beaten and killed. It was also understood that if there should seem to be any danger in thus completely stripping Lepidus, Octavianus was to give him Numidia, and Antony, Africa. †

\* Appian, B. C. v. 3; Dion, xlviii. 1.

† Dion, xlviii. 1. Appian, B. C. v. 3, says, on the contrary, in a statement probably derived from the Memoirs of Augustus, that these provinces were to be given to Lepidus in case Octavianus should find that the suspicions of treachery with Sextus Pompeius under which Lepidus laboured, were unjust. Dion's statement is correct, as this pretended treachery was obviously only a pretext for despoiling Lepidus.

42 B.C.

The rewards to  
be given to the  
troops.

Finally it was decided that Antony should go to the east under pretext of pacifying that part of the empire, but with the real purpose of procuring money, while Octavianus was to go to Italy to continue the war with Sextus, and to distribute the lands to his father's veterans; the latter task was by no means easy. The veterans of the Gallic wars who had not yet received their rewards had been probably reduced to seven or eight thousand by the recent struggles; each of them, however, was to have the very considerable allowance of some fifty acres. Hence it was necessary to find three or four hundred thousand acres of good land in Italy, an almost impossible enterprise under ordinary conditions. Past experience had proved the fact. The agrarian laws of 64, 60 and 59 had been wholly ineffectual; under these measures the popular party had been obliged to respect legal fictions and to confine their proposed distributions to the remnant of the *ager publicus* and to proposals for buying land at reasonable prices *sine injuria privatorum*.<sup>\*</sup> The only result had been the failure of attempts to buy private lands when the *ager publicus* proved inadequate; no one was willing to sell, except at excessive prices, the privileged soil of Italy which was free from taxation; the petitions, the prayers and the intrigues of the landowners had bound by invisible bonds the hands of those who would found colonies, and even of Cæsar himself. On the other hand, the triumvirs had no money and could not therefore have bought lands even if they had wished. As, however, they had annihilated the conservative party at Philippi, Antony and Octavianus might take more violent measures than Cæsar had ventured to use after Thapsus against the conservatives, who were then defeated but not crushed; only by such means was it possible to overcome the quiet but obstinate resistance of private interests. Antony

<sup>\*</sup> This formula had been used in the *senatus consultum* proposed by Cicero, January 1, 43. Cic. *Phil.* V. xix. 53: *agri . . . qui sine injuria privatorum dividi possent*. It seems probable to me that some similar formula appeared in all the agrarian laws, even in those of Cæsar for the year 59 B.C. Its insertion was intended to reassure the middle classes; unfortunately, it enabled landowners to make the law inoperative.



42 B.C.

and Octavianus therefore decided to provide these seven or eight thousand soldiers with lands from the territory of eighteen of the fairest and richest towns in Italy; \* from each town individual landowners were to be deprived of a part of their holdings, and to receive promises of indemnities which the triumvirs would fix and pay when they could. These colonies, to be founded by Octavianus and to receive the name of *Juliae*, would be entirely composed of Cæsar's veterans, and their foundation was merely the accomplishment of Cæsar's promises.† It was also resolved that Cæsar's law granting citizen rights to the Cisalpine Gauls should be carried out.‡ These secret arrangements were not to be submitted for approval either to the Senate or to the people.§ After Philippi, the constitutional fictions which the triumvirate was obliged to use at the outset of its existence no longer seemed necessary; the personal power of the triumvirs could outrage republican tradition more openly than before. Antony also took over from Octavianus two other legions which were in Macedonia, promising two of the legions then in Italy by way of exchange. ||

Many modern historians have asserted that Antony preferred the east in a foolish longing for the easy satisfaction of his sensuality; it seems to me more probable that his object was to reorganise this portion of the Roman dominions which he and all his contemporaries, including Cæsar, regarded as Rome's most precious possession. The European provinces were indeed poor, thinly populated, and half civilised in comparison with the vast east, full of wealth and advanced civilisation, with great manufacturing towns, great commercial routes, important centres of learning, and well-cultivated lands. Italy herself was passing through an economic and political crisis of such serious length and complexity that few people had any hopes of the re-establishment of peace and order. Cæsar had turned towards the Rhine to extend the Roman dominion,

Why Antony  
chose the east.

\* Appian, B. C. iv. 3.

† Appian, B. C. v. 14.

‡ Appian, B. C. v. 3; Dion, xlviii. 12.

§ As may be seen in Appian, B. C. v. 12, and Dion, xlviii. 11-12.  
Cp. Ganter, *Die Provinzial-Verwaltung der Triumviri*, Strasburg, 1892,  
p. 2.

| Dion, xlviii. 2; Appian, B. C. v. 3.

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almost by chance and because no other opportunity for conquest lay before him at the end of his consulate ; but even he had always regarded the east as the true object of Italian aggression, and he was preparing a further expedition against Persia at the moment of his death. Moreover, the progress of the mercantile spirit inclined men to exaggerate the importance of wealth in human life, and therefore to consider the richest countries as the most perfect and desirable. The triumvirs had almost been defeated in the recent struggle for want of money. Cæsar had said that with soldiers and money the world could be governed. Antony, his faithful pupil, resolved now that he had an army, to seize the richest countries before attempting further action. Thus it appears that in this case, as in every other article of the so-called convention of Philippi, Octavianus was obliged to yield to the conditions which Antony was pleased to lay upon him. \*

The situation  
in Italy.

Thus towards the end of the year 42, Antony set off for Greece with eight legions, while Octavianus returned to Italy with three legions, preceded and followed by troops of disbanded veterans who were returning to their homes. They found Italy in the most disastrous state. Her economic ruin seemed complete ; there was no money in circulation and a kind of universal bankruptcy had been the consequence. By their extortion of high taxes at a moment when the precious metals were so scarce, the triumvirs had driven a large number of landowners into bankruptcy, even though they had allowed them to retain a third of the money produced by the sale of their property. Estates were sold at so low a price that almost all of them had been allowed to lie fallow. † Thus a large number of those small holdings which in the preceding half-century had been established side by side with the great public and private estates, were once more ruined.

\* Seeck, *Kaiser Augustus*, Leipzig, 1902, p. 63 ff, has given due weight to this fact. Certain events turned to the advantage of Octavianus some unfavourable clauses in the Treaty of Philippi, to which he was forced to agree ; and this obvious fact will appear in the course of our narrative. It is, however, futile to assume, as the majority of historians do, that Octavianus had been able to foresee these changes immediately after Philippi.

† Dion, xlvii. 17.

The condition of public morality was yet more frightful. The aristocracy had disappeared, the popular party was non-existent, the Senate was reduced to an obscure company of adventurers, the magistrates had lost all prestige and the laws all binding force. The distinctions of class and party, the constitutional machinery and the traditions by which the aristocracy had been guided, were broken up; confusion was universal, revolutionary anarchy complete, and the inevitable consequences were manifest; individual tyrannies, formed by chance, asserted their power by the strangest means. The most monstrous and the strangest of these tyrannies, that of Fulvia, had dominated Italy. Amid this indescribable confusion, a woman had seized the supreme power, had appointed magistrates, guided the Senate, and made laws for a State in which the constitution had ever been most masculine in character. The government of Fulvia, by its mere existence, pointed to a vast disruption of the old Roman traditions. It was, however, not the only disintegrating force. When the classes and institutions based upon constitutional tradition had disappeared, the rising tide of revolution swept away the rights of the individual, the dignity of family life, the reality of education and the refinement of literature. The sense of social rank had so completely vanished that citizens of the equestrian order were now to be seen fighting wild beasts in the circus.\*

Amid this appalling confusion, the following year was to see the enactment of a law most important for its bearing upon the economic organisation of the Latin family, the *lex Falcidia*.† This law was to become the basis of hereditary right for centuries and limited the unrestrained freedom which testators had enjoyed under the old system; they were now forced to leave a quarter of their estates to their heirs, though they might bequeath the remaining three quarters as they pleased. Such a woman as Fulvia was certainly abnormal, though many men could trace similar ambition and imperiousness in their own wives and daughters. Throughout the high society of Rome women had received some literary culture and were arrogating

The decay of  
traditional  
institutions.

\* Dion, *xlvi*. 33.

† *Ibid.* Gaius, *Inst.* ii. 227.

42 B.C.

to themselves a greater measure of freedom and licence. Instead of remaining at home, busy in the education of their children, and the management of their servants, they preferred to mix in society, to be present at public shows and to attract admiration, while the men, who were enervated by vice, by study and by wild philosophical ideas, often became their slaves or their victims. The basis of authority had been shaken within the family circle; the *pater familias*, the old-time despot, now resigned himself to share his power with his wife, as is often the case when civilisation reaches a height of intellectual and voluptuous refinement, under which the man surrenders the most powerful instrument of authority, the stick. As in the family and the State, so in literature, the struggle between the ancient and modern spirit was obvious. The passion for study, already wide-spread in the upper and middle classes of the earlier generation, became yet more pronounced in the new generation. Cicero had founded the dynasty of men of letters in Italy; literary talent became a social force of increasing power as the aristocracy disappeared and as wealth and power fell into the hands of obscure families. Amid the universal decay of trade and handicrafts, education, in those days a matter of private enterprise, became a highly profitable business. Students became more numerous in the schools and in the lecture-rooms of private tutors. The sons of wealthy landowners in the little towns elbowed the sons of freedmen or the slaves of knights who had made some little competence for themselves in agriculture or commerce under Cæsar's rule. Rome was full of poets reading their verses in public, even in the baths.\* It was then that the son of the rich lord of Padua, Titus Livius, was to begin his studies at the age of seventeen, as also were the many *poetæ minores* of the Augustan age, under the numerous freedmen who will be found teaching rhetoric and grammar under the rule of Augustus. Thus these citizens, slaves, and freedmen formed a little class of "intellectuals," as they would now be known, soon to contend with the eastern rhetoricians and philosophers in the intellectual professions, though they were but to swell the

\* Horace, *Sat.* I. iv. 73 ff.

triumph of their rivals' culture over that of their own country. The fall of the aristocracy and the triumph of the revolutionary party at Philippi was re-echoed even in the literary world. The old Roman classical literature was despised and neglected and the Greek spirit was everywhere triumphant. Asinius Pollio, the governor of Cisalpine Gaul, a young man of cultivation and great wealth, composed *carmina nova*,\* or poetry in a new style; he became the centre of a group of young poets imbued with the Greek spirit, and enthusiastic supporters of the most audacious Greek inventions.

42 B.C.

One of these young poets was Virgil, then twenty-eight years of age; encouraged by Asinius, he was meditating a more original work than the minor compositions to which he had hitherto confined his efforts. He proposed to write Eclogues in hexameter verse in imitation of Theocritus; but the Sicilian shepherds were to veil men of his own time, and the scenes of country life were to contain allusions to contemporary events; the traditional landscapes of Greek bucolic poetry were to be interspersed with descriptions of the beautiful Valley of the Po, the charm of which was profoundly felt by this peasant's son, brought up on the banks of the Mincio. Towards the end of the year 42, he was working at his Second Eclogue, the first which he composed, in which he sings the loves of the shepherd Corydon for the fair Alexis, thus displaying in bucolic verse, if the statements of ancient writers are to be believed, his admiration for a young slave with whom Asinius Pollio had presented him. This work was followed by the Third Eclogue, an imitation of the Fourth Idyll of Theocritus, where the poet represents two shepherds who quarrel and challenge one another to a poetic contest in which they launch invectives at the poets of the olden school and praise Pollio as a poet able to cultivate the new style. Thus even the songs of the Arcadian shepherds were disturbed by the literary polemics of the time. At the same moment the furious and haughty spirit of Sallust attacked with murderous intent another hoary antiquity, the writing of "Annals." Sallust had restored his fortune during Cæsar's civil war by plunder extorted in Numidia; on his return he had been

Virgil and  
Sallust.\* Virgil, *Buc.* iii. 86.



42-41 B.C. able to live in great luxury, to build villas and palaces, and to enjoy wealth and power which the friendship of Cæsar seemed to make permanent. The Ides of March, however, had shattered all his prospects. After this catastrophe, Sallust had hastily retired from political life, as too dangerous an occupation for so wealthy a man as himself. He was not, however, reconciled to the conservatives, and when the victory of Philippi destroyed all hopes of a conservative restoration, he poured forth his rancour through his pen, and proceeded to compose a series of histories intended to display the blunders and disgrace of the conservative party. The first of these works which he was then composing with the help of a Greek freedman, by name Atteius, a professional rhetorician and grammarian,\* was a paradoxical history of Catiline's conspiracy. Desirous of giving a bold answer to the conservatives, who constantly accused the popular party of complicity with this terrible criminal, Sallust attempted to prove that the conspiracy had been hatched by the nobility devoted to Sulla, which had squandered the booty of the civil war and was rendered desperate by poverty. This conspiracy was a disgraceful incident in the history of the conservative party and in it had been involved the mother of one of the heroes of that party, the mother of Decimus Brutus, Cæsar's murderer. Sallust's excessive partisanship naturally obliged him to confuse and distort his facts, but at the same time he rendered great service to lovers of literature by reviving the artistic and psychological mode of writing history in opposition to the dry record of the Annals, which for centuries had been the official history of Rome; as dry and absurd a mode of narration as the critical and scientific historical methods which certain pedants would revive to-day. Atticus and Cornelius Nepos, in relating the great events of Roman history had also followed the traditional method, and had given a dry summary of events year by year as if historical figures were merely shadows, and events the material for a monotonous catalogue. Sallust, on the contrary, in imitation of the Greeks, and especially of Thucydides, wrote a psychological and artistic history; he analyses the passions of his characters, shows up

\* Suet. iii. Gr. 10.

the actors in strong relief, relates events in a rational order, and passes moral and philosophical judgments upon their course.

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These striking contradictions in the ideas and political ambitions of the time, together with the anxiety of the land-owners who feared deprivation of their property, inevitably caused great uneasiness throughout Italy, and revived hatred and animosity upon every side. Towards the end of the year 42 Octavianus was known to be dangerously ill, and while he was returning to Italy at the point of death, many would have greeted his death with delight.\* It was known that he was returning for the sole purpose of committing further villainy at the expense of the rich and wealthy. The young triumvir however, did not die, and in the early spring of 41 he reached Rome almost recovered in health, with the object of beginning the distribution of lands to the veterans without delay. But an unforeseen obstacle awaited him. Fulvia, who had governed Italy during the war, had no intention of handing over the power to her young son-in-law. The Battle of Philippi had made Antony master of the situation and had increased the influence and ambition of his family; during that year his brother Lucius was consul with Publius Servilius; Lucius and Fulvia intended to govern Rome and Italy as the brother and wife of the victor of Philippi in place of a sickly and discredited young man. Octavianus, who had been weakened by his illness, and was unable to think of anything but the difficult task of land distribution, displayed much conciliation at first. He ordered Salvidienus to betake himself to Spain with his legions and those of Lepidus; he was however, unable to induce Lepidus to hand over his three legions, and resolved to do without them for the moment; he showed Antony's letters and secured a promise from Calenus that the two legions should be transferred to him.† But he did not insist and the performance of this promise was delayed. Then, without giving Lucius or Fulvia any reason for anxiety, he began the business of land distribution, appointing commissioners throughout

The return  
of Octavianus  
to Italy.

\* Plut. *Ant.* 23; Dion, *xlvi.* 3; Appian, *B. C.* v. 12.

† Appian, *B. C.* v. 12. Appian, however, is wrong in asserting that the legions were given back, and Dion, *xlvi.* 5, is correct in his contrary assertion.

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Italy and recruiting surveyors. He was, however, both too intelligent and too ambitious to be governed by Fulvia, or to waive his rights as triumvir. Thus relations speedily became strained, and Lucius began to accuse him of violating his rights as consul. \*

The confis-  
cations of land.

Though Octavianus had numerous causes of complaint,† he none the less bore this further vexation patiently, as he was anxious to finish the distribution of land without delay. The commissioners soon arrived in many Italian towns, which certainly included Ancona, Aquino, Benevento, Apollonia, Capua, Cremona, Fermo, Florence, Lucca, Pesaro, Rimini, and Venosa; they were ordered to choose lands for the veterans, to draw up a list of the owners, and to settle their contributions to the imposts, which were probably in proportion to their wealth, and consisted in grants, not merely of lands, but of animals, slaves, and agricultural implements; they were then to settle the indemnities for these expropriations, which indemnities were not to be paid, and to divide the land with the help of the surveyors, and also the slaves and cattle.‡ In the spring this great spoliation began. Such wealthy families as those of Albius Tibullus and of Propertius in Umbria, lost the greater portion of their estates; smaller landowners, who possessed less property than the smallest grant made to a veteran, lost the whole; the wealthy middle class of Italy, which had shown such Platonic affection for the conspirators' party, was obliged to yield part of its lands to the veterans, lands on which they had with anxious toil planted vines and olives during recent years with money borrowed at usurious rates of interest. They were forced to divide with the soldiers who had returned from Philippi the flocks which they had reared, and the slaves which they had bought at high prices and had trained with much trouble. The veterans would not be satisfied, as the soldiers of a former of age, with virgin soil

\* The special clauses of the agreement of Teanum show that this accusation had been made against Octavianus. Cp. Appian, B. C. v. 20: *τοὺς μὲν ὑπάτους τὰ πάτρια διοικεῖν, μὴ κωλυμένους ὑπὸ τῶν τριῶν ἀνδρῶν.*

† Dion, xlvi. 5.

‡ Appian, B. C. v. 12, shows that indemnities were estimated. But they were not paid.

for clearing; they required fields which others had already brought under cultivation, together with implements, cattle, and slaves; in these holdings they proposed peacefully to spend the rest of their lives, as comfortable citizens and members of municipal Senates. \*

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No sooner, however, was the distribution begun, than the whole of Italy was shaken by a formidable agitation. During the early months of the year 41, the towns threatened with spoliation sent deputations to Rome from every quarter to intrigue, to supplicate, and to protest against the fact that only eighteen towns should have been marked for deprivation of their land. If Italy was bound to undergo this process of confiscation, surely it was just that every citizen should bear the burden. † Octavianus, who, apart from his youth, was broken both in reputation and in health, felt considerable anxiety at this deputation with its protests and intrigues. Another difficulty however, far more serious and utterly unexpected, presented itself. Fulvia and Lucius were exasperated at finding the young man less pliable than they could wish; they therefore agreed to stop his distributions of land under various pretexts. They began by asserting that Octavianus should await Antony's return from Asia; then they claimed that if the distribution of land was to be made without delay, those of Cæsar's veterans who had fought at Philippi under Antony's orders, should be installed in their colonies either by Antony himself or by his representatives, that their gratitude might be recognised as due to Antony and not to Octavianus. ‡ Octavianus showed the text of the agreement concluded at Philippi, but Fulvia and Lucius declined to yield. Fulvia seems to have worked upon the veterans in Rome by her invectives and intrigues so far that Octavianus was eventually obliged to yield. § He ordered Asinius Pollio to supervise the commissions working in Cisalpine Gaul, || and appointed several of Antony's friends to other commissions; Plancus, for instance was appointed to

Consequent agitation.

\* Dion, xlviii. 6: *μετά τε τῆς δουλείας καὶ μετὰ τῆς ἄλλης κατασκευῆς τοὺς δεσπότας ὁ Καῖσαρ σφηραῖτο.* Cp. Virgil, *Ecl.* I. 70. *Impius hæc tam culta novalia miles habebit.*

† Appian, B. C. v. 12.

‡ Appian, B. C. v. 14; Dion, xlviii. 5 and 6.

§ Appian, B. C. v. 14.

|| Servius, *ad Virg. Ecl.* ii. 1.

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the commission of Benevento.\* Octavianus, however, was continually confronted by further difficulties apart from the malignity of his enemies. The veterans in the proud consciousness of their power seized lands which were not intended for them.† Among the wealthy classes admiration for Brutus and Cassius, hatred for the despotic triumvirate and desire for free institutions were revived by the exasperation universally aroused by the loss of property and by the failure to pay the indemnities. Many small landowners finding themselves stripped of everything, took up arms and proceeded to violence and murder;‡ some enlisted in the army of Sextus Pompeius;§ others turned to brigandage; others again put their children and their household goods into carts and went to Rome in the hope of finding some means or other of livelihood.

Difficulties  
confronting  
Octavianus.

Rome was already thronged by veterans waiting to be led to their colonies, and was now invaded by the starving bands of their victims who took refuge in the temples with loud lamentations.|| Worse than all was the lack of money. Antony sent nothing;¶ none the less, Octavianus was bound to pay the veterans the promised sums, to give the poorest soldiers a little ready money, and to provide them with slaves and implements when these were not to be had by confiscation; finally the expropriated landowners were continually clamouring for their indemnities. Octavianus again began the sale of the property of the proscribed, and of the rich who had fallen at Philippi such as Lucullus and Hortensius; some money was thus realised,\*\* for many veterans and officers both in the army of the triumvirate and in that of Brutus and Cassius had returned from Philippi with small fortunes of their own, and were willing to invest them in land at ridiculously low prices. Octavianus also placed a forced loan upon the towns exempted from the confiscation of land. But far larger amounts were required to meet his

\* C. I. L. x. 6087. That he was appointed in consequence of the remonstrances of Lucius and Fulvia is only a conjecture.

† Appian, B. C. v. 13.

‡ Dion, xlviii. 8.

§ Appian, B. C. v. 25.

|| Appian, B. C. v. 12.

¶ Appian, B. C. v. 13 and 15.

\*\* Appian, B. C. v. 12. However, Dion, xlviii. 7, and Appian, B. C. v. 72, show that in this year, at the time of the peace of Misenum, much confiscated property had not as yet been sold.



necessities. To crown his misfortunes, during the spring Sextus Pompeius began to reduce Rome by starvation, cutting off the corn ships by sea, while Domitius remained master of the Adriatic. Of the surviving remnants of the fleet and army of Brutus and Cassius, Staius Murcus, Cassius Parmensis, and Clodius had rejoined Sextus or Domitius, and Sextus in particular had become more powerful and correspondingly audacious. \*

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Confronted by such difficulties, Octavianus was bound to adopt a moderate and conciliatory attitude. Unfortunately, moderation is often more irritating to an enraged crowd than open defiance. Lucius and Fulvia, far from abandoning their harassing policy, pursued it with greater vigour; they declined to transfer to Octavianus the two promised legions, while Calenus and Asinius Pollio, instigated by the terrible woman whom they could not resist, refused to allow the despatch of the six legions which the triumvir wished to send to Spain under the orders of Salvidienus. † Finally, Lucius began a most audacious intrigue; he attempted to turn the hatred of the landowners against Octavianus to his own advantage without discontenting the veterans; he asserted in a series of speeches that further confiscation was unnecessary, as there were in hand large estates belonging to the proscribed with which the veterans might be satisfied. ‡ The universal unpopularity of Octavianus, the fear of confiscation and the general discontent, induced the public to lend a ready ear to these assertions; every one asserted that Lucius Antonius was right, and that Octavianus was continuing the confiscations merely for the purpose of winning the friendship of the soldiers by enriching them. § Lucius delivered these speeches with no other idea than that of confusing and harassing his adversary, but the effect which he produced far outran his expectations. The wealthy middle classes imagined that Lucius and Mark Antony had agreed to discredit Octavianus; the remnants of the conservative party

Opposition  
of Lucius  
and Fulvia  
to Octavianus.

\* Velleius, ii. 72; Dion, xlviii. 7 and 19; Appian, B. C. v. 2 and 25.

† This is shown by the convention of Teanum: Appian, B. C. v. 20; cp. Dion, xlviii. 10.

‡ Appian, B. C. v. 19; Dion, xlviii. 7.

§ Dion, xlviii. 7.

41 B.C. soon conceived an unexpected and almost incredible admiration for Lucius, while the threatened landowners, believing themselves sure of his support, took courage and proposed to defend their property by force of arms. Outbreaks of violence increased in number both in the country and the little towns, \* and even in Rome, where a large number of brigands driven from every quarter, were committing robberies and assassinations. Poverty and famine increased to such an extent that many artisans, freedmen or foreigners, finding no work, afraid for their personal safety and horrified at the price of food, closed their shops and went away to seek their fortune in other towns. † Antony's partisans, and even Fulvia herself, were at first dismayed by the agitation they had aroused, and were afraid of alienating the veterans. ‡ Lucius, however, was carried away by the movement which he had begun and was also deceived by its apparent tendencies; he therefore, went further and deliberately appeared as the champion of the despoiled landowners. Lucius thus became the most popular man in Italy, except amongst the veterans. He now asserted that land should only be given to those of Cæsar's veterans who had re-enlisted after the Ides of March and had fought at Philippi; those who had remained at home were to have nothing. §

Virgil's First  
Eclogue.

The ferment which Lucius had raised throughout Italy by this declaration was so great that Octavianus in dismay attempted to calm the prevailing exasperation by some concessions. He revived Cæsar's law reducing a year's payment of rents by two thousand sesterces at Rome, and by five hundred sesterces in the other towns of Italy; he decided that in the distribution of lands, the estates of senators should be spared, and also land given as dowries and small holdings within areas already assigned to the veterans. Thus he attempted

\* Dion, xlviii. 8-9.

† Appian, B. C. v. 18.

‡ Appian, B. C. v. 19. The fact is important because it shows that Lucius was not a mere instrument in the hands of Fulvia, as certain historians would represent him, but that he acted on his own account and for personal reasons, and afterwards joined Fulvia when she had been induced to oppose Octavianus for reasons of her own.

§ This is also proved by the clauses of the convention of Teanum: Appian, B. C. v. 20.

to save the small holders from the utter ruin with which they were threatened.\* This concession brought some small consolation to the middle classes, and amid the appalling confusion, a sweet and tuneful voice raised a song of gratitude which was to echo down succeeding centuries. Virgil, who was himself a small landowner, ventured for the first time to make bucolic poetry a medium for the treatment of what we should now call a question of the hour; in his First Eclogue he expressed his gratitude and that of the small Italian landowners to the young triumvir, whose acquaintance he had not yet made; the poem was touched with that half-religious adoration which had been extended from the dead to the living after Cæsar's apotheosis, from the founder who had been killed to the new leaders of the victorious popular party.

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O Melibœe, deus nobis hæc otia fecit;  
Namque erit ille mihi semper deus; illius aram  
Sæpe tener nostris ab ovilibus imbuet agnus; †

and he concluded with a beautiful description of a peaceful country evening:

Et jam summa procul villarum culmina fumant,  
Majoresque cadunt altis de montibus umbræ.

The adoration of Virgil's shepherds was, however, a very poor consolation for Octavianus in view of the discontent which these concessions aroused among the veterans in Rome. These warriors entertained no great respect for the triumvir at any time, and now cursed him to his face, displayed the utmost insolence, and went so far as to kill the officers who ventured to reproach them.‡ In order to calm the soldiers, Octavianus, who had not ventured to punish the murderers among them,

\* Dion, *xlvi*. 8-9.

† Shaper thinks that lines 7-8 were added after the year 30 B.C., when emperor worship was introduced as a state religion. This theory is unnecessary; on the contrary, if these lines were written at this time, they help us to understand the revolutionary notions which had made their way into literature and public feeling and had produced the idea of Cæsar's apotheosis.

‡ The facts related by Appian, *v*. 15-17, are explained by the briefer narrative of Dion, *xlvi*. 9. Cp. also *Sent. Aug.* *xiii.*: *neque veteranorum neque possessorum gratiam tenuit.*

41 B.C. seems to have promised to increase the number of towns upon whose territory the colonies were to be founded; he also proclaimed that the parents of veterans were not to be deprived of their fields; \* in order to pay the soldiers more rapidly he borrowed, as he said, but in reality appropriated the sums laid up in the temples of Italy as sacred treasures.†

Antony in the east.

Thus at the outset of the year 41 Octavianus seemed to be in a hopeless situation. He could not avoid one danger without rushing into another. If he satisfied the greed of the merciless veterans, he deeply wounded the wealthy classes; if he attempted to satisfy both parties he provoked the anger of the veterans without gaining sympathy elsewhere. Meanwhile, Antony had led an army to Greece, where he had remained until the spring; with the idea that he required no great military force for his immediate purpose, he had then appointed Lucius Marcius Censorinus as governor of Greece and Macedonia, ‡ and had started for the east. The object of his journey was, however, no unrestrained passion as many modern historians assert, in blind reliance upon the superficial narratives of classical historians. No sooner had he reached Bithynia than he was besieged with deputations from the towns and from the majority of the eastern States, sent to justify their actions, to ask rewards for their fidelity, or to complain of some injustice which they had suffered. He was thus obliged to plunge into the hopeless labyrinth of dynastic intrigue, municipal rivalry, and political faction, which the east produced in such infinite variety; he was forced to show favour here and severity there in order to form a political party, to re-establish some semblance of order, and to extract money from every one.§ For six centuries Rome had borne with this Oriental policy; Antony, however, was unable to follow the simple and expeditious severity of the first pro-consuls and ambassadors sent to the Asiatic courts; he possessed neither the clear-sightedness and energy of Sulla, nor the audacious rapidity of Lucullus, nor the outward dignity of Pompey, nor the sure

\* Dion, *xlvi*. 9.

† Appian, *B. C.* v. 13.

‡ Plutarch, *Ant.* 23-24. Censorinus was not merely governor of Greece, as Plutarch states, but also of Macedonia. Cp. *C. I. L.* i. p. 461.

§ Plut. *Ant.* 24.

dexterity and speed of Cæsar. After the final victory of Philippi, Cæsar's old lieutenant fell back into the ill-balanced, inconsistent, and voluptuous habits natural to an intelligent but undecided character ; these defects were even exaggerated ; his comprehension was rapid and his decision swift, but he was too prone to extreme measures, inclined to forget, and easily deceived. During his stay in the east, Antony plunged into myriad amusements and enterprises ; hasty actions were as hastily countermanded ; crowds of intriguers, male and female, worked upon his mind ; favouritism was combined with policy and political interests were often subordinated to caprice. Respect for discipline is incumbent upon those who command no less than upon those who obey, and its first law is that the commander should abstain from actions, however innocent, which may diminish the authority of his position. This was a principle fully realised by the earlier generation of Romans ; but the later and pleasure-loving aristocracy, brought up amidst revolutions, speedily abandoned the principle when, like Antony, they became supreme masters of the east. Antony made no effort to enforce respect, to reward obedience or to repress insubordination. He wished to be surrounded, not by obedient and docile servants, but by boon companions, whose hilarity he encouraged, allowing them full liberty as if they had been his equals. The Orientals had never seen so tolerant a pro-consul, and speedily turned his compliance to advantage ; a horde of native intriguers and adventurers made their way to his acquaintance and insinuated themselves into his good graces.\*

Notwithstanding these undisciplined methods, Antony decided various matters of importance. Herod, the son of Antipater, the prime minister of Hyrcanus and Ethnarch of Palestine, won him over with a great sum of money, and he ordered Tyre to restore the territory which it had conquered. † He also gave orders to collect a fleet of two hundred ships ; he visited Ephesus and laid a ten years' contribution upon the Asiatic provinces, which was to be paid in two years ; he pardoned certain illustrious fugitives who had fled to Asia

Antony's  
progress  
through Asia  
Minor.

\* Plut. *Ant.* 24.

† Jos. A. J. xiv. 12.



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after the Battle of Philippi, such as the brother of Cassius, though he put every conspirator to death who was captured. He also decided certain points of eastern policy.\* Then accompanied by bands of clowns, dancers and musicians at high salaries, he began to tour Phrygia, Galatia and Cappadocia, taking part in all festivities, scattering money everywhere, transforming the political map of the eastern world,† and taking wives and concubines from reigning sovereigns when their beauty pleased him.‡

Cleopatra.

He gathered, however, more homage than money; Brutus and Cassius had carried off most of the accumulated capital, which was now in the hands of the soldiers, in the chests of the quæstors, in the baggage of the troops, in the houses of the disbanded soldiers, or had been carried off by the Thracian, Macedonian and Gallic cavalry when they had been sent home. § In this most important respect, therefore, his enterprise was a failure. When he at length reached Tarsus, he encountered one of the most important, though one of the most obscure, adventures of his career; he there met Cleopatra. The ancient historians represent the history of Antony's last twelve years as a love-story; and relate this meeting in highly dramatic style. The triumvir, who was then aged forty, is said to have summoned the Queen of Egypt to Tarsus, to clear herself of the accusation that she had shown favour to Cassius; the terrible woman is said to have appeared before the conqueror of Philippi and to have entirely turned his head. In the first place, it is by no means certain that Antony summoned Cleopatra to Tarsus to prove her innocence; it is quite as probable that Cleopatra may have come to meet Antony of her own accord, or by the advice of the triumvir's friends.|| In any case it is certain that she went to meet him at Tarsus with a display of pomp which called forth most magnificent

\* Appian, B. C. v. 4-5.

† Appian, B. C. v. 7.

‡ Plut. *Ant.* 24.§ That the contributions imposed upon the east produced little money is proved not only by the anecdotes related in Plutarch, *Ant.* 24, but also by the fact that Antony, as we shall see, had no money when the treaty of Brundisium was concluded.|| This is the version of Plutarch, *Ant.* 25. Appian, B. C. v. 8, is of another opinion.

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descriptions from the ancient historians; not only was she pardoned, but she secured a promise from Antony that he would come to Egypt and re-establish her power, which had been somewhat shaken by recent events, while she also extracted a further promise that he would spend the winter at Alexandria.\*

Overwhelmed as he was with business, with complaints and with pleasures, it is not surprising that Antony should have paid little attention to the news which came to him from Italy. The situation seemed to him, doubtless, less serious than it really was. He therefore continued his journey to Syria, where he speedily and without difficulty dethroned the petty usurpers, and received the submission of the small garrisons left in the provinces by Cassius. Antony's indifference, however, rather strained than relaxed the tension existing between Fulvia, his brother and Octavianus. When Fulvia heard that her husband had forgotten Italy and was spending his time amid festivities with eastern queens, and that his absence promised to be far longer than she had expected, she feared that her own power at Rome might grow weak. Actuated rather by ambition than by jealousy, her sole idea now was to support Lucius and to raise such disturbances that Antony would be obliged to pay some attention to Italy.† Amid the prevailing confusion, the plan was by no means impossible for two such bold and truculent characters as Fulvia and Lucius, opposed as they were to so feeble and timid an adversary as Octavianus. Octavianus, in fact, at the outset of the summer, had sent deputations of veterans to Lucius to propose an agreement which was concluded at Teanum, and in which he promised to distribute land only to those soldiers who had fought at Philippi.‡ Lucius and Fulvia, however, were but the more exasperated§ by this proceeding; they discovered different pretexts for breaking their promises,|| and went away to Præneste¶ with their friends as though

Antony's  
neglect of  
Italy.

\* Appian, B. C. v. 9.

† Appian, B. C. v. 19.

‡ Appian, B. C. v. 20: there is possibly a vague allusion to this agreement in Dion, xlviii. 10.

§ Dion, xlviii. 10.

|| Appian, B. C. v. 20-21.

¶ Dion, xlviii. 10; Appian, B. C. v. 21.

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they feared some new snare in Rome. They wrote to Antony and told him that his authority was threatened.\* They then revived the project which Antony had failed to carry out in 44, the attempt to establish his family in sole power by crushing Octavianus in a civil war. To secure this object Fulvia and Lucius hoped to make use of the eleven legions of Antony stationed in the Valley of the Po and in Gaul, under the command of Calenus, Ventidius Bassus, and Asinius Pollio. Octavianus could only oppose them with ten legions, six of which were in Spain under the command of Salvidienus, while in the face of so threatening a situation he could not force Lepidus to surrender his three legions.† He had therefore become reconciled to him by promising him the province of Africa.‡ At the same time there is no doubt that Calenus, Ventidius and Asinius replied to the advances of Lucius and Fulvia by urging them to prudence.§ This agitation had hindered the foundation of colonies and the distribution of lands; the soldiers under arms, as well as the disappointed veterans, were anxious that peace between the triumvirs should be maintained; it would therefore be imprudent to provoke a civil war of the landowners against the veterans, seeing that the army was the basis of their party strength. Certain friends of Antony, such as Barbatius, were utterly opposed to the plan.|| Thus Octavianus who was anxious for peace, was easily able to induce the veterans to intervene. Two of Antony's former legions, who had received lands in the neighbourhood of Ancona, sent an embassy to Octavianus and to Lucius, explaining the

\* Appian, B. C. v. 21.

† Appian, B. C. v. 24.

‡ Dion, *xlvi.* 20, places this reconciliation a little later, but it seems likely to me that the first negotiations were begun at this moment, and that Octavianus secured the good offices of Lepidus at Rome by holding out the possibility of this restitution.

§ There is no trace of these negotiations or of this advice in the accounts of historians, but at the same time they must be assumed to explain the levies of Lucius and the revolt which he prepared in the Italian towns, by proclaiming himself, with increasing vehemence, as the defender of the conservative interests. If Lucius and Fulvia had been able to rely upon the help of Antony's generals, they would not have had recourse to this dangerous expedient, which was merely intended to raise disturbance and disorder and to force the generals' interference.

|| Appian, B. C. v. 31.

common desire of the army that peace should not be disturbed. Octavianus declared himself ready to submit the points in dispute to the army, and added that he was Mark Antony's friend; the deputation formed a jury, in modern parlance, and invited Octavianus and Lucius to explain their views and to hear their own decision. The spot chosen was the little town of Gabii, halfway between Præneste and Rome. It is now buried beneath cornfields, but still displays the ruins of a temple. The veterans thronged Gabii on the appointed day; seats for the jury were placed in the forum, with two other seats, one for Octavianus and one for Lucius. Octavianus, however, was the only man to appear.\*

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Lucius did not come to the meeting and justified his absence by accusing Octavianus of laying an ambush for him on the road to Gabii.† The truth was that neither Fulvia nor himself felt any concern whatever for Antony's generals or the veterans. Encouraged by the few conservatives who survived in the Senate and the equestrian order, and also by the very favourable attitude of the Italian towns, Lucius and Fulvia imagined that they could easily overcome the opposition of the soldiers by means of promises; they had resolved to deprive Octavianus of his province, to raise a general revolt in the Italian towns, and to recruit an army of six legions from the numerous bands of idle young men and from the artisans who had fled to Rome; they might also count upon the help of the small landowners who had lost their all, and had now no means of livelihood. Sextius, the former governor of Africa, was urged to prepare a revolt against the new governor appointed by Octavianus, Fango, a former centurion in Cæsar's army.‡ Bocchus, the king of Mauretania, was apparently ready to seize the Spanish provinces of Octavianus; § emissaries were sent out in every direction throughout Italy to recruit the six legions, to encourage the work of enlistment, to persuade the townships to give Lucius the money deposited in the temples, and to prepare

Lucius and  
Fulvia attempt  
civil war.

\* Appian, B. C. v. 23; Dion, xlviii. 12.

† Appian, B. C. v. 23.

‡ Appian, B. C. v. 26; Dion, xlviii. 21.

§ Appian, B. C. v. 26. This, however, may be a calumny, or, at any rate, an exaggeration of the partisans of Octavianus.

41 B.C. the revolt of the landowners. We know that in Campania this task was entrusted to Tiberius Claudius Nero; he had served under Cæsar on March 17 of the year 44, and had brought forward the proposal in the Senate to declare Cæsar a tyrant; he made arrangements for the success of his mission with a certain Caius Velleius, a wealthy Campanian landowner, and a former friend and officer of Pompey.\* Lucius and Fulvia hoped that upon the outbreak of the revolt and of the civil-war in Italy, Antony's generals would come to their help and crush their common enemy, even though they received no orders from their absent chief.

Initial  
disturbances.

Recollections of the social war speedily awoke in every mind; every one wondered whether Italy would rise, as upon a former occasion, not to secure citizen rights, but to defend its territory against the greed of the veterans and to restore the free republic of an earlier age. The outlook was most gloomy; it was readily believed that this terrible episode of Roman history would be repeated; Octavianus shared these apprehensions, and did not venture to crush the obvious preparations for the revolt, or to stop the levies of the consul; he confined himself to a feeble show of defence, divorcing Clodia, recalling Salvidienus, recruiting soldiers for himself, taking money from the temples in the Italian towns,† and discharging abusive lampoons at Fulvia from time to time. One of these has come down to us; it seems to be authentic and is full of wit, but so brutally obscene that translation is impossible.‡ Thus, towards the end of the summer, the agents of Lucius and Octavianus were struggling in the towns to secure the young men, the veterans and the temple treasures.§ The disbandment of the eleven legions after Philippi had thus proved useless,

\* Velleius, ii. 75, 76. The passage is important, because it gives us an insight into the secret intrigues of this business, and shows us that attempts were actually made to raise a revolt *eorum qui perdidervant agros*. Probably Campania was not the only district in which such intrigues went on, though this case comes to our notice really because the historian wished to mention his ancestor.

† Appian, B. C. v. 27; Dion, xlviii. 3.

‡ Martial, xi. 20. Weichert and Drumann regard it as apocryphal; Gardthausen, on the other hand, considers it authentic.

§ Appian, B. C. v. 27.



as new levies were being raised ; the majority of the veterans, even those of Antony, hastened to take service under Octavianus ;\* the expropriated landowners enlisted under Lucius, who was obviously supported by the majority of the population.† No one asked how all these troops were to be paid. Quarrels and consequent bloodshed between the two parties were of constant occurrence,‡ and the situation soon became so threatening that the veterans in several colonies sent ambassadors to Antony in the east urging him to come and restore peace without delay.§ Octavianus still vacillated, and made a last attempt to secure an agreement by sending a deputation of senators and knights to Præneste.|| Once again he failed.

At length, encouraged by the wavering attitude of Antony's generals, Octavianus resolved to act, and determined to make an example of one of the numerous towns where the intrigues of the enemy were most active against him.¶ At this moment we meet for the first time with his young friend, Agrippa ; our previous information concerning him is confined to the fact that he had accompanied Octavianus from Apollonia, and that he had been one of the accusers of the conspirators. He was to be prætor the following year, and Octavianus gave him the command of an army. When the time arrived, Octavianus left Lepidus at Rome with two legions, and attempted to surprise Norcia. He was unsuccessful and was obliged to lay siege to the town, and as these operations were protracted, he turned upon Sentinum, where he met with no better fortune. Lucius was encouraged by these failures and resolved to take the offensive and attempt an audacious stroke which was probably to be the signal of revolt throughout Italy. With the

\* Cp. Appian, B. C. v. 27.

† Appian, B. C. v. 31.

‡ *Ibid.*

§ Appian, B. C. v. 52, says that Antony kept the ambassadors from the colonies at Alexandria during the winter ; *τοὺς πρέσβεις . . . τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν κληρουχίων*. No previous mention of the departure of these ambassadors is found. It is probable that he kept them during the winter because the stormy season had then begun, and they doubtless started at the beginning of the autumn.

|| Appian, B. C. v. 28. Dion, xlviii. 11, places this embassy before the judgment of Gabii.

¶ Dion, xlviii. 13. I assume that Octavianus was actuated by this reason, but the history of this war is very obscure.

41 B.C. approval of his partisans, he suddenly threw himself into Rome with a few troops, meeting with no opposition from Lepidus, who was a feeble character, and was possibly on bad terms with Octavianus.\* Lucius reached the forum and delivered a great speech, in which he declared himself the supporter of the republican ideas so deeply cherished by the wealthy classes; he said that he was fighting to destroy the triumvirate which had no reason for continuance after the defeat of Brutus and Cassius, and to re-establish the republic. He asserted that his brother, Mark Antony, was prepared to lay down his power, and would be content with a nomination as consul. Then he proclaimed Octavianus a public enemy.† On receiving the news of his surprise, Octavianus marched upon Rome with a considerable force, and Lucius, who was unable to offer resistance, left the city and returned to his army which was concentrated in some place unknown to us.‡ In this strange and confused manner, the war began. Unfortunately, the accounts given by the historians of antiquity are so incomplete and obscure that I have been unable to evolve a comprehensible narrative. It can merely be said that at a certain moment, Lucius Antonius took the field with six new legions and advanced along the Via Cassia to meet Salvidienus, who was slowly returning from Gaul followed by Asinius and Ventidius. Agrippa, by clever manœuvres, was able to overthrow the calculations of Lucius, and forced him to retreat to Perugia about the end of the autumn, where Octavianus besieged him. Fulvia remained at Præneste and wrote to Ventidius, Asinius, and Calenus to hasten with their legions to the help of Lucius; she also attempted to precipitate the revolt among the Italian towns. The die was now cast. Lucius and Fulvia might well believe that the Italian towns would revolt and that Antony's generals would no longer hesitate to make an end of Octavianus.

The parody of  
the social war.

Italy however, did not revolt, and Antony's generals brought no support. Tiberius Claudius Nero § made vain attempts in

\* Appian, B.C. v. 30; Dion, xlviii. 13.

† *Ibid.*

‡ Dion, xlviii. 13.

§ Suet. *Tib.* 4; he asserts that Tiberius Claudius Nero was at Perugia, but this is refuted by Velleius, ii. 75.

Campania to induce the landowners to take up arms, and even sought to raise the slaves; equally unsuccessful were the attempts of Fulvia's and Antony's friends in Campania and elsewhere, to rouse the tearful protestations of the despoiled landowners and the empty republican aspirations of the wealthy classes to something like warlike fury. Times had greatly changed since the social war; ease, culture, and so-called civilisation had refined these classes, but had also led to effeminacy; they had forgotten how to wield arms, and thought more of commerce and of study than of war. After loud lamentations concerning the outrages which they had endured they preferred at the decisive moment to submit, rather than to risk what little wealth remained to them.\* Amid the general apathy of the nation Lucius Antonius remained on the heights of Perugia as the solitary champion of a cause which attracted no supporters. The beacon which he had lighted as the signal for insurrection throughout Italy burned slowly, faded and went out, without sending the fire of revolt from hill to hill and plain to plain. Agrippa, whom Octavianus had entrusted with the command of his army, constructed great entrenchments round Perugia during December and January and blockaded the town on either side, in spite of the vigorous and constant sorties made by Lucius; he was able to starve Lucius out before the dreaded revolt broke out behind him. The war of Perugia was but a miserable parody of the social war.

Though Italy did not rise in support of the turbulent democrat who had prematurely come forward as the leader of the conservatives, it did not seem likely that Antony's generals with fourteen legions at their command (the eleven existing legions and the three new ones of Plancus) would allow their leader's brother to be crushed by a little army of seven legions. Yet though the situation of Perugia became daily more critical during January and February, Calenus did not stir from Gaul; Asinius, Ventidius, and Plancus approached the town, but

Lucius  
surrenders.

\* See Jullian, C. P. i. pp. 20-21, who justly points out that many historians have not realised the true meaning of this war. At the same time I am inclined to think that the resistance offered by Italy was not so great as he supposes; in reality the country remained undisturbed, and very few outbreaks are noticed during the siege of Perugia.

41 B.C. made no serious effort to liberate Lucius.\* They were in a position, however, analogous to that of Octavianus and Hirtius under the walls of Modena when they came to relieve Decimus Brutus; they were by no means sure of their soldiers, and did not know what construction would be placed upon this war; they did not approve of the foolish policy of Lucius and Fulvia, who began the war for the purpose of depriving the veterans of their rewards at a moment when the fidelity of the legions was the sole basis of power. Under such circumstances Fulvia herself could not induce them to advance, nor would they have stirred for anybody but the conqueror of Philippi, who neither appeared in person, nor sent any instructions. While his brother and his army were starving within Perugia, Antony had spent the winter at Alexandria, after driving the petty chieftains out of Syria without difficulty; he led an agreeable life of festivity and amusement within the royal palace, abandoned the insignia of a pro-consul, and wore Greek dress, as though he were a private individual, the guest and lover of the queen of Egypt.† Thus the great danger vanished in a manner wholly unexpected. Lucius, who had exhausted his provisions, surrendered at the outset of March; Octavianus, anxious not to irritate Mark Antony, treated him kindly, gave him a safe conduct and pardoned his soldiers, inviting them to join his army. At the same time his fright and the danger he had run had greatly exasperated him, while the veterans were furious because the war had stopped the distribution of land. Octavianus, to satisfy the veterans, to terrorise Italy, and to secure final acquiescence in the supremacy and the confiscations of the triumvirs, put to death the decurions of Perugia and some senators and knights who had been made prisoners in the town. Among them were Caius Flavius, the friend of Brutus, and Clodius Bithynicus. The town was promised to the soldiers for pillage, but a conflagration, apparently accidental, destroyed it before they could begin the sack. ‡

\* Appian, B. C. v. 33-35.

† Appian, B. C. v. 11.

‡ On the question of the *aræ perusinæ*, an obscure and terrible episode, see Græbe, App. to Drumann, xii. p. 474 ff.

By the irony of fate, during the conclusion of the year 41 and the beginning of the year 40, Virgil was composing his Fourth Eclogue "Upon the Golden Age" in honour of his friend Pollio, who was to be consul in the year 40, and to whom a son had just been born. In every time of storm and stress in a rising civilisation, there is a simultaneous rise of a desire for real knowledge, and of higher aspirations mystical in their nature. Certain ideas of the Stoics and Academics were then fashionable and seemed to harmonise with Etruscan superstitions of long standing at Rome, and with the religious traditions of the Sibylline books, which stated that the world was to undergo a periodical rejuvenation. This "return of the Golden Age" was a favourite subject of conversation, and the *haruspex* Volcatius had seen an omen of it in the comet which appeared at the games in honour of Cæsar's victory in 44. Virgil made the birth of this child and the consulship of Pollio the occasion for using these vague philosophical and religious ideas as the subject of a melodious poem, predicting that this consulship would begin an era of peace, order and justice coincident with the child's lifetime. Unfortunately, the poet's prophecies were answered by the massacres and the burning of Perugia.

41 B.C.

Virgil's Fourth  
Eclogue.

The fall of the Roman aristocracy seemed inevitable and implied the fall of Italy and of her empire. Throughout the empire there existed but one organised force—the legions, or more properly, the horde of pillagers who continued to call themselves legions by force of habit. Their leaders, apparently the masters of the world, were in reality the slaves of these soldiers; under the reign of pillage and lawlessness, existing institutions decayed with appalling rapidity. Private and public wealth, law, tradition, and the constitutional machinery were alike disorganised; literature alone continued to develop. Amid this vast confusion, poets and prose writers of admirable power began their work. Great poets, however, could neither unify nor govern an empire. One man alone began to think that something must be done to conclude this disastrous situation and to check the universal dissolution. This was Antony, who is accused by ancient historians of having no

The hopeless-  
ness of the  
outlook.



41 B.C. thought after Philippi but for Cleopatra. He was studying the plans which Cæsar had drawn up for his Parthian campaign, and which he had seized on the night of March 15; like Cæsar, he told himself that only the conquest of Persia would provide him with sufficient wealth and reputation to dominate the situation upon his return.

## CHAPTER XIII

### EASTWARDS

Egypt—Antony and Cleopatra—The Parthian invasion of Syria in the year 40 B.C.—Confusion in Italy after the fall of Perugia—Further violent action by Octavianus—Mæcenas and Athenodorus of Tarsus—Antony in Greece—The marriage of Octavianus and Scribonia—The beginning of hostilities between Antony and Octavianus—The treaty of Brundisium—The marriage of Antony and Octavia.

MANY historians have severely blamed the careless indifference which Antony displayed in remaining at Alexandria after the fall of Perugia; they assume that if he had then gone to Italy and taken command of his army, he could easily have overthrown Octavianus.\* Historians, without exception, continue to relate the love-story of Antony and Cleopatra which is considered to begin with the interview at Tarsus, and describe his stay at Alexandria as a long series of reckless festivities, during which Antony devoted himself to pleasure and abandoned all else.† It must be observed, however, that the siege of Perugia began at the close of the autumn of 41, at which time navigation was suspended in the Mediterranean. Thus Antony did not learn of this event until the spring of 40, when the siege was already over. But it must be remembered that though he could not entirely abandon his nearest relatives, it was equally impossible for him to approve the reckless policy of his brother and his wife, who seemed to have forgotten that the popular party was now contained in the army and was, in fact, the army itself. Finally, while it is beyond doubt that Mark Antony during that winter plunged into the pleasures

Antony in  
Egypt.

\* Cp. Seeck, *Kaiser Augustus*, Bielefeld and Leipzig, 1902, p. 69.

† Cp. Plutarch, *Ant.* 28-29; Dion, *xlvi.* 27; Appian, *B. C. v.* 11.

41 B.C.

of the vast and sumptuous palace of the Ptolemies, it is equally certain that his attention was occupied with more serious business, indeed with the gravest problem which could then confront the leader of the republic and the chief magistrate in the empire. If Cleopatra had invited him to Alexandria, her object was not merely to attract his fancy or to amuse him ; she also wished to repeat the proposal which she had probably made to Cæsar four years before, when she came to Rome for that purpose. She offered him the possibility of becoming king of Egypt by marriage with herself. Doubtless Cleopatra used every means in her power to persuade Antony, but her project of marriage is not on that account to be regarded as a mere attempt at seduction. The plan was based upon a highly ingenious policy, most creditable to Cleopatra's intellectual power ; she hoped by this marriage to save Egypt from the common fate of the other Mediterranean peoples, the fate of servitude to Rome. Hitherto Egypt had been able to preserve its independence by pursuing an extremely adroit policy and buying its liberty in gold from the various parties who succeeded to power at Rome ; it was, however, impossible even at Alexandria to preserve any illusions upon this point for the future. The wealth of Egypt was too great not to arouse the cupidity of ruined Italy, while its government was too feeble and disorganised to offer any successful resistance.

Egypt : the  
country.

From the economic and intellectual point of view, Egypt was the only self-contained country in the ancient world ; her agriculture was prosperous, her manufactures flourishing, her commerce widely spread, her schools famous and her artistic life vigorous. From her fields, which were most fertile and admirably cultivated, was gathered all the flax which went to weave the sails upon the Mediterranean Sea ; the country produced more grain than was required to feed her dense population, and much of it was exported. Egyptian manufactures were in the front rank of Mediterranean productions ; the numerous and clever artisans of Alexandria manufactured the most delicate fabrics, perfumes, glassware, papyrus and numbers of other articles, which were then exported by

rich merchants to every country. Egypt was the country of luxury and elegance ; it sent out everywhere, even to Italy, painters, decorators, stucco workers and anything which could contribute to the advance of luxury. It was a famous centre of learning and attracted students from the most distant countries in the world, even from Greece, who came to visit the schools of medicine, astronomy and literature, which were maintained at Alexandria by the royal government. Egyptian commerce was most widely spread and most lucrative ; not only did the country export its own productions in exchange for the precious metals which it thus accumulated, but it also intercepted the greater part of the commerce with the far east, with India and China.

Brilliant as is the picture of Egyptian wealth and culture, the conditions of social and political life were gloomy in the extreme. The old and glorious monarchy of the Ptolemies was in its last agony. Division of labour, the result of a high stage of civilisation, had been driven so far in Egypt as to quench every spark of social and national unity. Trades, professions, families and individuals thought solely of their own interest and their own pleasure. Appalling selfishness and invincible indifference to anything but their own immediate concerns isolated social groups in every class, from the cultivators of wide estates, of crown property and royal domains, who lived in a subjection akin to slavery ; from the free farmers whose industry was devoted merely to the increase of their private hoards ; from the artisans and cosmopolitan plebs who were intelligent workmen, though turbulent and blood-thirsty, to the upper and wealthy classes who had settled in Egypt as the chief place of concourse upon the trade-routes of the world. These included the merchants and the rich land-owners who lived in marvellous luxury, regarding the court as the supreme model of refined taste, though they were in no sense a political or military aristocracy, and from indolence or pride allowed the eunuchs, freedmen, adventurers and strangers to monopolise the chief offices of State ; the priestly caste which thought only of increasing its wealth and power ; the bureaucracy, a numerous body well disciplined in theory but

The popula-  
tion.

41 B.C.

in practice corrupt and rapacious, with little sense of duty and finally the court, which opened its insatiable maw for wealth and treasure, wallowing in a welter of intrigue and crime and of petty dynastic revolutions, engineered by insignificant factions, amid universal indifference, with iniquitous and vastly ingenious dexterity. Thus this decaying realm was at the same time torpid and in violent agitation. Magnificence were its schemes of administration, but even the Nile canal were allowed to fall into ruin ; the members of this monarchy were worshipped as gods during their lives, while their dynasties were constantly overturned by palace revolutions which cut short their reigns and prevented any alleviation of the smallest political evils ; wealthy as the government was, it possessed no army and could only procure troops by recruiting slaves from other countries ; men of high culture and keen intelligence were numerous, but the country was unable to make head against Rome except by means of strange and complex intrigues.† By degrees its diplomacy had sunk so low as to offer its queen as the courtesan of the Roman proconsul. Cleopatra's female government had many adversaries, especially among the upper class, for reasons which we do not know ; possibly they were ashamed of her intrigues with Cæsar and Antony, or were disgusted by her insatiable greed, her rapacious cruelty and by the incompetence of her favourites in office.† Feeling her existence threatened, she thought of saving herself and Egypt at the same time by an alliance with Rome and had attempted to secure this compact by a marriage with Cæsar. When the plan failed she attempted to realise it by means of Antony, if he were king of Egypt and if the Egyptian government could use the Roman legions, the independence of Egypt and Cleopatra's monarchy would be sheltered from all danger.

The value of  
Egypt to  
Antony.

The weak point of this plan is not far to seek. Superficial as Antony may have been, he could not fail to perceive it.

\* See the fine study of C. Barbagallo, *Le Relazioni politiche di Roma con l'Egitto*, Rome, 1901.

† Dion, li. 5 ; πολλοὺς τῶν πρώτων, ἅτε καὶ ἀεὶ οἱ (Cleopatra) ἀχθομένων. This passage, though very short, is important and explains the whole policy of Cleopatra.



The crisis in which the republic was struggling might place the guidance of the Roman empire for a few years in the hands of two or three military leaders ; they might represent but they could not personify the State as could kings who reigned by dynastic right and therefore they could not conclude any alliance by marriage. A marriage between a proconsul and an eastern queen would have been regarded in Italy and by the soldiers as high treason or extraordinary foolishness. Notwithstanding this difficulty, Cleopatra's plan had some chance of success, owing to the immediate difficulties of Antony's situation and by reason of the new project which he had proposed, the conquest of Persia. Antony, to a much greater extent than Octavianus, was the pupil and political heir of Cæsar. For the last six months of Cæsar's life, while Octavianus had been in Apollonia, Antony had been the most intimate of the dictator's confidants at Rome ; he had known his most secret thoughts and had seized his papers after his death, including the plans for the war which Cæsar was preparing against Parthia. When the civil war was concluded and Antony found himself master of unusual opportunities, what could be more natural than the idea of resuming the great projects conceived by the dictator during the stormy twilight of his life, projects of which he, perhaps, was the only man who knew the details ? Among these projects, the Persian war necessarily seemed to him the most important. Cæsar himself with all his genius and military reputation had thought it impossible to dominate the situation without some brilliant success in a foreign war ; how could Antony delude himself with the belief that he might succeed in a much more disastrous position ? The government of the triumvirs was utterly bankrupt in money and prestige. Nothing but the conquest of Persia, as Cæsar had said, could provide his government with these necessary factors and make him the chief of the republic once and for all. Doubtless it was a difficult enterprise, but Cæsar, the greatest general of his age, had left a plan of campaign in which the details had been worked out, from the number of legions required to the route to be followed. Antony needed only to put this plan into practice with his wonted capacity and energy. The proba-

40 B.C.

bility of success might thus be reasonably regarded as high. In short, the greatest difficulty before the enterprise was the want of money, and precisely for this reason Cleopatra might hope for some partial success in her own plans. Egypt was still extremely rich and the royal family possessed the only great treasure of precious metals in the Mediterranean world, which Rome had not yet plundered. The alliance with Egypt, as proposed by Cleopatra, could provide Antony with the necessary means for executing Cæsar's great project.

Disturbances  
in Asia.

Cleopatra's plan, however, was audacious and extraordinary in the extreme and it is not surprising that Antony could not be persuaded during that winter. An unforeseen event also disturbed negotiations during the spring of the year 40. As in the year 41 Italy had seen a parody of the social war, so Asia at the outset of 40 was troubled by a parody of the Mithridatic war. The petty princes of Syria whom Antony had driven out \* together with Antigonus, whose claims to the throne of Palestine he had refused to support,† had arranged during the winter for an invasion of the Roman provinces with Parthian help; the Parthians were told that Syria and Asia would accord them a ready welcome, as they were terror-stricken by the enormous imposts with which Antony had overwhelmed them. The son of Labienus had fled to the court of Ctesiphon after the battle of Philippi and proposed to command part of the Parthian army, following the example of the Italian exiles who had served in the army of Mithridates after the civil war.‡ Antony was at Alexandria; Syria was governed by Decimus Saxa and Asia by Titus Munatius Plancus;§ these provinces were guarded only by the former garrisons of Cassius, which had recognised the new governor. A surprise might thus prove successful. In fact about the month of February, Antony was informed that an army under the orders of Labienus and Pacorus, the son of the

\* Appian, B. C. v. 10.

† Josephus, A. J. XIV. xiii. 3.

‡ Dion, xlvi. 24.

§ Plancus, the Governor of Asia of whom Dion, xlvi. 24 speaks, cannot be Lucius, who perished in the war of Perugia. He must therefore be Titus.

Parthian king, was invading Syria by way of Ctesiphon and Apamea.\* 40 B.C.

Antony was thus obliged to abandon for the moment his magnificent dreams of an Asiatic empire and to leave Cleopatra; he started from Alexandria at the beginning of March with a little fleet and sailed to Tyre, where he seems to have realised that strong reinforcements from Macedonia and Italy would be required to repel the invasion. He determined to abandon Syria to the enemy for the moment, to cross to Asia by way of Cyprus and Rhodes and thence to Greece; there he would gather a large army and return to the east to repel the Parthians. Upon his departure the little garrisons in the town, surprised as they were by superior forces, speedily surrendered. Decidius alone attempted to hold out at Apamea, but Labienus sought to seduce his soldiers, who were all of them former troops of Brutus and Cassius, and Decidius in fear of treachery soon fled to Antioch; Labienus on receiving information of his flight, captured the little garrison and massacred it almost to a man; he then pursued Decidius to Antioch, besieged and captured the town and obliged his adversary to flee once more to Cilicia. Syria and Phœnicia were almost entirely in the power of the Parthians, with the exception of Tyre, where the Romans in the neighbourhood had taken refuge, as they had taken refuge at Chalcedon in 74 when Mithridates was invading Bithynia. Pacorus, however, went to Palestine with part of his army, while Labienus advanced with the remainder to the conquest of Cilicia.†

Antony sails  
for Asia.

\* Plutarch, *Ant.* 30, says that Antony received the news from Syria and Italy simultaneously at Alexandria; Appian, v. 52, says, on the contrary, that he did not receive the news from Italy until he was already in Asia, probably at Ephesus. Appian's version is the more probable; in fact, Antony in Egypt could get news quicker from Syria than from Italy. On the other hand, the Parthian invasion had been prepared during the winter; thus he could receive timely information of it and start without delay, as the danger was serious.

† Cp. Dion, xlviii. 24-26. In xlviii. 25, he gives the real reason why Antony did not stay at Tyre; in Syria there were none but the former garrisons of Cassius, which were weak and scanty in number; Antony's legions were in Italy, Gaul, and Macedonia. However, after giving this plausible reason, Dion adds further absurd arguments, and persists in regarding Antony as a man whose love for Cleopatra deprived him of his senses.

40 B.C.  
Events in  
Italy.

At Ephesus Antony found messengers from Italy, who informed him of the siege of Perugia and of the appalling confusion into which his party had fallen after the capture of that town. The triumvir, already fully occupied by the Parthian war, was thus confronted by new and most serious difficulties. It seemed as if the edifice which he had reared with such toil at Philippi was about to crumble at a blow, though a few months before he had thought it secure against all the ravages of time. The massacre of Perugia had terrified his friends and relatives, who were all in flight. Fulvia, escorted by three thousand cavalry sent by her generals, had gone to take ship at Brundisium with the intention of sailing for Greece and awaiting Antony at Athens; \* Plancus had abandoned his three legions and was in flight with Fulvia; his mother Julia had taken refuge with Sextus Pompeius, who had received her very kindly; † Asinius Pollio had thrown himself into the delta of the Po with his army, where he proposed to remain on the defensive; ‡ Ventidius Bassus seems to have been marching upon Brundisium.§ All were anxious to reach the shore in order to open communications with Antony; many partisans of Fulvia and of Lucius had fled, some to Sextus Pompeius and others to Antony himself. This latter included the son of Servilia, Marcus Junius Silanus and Tiberius Claudius Nero, who embarked secretly at Naples with his wife, a daughter of Livius Drusus who had killed himself at Philippi, and with a child little more than a year old, who by a strange caprice of fortune was afterwards to become the Emperor Tiberius.||

Octavianus at  
Rome.

Octavianus remained the sole master of Italy, a cruel and terrible master, whose character seemed to grow worse day by day. In the prosecutions begun against the plebeians, freed-

\* Appian, B. C. v. 50. This flight could not have been very rapid, and hence we can understand how Fulvia and Antony met at Athens.

† Appian, B. C. v. 52; Dion, xlviii. 15.

‡ Velleius, C. ii. 76. At this time the contributions of arms and money must have been imposed upon the Paduans, of which mention is made by Macrobius, I. xi. 21. I can hardly think, however, that Asinius had the seven legions which Velleius attributes to him.

§ Appian, B. C. v. 50.

|| Velleius, ii. 75; Suetonius, *Tiberius*, 4.

men and foreigners, he delivered sentences of torture, death and crucifixion with such readiness as to be nicknamed the executioner; \* he frequented society of the lowest class and gambled desperately; † he filled Rome with the scandal of his wild debauches, summoning to his house the fair matrons who caught his eye in the streets and forcing them to yield to his desires. ‡ Morose and jealous of every one, notwithstanding his power, he would trust none of his supporters. He had begun to appreciate the cleverness of Agrippa and had made him prætor that year in spite of his youth, but Agrippa complained of his jealousy and was careful to give him no opening. § The truth was that his triumph and the general disruption which followed it had stricken him with utter panic and fear made him cruel. Like every one else, he exaggerated Fulvia's influence over her husband and knew that she would urge Antony to vengeance. He knew that Antony was stronger than himself and possessed powerful armies and faithful friends. He was also aware that Sextus Pompeius was showering kindness upon the mother and supporters of Antony and this knowledge crowned his uneasiness by pointing to the possibility of a compact between Sextus and his colleague. He therefore attempted to defend himself by beginning a reign of terror, securing the fidelity of his soldiers by any means, regardless of consequences and hatching the most perfidious intrigues. He began by handing over Italy to the veterans. As if the dreadful massacre of Perugia had not satiated his cruelty, he confiscated almost the entire territory of Norcia, because the citizens had raised a monument to those who had died in the defence of the town with an inscription saying that they had died for liberty, and thus marking the regret with which the Italian middle class looked back upon the old republic. || He founded colonies with all possible speed, distributed bounties to all Cæsar's veterans and replaced Asinius Pollio by Alfenus Varus in Cisalpine Gaul. He now did his utmost to seduce the

\* Suetonius, *Aug.* 70; Seneca, *De clem.* I. x. 4: *in adolescentia caluit, arsit ira.*

† Suet. *Aug.* 70.

‡ Dion, lvi. 43; Zonaras, x. 38 (544).

§ Cp. Dion, xlix. 4.

|| Dion, xlviii. 13; Suet. *Aug.* 12.



40 B.C.

legions of Antony from their fidelity. Agrippa had been able to induce two of the legions abandoned by Plancus to join him, but the cavalry had gone to Sextus Pompeius and a third legion had rejoined Ventidius.\* It seems that Octavianus made an effort to corrupt Calenus, Ventidius and Asinius under cover of an attempt to conclude peace; † he was, however, unsuccessful, for no one would trust him and Antony's prestige was far greater. However, Antony was rapidly approaching Greece, where Fulvia was to meet him. The imminent arrival of his colleague caused him the utmost anxiety and at the end of May he applied to the mother of Sextus, the Mucia whom Pompey the Great had divorced on his return from the east for her suspected adultery with Cæsar; he was anxious to secure her intervention with her son on his own behalf.‡ He was

\* Appian, B. C. v. 50.

† *Ibid.* v. 50-51.

‡ The chronology of these intrigues is very obscure; I have attempted to restore it, starting from the only precise date, which is given us by Dion, *xlvi. 20*. This passage affirms that Octavianus started for Gaul at such a moment that Sextus, with a knowledge of his movements, was able to prepare an attack upon the Italian coast at the time of the Apollinarian Games, which was about the middle of July. This implies that Octavianus started in the second half of June. Dion, *xlvi. 20*, says that Octavianus started when he knew that his efforts with Sextus had failed, and they therefore must have been made in April or May. The overtures to which Dion alludes (*xlvi. 20*) are those which he has mentioned before (*xlvi. 16*)—that is to say, those which Mucia was asked to undertake; they seem to have been made at the moment of Scribonia's marriage and, like this marriage, to have been the outcome of the alliance proposed by Sextus to Antony. Appian, B. C. v. 53, relates events somewhat differently; he says that Octavianus learnt of the alliance proposed by Sextus to Antony on his return from Gaul, and it is after this return that he places the negotiations for the marriage without speaking of Mucia. Appian's chronology may be exact, for this marriage cannot possibly have been the object of the negotiations in May; these negotiations failed, as Dion himself states, so that at the end of June Octavianus knew that Sextus was preparing an attack upon the Italian coasts, and he would not then have celebrated a marriage which was perfectly useless. The negotiations must therefore have taken place at a later time. The contradiction, however, can be harmonised if we do not confuse the intervention of Mucia with the negotiations for the marriage, as Dion has done, *xlvi. 16*. In the month of May Octavianus sent Mucia to Sextus to bring about a peace, but without result; in the month of June he went to Gaul, where he remained throughout July; when he returned in August, he learnt of the negotiations between Sextus and Antony, and attempted to impede them by this marriage proposal. This hypothesis is confirmed by the fact that Appian speaks of these marriage negotiations without mentioning Mucia.

thus willing to conclude an alliance with Pompeius rather than to humiliate himself before Antony and Fulvia. A monster incarnate, with all the hideous vices of a tyrant, cruelty, pride, luxury and treachery, Octavianus was the abomination of Italy. Strange as the fact may seem in the case of a tyrant, he had some true friends, including his master Athenodorus of Tarsus and a certain Mæcenas, descended from an old royal family of Etruria ; we do not know how Octavianus made his acquaintance. He kept these men about his person and was willing to listen to their advice. What is still more extraordinary in the case of a tyrant, he would listen patiently to their remonstrances, would sometimes recognise his faults and promise amendment.\* Was this perversity the result of a nature incredibly bad, or was it merely the ebullition of a sickly youth, spoiled by power and hardened by hatred and fear ? This was the great problem which the future was to solve.

Octavianus was not anxious for war, but he did not wish to humble himself before Fulvia and Antony or to display any weakness to the gaze of the Italian public ; he therefore precipitated war as the best means of defence. In the second half of June he had learnt that Mucia had been unsuccessful in her attempt to secure the support of Sextus Pompeius and that the latter, emboldened by the increase of his forces and encouraged by the exiles, was preparing to devastate the coasts of Italy ; † he also learnt at the same time that Calenus had died in Gaul and that his young son had taken command of the eleven legions. He made a bold effort to extricate himself from the difficulties of this situation by entrusting Agrippa with the defence of Italy against Sextus and by going himself to Gaul for the purpose of seducing the legions of Calenus ; ‡

Antony in  
Greece.

\* Dion, lv. 7 ; lvi. 43 ; Zonaras, x. 38 (544). These facts must belong to the first half of his life, for they are too discrepant with the moderation which Octavianus showed when he had taken the title of Augustus.

† Dion, xlviii. 20.

‡ With reference to the departure of Octavianus, see Dion, xlviii. 20. Appian, B. C. v. 51, tells us that he left Rome after learning of the death of Calenus, which is likely enough. Dion, xlviii. 20, when he states that Octavianus had already attempted to seduce the army, is alluding to some previous vague attempts at corruption, which

40 B.C.

he hoped to find little difficulty in withdrawing their allegiance from their new leader, in which case the addition to his forces would counterbalance the probable alliance of Sextus and Antony. About this moment, shortly after the departure of Octavianus from Rome, Antony arrived at Athens, where his meeting with Fulvia took place; it was generally feared that this meeting would mark the commencement of the war. Antony, however, was no more anxious for war than Octavianus, for the situation in the east had grown far too critical. Cleopatra's empire was at present out of the question. Labienus had invaded Cilicia and Asia, had killed Decidius Saxa and seized without difficulty all the towns with the exception of Stratonicea, Mylasa and Alabanda,\* driving the governor to take refuge in the islands.† Hence, whatever the indignation of Antony with Octavianus, this eastern province which seemed likely to slip from his grasp, monopolised his attention for the moment. He seems to have reproached Fulvia bitterly for her foolishness‡ and while awaiting the return of Octavianus from Gaul,§ he strove to reconcentrate his forces to be ready for any event, but yielded in no respect to the instigations of Fulvia and of the numerous enemies of his colleague. About the month of July his aged mother arrived at Athens; she had been sent to him by Sextus with an escort of leading men, including the proscribed Caius Sentius Saturninus and Lucius Scribonius Libo; this embassy came to propose a definite alliance between Sextus Pompeius and Antony against Octavianus. Resolved not to provoke war and not to run the danger of any surprise without full preparation, Antony replied that he was grateful to Sextus for his proposal and would be ready to join him if Octavianus did not keep the promises he had made at Philippi; if, however, Octavianus had made. When these failed, Octavianus went to the legions as soon as he heard of the death of Calenus.

\* Dion, xlviii. 26. On the subject of Mylasa, see the letter from Octavianus, which has been recovered from an inscription: Lebas Waddington, 3, *Asie Mineure*, 441.

† Dion, xliii. 26.

‡ Cp. Appian, B. C. v. 52.

§ If we suppose that Antony arrived in Greece while Octavianus was on the road to Gaul, we have a clear reason for the absence of any trace of negotiations between Octavianus and Antony. Antony was awaiting the return of Octavianus, and when he came back negotiations were impossible, as the revolt of the legions in Gaul was well known.

Octavianus should observe his compact, he would do his best to reconcile Sextus with his colleague.\* 40 B.C.

Antony and Octavianus were thus suspiciously watching one another; neither was anxious for war but on the other hand neither would take the first steps to peace. Such a situation could not possibly continue. Octavianus had successfully seduced the legions of Calenus in Gaul and after placing them under the command of Salvidienus, he returned to Rome at the end of July or the beginning of August in a state of great anxiety and fear. He wondered whether the revolt of Antony's legions would be of real advantage to him, whether it would not provoke war and whether these troops would remain faithful. When he reached Rome he was able to gather fuller information of the negotiations between Antony and Sextus, though he could not be certain whether an alliance had been concluded or not. Sextus had begun to harry the coasts of Italy, but Octavianus did not know whether he was acting on his own initiative or in concert with Antony. However, to hamper the alliance which was in any case possible, he sent Mæcenus to Lucius Scribonius Libo, the father-in-law of Sextus and, by reason of his long standing friendship with his father, his most influential adviser. He was commissioned to ask the hand of his sister Scribonia in marriage; she seems to have been older than Octavianus and had already been the wife of two former consuls.† Scribonius, in high delight, immediately wrote to Rome, saying that so admirable a marriage should be celebrated without delay; the triumvir, who felt certain of Antony's hostility, after the treachery of the legions, hurried on the marriage, which probably took place in the month of August and excited the derision of all Rome. At the same time Octavianus made efforts to persuade the veterans that Antony's alliance with Sextus was designed for the sole purpose of restoring to their former owners the lands which had been assigned to the troops; ‡ he also attempted to secure a reconciliation with Lucius Antonius, whom he made governor of Spain.§

\* Appian, B. C. v. 52.

† Appian, B. C. v. 53; [Suetonius, *Aug.* 62.

‡ Appian, B. C. v. 53.

§ Appian, B. C. v. 54.

40 B.C. Lucius accepted; but from that moment he disappears; he probably died shortly afterwards, though whether by a natural death we cannot say.

The outbreak  
of hostilities.

On this occasion Octavianus was not mistaken. When it was known in Greece that Cæsar's son had deprived his colleague of his best army, Fulvia and the war party gained the upper hand.\* Antony immediately assumed the offensive; he embarked some of the Macedonian legions upon the vessels which he had found in Asia and prepared to attack Italy. At this critical moment help came from another quarter. From his refuge in the delta of the Po, Asinius Pollio had opened negotiations with Domitius Ahenobarbus, the wandering master of the Adriatic, whose transitory kingdom was bounded by the planks of his vessels; Asinius had persuaded him to attempt to secure peace with Antony. The proposals of Domitius arrived most opportunely, as Antony required ships; he therefore accepted, forgetting that Domitius was one of the conspirators condemned by the *Lex Pedia*; † with this reinforcement of vessels and with the two legions which Domitius commanded, he started in the month of September, after leaving Fulvia at Sicyon and writing to Sextus Pompeius to accept his alliance. Military operations soon began upon the two coasts. Antony seized Sipontum and proceeded to besiege Brundisium. Sextus disembarked a body of troops on the shore of Lucania and besieged Cosenza; he sent another body to attack Thurii in the Gulf of Tarentum and sent a fleet with four legions under the orders of his freedman, Menodorus or Menas, to attempt the conquest of Sardinia.‡ Octavianus replied by sending Agrippa to recapture Sipontum; he started in person to relieve Brundisium and ordered P. Servilius Rullus to concentrate the remaining forces and to follow him.§

\* No historian states that the revolt of the legions in Gaul was the cause of hostilities; but there seems to be no other reason which could have induced Antony to abandon his waiting attitude. On the other hand, this reason is enough to account for his action. There is an allusion to it in the negotiations for peace as summarised by Appian, B. C. v. 60. Such is also the opinion of Ciccotti, A. p. 6.

† Appian, B. C. v. 55; Velleius, ii. 76.

‡ Appian, B. C. v. 56.

§ Dion, xlviii. 28; Appian, B. C. v. 57-58.



However, Octavianus speedily perceived that his greatest difficulty in this war, as in the wars of Modena and Perugia, arose from the reluctance of the soldiers, who persistently demanded harmony between Octavianus and Antony and were reluctant to take up arms against the conqueror of Philippi. Agrippa had made a vain attempt to enlist the veterans to whom lands had been assigned in southern Italy; Octavianus on his journey to Brundisium had persuaded many veterans to follow him; but they obeyed only in the hope that they would induce him to conclude peace; \* Sipontum had been recovered by Agrippa, but Servilius was surprised by Antony near Brundisium; he had been defeated and abandoned by nearly all his soldiers,† while Cæsar's troops were constantly exposed to the maledictions and reproaches of Antony's force under the walls of Brundisium.‡ More serious yet was the fact that Salvidienus had, it seems, begun negotiations with Antony with the object of returning to him the army which Octavius had taken from him, as it appeared impossible to preserve the loyalty of the troops to their new master. With an army so little inclined for conflict it was difficult for Octavianus to begin vigorous action; if the triumvirs were the masters of the empire, they were also the slaves of the legions. On the other hand Antony was preparing to bring up reinforcements from Macedonia; Sextus Pompeius had successfully seized Sardinia and had won over the two legions of Octavianus.§ Thus the situation began to seem desperate.

40 B.C.  
Reluctance of  
the army.

Octavianus would gladly have begun negotiations, but neither he nor Antony was willing to take the first steps. Some intermediary was required, but no one would venture to assume this office, for the fear which Fulvia inspired was excessive. By a strange chance, news arrived in the midst of these difficulties that Fulvia had died at Sicyon.|| One of Antony's friends who was then with him, Lucius Cocceius, was bold enough to begin the task of restoring peace between Octavianus and Antony. He first visited Octavianus, went back

The death  
of Fulvia :  
negotiations  
begun.

\* Appian, B. C. v. 57.

† Dion, xlviii. 28; Appian, B. C. v. 58.

‡ Appian, B. C. v. 59.

§ *Ibid.*

|| Dion, xlviii. 28; Appian, B. C. v. 59; Plutarch, *Ant.* 30.

40 B.C.

to Antony and again returned to Octavianus, drawing by degrees from either side justifications of past actions, proposals and answers. Octavianus commissioned him to tell Antony that he had been anxious to serve his interests in withdrawing the legions of Calenus, as he did not wish to leave a young man in charge of troops which Sextus Pompeius might have attracted to himself; \* Antony on his side requested him to tell Octavianus that he recognised the wrongfulness of Fulvia's actions. † While Cocceius was discussing with Antony and with Octavianus, the soldiers were making great demonstrations in favour of peace. ‡ It was impossible to resist their desires. Antony despatched Domitius to Bithynia and sent written orders to Sextus Pompeius to withdraw to Sicily; § it was then possible to arrange for the discussion of a new agreement to be negotiated, not by the two triumvirs themselves but by Asinius Pollio and Mæcenas, the first representing Antony and the latter Octavianus. ||

The treaty of  
Brundisium.

Thus, during the autumn of the year 40 an entirely new agreement was concluded at Brundisium. It was a new division of the Roman empire, including upon this occasion the eastern provinces, which had not been mentioned at Philippi. Octavianus was to have all the European provinces including Dalmatia, Illyria and therefore Gallia Narbonensis and Transalpine Gaul, which had formerly belonged to Antony. Antony received all the eastern provinces, Macedonia, Greece, Bithynia, Asia, Syria and Cyrene. Africa alone was left for Lepidus. ¶ Octavianus handed over the legions of Calenus to Antony, \*\* but he received the two legions which Antony owed him, the three which Lepidus had not yet given, and retained the three which Plancus had just recruited. Thus he had an army of sixteen legions, as Sextus had taken two from him;

\* Appian, B. C. v. 60-63.

† Plutarch, *Ant.* 30.

‡ Appian, B. C. v. 63.

§ *Ibid.*

|| Appian, B. C. v. 64.

¶ Appian, B. C. v. 65; Dion, xlviii. 28; Plutarch, *Ant.* 30.

\*\* Appian, B. C. v. 66; but the reason he gives is not accurate. Octavianus restored the army of Gaul, not because he suspected its loyalty, but because the stipulation formed part of the convention of Brundisium. It is impossible to suppose that Antony would have made peace if Octavianus had declined to restore his army.

Antony retained the two legions of Domitius, thus raising his forces to nineteen legions and reserved the right to raise levies in Italy; \* Lepidus had the six legions recently recruited by Lucius Antonius. Sextus Pompeius was abandoned by Antony and Octavianus could begin war upon him without delay.

In this convention, the importance of which has been strangely disregarded by historians, we may see the first consequences of Cleopatra's intrigues. A year previously, after the battle of Philippi, Antony had claimed his share in the government of Italy and had required part of the country for himself; now he was ready to leave Italy, the barbarous and poverty-stricken province of the west, to his colleague, taking for himself that part of the empire of which Egypt might be considered the centre, the rich and civilised eastern provinces and Cyrene, which was the best province of Africa. This change of view was certainly the result of the discussions at the court of Alexandria. The outward splendour of Egyptian decadence had persuaded Antony, as it had persuaded Cæsar towards the close of his life, that Europe, including Italy, was a poor and barbarous continent, which could never be rich; since he could not have the whole of the Roman Empire, he would take the east and regard Egypt as its vital part. As master of Egypt, commanding Italian soldiers and eastern gold, he might complete the conquest of Persia and become the most powerful of men. He was obliged, however to abandon part of this proposal for the moment, namely his designs upon the realm of the Ptolemies, the command of the Nile and the marriage with Cleopatra, who had just presented him with a son. Fulvia's death had been opportune but the troops invariably believed in the efficacy of marriage as a guarantee for peace, and, to confirm the recent compact, had a new marriage in view for him. Antony must agree to marry Octavia, the sister of Octavianus, who had been a widow for some months and had one young son; † he was to amend his

\* Appian, B. C. v. 93.

† Weichert, *Imp. C. Aug. scr. rel.*, p. 118, n. 13, and Moll, *Zur Genealogie des Jul. Claud-Kaiserh.*, pp. 9-10, assert that Octavia who married Antony was the elder of the two sisters of Octavianus, and had been the wife of the consul Marcellus, in the year 49. Drumann, G. R. iv. 235, n. 83, says, on the contrary, that she was the younger. An inscription discovered at Pergamum (*Ergebnisse der Ausgrabungen*

40 B.C.

mode of life, to cease to live as an Asiatic monarch surrounded by concubines and eunuchs, and to become the *pater familias* of Latin tradition, the husband of a simple Roman matron. Cleopatra, however, had introduced many clever and cunning Egyptians among Antony's servants, who doubtless sent full information of all that he was doing or proposed to do, and also worked patiently upon the triumvir's uneasy mind to retain his favour towards their queen and her projects.\* Cleopatra, even from a distance, was stubbornly working to change Octavia's husband into an oriental monarch.

The separation of East and West.

In any case, this marriage shows that Antony had been induced to spend the preceding winter at Alexandria rather by his political plans than by his love for Cleopatra. When events obliged a temporary change of purpose, he did not hesitate to marry Octavia instead of Cleopatra. From another point of view however, the treaty of Brundisium is of far greater importance; it shows that the empire was menaced by other forces of dissolution than those of revolution and anarchy, by the antagonism between east and west. This treaty, in short, anticipated by three centuries that division of the Roman world into the eastern and western empires which was finally accomplished in the reign of Diocletian; a few strokes of the pen despoiled Italy of vast domains in the conquest of which she had spent two centuries. For two hundred years Italy had been living upon eastern plunder and whenever the delivery of these eastern tributes had been interrupted, she had experienced the utmost inconvenience, and was still suffering from that cause. What would be the state of affairs if these revenues, instead of reaching Rome, were intercepted at Athens where Antony proposed to establish his capital, until he could fix it at Alexandria. Great would be the disturbance and ruin of the economic system established for more than a century, if these revenues were expended in the east instead of in Italy and

*von Pergamon*, 1880-1881, pp. 50-51), which refers to a certain Octavia, the sister of Octavianus, the wife of Sextus Apuleius, shows that the wife of Marcellus was not the elder, and that consequently Antony's wife was the younger. Cp. Gardthausen, *Augustus und seine Zeit*, ii. 102, n. 13.

\* Cp. in Plutarch, *Ant.* xxxiii., the anecdote of the Egyptian Diviner.

Europe. Yet this profound revolution was a necessary consequence of the great proposal for the conquest of Persia. It was obvious that if so vast an enterprise in the interior of Asia were to have any hope of success, the centre of the empire must be shifted eastward, the more so for the reason that Italy was now almost ruined and unable to offer any financial support to so great an undertaking. The Italian public had in any case divined that the conquest of Persia, following upon that of Pontus and Syria, would disturb the equilibrium of the provinces to the eventual advantage of the east; rumours had been in circulation that Cæsar desired to transfer the capital to the east, to Ilium or to Alexandria, and these were but the expression of apprehensions aroused by an obvious danger. The nature of this danger had hitherto been vague, but the compact of Brundisium defined it more clearly; Antony was about to carry eastward the centre of his political and military activity and would retain but one feeble tie with Italy, the right of recruiting. Was it likely that Italy, which had been the head of the Roman power, would now consent to become one arm and to fight in defence of an empire, the best fruits of which were withheld from her? Antony's enthusiasm for the Persian war steadily increased; he was carried away by his success, by his natural audacity and by the immense power which he was able to wield, thanks to the prevailing confusion; he cast aside his hesitation and plunged recklessly into the dangers of the future.

Italy made no effort at resistance. The country had been overwhelmed by too many misfortunes. Disaster struck every place and person, even the poet who sang the coming of the golden age. Averting his gaze from the dreadful realities about him to lose himself in the poetic contemplation of an ideal world, Virgil had written his Fifth Eclogue in that year as a continuation to the prophecies of the Fourth; it was an idyll of pure and tender imaginative power, full of exquisite country scenes and mystical longings, but marked by deep sadness, representing two shepherds who bewailed the death of Daphnis, the hero of country life, and sang his apotheosis. Stern reality, however, soon changed the poet's dreams.

Virgil's Fifth  
Eclogue.



40 B.C

Alfenus Varus, unable to resist the avaricious demands of his veterans, had been obliged to share among them the territory of Cremona as well as that of Mantua, and the small estate which Virgil had inherited from his ancestors was thus confiscated. The poet had appealed to Alfenus, who was his friend and who asked to be immortalised in poetry as Pollio had been ; but he could obtain no redress : the veterans were the masters of Italy. Virgil was obliged to take refuge at Rome in the house of his old teacher of philosophy, Siro.

## CHAPTER XIV

### POMPEY'S SON

The economic consequences of the civil war—Universal discontent in Italy—Apathy of public opinion—The young Horace at Rome—The first popular revolt against the triumvirate—The popularity of Sextus Pompeius—Further embarrassments of the triumvirate—Virgil introduces Horace to *Mæcenas*—Sextus Pompeius master of Sicily—The treaty of Misenum.

As soon as peace was concluded Antony turned his attention to those of his provinces which the Parthians had invaded. He appointed Cnæus Domitius Ahenobarbus governor of Bithynia, L. Munatius Plancus governor of Asia, P. Ventidius Bassus governor of Syria ; he gave them such military forces as were then available at Brundisium and in Macedonia and bade them strain every effort for the liberation of the invaded provinces.\* He then arranged for the transference to the east of the legions which he had in Europe and ordered Asinius Pollio to concentrate them in the valley of the Po and to march by way of Venice, Istria, Dalmatia, Illyria and Epirus to Macedonia, of which province Asinius was to be governor in the year 39.† Great festivals were then celebrated which showed how far Antony had yielded to eastern influences in the last two years. It was the general opinion that he had become an Asiatic in taste and dress.‡ These festivities, however, were speedily disturbed. The soldiers imagined that

Antony's measures after the conclusion of peace.

\* Dion, *xlvi*. 39 ; Appian, *B. C.* v. 65 ; Plutarch, *Ant.* 33. Cp. Ganter, *Die Provinzialverwaltung der Triumviri*, Strasburg, 1892, pp. 37 to 41.

† Thus we must interpret Servius, *ad Virg.*, *Ecl.* iv. ; and *ad Virg.*, *Ecl.* viii. 6-7. Cp. Ganter, *P. V.*, p. 71.

‡ Dion, *xlvi*. 30.

40 B.C.

Antony had returned from the east loaded with gold and considered that the moment was favourable to claim the sums promised before Philippi and their arrears of pay. Antony, however, had been able to collect but very little money during the preceding year in the east, which had been already squeezed dry by Brutus and Cassius; he therefore made excuses to the soldiers, telling them that it was impossible to accede to their demands; the soldiers declined to believe him and a revolt broke out. Antony and Octavianus could only calm the disturbance by fresh promises and by granting discharges and lands in Italy to those soldiers who had been longest under arms.\*

Economic  
results of the  
civil war.

This revolt is a further proof of the fact that the loyalty of the armies was most precarious amid the general collapse of all tradition and all authority. Yet upon this unique foundation the power of the triumvirs rested. Apart from the armies, the triumvirs had alienated the sympathy of every class within the last three years, although, as in many other revolutions in ancient history, this civil war had allowed the middle and lower classes to seize the property of the aristocracy and plutocracy and to divide it. Cæsar's fortune and the fortunes of all the revolution leaders in the two parties from Decimus and Marcus Brutus to Octavianus himself, had been expended in paying soldiers, officers, spies and agents of every kind, who almost invariably belonged to the poor and middle classes. The fortunes of the greatest personages in Rome, such as Pompey, Lucullus and Varro, of the two thousand richest knights in Italy, had been partially or wholly confiscated and divided among *tribuni militum*, centurions, soldiers and adventurers. Great profits had also been made by armourers, merchants of metals and military equipment, keepers of the *tabernæ deversoriæ*, the smoky inns on the high roads constantly frequented by soldiers, messengers, couriers, ambassadors, fugitive landowners, beggars and adventurers on the road to Rome; many had acquired wealth on these same roads who *faciebant vecturam*, or provided travellers with carriages, drivers and horses.† Moreover the prosecution of so many usurers, and

\* Dion, xlviii. 30.

† Cp. Varro, R. R. I. ii. 14; I. ii. 23.

40 B.C.

the confiscation of so much land, had annulled, in practice if not in law, a large number of debts and mortgages; the republic, or in other words the triumvirs who represented the creditors, had no time to call in or to examine the piles of *syngraphæ*, and confiscated lands were sold or assigned to the new holders free of charges and of debt. The senatorial and equestrian orders had thus been impoverished; knights and senators became gladiators to gain a livelihood,\* while the municipal middle classes, which had been increasing for forty years in wealth and power were swelled by disbanded veterans and by all who had succeeded in amassing a little wealth and buying some land or slaves amid these upheavals. In a word there were many who gained as well as many who lost in this, as in all revolutions.

At the same time discontent seemed to be universal for the reason that the number which had profited was insignificant in comparison with the victims of disaster. The poorer classes of Italy and of Rome, infuriated by Cæsar's assassination, inflamed by the wish for vengeance and inspired by chimerical hopes, had favoured the popular party in the years 44 and 43. But the triumphs had remained with the soldiers alone, and the poor freedmen, the artisans, the small merchants and landowners had been bitterly undeceived. Not only had crushing taxation been imposed upon Italy to pay the troops, but all public works had been suspended; the upkeep of sacred and secular buildings had been neglected, and these were falling into ruin, as were the high roads under the incessant traffic of armies; thus numerous artisans and small contractors were deprived of their daily bread. Many a merchant had been ruined by the confiscations of ships to provide the fleets of the triumvirs and of Sextus. The extermination of so many wealthy families destroyed certain branches of commerce and trade which had been very flourishing. The stucco-workers, sculptors, painters, sellers of purple or perfumes and the anti-quaries were either struggling with debt or were bankrupt; the heavy contributions extorted by the triumvirs had wiped out numbers of small landowners throughout Italy, who had

Universal  
discontent.

\* Cp. Dion, *xlvi.* 33; *xlvi.* 43.

40 B.C. been deprived of their lands because they could not pay or borrow. Not only the aristocracy and plutocracy but also the small yeoman class was sacrificed to the greed of that middle-class section represented by the soldiers and politicians of the triumphant faction.

The movement  
to the towns.

In consequence the towns, and Rome in particular, were thronged by ruined farmers, bankrupt merchants, artisans and freedmen without work, who had been unable to enlist and were too timid to join the brigands who infested the whole of Italy; to these were added the learned freedmen of the great families now extinct, including a large number of Pompey's freedmen; they were now reduced to living upon the savings they had made in happier times, for the new holders of wealthy estates did not know what to do with these learned men or with their rights of patronage over them. To the towns also came many young men, sons of Italian landowners, who had studied philosophy and rhetoric, had been stranded in the general disorders at Rome and left behind by the throng pressing forward on the narrow road to fortune. Finally, every one was suffering from the scarcity of money and the general depreciation of all securities. Those even who enlisted and were able to serve the triumvirs were often ill satisfied; of their pay and promised rewards they received but small instalments, and those who had been able to seize fields or houses during the revolutions had no money; expensive luxuries were therefore out of the question and they were forced to live quietly at Rome. Nor was any one certain of his ability to keep what he held. If it be asked what the triumvirs had done with their almighty powers during the last three years, the answer is that they had distributed lands to some three thousand veterans and that this, their sole achievement, had brought not the smallest advantage to the great mass of the people.

Prevailing  
apathy and  
cowardice.

Throughout Italy public feeling cherished a violent though secret indignation; the fire, however, smouldered beneath the ashes, for all were afraid. Antony's power seemed infinite and Octavianus was said to have put to death or to have treated with appalling cruelty those whom he suspected of



opposition.\* Courage was thus crushed beneath terror and such sparks of energy as remained were quenched by the struggle for existence in the majority of cases. The growing insolence of the soldiers increased the cowardice of those members of the middle and cultured classes who clung in any way to what they still possessed : all hope of overthrowing the tyranny of the armies and their leaders seemed lost and men swallowed their anger and prepared to make the best of the situation. The partition of the empire, which had deprived Italy of the fairest half of her conquests, does not seem to have aroused any public indignation but to have been regarded as a matter of little importance. Virgil himself, notwithstanding the loftiness of his intellect, had been unable to resist the solicitations of Alfenus Varus, who wished to be immortalised by his poetry after depriving him of his estate ; in the house of his old master, Siro, Virgil had felt a renewal of his youthful passion for philosophy and of his admiration for Lucretius and dedicated to Varus the Sixth or philosophical Eclogue which he then composed. This was a summary, presented under the form of a Greek fable about Silenus, of the Epicurean theory of the origin of the world, and the poet thus stirred the reeds of Theocritus with a breath of Lucretian poetry.

The generality of persons bore their sufferings as best they could, careless of the condition of others and following their respective destinies. Some sought oblivion in sensual pleasures and spent their time and money upon sumptuous banquets, courtesans and boys ; others devoted themselves to study and philosophy, and religion or superstition found many devotees. Of religion alone there was no lack ; those parasites of ancient civilisation, the astrologers, magicians, sorcerers and preachers of strange religions and doctrines, who had been driven from their countries by poverty and the ravages of war, now flocked to Rome to gather some morsels of bread from the pillage of their civilisations.† Stories of magic must have furnished abundant material for conversation in all grades of society since even a poet like Horace could turn his attention to

Signs of  
decadence.

\* Suetonius, *Aug.* 27.

† Agrippa drove them out in the year 33. Cp. Dion, xlix. 43.

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Canidia, the most fashionable sorceress of the time. Rome was full of vagabond philosophers in strange garments, who could find no shelter in the deserted and abandoned houses of the nobles and therefore wandered through the streets preaching doctrines akin to modern Nihilism and fulminating against luxury, wealth, power and pleasure.\* Asceticism has invariably been a flourishing philosophy in times of want.

Horace at  
Rome.

These were anxious and painful years and their troubles were felt by no one more profoundly than by the young Horace, who had returned to Italy after the battle of Philippi; he had lost his father's estate when Venusia was included in the towns given to Cæsar's veterans. He had therefore gone to Rome after saving from the wreck nothing but a few slaves, apparently three young men,† and a small amount of capital, with which he bought, probably at a low price, the post of scribe to a quæstor, in other words, a secretaryship to the treasury.‡ This was one of the few paid posts reserved to freedmen under the republic and could be bought and sold like many other offices under the old system. At that time the general uncertainty was such that the young man thought he could better invest his capital in this way than in the purchase of a house and land. He was the only son of a freedman and had received an education above his rank and fortune; he was both proud and timid, indolent and refined. In no long time he found himself in difficulties; he had known Plautius, Varius and other young men of letters, but with these exceptions, he was brought in contact with none but nonentities, actors, parasites, sophists, usurers and merchants,§ who outraged his aristocratic instincts. On the other hand he could not venture to make his way into high society, hampered as he was by his shyness and his political past, which his pride forbade him to disavow. He had had love-affairs with certain courtesans, but his health was too delicate and his fortune too modest for him to plunge into a life of sensuality, except upon condition of becoming a

\* Damasippus and Stertinius, so well described in the third satire of the second book of Horace, are two creatures of this kind.

† Cp. Horace, *Sat.* I. vi. 116.

‡ Suetonius, *Vita Hor.*

§ Cp. Cartault, *Etudes sur les Satires d'Horace*, Paris, 1899, p. 12 ff.

parasite, a position which his pride refused to contemplate.\* He was fond of study and literature, but the task of writing was burdensome to him and he did not know what to do in these disturbed times. He had begun to compose Greek poetry but had grown disgusted with it.† At times he thought of an attempt to revive the style of Lucilius and to devote himself to the mordant satire of native Latin growth. If, however, he were to show himself worthy of his great predecessor, he would have to attack the vices and defects of the great, which were the vices and defects of the age, and to appear as a censor of public morality in opposition to the triumphant popular party and the triumvirate. For this task his courage failed him and he shuddered at the mere thought of reading his compositions in public or offering them for sale. Thus the first Satire (No. 11 of the First Book) which he composed, was a very modest and restrained composition. He confined himself to mockery of some of his humble friends and instead of vehemently attacking some burning moral question, he decided with great cynicism the question whether it were better for a young man to pay court to married ladies or to courtesans. The prudent moralist pronounced in favour of the latter and the prevailing terror must have been great, if the successor of Lucilius could spend time upon such themes at a moment when the Roman world was in so tragical a situation.

The peace of Brundisium caused great rejoicing throughout Italy and at the outset of October the people were delighted to see ‡ the two triumvirs return in friendship to Rome, where the marriage of Antony with Octavia took place.§ It seemed that there would now be a moment's breathing-space. These hopes, however, were of short duration. Octavianus had little attention to spare for Italy; as the agreement had been concluded, he was anxious to recover Sardinia without delay and had already sent his freedman, Helenus, to reconquer the

The first popular revolt against the triumvirate.

\* On this subject there are several passages in the *Epodes*, but the eleventh epode alone seems to me to refer to an actual occurrence.

† Horace, *Sat.* I. x. 31.

‡ Kromayer, in *Hermes*, vol. 29, pp. 540-561.

§ Dion, xlviii. 31.

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island. Helenus had been defeated by Menodorus\* and Octavianus therefore undertook the conduct of the war; he raised money by a tax upon legacies and a poll tax of fifty sesterces upon every slave.† It appeared that civil war was thus to break out once more for reasons of private animosity and because Octavianus wished to exterminate Pompey's family.‡ Octavianus had gone too far; the timid and submissive public was seized by one of those sudden fits of rage which counterbalance the habitual weakness of feeble minds. At Rome a furious mob tore down the edicts announcing the new taxation and made tumultuous demonstrations in favour of peace;§ throughout Italy republican feeling, which though dormant was not dead, suddenly sprang to life; public opinion immediately veered round in favour of Sextus Pompeius;|| exaggerated respect was shown to the memory of his father, the great warrior and legislator, who had died in the defence of the republic and its institutions against the turbulent ambition of Cæsar and his bands. Pity was universal for the tragical destiny of this family and its disastrous end, while its last survivor was regarded as a liberator.¶ The said liberator, however, was master of Sardinia and the sea and proceeded to reduce Rome to starvation. In November a terrible famine prevailed,\*\* but instead of reproaching Sextus Pompeius the people vented their increasing exasperation upon Octavianus; on November 15,†† the first day of the *Circenses* which were celebrated at the close of the *Ludi Plebei*, on the appearance of the statue of Neptune from whom Sextus claimed descent, the crowd burst into frenzied and interminable applause. The next day Antony and Octavianus ordered that the state of Neptune should not be shown, but the people loudly clamoured for the idol

\* Dion, xlviii. 30; Appian, B. C. v. 66.

† Appian, B. C. v. 67; Dion, xlviii. 31.

‡ Appian, B. C. v. 67.

|| Dion xlviii. 31.

\*\* Appian, B. C. v. 67.

§ *Ibid.*

¶ *Ibid.*

†† The *Circenses* to which Dion alludes (xlviii. 31) cannot be those which were given on the last three days of the *Ludi Plebei*, that is to say, on November 15, 16 and 17. These were the last of the great games of the year. Cp. the *Calendario Maffei* in G. Vaccai, *Le feste di Roma antica*, Turin, 1902, xxi.; and Kromayer in *Hermes*, vol. xxix. p. 557.

and overthrew the statues of the triumvirs.\* Octavianus attempted a bold stroke, appeared in the forum and began to speak, but the people almost tore him in pieces; Antony was obliged to come to his help and also met with a very bad reception. Riots broke out and it became necessary to bring soldiers to Rome to restore order.†

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The disturbances were easily suppressed, though not without some bloodshed; however, this joint military government was so weak and the two triumvirs were so intimidated by this sudden explosion of hatred that they suspended their military preparations and even attempted to give some satisfaction to republican feeling. The public were surprised to discover that threats and tumults were far more efficacious than tears and lamentations. The triumvirs looked about for new friends and as every post had been filled until the end of the triumvirate, they decided to reduce the length of the magistracies, so that they could appoint magistrates at least twice or even oftener every year.‡ Thus they divided amongst the needy and ambitious middle class the political inheritance of the extinct aristocracy, the republican magistracies which in Cicero's time were still in the hands of noble families, however degenerate, and were held in high honour by the people who had been accustomed for centuries to look upon consuls, prætors, ædiles and senators almost as demigods. Though the end of the year was now at hand, the consuls and prætors were invited to resign; the new consuls were the Spaniard, Cornelius Balbus, Cæsar's former agent, and P. Canidius, who had worked hard to bring the legions of Lepidus over to Antony; all the prætors were replaced.§

Concession  
of the  
triumvirs.

While they thus attempted to provide rapid promotion for their friends, they also endeavoured to intimidate those whom they suspected. Antony had revealed to Octavianus the fact that Salvidienus had proposed to transfer his legions to himself and Octavianus, whose fear and cruelty had been in-

Salvidienus  
and Agrippa.

\* Dion, *xlvi.* 31; Appian does not mention the fact.

† Appian, *B. C. v.* 68; Dion, *xlvi.* 31.

‡ Dion *xlvi.* 35. Cp. Dion *xlvi.* 43; he reports most important facts which have been passed over in silence by other historians.

§ Dion, *xlvi.* 32.



40-39 B.C. creased by so many difficulties, wished to put him to death; he would not venture, however, to give orders to this effect, so he resolved to bring Salvidienus before the Senate which sat as a court to judge crimes of high treason, and the Senate as Octavianus foresaw, declared Salvidienus guilty of *perduellio*.\* Antony, on the other hand, was anxious to secure the fidelity of Agrippa and arranged a marriage for him with the only daughter of the aged Atticus.† A fact characteristic of this revolutionary epoch was the rapidity with which certain young men rose to wealth and power. Agrippa was only twenty-four years of age and descended from a poor and obscure family; none the less he had held the prætorship and was about to marry the richest heiress in Rome. These concessions, however, and the cessation of hostilities were not enough to calm public exasperation; the people persistently demanded a peace with Sextus Pompeius which would put an end to the famine, and the demonstrations became steadily more numerous and tumultuous. Neither Antony nor Octavianus could venture to leave Rome, though the position in the east was becoming critical. Towards the end of the year Herod, in flight before the Parthian invasion, had reached Rome; his object was to secure his nomination as king of Judea by the triumvirs and to return to his states with the support of the Roman legions.‡

Further  
difficulties of  
the triumvirs.

Thus the year 39, when Lucius Marcus Censorinus and Caius Calvisius Sabinus were the first consuls, began amidst disturbances and uncertainties. When Octavianus and Antony found that public opinion was not to be appeased they displayed yet greater conciliation and attempted to cloak their arbitrary and tyrannical rule with the authority of the Senate. They brought before the Senate for approval all the acts which they

\* Velleius, ii. 76; Dion, xlviii. 33; Appian, B. C. v. 66; Suetonius, *Aug.* 66; Livy, *Per.* 127. Historians have failed to observe that if Octavianus and Antony pursued a policy so obviously republican during these months, their action was dictated by public ill-feeling and by the popularity of Sextus Pompeius.

† Cornelius Nepos, *Att.* 12; he does not state, however, that the marriage took place at that moment. Yet I am inclined to think that it must have been so, as this was the last stay which Antony made at Rome, and he was the *harum nuptiarum conciliator*. Before Philippi the marriage was impossible, as Agrippa was then a nonentity.

‡ Josephus, A. J. XIV. xiv. 3.

had performed as triumvirs ; \* they seem to have obliged the Senate to decree the new taxation, though with some diminution ; † finally they requested the Senate to settle the question of Judea. Herod had secured Antony's support by valuable gifts and at the instigation of the triumvirs, of Messala, of L. Sempronius Atratinus and other leading men, the Senate decided that Judea should be reconstituted a kingdom and that Herod should be king.‡ Antony and Octavianus were thus making every effort to appear as good republicans who respected the authority of the Senate ; this policy, however, did not prevent them from promising every official post to various nominees for the next four years ; § or from appointing a large number of senators chosen from men of obscure origin and of no reputation, from officers, centurions, old soldiers and even freedmen. || The military despotism was thus beginning to give way ; what we should now call the lower middle class were invading the Senate, from which the nobility had disappeared ; a crowd of nonentities was seizing the seats which had been occupied by Lucullus, Pompey, Cicero, Cato and Cæsar ; the dynasty of writers founded by Cicero was acquiring a growing influence amid the universal dissolution.

Amid these wars and revolutions the public was astounded Virgil. to see the rise of a man whose only weapon was the pen. For some time the name of Virgil, first known to the little cliques of νεώτεροι and young dabblers in literature, had been securing a wider reputation ; his *Bucolics* had been recited in the theatres by many actors, including the famous Citheris, the freed —woman of Volumnius, who had been Antony's mistress ; ¶

\* Dion, *xlvi.* 34.

† *Ibid.* ; but the text is obscure.

‡ Josephus, *A. J.* *XIV.* *xiv.* 4.

§ In reality, Dion, *xlvi.* 35, says that they were chosen for eight years ; Appian, *B. C.* *v.* 73, says that after the peace of Misenum the consuls were appointed for four years, and he gives the names of the consuls from 34 to 31. This proves that the consuls for the years 38 to 35 had been already appointed at the time of which Dion speaks ; he has confused two appointments of consuls for four years severally made at a short interval of time and regarded them as one appointment for a term of eight years.

|| Dion, *xlvi.* 34.

¶ Servius, *ad Virg. Ecl.* *VI.* 11 ; Donatus, *in vita*, p. 60, R.

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Mæcenas and Octavianus, whose tastes were fundamentally intellectual and who was anxious to make friends on every side, eventually patronised him and soon gave him land in Campania, to compensate for the confiscation which he had suffered. This patronage increased his literary fame and he became an important character in the midst of the disturbances. None the less he continued to improve his poetical art and composed two further imitations of Theocritus, the Seventh and Eighth Eclogues ; the first represents a conflict between two shepherds in brief couplets ; while the second, derived from the first and second idyll of Theocritus, represents two excessively cultivated shepherds, who met at dawn and sang with deep and harmonious fancy the unfortunate love of a young man and the spells practised by an enamoured woman who attempts to recall a lover who has left her for the city. Virgil, however, did not merely confine himself to poetry ; he also attempted to use his influence on behalf of his poorer associates, his friends and fellow citizens. He had entertained some hope of inducing Alfenus Varus, with the help of the muses of Sicily, to rescind the edict confiscating the lands of Mantua ; when this attempt failed, he helped Horace to improve his position by introducing him to Mæcenas at the outset of the year 39. The occasion was opportune, as the triumvirs and their friends in trepidation were opening their doors to petitioners. Mæcenas extended a kindly welcome to the young man, whose bashfulness allowed him only to stammer a few words,\* but was unable to do anything for him at the moment. This counsellor of Octavianus was occupied by many other cares. The triumvirs had been mistaken in their idea that fresh concessions and the lapse of a short time would calm public excitement ; the scarcity of corn continued and the people raised their demands when they saw the hesitation of the triumvirs ; demonstrators even sought Mucia, the mother of Sextus, to secure her intervention and threatened to set fire to her house if she did not consent to act.† The triumvirs were at their wits' end ; Octavianus was anxious for resistance, but Antony understood that for the moment they must yield and requested Libo, the father-in-law

\* Horace, *Sat.* I. vi. 56 ff.

† Appian, B. C. v. 69.

of Sextus Pompeius and the brother-in-law of Octavianus, to use his good offices for intervention.\* 39 B.C.

Octavianus and Antony were thus unable to calm public indignation even by the most abject flattery of republicanism; in strange contrast was the position of the young man who was regarded by Italian opinion as the champion of the republic and its liberty. He had established a despotic sea-power of an Asiatic type upon the three islands where his rule was paramount. His ministers were the clever oriental freedmen of his father, Menodorus, Menecrates, and Apollophanes, who now acted as admirals and governors. Many of the nobles who had taken refuge with him, including Cicero's son, chafed beneath this despotic government; the consequences were discontent, discord and suspicion, which sometimes drove Sextus to acts of cruelty and violence and had recently induced him to put Staius Murcus to death.† Sextus had also recruited nine legions, largely composed of slaves, from the Sicilian estates which had been held by Roman knights and were now in his possession; his little circle of empire had become a refuge for every slave who was willing to enlist in his army.‡ The wealthy classes of Italy had thus reason enough for anxiety. Yet Italy hated the triumvirs and Cæsar's son so profoundly, and had set such hope upon Pompey's son, that some modern historians have believed that Sextus might have avenged Pharsalia and eventually changed the course of events, if he had ventured to invade Italy with his army instead of confining his operations to harrying its coasts. But the spring of the year 39 was now at hand and ten momentous years had elapsed since the crossing of the Rubicon. In great historical struggles the audacity or timidity of leaders is not the mere outcome of innate or acquired energy; these qualities also depend partially, at least, upon the confidence or despondency with which success or adversity may inspire their environment. Ten years previously Cæsar had been able to cross the Rubicon with full confidence, not merely because of his native audacity,

The Sicilian  
dominion of  
Sextus  
Pompeius.

\* Appian, B. C. v. 69; Dion, xlviii. 36.

† Cp. Suetonius, *Tib.* 4; Velleius, ii. 77; Appian, B. C. v. 70.

‡ Seeck, *Kaiser Augustus*, 74 ff.

39 B.C.

but also because the whole nation had been lulled to rest by twenty-five years of domestic peace and declined to contemplate the possibility of a new upheaval. Nor had Cæsar himself any intention of beginning a ruinous civil war between the rich and poor; his object was merely to overpower his opponents in a simple political conflict. But at the present time, men's minds were profoundly depressed by the fearful disasters they had experienced; Antony himself and the leaders of the victorious party were confronted by fresh difficulties at every turn; every one preferred to wait until the progress of events pointed to some definite conclusion.

The policy  
of Sextus.

Thus no bold stroke could be expected from Sextus. In view of the tragical destiny by which his family had been crushed, only pre-eminent genius could have risen superior to discouragement at a decisive moment when all must be staked. Though, however, he could not imitate the audacity of Cæsar, Sextus Pompeius was sufficiently intelligent to realise that Antony and Octavianus needed peace even more than himself at that moment; his clever adviser, Menodorus, urged him to resist and to protract the struggle as long as possible; his threats and the continuance of the famine would increase the dangers which confronted his two rivals.\* On the other hand, the leading Romans who had taken refuge with him, such as Libo and Mucia, argued on the opposite side and asserted that Italy would become hostile and would turn against him if he did not give way.† After lengthy negotiations an agreement was eventually concluded; Sextus Pompeius was to be recognised as the master of Sicily and Sardinia and would be given the Peloponnese for five years, that is, until the year 34; in the year 33 he was to be elected consul, to enter the college of pontiffs and to receive seventy millions of sesterces as indemnity for the confiscation of his father's property. In return he would undertake to cease ravaging the coasts of Italy, to receive no more fugitive slaves, to allow full freedom of navigation and to help in the suppression of piracy. Advantage would also be taken of the peace of Misenum to pardon all deserters and all survivors of the proscription, excepting only

\* Appian, B. C. v. 70.

† Appian, B. C. v. 70-71.



those conspirators who had been condemned for Cæsar's murder; all their real property would be restored to the deserters and a fourth part of their wealth to the proscribed; all slaves who had taken service under Sextus would receive their freedom, and the same rewards were promised to his soldiers as to those of Octavianus and Antony.\* After this agreement, the two triumvirs set out for Misenum with an army in the course of the summer; Sextus also came with his fleet, and in this beautiful bay, under the eyes of the army, which thronged the shores of the headland, and of the fleet which covered the sea to its horizon, the sons of Cæsar and Pompey, together with Antony, met upon ship-board, ratified their peace, arranged for a solemn banquet and for the marriage of the young daughter of Sextus with the little Marcellus, the son of Octavianus. The better to confirm the peace, a list of consuls was drawn up for four further years, that is to say until the year 31 B.C.† Sextus then went to Sicily while Antony and Octavianus returned to Rome, bringing with them a considerable number of well-known men who had been proscribed and some former adherents of Lucius Antonius who had fled after the capture of Perugia; these exiles now took advantage of the amnesty to abandon Sextus and his freedmen and returned to Rome to recover the remnant of their property. They included Lucius Arruntius, Marcus Junius Silanus, Caius Sentius Saturninus, Marcus Titius and Cicero's son.‡ Peace was then re-established, to the great delight of Italy, and appeared to be confirmed by a happy chance which most opportunely added fresh ties to the bonds of relationship uniting the three contracting parties to the peace of Misenum. Scribonia had just presented or was about to present Octavianus with a daughter, who was called Julia, and Antony's wife, Octavia, was with child.

The peace of Misenum marks the first surrender of the Importance of  
the peace of  
Misenum.

\* Dion, *xlvi.* 36; Appian, *B. C. v.* 72.

† Appian, *B. C. v.* 73; Dion, *xlvi.* 37-38.

‡ Velleius, *ii.* 77, is wrong, however, in adding to those who took refuge with Sextus and returned to Rome, Tiberius Claudius Nero, as he had returned to Rome after the peace of Brundisium. Cp. Dion, *xlvi.* 15, and Suetonius, *Tib.* 4.

39 B.C.

triumvirs to the imperceptible force of public opinion. This is the real importance of the treaty, which denotes the beginning of a silent struggle between the wealthy classes of Italy and the military dictatorship of the revolution, a struggle in which the unarmed party gradually enforced its wishes upon the military party. Virgil, however, encouraged by the peace of Misenum, composed another Eclogue, the ninth, in which he ventured to place complaints in the mouths of his shepherds, concerning the confiscation of his estates and of the lands of Mantua, reproachfully recalling how he had saluted Cæsar's star and how ill he had been rewarded for the sympathy which he had expressed.

## CHAPTER XV

### THE DISASTER OF SCYLLA

The first victory of Ventidius over the Parthians—The apotheosis of Antony as Dionysus—Horace and Sallust—The success of Virgil's *Eclogues*—Marriage of Octavianus with Livia—Fresh war between Sextus Pompeius and Octavianus—Antony wishes to force a peace upon Octavianus—Octavianus determines to continue the war—The disaster of Scylla—Crassus avenged—Octavianus sends Mæcenus to Antony—Horace's account of Mæcenus' journey.

IN the month of September,\* after the birth of his daughter,† Antony left Rome for Athens. Notwithstanding his marriage with Octavia, he had not abandoned his idea of shifting the political centre to the east and of making war upon Persia; on the contrary, he cherished this project more ardently than ever before. The defects of the Latin institutions, instability, corruption, incompetency and disorder, had merely increased since the triumvirs had opened the republican offices to the middle classes, had reduced the length of magistracies to six or even three months, and had filled the Senate with nonentities. It was impossible to employ, upon serious and difficult business, magistrates who were in office for so short a time, who were generally ill-suited for the difficult responsibilities of command, and did not possess the prestige of name which supported even the most degenerate descendants of the great families. With such instruments of government the leaders and the governing cliques stood in need of great authority and influence, if a general constitutional disruption was to be prevented. But the disturbances at Rome and the peace of Misenum which had marked the capitulation of the trium-

Antony's intentions.

\* Kromayer, in *Hermes*, vol. 29, p. 561.

† Plutarch, *Ant.* 33.

39 B.C.

virate to the force of public opinion, had displayed the real feebleness of that combination. It was thus more than ever necessary to overcome the principal causes of this weakness by some great effort, or in other words to wipe out the disastrous record of the triumvirate policy by a brilliant and profitable success. Antony was well aware that the triumvirs had so far conferred no lasting or general benefit upon any party, that they had not even been able to maintain order throughout the country and had contented themselves with dividing land among four or five thousand of Cæsar's veterans. This was no great result in view of the long wars and massacres which had taken place, of the many illegal and violent acts which the triumvirs had committed, and of the extraordinary powers which had been conferred upon them. For these reasons the Parthian war became a necessity; the expenses of the republic had increased while its revenue had diminished; the triumvirs had recently been obliged to pay their soldiers, officers and tax collectors with promises instead of money; the deficit was growing greater and debts were accumulating; \* the proposed expedition was no easy task from a military point of view, but far more difficult was the business of procuring the financial resources for its preparation.

Victory of  
Ventidius over  
the Parthians.

During the second half of the year 39, Antony left Rome in charge of the consuls for that period, L. Cocceius and P. Alfenus, wittily known by the public as the "little consuls"; he then went to Athens, fully intending to hurry on the preparations for the Persian campaign. The news which reached him from Asia shortly after his arrival in Greece only confirmed his resolve.† About the month of August, Ventidius Bassus by a clever stroke had surprised Labienus at the foot of the Taurus in some place unknown to us, had defeated him and driven him to flight with a weak escort; he had then swooped down upon Cilicia and pushed forward to the range of the Amanus and the passes leading to Syria; he had there encountered a second Parthian army led by a general of uncertain name and had defeated this force.‡ The Parthians, excellent

\* Dion, *xlvi.* 34.

† Plutarch, *Ant.* 33.

‡ Dion, *xlvi.* 39-41; Frontin, *Strat.* I. i. 6; II. v. 35-36; Orosius, VI. *xviii.* 23.

defenders of their own country, but useless at conquest, retreated to the banks of the Euphrates; Syria was open to the Romans and Antigonos alone held out in Palestine in hopes of Parthian reinforcements. Antony was highly delighted by this news \* and proceeded forthwith to spend the last months of the year 39 in rearranging the political map of the east; his mode of procedure shows a growing distaste for Roman governors and Italian forces and a growing preference for the bureaucratic institutions of oriental monarchs. Not only did he recognise Herod as King of Judea, but in Pontus, where Pompey had organised republics, he re-established the national dynasty in the person of Darius, the son of Pharnaces and nephew of Mithridates.† He made no attempt to subdue the Pisidians, a hardy race of mountaineers, excellent soldiers and terrible brigands, but gave them a king and chose for this position Amyntas, a secretary of Deiotarus.‡ A certain Polemo, the son of a rhetorician of Laodicea, who had improvised a force and defended the town against the Parthians, was rewarded with the throne of Lycaonia.§ Antony ordered these nominees to provide him with money and men || and commanded Darius to reorganise the old army of the kingdom of Pontus ¶ for his support in the Persian war; Pollio's army he divided into three bodies and recaptured as he went Salona, which had revolted; at the same time he inflicted a defeat upon the Parthini.\*\* One part of this force he sent to winter in Epirus and the two remaining divisions were employed in small expeditions against the barbarians.†† He then made efforts to collect money in Greece, especially in the Peloponnese, the province promised to Sextus Pompeius; ‡‡ and to secure the property of the richest landowner in the Peloponnese,

\* Plutarch, *Ant.* 33.

† Appian, B. C. v. 75.

‡ Appian, B. C. v. 75. Cp. Strabo, XIV. v. 6 (671), who thus explains the foundation of the kingdom of Pisidia without attributing it to Antony, but as the kingdom was founded by Antony it is probably this fact that he had in view.

§ Appian, B. C. v. 75; Strabo, XII. viii. 16 (578).

|| Appian, B. C. v. 75.

¶ This is confirmed by the fact that for the Persian expedition for the year 36 he had a contingent of soldiers from Pontus.

\*\* Servius, *ad Virg. Ecl.* IV. i. and viii. 12; C. I. L. i. 461.

†† Appian, B. C. v. 75.

‡‡ Dion, xlviii. 39.



39 B.C.

a certain Lachares, he ordered the man to be beheaded, a democratic custom highly fashionable among the monarchs of ancient times.\* Finally he wished to enjoy the divine adoration paid to Asiatic monarchs. Octavianus had been content with his position as "son of the divine;" Antony wished to be called a god and a second Dionysus.† In the religious ceremonies he took the place of the statue of the god and celebrated a kind of mystical marriage with Athene at Athens, obliging the unfortunate town to pay him a dowry of one thousand talents.‡ Then, when the stormy season began, he settled in this famous and beautiful city and spent his time in festivals, games and conversations with philosophers and rhetoricians, thus flattering the Hellenic spirit and attempting to pose as a successor of Alexander, even in his patronage of the arts and sciences.§

Horace and  
Sallust.

Meanwhile Octavianus had gone to Gaul, where the Aquitani had revolted; || but he returned after a short stay, leaving Agrippa to crush this revolt, which it was hoped would be the last.¶ Thereupon, on October 25, Asinius entered Rome and celebrated his triumph over the Parthians \*\* and Mæcenas towards the close of the year found leisure to remember the young poet who had been introduced to him nine months before, and informed him that the doors of his palace were open to him. Horace was transported with delight, threw off his habitual indolence, and wrote the third satire, in which he celebrates friendship and all its virtues, with a warmth of feeling which certain critics have regarded as the expression of his gratitude to Virgil.†† At the same time he does not seem to

\* Plutarch, *Ant.* 67. Cp. *Bulletin de correspondance hellénique*, 1896, p. 155. † C. I. A. ii. 482, v. 22-23. 'Αντωνίου Θεοῦ νέου Διονύσου.

‡ Dion, *xlvi.* 39.

§ Plutarch, *Ant.* 33; Appian, *B. C.* v. 76. If we examine all that was done during the year 34 we cannot possibly support the assertion of a German historian, who merely repeats the general belief of historians, that Antony passed this winter *thatenlos und in unwürdigem Genussleben* (Schiller, *Geschichte der Römischen Kaiserzeit*, Gotha, 1883, i. 101.) There is a legend on the subject of Antony which leads historians astray and blinds their eyes to the most obvious facts.

|| Appian, *B. C.* v. 75.

¶ This is a natural inference from the statement of Eutropius, vii. 5, which must be connected with the statement of Appian, v. 65.

\*\* C. I. L. i. 461.

†† Cp. Cartault, *Etude sur les Satires d'Horace*, Paris, 1899, 28 ff.

have profited in the least by his friendship or even to have received any encouragement for his poetry. The young man was too timid and too fearful of intrusion \* to ask for help ; he wrote but little and would publish nothing, showing his poems only to his intimate friends. Mæcenas seems to have regarded him rather as a future politician than as a great poet. Agitated by the retorts of the nonentities whom he had mentioned in his second satire, he composed the fourth satire in his defence, invoking the authority of Lucilius and asserting that in any case he had no intention either of selling his poems or of reading them in public.† However, the opportunity of mixing with the literary and cultured classes was a great advantage to Horace, for writers of scanty means could only gain a hearing through the patronage of the rich and powerful ; the best of them were obliged to secure this help if they desired reputation, for unfortunately all of them were not great lords and masters of their own time, power and ability like Sallust, who continued to avenge himself upon the conservatives by the composition of his fine *Jugurtha*, the history of the first great aristocratic scandal ; in the *Historiæ* he gave a detailed account of the crimes, the errors, the scandals and the fall of Sulla's party, from the death of the dictator to the year 67, and seized every opportunity of invective against Pompey. Few writers, again, were so fortunate as Virgil, who was now freed from the burden of poverty, patronised by the rich and admired by the public ; he continued to work at his ease and composed his tenth and last Eclogue to console the love troubles of one of his friends. Caius Cornelius Gallus ‡ was born of an obscure family of the equestrian order in Cisalpine Gaul ; a member of the political clique of Octavianus, he was one of those numerous Italians who struggled to secure the posts which the annihilation of the aristocracy had left vacant ; he was an intelligent, pushing man, anxious to secure a reputation and to advertise himself at any price, a distinguished writer, a politician and a soldier ; at the same time he found leisure for love and women

\* Horace, *Sat.* I. iii. 63 ff.

† Horace, *Sat.* I. iv. 71 ff.

‡ An inscription recently discovered in Egypt proved that his prænomen was certainly Caius. Cp. *Sitzb. Berl. König. Preuss. Akad.*, 1896, vol. i. p. 478.

39 B.C. and his mistress had been that Citheris who recited Virgil's Eclogues at Rome ; when she abandoned him, the young man begged Virgil to compose an Eclogue to console him for his loss and to inform half Italy that he had been the lover of the most famous courtesan of his age. \* Virgil was kind enough to perform this service. He disguised himself as an Arcadian shepherd and depicted the mountains and forests, the laurels, the tamarisks, the flocks and herds and even the gods themselves mourning for the grief of Gallus ; Gallus replied that he wished to abandon the world and live with the shepherds of Arcadia in the forests and caverns, to sing their country songs, hunt wild beasts and write the name of his lady upon the bark of the trees.

Virgil's  
Eclogues.

With this poem Virgil concluded his Eclogues, which were then read and admired by the Italian public chiefly for the reason that they corresponded with the tendencies of the age and met the wants of the more varied and numerous public, which now followed the study of literature in place of the old cultured class, the vanished aristocracy. These little poems, composed in the style of Theocritus and of other Greek bucolic poets who were then fashionable, placed on the lips of imaginary shepherds, nymphs, fawns and gods, the new ideas which the mixture of many civilisations had brought to Italy amid so long a series of disasters and calamities ; these mouth-pieces expressed the desire for peace, the hope of a better future, a wistful affection for country life, philosophical curiosity awakened by the mystery of the world's origin and the first movements of a mysticism which was beginning to invade social and political life ; thus every member of the reading public could find something to delight his fancy, though very few could appreciate the exquisite delicacy of form and the refined and imaginative sensuality of which the Eclogues are full. Moreover they were short ; but little time was required to read or hear them ; they were easily learnt by heart and these were great advantages in appealing to a numerous and superficial public of political adventurers, busy speculators, centurions and military tribunes in pursuit of wealth, young

\* Servius, *ad Ecl.* x. 1.

students and cultured freedmen who wished to read something but had neither time nor inclination for the interminable epics of Ennius and Pacuvius.

38 B.C.

A soldier abandoned by a courtesan and attempting to console his grief by commissioning a fashionable poet to advertise his name and his adventures throughout Italy, would have aroused the scorn of the ancient Romans. But amid the universal confusion men also lost that sense of dignity which formerly restrained government officials from displaying their weakness to the public gaze. The god Eros showed his brazen visage both in the general's tent and in the Senate house, and public opinion was now inclined to deal with this weakness as indulgently as with all others. At the outset of the year 38 the impetuous and lascivious Octavianus was suddenly seized with a violent passion for the wife of Tiberius Claudius Nero; he forthwith divorced Scribonia, secured the divorce of Livia, the object of his adoration, and, though she had been six months with child, married her in spite of the prohibitions of the old priestly code at Rome. \* The obliging pontiffs had pronounced that the old religious rules did not apply in such cases as this. Great was the astonishment, the ridicule and the scandal at Rome when it was learnt that the husband had given Livia a dowry as if she had been his daughter and had been present at the marriage feast.† Whether Octavianus acted or not in one of his characteristic fits of impetuosity, there is no doubt that he had political reasons for divorcing Scribonia. Timid and hesitating, with no self-command in a dangerous crisis calling for immediate decision, Octavianus none the less possessed real strength, though his energy could be but slowly evoked. When he had time to reflect at his ease, he was able to foresee every precaution demanded by a dangerous enterprise, while he possessed the tenacity to carry out pre-determined plans and to triumph over his uncertainty and vacillation. After the capitulation of Misenum, Octavianus, like Antony, had realised how far his prestige had sunk. Unable to undertake any such enterprise as the conquest of Persia, he had at least resolved

Octavianus' marriage with Livia.

\* Dion, *xlvi.* 44 ; Suetonius, *Aug.* 62.

† Dion, *xlvi.* 44.

38 B.C. to crush Pompey's son lest popular admiration should restore this rival family to its ancient power. Octavianus therefore had been seeking pretexts for quarrel at the end of 39 and the beginning of 38; he had written letters to Pompeius reproaching him for sheltering fugitive slaves, for failing to suppress piracy, for continuing the maintenance of his armaments and for breaking certain conventions in the treaty of Misenum.\* Thus his divorce of Scribonia was a means for accelerating his rupture with the master of the islands. Granted these political reasons for the divorce, no reason of any kind is forthcoming to explain his precipitate marriage with Livia, which wounded the superstitions of the multitude and exposed himself and his new wife to popular ridicule. A daughter of Livius Drusus, an aristocrat of the old stock which had perished at Philippi, Livia was a young woman of marvellous beauty, high intellect and attractive character. It is likely enough that the young man who was intelligent but nervous, impressionable and constantly alternating between hesitation and rashness, irritation and weakness, should have fallen in love with this woman, both for her marvellous beauty and even more for that clear intelligence and certainty of judgment, which are often to be found in well-balanced women. This hasty marriage must therefore be reckoned among the impetuous acts to which his weak and headstrong character drove him at this time.

Breach  
between  
Octavianus and  
Sextus.

About the time when Octavianus concluded this extraordinary marriage, an event occurred which precipitated the breach with Sextus Pompeius. Menodorus, who had been appointed governor of Sardinia by Sextus, quarrelled with his patron and went over to the enemy, surrendering the island, a fleet of sixty ships and three legions to Octavianus.† Delighted thus to recover Sardinia without a blow, Octavianus received him with open arms, but as soon as Sextus had heard of the treachery he sent a fleet to ravage the coasts of Italy.‡ Thus at the

\* Appian, B. C. v. 77.

† Dion xlviii. 45; Appian, B. C. v. 78; Orosius, vi. 18, 21.

‡ According to Appian, B. C. v. 78 and 81, the treachery of Menodorus did not take place until the war had begun. However, Dion, xlviii. 45-46, tells us that the treachery was the immediate cause of the war. The second version seems to me the more probable; indeed,



outset of the spring of 38 the war had broken out anew. Octavianus immediately wrote to Antony, begging him to come to Brundisium and discuss the situation ; \* he asked Lepidus for help ; † he ordered the fleet anchored at Ravenna to sail to Brundisium and to await Antony, ‡ while the fleet of Menodorus was sent to join the other vessels on the Etrurian coast ; § he began the construction of new triremes at Ravenna and at Rome ; || he recalled the legions from Gaul and Illyria, sending some to Brundisium and others to Naples ¶ that he might attack Sicily upon two sides if Antony approved his design. \*\* Antony, however, was greatly irritated by this news from Italy and by the request that he would leave Greece for Brundisium. He had spent the winter at Athens much to his own satisfaction, and, as spring approached, had energetically resumed the execution of his plans and was then busy transferring to Asia the army which had been quartered in Epirus upon the borders of Macedonia ; he also proposed to follow the army in a short time. †† Now Octavianus was recalling him to Italy to begin a new war with Sextus Pompeius ! Antony was not inclined to interrupt his eastern plans and to postpone his revenge for the capitulation of Misenum, in order to help Octavianus to his vengeance ; he therefore started with a few ships and a small following ‡‡ for Brundisium, resolved to prevent the turbulent

Appian's story is contradicted by another fact which he himself relates, namely, that Antony was aware of the treachery of Menodorus when he went to Brundisium (chap. lxxix.). Antony's voyage, however, must have begun some time before the commencement of hostilities. See note †† below.

\* Appian, B. C. v. 78.

† Dion, xlvi. 46.

‡ Appian, B. C. iii. 78.

§ Appian, B. C. iii. 78, says, at Puteoli ; but in chap. 81, it appears that this fleet left the coast of Etruria. Appian is mistaken in chap. 78, or the orders issued were changed for some reason unknown to us.

|| Appian, B. C. v. 80.

¶ Appian, B. C. v. 78 and 80.

\*\* Appian, B. C. v. 78.

†† So much is not directly stated by any text, but as we know that a considerable part of Antony's army spent the winter 39-38 in Epirus and in Greece, and that the whole army was in Asia the following winter, we are bound to assume that the transportation of the troops was begun at that moment. Possibly an allusion to this work may be found in Appian, B. C. v. 76, which describes Antony's military activity during the spring of 38.

‡‡ Appian, B. C. v. 79 ; *σὺν ὀλίγοις*. The rapidity of this return

38 B.C.

Octavianus from making war. He was the elder man, his reputation and authority were greater and he was inclined to regard his young colleague as his subordinate ; he therefore intended to arrange the matter as he pleased. However, when he reached Brundisium on the appointed day Octavianus was not there, for reasons unknown to us. Antony did not wait for him but started back without delay after writing two imperious letters, one to Octavianus ordering him to respect the treaty of Misenum, and the other to Menodorus warning him that if he did not preserve the peace, he would assert those rights of mastery over him which he had acquired with the estate of Pompeius.\*

Preparations  
of Octavianus  
for war.

Octavianus, who was largely counting upon Antony's help, was greatly undeceived ; in fact, the beginning of the war was beset with difficulties. Lepidus was angry because the peace of Misenum had been concluded without reference to himself and declined to stir. Popular feeling was entirely opposed to the war and was indignant with Octavianus. Agrippa was far away, conducting a successful campaign against the Aquitani. To oppose Sextus Pompeius alone was the height of rashness. Octavianus, however, understood that after Antony's intimations and after the provocation which Sextus Pompeius had given, he would be utterly discredited if he showed himself afraid of his rival, or unable to act without his colleague ; to restore the fading lustre of Cæsar's name and to obscure the growing brightness of the name of Pompey he required a second Pharsalia on sea or land. He also thought himself competent to conduct the war alone. Nervous characters often err as much by excessive audacity as by excessive prudence. Octavianus had heard that the Parthians were again invading Syria and believed that Antony, who was thus detained in the east, could not interfere in Italian affairs. He told himself that if he could crush

and the letters sent to Octavianus and Menodorus clearly show that Antony reached Brundisium before hostilities were begun, with the intention of maintaining peace. Hence the story in Dion, *xlvi.* 46, that Antony proposed to join Octavianus in Etruria, but returned because he had been frightened by a wolf which had entered his prætorium, is but a fable.

\* Appian, *B. C.* v. 79.

Pompeius his success would cover all shortcomings, and, after asking help from every one, he resolved unaided to conduct an ingenious but complicated plan of campaign by sea and by land. He put Cornificius in command of the fleet already concentrated at Brundisium and ordered him to sail to Tarentum. He entrusted the ships anchored in the Etrurian waters to Calvisius Sabinus, with Menodorus as vice-admiral and sent them to Sicily. Finally he led to Rhegium in person the army which he intended to transport to Sicily when the two fleets had destroyed Pompeius' ships.\* To calm the apprehensions of Menodorus at Antony's threats, he had raised him to the rank of knight.

The war apparently began about the end of July. Pompeius, however, in place of Menodorus had appointed another Greek freedman of equal intelligence, by name Menecrates, who cleverly turned the division of the enemy's forces to account and proposed to destroy the two halves of the fleet of Octavianus before they could effect a junction. He therefore left Pompeius with forty ships at Messina,† and sailed with the main body of the fleet to Naples, meeting Calvisius and Menodorus off Cumæ on their way from Etruria. The fleet of Octavianus was perhaps smaller and Calvisius was an inexperienced commander. It therefore suffered severe loss. However Menecrates was killed in the battle and Demochares, the second in command, would not follow up his advantage and retired slowly upon Sicily, leaving Calvisius and Menodorus in the Bay of Naples, where they repaired their damages.‡ Meanwhile Octavianus had reached Rhegium, had established his army upon the shore and taken over the fleet of Cornificius. From Rhegium he watched Pompeius, scrutinising the horizon with anxious and irresolute gaze; from morning till evening he meditated plans of attack, but he waited for Calvisius and lost all the opportunities which should be seized at once in war. He would not even venture

The outbreak  
of war.

\* Appian, B. C. v. 80.

† This seems to be established by the comparison of Appian, B. C. v. 81, which states that "Pompeius awaited Caesar at Messina," with another passage, B. C. v. 84, which states that Octavianus had an opportunity of attacking Pompeius at Messina with only forty ships.

‡ Dion, xlviii. 46; Appian, B. C. v. 81-84.

38 B.C.

to crush Sextus in the strait, when he appeared there one day with his forty ships.\* After repairing damages Calvisius and Menodorus sailed to Sicily and this timorous admiral then committed an act of such imprudence that we are inclined to suppose he lost his head or that the ancient historians have neglected to state some vital point which would explain his action. Octavianus left Rhegium to meet Calvisius, leaving behind him at Messina not only the forty ships of Sextus, but the whole of the fleet which had returned from Cumæ. Demochares and Apollophanes immediately pursued him and attacked him in the rear off Scylla.

The defeat of  
Scylla.

The young admiral of twenty-five years was thus obliged to conduct his first naval engagement † and the results were most discreditable. Octavianus first attempted resistance in the open sea, concentrating his largest and heaviest vessels which were manned by the best of his troops; however, when attacked by Apollophanes, in fear that he might be sunk or captured he retreated to the coast and cast anchor. The enemy, however, continued their pursuit of the heavy vessels which were less easily able to defend themselves when anchored.‡ The orders of the admiral became confused and contradictory and many soldiers threw themselves into the sea to reach the shore. Octavianus soon lost his head and committed an act of cowardice almost unexampled in a Roman general; he disembarked and abandoned the command at the height of the struggle.§ This cowardice, however, saved the fleet from utter disaster, for Cornificius, when he was relieved of his admiral's embarrassing fears, weighed anchor and resumed the conflict, holding out until the enemy retired upon Messina on observing the approach of Calvisius.|| By this time the evening was advanced, and the sun set before Cornificius perceived that the fleet from Naples was close beside him; thus while Octavianus spent the

\* Appian, B. C. v. 84.

† Appian, B. C. v. 85.

‡ Appian, B. C. v. 85-86. Dion, *xlvi. 47*, adds some precise details on the first part of the battle, but for the second part gives only a few lines of confused description, and we must therefore rely upon Appian.

§ Appian, B. C. v. 85; 'Ο μὲν δὴ Καῖσαρ ἐξήλατο τῆς νεῶς ἐπὶ τὰς πέτρας.

|| Appian, B. C. v. 86.

night on land in the midst of wounded and starving fugitives, Cornificius cast anchor, ignorant of the fate of his leader or of the presence of Calvisius and with no plan of action for the following day. The dawn brought comfort to every one; the cohorts which came up from Rhegium found Octavianus on the shore, no less exhausted than the rank and file; Cornificius perceived that Calvisius had arrived and reassuring messages passed between the two admirals and their fugitive general.\* However, while their confidence was thus rising, a furious storm broke upon them which lasted all that day and the following night and destroyed the greater and the best part of the fleet.† The winds completed the work which the admirals of Pompeius had begun; Octavianus lost his fleet and the Sicilian expedition ended in miserable disaster.

The blow was more serious for the reason that Antony had meanwhile been winning the most brilliant military successes in the east. The Parthians had once more invaded the Roman provinces in the spring under the command of Pacorus, the king's favourite son, while Antony was still in Greece; however, Ventidius, with admirable rapidity and skill, had been able to concentrate all the Roman forces in Syria and Cilicia and had inflicted a memorable defeat upon the enemy, apparently on June 9, sixteen years after the disaster of Carrhæ. Pacorus himself had perished in the conflict‡ and Crassus was thus avenged. The death of a Parthian prince had expiated the death of a Roman pro-consul.§ The enthusiasm at Rome was so great that the Senate decreed a triumph not only to Antony, the chief in command, but to Ventidius himself, || an unprecedented measure. Antony had gone to Asia shortly after the battle of Gindarus and had taken command of the army of Ventidius, which had already opened hostilities against the king of Commagene, a great supporter of the Parthians, and was besieging Samosata; Antony then continued the siege which

The defeat of  
Crassus  
avenged by  
Antony.

\* Appian, B. C. v. 87-88.

† Appian, B. C. v. 89-90; Dion, xlviii. 48.

‡ Dion, xlix. 19-20; Livy, *Per.* 128; Plutarch, *Ant.* 34; Oros. VI. vii. 23.

§ Plutarch, *Ant.* 34.

|| Dion, xlix. 21



38 B.C.

his general had begun.\* Against these triumphs Octavianus could show nothing but the success of Agrippa against the Aquitani, and this was no compensation for the Sicilian disaster, which had caused merriment throughout Italy. Money was scarce and the state of public opinion forbade Octavianus to impose fresh taxation; † Antony was likely to be furious with him and, to increase his embarrassment, the present year, 38, was the last of the five years of the triumvirate, which could only be renewed after discussion with his colleagues. In so difficult a situation, his lavish distribution of offices did not help him greatly, though he appointed as many as sixty-seven prætors during that year. ‡ He had hoped for a moment that Antony would be detained in Syria by the campaign against the Parthians; but towards the end of September he heard that Antony had made peace with the king of Commagene in return for a monetary indemnity and that he was preparing to return to Greece, § with the fixed resolve of interfering in Italian affairs. Antony left Caius Sossius as governor in Syria; he was another nonentity who had risen in Antony's service and was now ordered to complete the conquest of Judea, to transfer the provinces to Herod and to capture Jerusalem, where Antigonus continued to hold out. ||

Octavianus  
sends Mæcenus  
to Antony.

Octavianus then resolved to send to Athens as delegates to Antony, Mæcenus, ¶ Lucius Cocceius and Caius Fonteius Capito\*\* with the object of soothing his indignation and arranging a friendly agreement for the renewal of the triumvirate. Horace, who was invited to accompany Mæcenus as far as Brundisium, has given us a fine description of this journey in the fifth satire of the first book. He left Rome by carriage, probably during the second half of September, and accom-

\* Plutarch, *Ant.* 34; Dion, xlix. 21. It was natural that Antony should assume command upon his arrival. The supposed jealousy of Ventidius is thus fictitious.

† Appian, B. C. v. 92. Possibly at this moment the revolt against the publicani occurred, to which Dion refers, xlviii. 43.

‡ Dion, xlviii. 43.

§ Plutarch, *Ant.* 34; Dion, xlix. 22 (he is wrong in saying that Antony started for Italy).

|| Dion, xlix. 22.

¶ Appian, B. C. v. 92.

\*\* Horace, *Sat.* I. v. 32.

panied only by a friendly Greek rhetorician, Heliodorus, he reached Aricia in the evening and spent the night with his companion in a modest inn; the next day they started early and in the evening reached Appii Forum on the edge of the Pontine marshes, whence the canal was to take them to Terracina during the night. Horace was unable to drink wine owing to a disease of the eyes, and as he did not care for the bad water of the village he resolved to go without food for that evening; while the other travellers were dining, he went to watch the boatmen and their young slaves who were preparing the boat and embarking the luggage. The first stars were twinkling in the sky. In the evening the boat, drawn by a mule on the tow path, started to the songs of the boatman and the passengers; by degrees the voices were silent, the passengers went to sleep and the boatman alone continued to sing until sleep overcame him also. At dawn a traveller perceived that the boat had stopped and that the boatman was asleep. He therefore woke him unceremoniously. On the third day at ten o'clock in the morning the two travellers were able to wash their faces and hands at the inn of the Fons Feronia, whence they set out for Terracina, three miles distant. There they found Mæcnas, Cocceius and Capito, and Horace bathed his eyes with collyrium. The fourth day they set out together for Capua, passing Fundi, where the prætor, the mayor of the age, came to meet them with great ceremony and caused them much amusement; they reached Formiæ, where they spent the night and were entertained by Lucius Lucinius Murena in his villa. The next morning Plautius, Varius and Virgil arrived from Naples; Virgil possibly came from the Campanian estate, which Octavianus had given him. The company thus increased started in carriages and spent the evening of the fifth day at a little inn on the Bridge of Campania. The next day they stopped at Capua where Mæcnas, who had a passion for physical exercise, played a game of ball. On the seventh day they reached the Caudine Forks and went to the magnificent villa of Cocceius, where dinner was prolonged far into the night and enlivened by a stage quarrel of buffoons. The next day they reached Beneventum, where the innkeeper nearly set the

38 B.C.

house on fire while roasting thrushes for them. Mæcnas and his friends were obliged to help him to extinguish the conflagration. From Beneventum on the ninth day of the journey Horace was delighted to see the mountains of his native country, but was obliged to spend the night at Trecum in a smoky inn where he made a vain attempt to seduce a serving-girl, whose modesty, however, was not remarkable. Two days later they were at Canusium, where Varius left them; on the twelfth day they reached Rubiæ over roads made difficult by the rain, and though when they came to Barium on the thirteenth day the weather had mended, the roads were worse than ever. On the fourteenth day they reached Egnatia and saw in the temple the miraculous incense which burned without being lighted; the poet was much amused by this superstition which, as he said, was good enough for the Jews. For himself, he did not believe that the gods troubled about such foolishness. On the fifteenth day, after a journey of three hundred and sixty miles from Rome, almost entirely by carriage, they reached Brundisium, where Mæcnas embarked for Greece.

The narrative of this voyage is an interesting document. We see Mæcnas, one of the greatest personages of his time, obliged on several occasions during this short journey from Rome to Brundisium, to stay at abominable inns. Thus upon this high road there were few rich landowners at that time able to give hospitality to these illustrious travellers, and upon the ancient Appian way there were numbers of deserted and abandoned villas, gloomy memorials of the vanished plutocracy and of the fallen grandeur of the Roman aristocracy.

## CHAPTER XVI

### THE GEORGICS

Antony's reply to Octavianus—Agrippa builds a fleet—The meeting and convention of Tarentum—The slow transformation of Italy—The return to tradition—The *De re rustica* of Varro—The fundamental ideas and the inconsistencies of the book—Town and country according to Varro—The Georgics.

ON November 27 of this year, 38 B.C., Ventidius entered Rome amid the applause of the people and celebrated the triumph over the Parthians; \* immediately afterwards (the precise dates are unfortunately wanting) Mæcenas returned from Greece and Agrippa from Gaul. † Octavianus had hoped to secure a triumph for Agrippa to counterbalance the triumph of Ventidius and to show that Antony's generals had no monopoly of victory. Agrippa, however, understood that a triumph decreed through Octavianus for comparatively unimportant exploits in Gaul, would have seemed futile in comparison with that of Ventidius, which had been decreed by the loud voice of public opinion, after the glorious battle of Gindarus; possibly he also feared to arouse the jealousy of Octavianus and asserted that he had no wish for a triumph in view of the recent disaster at Scylla. ‡ There was also more serious business at hand. We have no direct evidence of the message which Mæcenas brought to Octavianus, but succeeding events incline us to believe that it must have been nearly as follows: Antony declared himself ready to help Octavianus in the war against Pompeius and to give

Antony's  
arrangement  
with  
Octavianus.

\* C. I. L. i. pp. 461, 478.

† Appian, B. C. v. 92.

‡ Dion, xlviii. 49; these motives for Agrippa's refusal are merely conjectural, but that given by Dion was certainly not the pretext alleged by Agrippa.

38 B.C. him part of his fleet ; in exchange he required a contingent of soldiers for the conquest of Persia, apparently a valuable contingent, not composed of such raw recruits as Antony could have enlisted in Italy without reference to Octavianus, but tried soldiers taken from his colleague's army. Antony had now resolved to attempt war with Persia in the following year (the year 37) ; but part of his army was then besieging Jerusalem, his fleet was useless for the conquest of Persia and he was short of money ; he therefore considered that this exchange would enable him to save naval expenditure. \* With reference to the renewal of the triumvirate, he would postpone the matter until the spring, when he was coming to Italy to conclude the exchange ; this was a further expedient obliging Octavianus to adopt a conciliatory attitude. In fact, as the triumvirate was not renewed until the end of the year, if Octavianus did not wish to return to private life or to act illegally, he would be obliged to leave Rome on January 1 of the year 37, for a fundamental principle of the Roman constitution allowed every leader to retain his command by interim beyond his term of office, when his successor had not been appointed or was not upon the spot, but in that case he was obliged to remain outside the pomerium. Thus the triumvirs would retain their *imperium* over the armies in the provinces, in other words the vital part of their authority, as long as their successors were not appointed, on condition that they remained outside of Rome ; † this was a matter of indifference to Lepidus and Antony, who were in Africa and Greece, but was most embarrassing to Octavianus, who was in charge of the government of Italy.

Agrippa  
constructs a  
fleet.

Antony, in short, wished that his colleague's forces should share the probable wastage of the Persian campaign, though he proposed to monopolise the resulting glory and power. His proposals were thus naturally the subject of great consideration and discussion for Octavianus and his friends. Should

\* That this was one of the objects which Antony had in view in proposing the change is expressly stated by Appian, B. C. v. 93 : τῇ τε γὰρ χορηγία τοῦ ναυτικοῦ κάμνων. . .

† Cp. the acute arguments of Kromayer, *Die Rechtliche Begründung des Principats*, Marburg, 1888, p. 7. I entirely share his point of view.



they yield or resist ? If they resisted, how could they avoid a civil war ? Doubtless under the advice of Agrippa and Mæcenas, Octavianus immediately set about the construction of a new fleet and did not shrink from the necessity of burdening the landowners with further taxation in money and slaves ; \* he wished, when Antony returned in the spring, to be able to reply that he had no need of his ships and thus to bargain for an exchange less onerous to himself. Agrippa, who was an active and resourceful man, undertook the construction of the new fleet. He immediately went to Naples, enlisted workmen, ordered his soldiers to take the pick-axe and the hatchet and conceived the idea of digging a canal between Puteoli and Cape Misenum and of connecting the lake of Avernus with the Lucrine lake ; he also proposed to change the narrow strip of land which separated the Lucrine Lake from the sea into a break-water with openings. † At the beginning of the year 37 the shores of the beautiful bay of Puteoli were crowded with navvies, masons, smiths and shipwrights at work upon the harbour and the fleet.

However, at the end of the year 38 Octavianus had left the pomœrium ‡ ; on January 1, 37, the powers of the triumvirs expired and Rome was once more administered by the old republican magistrates already appointed ; their numbers had been increased during the last year. Not only a large number of prætors but also an extraordinary number of quæstors had been appointed. § As Octavianus could not undertake the war against Sextus Pompeius until he had secured an agreement with Antony, nothing was done until the month of May, when Antony reached the port of Tarentum with three hundred ships || to effect the proposed exchange. Octavianus, however,

Negotiations  
between  
Antony and  
Octavianus ;  
the agreement  
of Tarentum.

\* Dion, xlviii. 49.

† Dion, xlviii. 48-51 ; Velleius, ii. 79 ; Florus, IV. viii. 6 ; Suetonius, Aug. 16.

‡ Cp. Kromayer, *Die Rechtliche Begründung des Principats*, Marburg, 1888, p. 7, on the subject of this conjecture, necessary to explain the events of this year.

§ Dion, xlviii. 53.

|| Appian, B. C. v. 93. For this year again we can only determine the dates approximately. The date of May 37, for Antony's arrival is proposed by Kromayer, *Die Rechtliche Begründung des Principats*, Marburg, 1888, 56-57, who relies upon excellent arguments. However, I cannot understand why Antony went to Tarentum instead of Brun-

37 B.C. was not there and had sent no message. Antony was forced to send out messengers in every direction to look for him and ask for a reply, and to spend a long time in waiting, as Octavianus showed no inclination to answer. At length the reply came in the negative, to the effect that Octavianus did not require Antony's ships, as he had now built a fleet. Antony was greatly exasperated. He may easily have understood that this was merely a pretext to secure better conditions, but none the less he saw his expedition against Persia hampered by a fresh obstacle. On the other hand he could not use force or begin a fresh civil war to oblige his colleague to accept part of his ships, notwithstanding the absurd idea which had induced Octavianus to build a new fleet while Antony's ships were rotting in the waters of Greece. It was therefore necessary to wait and bring Octavianus to reason by other means. Antony, who was always ready with an expedient, made use of his wife on this occasion; he frightened the gentle Octavia by threatening to make war upon her brother, induced her to intervene and sent further envoys. Octavianus, however, did not hasten to reply and Antony was kept waiting during June and July. At length Octavianus appears to have resolved in the month of August to visit Tarentum with Agrippa and Mæcenas. Octavia came to meet them and begged Octavianus not to make her the most unhappy of women now that her happiness was complete, by provoking a war in which she would lose her brother or her husband,\* and her brother heard her prayers. Such at any rate was the story believed by the public, which was now accustomed to see women in charge of political business. In reality, Octavianus, Agrippa and Mæcenas understood that they must give Antony some partial satisfaction and carry out the exchange, which in any case was worth their while; if they exasperated the triumvir beyond all bounds, they might drive him into an alliance with Sextus or with Lepidus. This

disium. Plutarch, *Ant.* 35, says that the inhabitants of Brundisium would not allow him to enter, but he does not explain the reason. They could only have acted thus upon the orders of Octavianus; but if Octavianus would not admit Antony to any large harbour, why did he not give the same orders to Tarentum?

\* Plutarch, *Ant.* 35; Dion, *xlvi.* 54; Appian, *B. C.* v. 93.

necessity, even more than the prayers of Octavia, facilitated an agreement at Tarentum. Antony showed greater moderation in his demands and Octavianus consented to yield; it was agreed that a law should be presented to the people renewing the triumvirate for five years, from January 1 of the year 37; \* Antony gave Octavianus a hundred and thirty ships and received twenty one thousand men in exchange.† It was also decided that Julia, the daughter of Octavianus, should be betrothed to Domitius. ‡ Finally the treaty of Misenum was cancelled. Antony immediately started for Syria, leaving a hundred and thirty ships at Tarentum.

This compact, however, did not arouse the general satisfaction which had followed the peace of Brundisium. The disturbances, the riot and confusion of the year 39 had been followed by silent exasperation or gloomy indifference. After the first momentary excitement a general feeling of despondency supervened; it was supposed that the power of the triumvirs was impregnable and that prospects of improvement or change were hopeless. No one suspected that the triumvirs themselves regarded their position as extremely dangerous and unstable. Thus, apart from men who aspired to official posts, it seemed that public interest in politics was dead. Yet beneath this universal despondency and indifference lay hid the first impulse to salutary reform, the first timid national effort at self-adaptation to the new order of things which had followed the storms of the revolution, and the first attempt to make the best of the dreadful desolation as of the happy and prosperous age of Cæsar and Pompey. Such is the eternal law of life—ceaselessly transforming good into evil and evil into good. By degrees, beneath the patient toil of individuals striving to secure a share of prosperity for themselves, the scourges of the revolution became so many benefits; even the division of land and capital, which the

The progress  
of social  
change.

\* Dion, *xlvi*. 54; Appian, *B. C.* v. 95; Appian, *iii*. 28. In the second passage Appian says that the law was approved by the people, while in the first he says it was not. The second statement is the more likely; the triumvirs had no interest in neglecting a formality which cost them nothing and gave legal significance to their authority.

† Appian, *B. C.* v. 95; Plutarch, *Ant.* 35, says, on the contrary, two legions and a thousand men in exchange for a hundred and twenty ships.

‡ Dion, *xlvi*. 54.

37 B.C.

revolution had executed with such injustice and violence, began to produce salutary effects. The veterans who had received a share of the great estates after their division, the new land-owners who had bought land cheap during the civil wars, and the original proprietors who had lost part of their domains, set to work under the stimulus of the economic crisis ; their increasing necessities, the taxation laid upon them and their desire to repair the losses they had suffered as rapidly as possible, were impulses which finally completed a change begun a century before, and transformed the old clumsy style of agriculture to new and more scientific methods, in which capital was invested, slaves employed and eastern agricultural science turned to the best account.

The reaction to  
simplicity of  
life.

If, however, there was no lack of land, money became very scarce when the Roman world, already devastated by civil war, had been divided into two parts by Antony ; it seemed that Italy must resign herself to do without even the smallest tribute from Asia. For the moment, however, this want of money was a real benefit. In Cæsar's time credit had been too easily gained, with disastrous results ; every one had abused the opportunity by plunging into rash speculations and enterprises, and by expenditure often wholly unreasonable. The difficulty of borrowing money at the present time forced men to husband their resources, obliged them to turn what they had to the best account, and introduced greater foresight and prudence into the social and commercial temper of the time. Public feeling was also undergoing a change ; the time was long past when Italy rejoiced over the vast conquests of Cæsar and Crassus and the huge expenditure of Pompey ; the time when fortunes were speedily acquired, when luxury was unrestrained in public and private life, when ambition was unscrupulous and debt was lightly incurred, when successful rapacity or fraud was tolerated or even admired by the nation which plundered the world to adorn its country seats and to provide good cheer for its free citizens, living on the work of slaves and on the tribute of the conquered. But now the panic spread by a succession of disasters had overcome the leisured and cultivated class ; they had experienced during the revolution the des-

potism which they had long exerted over others ; they now remembered the insignificant beginnings of the great empire and regretted the virtues of the old agricultural age which the vices of the mercantile epoch had destroyed. After the extravagances of the revolutionary spirit, old-time tradition became once more fashionable ; there was a revival of ancient habits and customs in those departments of life where the revolution had left the individual the power of choice—private life and domestic government. As luxurious display had been formerly fashionable, so now was ostentatious poverty and simplicity. When Mæcenas urged Horace to enter political life and to seek office, the poet answered by the sixth satire of the first book, boasting that his father had been a good and honourable freedman, declaring himself content with his poverty and his humble ancestors, and desirous of nothing more.\* Back to the land, the healthy and fertile mother of all things, was universally regarded as the wisest of precepts. Sallust had put his pen, his tongue and his sword at Cæsar's service and had supported the party which had done its best to foster the revolutionary spirit of the mercantile age ; yet he now based his philosophy of history upon the theory that nations were corrupted by wealth, luxury and pleasure, for the reason that these influences destroyed the sterner virtues of the rustic age. The dissension of the triumvirs, the possibility of further civil war and confiscation were indeed current topics, but in the upper and middle classes at Rome and in the small Italian towns, in the palace of Mæcenas and in the houses which Cæsar's veterans had taken from their lawful owners, the most serious subject of discussion was agriculture, the new methods of its pursuit and the profit to be gained from it ; books and advice upon this question were in the greatest demand. During those years a treatise upon agriculture had been already published by a Roman senator, Cnæus Tremellius Scrofa, who, like many others, had spent his life in the cultivation of his fields to the neglect of his political work.† Among the

\* Horace, *Sat.* I. vi. 100 ff. As regards the time and age when this satire was produced, see the fine study of Cartault, *Etude sur les satires d'Horace*, Paris, 1899, 29 ff.

† Schanz, *Gesch. Rom. Lit.* i. 301.



37 B.C. professional writers who were then becoming a class recruited from the freedmen of noble families and from middle-class citizens, several were naturally found who imitated the example of Scrofa, though not themselves agriculturists, and began to compile treatises from the works of the Greek writers on the subject, intended to meet the needs both of the old and the new classes of landowners. Such was the case of Caius Julius Hyginus, a slave who seems to have been taken from Alexandria by Cæsar in his youth; he had received his freedom and had been bequeathed to Octavianus.\* He composed, probably in the year 37, a book entitled *De agricultura* and a treatise upon bee-keeping, the first ever written in Latin.† The freedman's humble compilation met the needs of the moment so entirely that two greater intellects began the composition in that year of a comprehensive treatise upon the technicalities of country life and of a great poem upon agriculture.

Varro upon  
agriculture.

Varro had escaped the proscription with the loss of a great part of his large property;‡ at the age of eighty, towards the end of the year 37, § he resolved to collect his wide experiences as an agriculturist and a politician, his knowledge and his reflections as a practical man and a scholar,|| in a book of the utmost importance for the history of ancient Italy, though it has been strangely neglected by historians. Of all the writers of this epoch whose works have come down to us, no one, not even Cicero himself, has striven harder than Varro in his dialogue *De re rustica*, to secure a general outlook amid the confusion which then overwhelmed his country. Was Italy in a state of progress or of decay? Should she boldly proceed to a better future or retrace her steps? Varro attempts to find some general formula which will solve the antagonism then arising from the contrast between the old agricultural tradition and the mercantile spirit which pervaded even agriculture; an

\* Suetonius, iii., *Gr.* 20.

† Columella, IX. xiii. 8. Cp. Schanz, *Gesch. Rom. Lit.* ii. 218.

‡ When Varro in the *De r. r.* speaks of his property, he always uses the imperfect. For example, II. ii. 9: *mihi greges in Apulia hibernabant*.

§ Varro, R. R. I. i. 1: *annus enim octogesimus admonet me. . .*

|| Varro, R. R. I. i. 11: *quæ ipse in meis fundis colendo animadverti, et quæ legi, et quæ a peritis audi.*

obstinate and silent struggle had continued between the great owners of the *latifundia* who had undergone severe trials in recent years, and the middle class which did not stop short of revolution and violence ; the object of the latter was to divide Italy into moderate-sized holdings of thirty, forty or fifty acres, which, when cultivated by slaves, would provide their owners with the necessary resources for the pleasures, the duties, and the functions of municipal life in the numerous Italian towns. Varro professed what we should now call the theory of progress ; he does not agree with the philosophy of the Greek poets, who regarded the history of the world as a gradual decadence from the ancient golden age ; he believes that humanity is ever changing and improving ; in consequence, that men first lived on the fruits of the earth and then began the primitive barbarism of pastoral life ; scattered amid the solitude of the country they next began cultivation in common and eventually united in towns, where the arts and trades, the pleasures and also the most refined and deadly vices \* were developed and perfected. He wishes, therefore, from a philosophical point of view to study the needs of his own age, which he regards as a period of inevitable transition.

When, however, these personages, who are all rich landowners consider the phenomena of this transition in isolation, they fall into strange contradictions, nor does Varro escape this danger when he speaks under his own name in the introduction or in the dialogue. Varro's father-in-law, C. Fundanius, the knight Agrius and the tax-farmer Agrasius examine a map of Italy painted upon the wall of the temple of Tellus ; they exclaim that Italy is the best-cultivated country in the world † and has become almost entirely one vast garden. ‡ On the other hand Cnæus Tremellius Scrofa states with greater modesty that Italy was better cultivated in his time than in preceding centuries.§ Moreover, Varro always repeats the pessimistic outcry so common at his time, which complained that men had grown too effeminate, preferred to applaud actors in the towns rather than to till the soil, and neglected the art of Ceres,

The subject of  
Varro's  
dialogue.

\* Varro, R. R. ii. *Præf.* 3-4.

† Varro, R. R. I. ii. 6.

‡ Varro, R. R. I. ii. 3.

§ Varro, R. R. I. vii. 2.

37 B.C.

with the result that Italy could no longer produce sufficient for her own consumption as before, and that Rome was fed upon imported corn.\* The methods of agriculture were changing, but the results of the first attempts were so variable that it was difficult to decide whether failure was due to the inexperience of the farmers or to the insuperable difficulties of their situation. Thus Varro offers no direct contradiction to the statement of an idea then widely spread, that vine cultivation was unprofitable in Italy.† The characters of his dialogue knew by experience that a rich landowner can grow wealthy by rearing asses for farmers and horses for carriages, for chariots and for the army, by keeping great flocks of goats in the pasturages of southern Italy and Epirus under the guardianship of Illyrian or Gaulish slaves; each slave was in charge of some eighty or a hundred animals, under the direction of a more experienced and intelligent foreman. Goats' hair was wanted for engines of war and goats' skin was required for bottles; sheep's wool could be sold profitably, as the low class populations of the little towns increased, for the reason that this class could not make their own clothes with the wool of their own sheep. Yet even Varro preserves some tinge of the old animosity of the Italian peasants, who feared a century earlier that they might be driven from the fields of their ancestors to make room for sheep and goats. He sometimes complains that the old laws restricting the rights of pasturage and the number of flocks should have fallen into disuse.‡ Faithful to the great Roman traditions, Varro detests the towns, which he regards as schools of corruption, idleness and luxury. He praises the pure austerity of country life, which maintains bodily health without the artificial labour of gymnastics, and moral virtue without the wearisome toil of philosophy; he regrets the age when the nobles were accustomed to spend the greater part of their lives in the country and maintained a protectorate over a small band of free farmers, breathing pure country air instead of the pestilential odours of slums and alleys.§

Yet Varro devotes the whole of the third book in his treatise

\* Varro, R. R. ii. *Præf.* 2 ff.

† Varro, R. R. ii. *Præf.* 4.

‡ Varro, R. R. I. viii. 1.

§ *Ibid.* 1 ff.

to showing how agriculturists may profit by the vices, the orgies and the debauches of the great towns in general and Rome in particular. He explains how profit can be made in the neighbourhood of Rome as a result of the frequency of public banquets and the general desire for good living, by rearing thrushes, geese, pigeons, snails, fowls, peacocks, venison, wild boars and indeed any animal, the flesh of which could break the monotony of pork, lamb and kid, the only meat commonly consumed at a time when the ox was almost entirely a draught animal. Varro enumerates and studies these sources of profit with the utmost care. One of the speakers relates what he had heard from a freedman who kept the accounts of a villa belonging to Marcus Seius near Ostia; all kinds of animals were there reared for sale to Roman merchants and brought in a profit of fifty thousand sesterces a year.\* Varro adds that his maternal aunt, by rearing thrushes on a Sabine estate, twenty-four miles away on the Via Salaria, had made sixty thousand sesterces in one year, during which she had sold five thousand thrushes at an average of twelve sesterces apiece, about two shillings and three pence of our money; an excellent farm belonging to Varro at Reate, containing some two hundred acres, only brought in thirty thousand sesterces or three hundred pounds a year.† The first speaker resumes with a further quotation from the case of Marcus Seius, to show that a muster of a hundred peacocks, which could be looked after by an intelligent *procurator*, either a slave or a freedman, would produce about forty thousand sesterces a year by the sale of eggs and chickens.‡ The members of the party utter exclamations of surprise and admiration; and the old writer then forgets his austere theories to explain with the utmost care the means of extracting these great profits from the muddy waters of town vice and luxury.

Are we then to conclude, as many historians have done, that this admiration for past simplicity so loudly professed by Varro and many of his contemporaries, was merely a meaningless anachronism? I do not believe it. Notwithstanding the numerous and profound influences which were changing the

The land  
problem.

\* Varro, R. R. III. ii. 14.

† Varro, R. R. III. ii. 15.

‡ Varro, R. R. iii. 6.

37 B.C. old customs, these virtues, modified to greater refinement than before, were still necessary to the class of small Italian land-owners. Varro fully realised the ultimate reason of the difficulties under which this class was struggling. In earlier centuries when the head of the household under the protection of rich patrons cultivated his land by his own labour and that of his children, numerous families were able to gain a living from small allotments, provided that they were ready to work hard and to be content with little; similarly, large estates worked by slaves would produce some small monetary revenue to the owner if the land were fertile and the slaves cheap. The holding of moderate size, however, cultivated by slave labour, from which the master expected to gain an ample revenue without any labour of his own, was an impossibility, for a reason which Varro then perceived, and which the political economy of the last hundred years has made plain; this was the great expense of slave labour, which speedily swallowed up the income from a small holding. Varro quotes from Cato's account, which showed that an olive plantation of two hundred and forty acres required thirteen slaves, a bailiff and his wife, five ploughmen, three labourers, a donkey driver, a swineherd and a shepherd, while a vineyard of a hundred acres required a bailiff and his wife, ten ploughmen, a labourer, a swineherd and a donkey-driver, fifteen slaves in all. He points out, however, with justice that these figures are applicable to farms of a certain acreage, but that for smaller holdings the expense is relatively greater, as the bailiff and his wife are indispensable and the number of slaves cannot always be reduced in proportion to the smallness of the holding; hence the smaller the holding, the more expensive the slave labour.\* Varro also points out a further inconvenience of slave labour, which brought far greater loss upon the small holding than upon the large estate, namely the sickness or death of the slaves. The loss of one slave might in certain cases absorb the whole of a year's income, if the holding were a small one.† He explains

\* Varro, R. R. i. 18 (this chapter is most important).

† Varro, R. R. I. xvi. 4: *non nunquam unius artificis mors tollit undi fructum.*



a further difficulty of the same nature in reference to the acquisition of the implements necessary for cultivation. Formerly most of these implements were constructed at home by some member of the *familia*; Varro says that this method becomes more difficult if slaves are employed instead of children. Slaves are usually capable only of one kind of labour, and a large estate would therefore require a number of artisan slaves, trained in their own special branches of labour. The maintenance of so many slaves and the risks of death and illness would be far too great for a moderate holding to support. Varro therefore advises the purchase of land in the neighbourhood of a town where free artisans can be found, or near large estates worked by *familiæ* of numerous and specially trained slaves from which a slave could be hired from time to time for some special work.\* Finally he urges that free labourers should be used as much as possible, especially for unhealthy work or for such temporary occupations as harvesting or the vintage; † he urges that a clever slave should be placed over the servants as bailiff; this must be an experienced and faithful man, otherwise the estate will cost more than it brings in.‡ Above all, he advises economy and simplicity and that the management of estates should not follow recent examples, but long-standing tradition; the mania for outward show should be avoided, and in starting a farm the model should be the old Romans and not men like Lucullus; otherwise the income will be swallowed up by the interest upon capital sunk in the undertaking. § He is thus led to criticise with good reason the reckless prodigality which had infected Italy in Cæsar's time and he understands, even if his views are somewhat confused, that a yeoman class of landowners cannot confront the great expenses of slave cultivation except upon highly fertile land; in any case the holder must be able to sell his produce at a good price, be careful in his expenditure and be able to buy the implements necessary for his work in the towns. In Cæsar's time a temporary rise in prices, caused by the influx of booty, the ease of credit and general extravagance, had produced a fictitious

\* Varro, R. R. I. xvi. 3-4.

† *Ibid.* xvii. 4.

‡ *Ibid.* xvii. 2.

§ *Ibid.* xi. 1; xiii. 6.

37 B.C. golden age but no permanent prosperity ; greater prudence was now required ; expenses and profits, the sale of produce and the cost of agriculture must be balanced ; in short, farmers must return to certain wise principles of the old domestic economy, which had been unduly neglected by the former generation.

*The Georgics.* Virgil, who was a poet only, had no idea of writing so learned a treatise upon agriculture. Some surprise may be felt that after the ten *Bucolics*, he should have begun the composition of the *Georgics*, a work wholly different in matter and in form, in this year 37 ; but it should be remembered that Tremellius Hyginus and Varro were writing or publishing their treatises at that time. For his new work the poet chose the subject which was then in all men's minds, that of agriculture ; in this choice he was guided less by the advice of Mæcenas than by his desire for fame and by his artistic instincts, which naturally directed him to the question of the hour. The vitality of literature then depended not merely upon the patronage of some great aristocratic families, but also upon success and fame with the public at large. The admiration of the great for an author did not become serious until his popularity was assured. Moreover, a poem upon agriculture would strongly appeal to Virgil, who was a farmer's son, had spent his childhood in the country, had deep feeling for natural beauty and was also a poet and a philosopher, professing the doctrines of Epicurus. As a poet and an agriculturist he had studied the theories of Greek agriculturists, had seen his father tilling the soil, and possessed the necessary knowledge to write a serious treatise upon the subject, while his poetic talent gave his work life and colour and enabled him to avoid a dry enumeration of theories. He proceeded to develop his art of agriculture in a series of delightful pictures of country life, and gave it poetic power by contrasting the painful labour of those who till the soil with the vast background of universal life as he had learnt to contemplate it in the schools of philosophy, while he idealised the virtues and the happiness of country life, admiration for which had then become almost fashionable. The *Georgics* are not cold imitations of Greek poems, elaborated by a scholar with no love or experience of agriculture ; they are a kind of national

epic, singing the revival of agriculture in Italy—the great achievement of the hundred and fifty years which had elapsed since the death of the Gracchi. Virgil found poetic inspiration to sing the story of this great work, while Varro, an agriculturist and economist, attempted to show its difficulties and hazards. In his poem Virgil composed an immortal hymn to the plough, an implement which, quite as much as the sword, enabled the Romans to conquer Italy.



## APPENDICES





## APPENDIX A

### THE EVENTS AT ROME ON MARCH 15, 16 AND 17, 44 B.C.

THE historical sources for the events which occurred at Rome between Cæsar's death and the first session of the Senate held after the death of the dictator, are as follows :

Appian, B. C. ii. 119-152.

Nicolas of Damascus, *βίος Καίσαρος*, 26-27.

Dion Cassius, xliv. 28-35.

To these chief sources of information must be added scattered notices in various works, especially in Cicero's Philippics and Letters and in Plutarch's Lives of Cæsar, Cicero, Brutus and Antony. Cicero in Phil. II. xxxv. 89, informs us that the session of the Senate in the Temple of Tellus took place on March 17: *Post diem tertium veni in ædem Telluris*. The accounts, however, which have been given are so confused and contradictory that this episode of ancient history has well been called an inextricable tangle. We propose to attempt the discovery of the guiding thread and will, therefore, return to the moment when the conspirators had barricaded themselves in the Capitol.

Let us first of all take the account of Appian. Appian regards the occupation of the Capitol and the convocation of the Senate as separated only by one night. (Chapters 120-126.) He relates that after the occupation of the Capitol :

(a) The conspirators convoked in the forum a *contio* of people whom they had hired to make a demonstration in their favour and the prætor Cinna delivered a speech against Cæsar in the forum (chap. 121).

(b) Dolabella hired a band of veterans, appeared in the forum with the insignia of a consul, made a violent speech against Cæsar and invited the conspirators to come down from the Capitol (chap. 122).

(c) Brutus and Cassius therefore came down from the Capitol and Brutus made a speech to the people in the forum (chap. 123).

(d) After Brutus and Cassius had returned to the Capitol the conspirators were visited by their most eminent friends in Rome and

sent an embassy to open negotiations with Lepidus and with Antony (chap. 123).

(e) Antony and Lepidus replied by a declaration intended as a blind (chap. 124).

(f) Then Antony (chap. 125) τὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς ἐκέλευσε νυκτοφυλακεῖν (this is the first allusion to the night) and made other arrangements for the night; during that same night (τῆς δὲ αὐτῆς νυκτός) he seizes Cæsar's money and papers. The next day the Senate was convoked; διάγραμμα νυκτός ἀνεγιγνώσκετο Ἀντωνίου τὴν βουλήν συνακαλοῦντος ἔτι πρὸ ἡμέρας ἐς τὸ τῆς 17ης ἱερὸν.

It is obvious that as there were two nights between the assassination and the senatorial session, namely, the night of the 15th–16th and 16th–17th, Appian leaves out a day and relates events as if everything had happened as on the 15th and 16th and as if the Senate had been convoked on the morning of the 16th. I am therefore tempted to suppose that the events related in chapters 121 to 124, which happened between the assassination of Cæsar and the evening of the 15th, really occupied a longer time and extended over the days of the 15th and 16th. This supposition is confirmed by the fact that Cæsar was killed at an advanced hour of the morning and that the flight to the Capitol, where the conspirators barricaded the entrance and made their necessary arrangements, required a certain time; it is therefore unlikely that they could have come to any decision before the afternoon.

One of the events related by Appian certainly happened on the afternoon of the 15th; this was the visit to the conspirators of the leading members of the conservative party. Dion, who says that the citizens came to the conspirators in the evening, agrees with Appian on this point; while this testimony receives irrefutable confirmation from the direct evidence of Cicero, who was present at the meeting; Cic. A. XIV. x. 1; *Meministine me clamare, illo ipso primo Capitolino die senatum in Capitolium a prætioribus vocari?* This phrase certainly alludes to the meeting of which Cicero gives other details in his letter A. XIV. xiv. 2: *Illum sermonem capitulinum mihi non placuisse, tu testis es. Quid ergo? Ista culpa Brutorum? Minime illorum quidem: sed aliorum brutorum, qui se cautos ac sapientes putant: quibus satis fuit lætari, non nullis etiam gratulari, nullis permanere.*

Thus, during the afternoon of the 15th, a meeting of the conservative leaders took place at which the position was discussed. The passages from Cicero above quoted show that the meeting was numerously attended in the Capitol and that the discussion was lengthy; it is very unlikely that every one should have met merely because all had been seized by the idea of visiting the Capitol precisely at the same moment. On the other hand, we have to consider the position of the conspirators and to remember that they had intended to speak to the

Senate and induce it to decree the restoration of the republic immediately after Cæsar's death, but that this plan had been prevented by the flight of the senators ; as soon as they had recovered from their agitation and had barricaded themselves in the Capitol, one of their first ideas must obviously have been to secure an understanding with the leading members of the conservative party. This idea was so inevitable in the case of men who wished to restore pure republicanism, that they could not have waited for these personages to come of their own accord but must have sent slaves to them and appointed an hour for their meeting. Cicero was naturally one of those invited.

Thus a meeting was held in the Capitol, on the afternoon of the 15th, of the most eminent conservatives, who had probably been summoned by the conspirators. What subjects were discussed at this meeting ? This is a matter of considerable importance, as it may help us to solve another problem, the question at what moment Dolabella delivered his speech against Cæsar and went up to the Capitol with his consular insignia. We have already seen that Cicero claims to have proposed at this meeting (A. XIV. x. 1), *senatum in Capitolium a prætoribus vocari*. He gives further details in the second Philippic ; xxxv. 89 ; *Dicebam illis in Capitolio liberatoribus nostris, cum me ad te* (scil. ad Antonium) *ire vellent ut ad defendendam rempublicam te adhortarer, quoad metueres, omnia te promissurum : simul ac timere desisses, similem te futurum tui. Itaque cum ceteri consulares irent, redirent, in sententia mansi.*

Even supposing that Cicero slightly exaggerated his far-sightedness in this passage from the Philippics, it is obvious that the chief point of the discussion was the attitude to be observed with regard to Antony. Before Cæsar's death the conspirators had already discussed the advisability of killing the dictator's colleague in the consulship at the same time, and this question now appeared in another form ; should they treat with Antony and request him to convoke the Senate, a duty which was his by the constitution, or instead of applying to him, should they convoke the Senate in an irregular manner, for example through the prætors Brutus and Cassius, as Cicero proposed ? Now the discussion would not have taken this form if it had occurred after Dolabella's declaration of himself as consul and his visit to the Capitol to pay his respects to the conspirators. In that case Dolabella would have taken part in the discussion and the question would have been asked whether he could be commissioned to convoke the Senate. There is, however, no allusion to anything of the kind and this clearly proves that Dolabella's usurpation was not carried out until the 16th. This first consideration is supported by various facts which incline us to believe that the meeting in the Capitol lasted almost till the evening. Nic. Dam. xxvii. tells us that the messengers of the conspirators brought their message to Antony in the evening. As this message was the first action undertaken by the

conspirators after the *sessio capitolina*, this meeting could not have concluded until the evening. The fact is only natural; before the conspirators had barricaded themselves, had agreed upon their action and had summoned the senators, several hours had elapsed, so that the meeting could not be held until the afternoon; and a comparatively short discussion would bring them to the evening before Dolabella had declared himself.

Dolabella therefore proclaimed himself consul on the 16th. To complete the narrative of the conspirators' action during the 15th, we have yet to consider whether they held a popular meeting in the forum on that day. This meeting must have taken place before the *sessio capitolina*, since this latter lasted until the evening and so it is indeed asserted by App. B. C. ii. 122; Dion, lxiv. 21; Nic. Dam. xxvi. Plutarch, on the contrary (*Brut.* 18), puts the speech in the forum after the meeting in the Capitol, but this obliges us to regard the speech as given on the 16th, since there would be no time for it on the evening of the 15th. I am therefore inclined to regard Plutarch's version as the most probable. It is impossible that men who were so afraid of the people and veterans as to barricade themselves in the Capitol, would have ventured to go down to the forum and harangue the people, unless they had arranged some guarantee for freedom of speech and their personal safety. Their fears were certainly exaggerated, but the historian must not forget that his characters are for the most part mistaken in their judgment of events and act upon their own opinion rather than upon the actual situation. Plutarch relates that Brutus and Cassius went down to the forum to speak, surrounded by a large escort of eminent citizens; I regard this information as accurate because it harmonises precisely with the state of affairs and with prevailing feeling, and because Brutus and Cassius would certainly not have ventured to appear before the people without this precaution. In that case, however, the great meeting must have taken place on the 16th; the idea of the escort was perhaps borrowed from the escort which accompanied Cicero, when Catiline's accomplices were executed, and the conspirators could not have organised such a following until they had arranged for the co-operation of the leading conservatives in Rome. We have therefore to conjecture that this demonstration for the 16th was decided in the *sessio capitolina* during the afternoon of the 15th.

To sum up, during the afternoon of the 15th the conspirators were entirely occupied by their great meeting in the Capitol and they spent the whole of the afternoon, first in summoning the meeting and afterwards in discussion. The discussion was prolonged and it was resolved among other measures to send ambassadors of peace to Antony and to prepare a great demonstration for the following day.



We now turn to Antony and to his action during the afternoon of March 15.

Our first notice of him belongs to the evening and refers to the ambassadors of the conspirators and their visit to him. (Appian B. C. ii. 123; Nic. Dam. xxvii.) We have no information of his movements from the moment when he fled from the Senate until the evening. This lack of information is probably not accidental, but is very simply explained by the fact that Antony did nothing of importance that day. Our sources of information are silent upon certain elementary facts which the historian can certainly affirm by deduction from the details of the position. Here we are confronted by one of those facts which can easily be neglected, but which are none the less of great importance; during the hours immediately following Cæsar's death, Antony knew that the dictator had been killed, but he did not know the names or numbers of the conspirators, their object or their intentions. Hence it is certain, though we find no mention of the fact in our sources, that as soon as Antony recovered from his agitation, he attempted to procure information, and sent out people for the purpose, while he also sought the counsel of his friends; it is also certain that this procedure must have occupied several hours. It is not impossible that he may have sent for certain Cæsareans who were then with the conspirators in the Capitol, to hear their views; he certainly did not suspect that so many members of his party were involved in the assassination.

Such then was Antony's first action. What was the result of it? What information did he obtain? What friends came to see him? As to the information he procured, it was probably confused, contradictory and exaggerated in the extreme, as has always been the case after sudden catastrophes. With regard to the friends who came to him, we have a notice which enables us to make a reasonable conjecture. Nic. Dam. xxvi. and App. B. C. ii. 123, 124, say that the embassy was sent to Antony and to Lepidus and that they both replied simultaneously, according to Nic. Dam., by asking for time for consideration until the evening of the next day; while according to Appian they declared themselves ready to deliberate with the conspirators before the Senate and asserted that they were both agreed to re-establish harmony among the citizens. I consider that this information is not accurate but is the distortion of a plain fact. Lepidus was not a personage of any great importance; Cæsar's death deprived him of his post of *magister equitum*; as we shall see, in contradiction to the habitual assertion, he had no army in the neighbourhood of Rome; it is therefore difficult to understand why the conspirators should have sent ambassadors to him and not to Dolabella, Calenus, Piso and other illustrious Cæsareans. Antony's position was different; he was consul. On the other hand, the statement that Lepidus and Antony gave a joint answer

and were agreed in their views is too definitely stated by the two historians to be disregarded, and is also confirmed by the fact that during the following days we see Antony and Lepidus acting together in agreement. These contradictions can be solved in a satisfactory manner by one conjecture, namely, that Lepidus came to Antony on his first invitation and that he was the only man who came; hence when the envoys of the conspirators arrived, they found the two men discussing their joint action. This will explain how they could both return an identical answer upon the same evening, nor is it surprising that Lepidus alone should have responded to Antony's invitation; we know that Cæsar's death caused a terrible panic among his friends; Hirtius, Pansa, Calenus and Sallust all fled and did not reappear until later.

The ambassadors of the conspirators thus found Antony and Lepidus occupied in consideration of their future action. In my narrative I have made a further conjecture which every thoughtful reader will accept as a fact almost demonstrated, so entirely does it seem confirmed by the logic of events; I assume that it was during their conversation with the ambassadors of the conspirators that Antony and Lepidus learnt the real nature of the conspiracy and understood that the leading members of the Cæsarean party were involved in it, in alliance with the remnants of the Pompeian party and with many who had joined their side. The ambassadors were in fact bound to give the utmost possible importance to the conspiracy by stating the number and the names of the conspirators in order that Antony might be induced to co-operate with them for the restoration of the republic. It is also likely that the embassy and the information which it gave, aroused the utmost fear and distress on the part of Antony and Lepidus. The alliance of so large a number of Cæsareans with the Pompeians and conservatives hopelessly confused the disposition of political parties and profoundly embarrassed such Cæsareans as remained faithful. The extent of their panic and uncertainty seems to me sufficient explanation of the answer given by Antony and Lepidus, in which, as we know, they requested a day for consideration; it is, to my thinking, precisely because they learned the names and number of the conspirators in this conversation with their ambassadors that we have no notice of the movements of Antony and Lepidus except for the evening of that day. When they knew that Cæsar had fallen at the hands of a coalition of the moderate Cæsareans and the conservative party, they agreed to call in the help of the popular and revolutionary party, the remnants of the party of Clodius and the veterans, and in short to adopt the line of conduct which they pursued.

As for the actions of Antony and Lepidus during the evening of the 15th and the night of the 15th-16th, modern historians have been too ready to accept traditions which seem inaccurate. Thus it is commonly

asserted that Antony went off in the evening (τῆς δὲ αὐτῆς νυκτός, App. B. C. ii. 125) to the *domus publica* and took Cæsar's money and papers from Calpurnia, that he then seized the State treasury and carried it to his house. Now it must be observed in the first place, with regard to Cæsar's papers and money, that modern historians, following the ancients, who represent Antony as a reckless adventurer, have been inclined to consider this action far more violent and arbitrary than it really was. As Cæsar's colleague, he had some implied right to take his papers in order to protect them from the enemies of the dictator, who might attempt to seize them; this is so true that Cæsar himself (App. B. C. iii. 5) had left certain documents in his hands. In any case, could he leave such important documents in the hands of Calpurnia, and as this was impossible, who could take charge of them in the prevailing confusion, if not Cæsar's colleague? The same observations are true of the money; Antony rendered a service to Calpurnia by taking charge of it and spared her the danger of seeing her house plundered. Possibly as Appian says (B. C. ii. 125), it was Calpurnia herself who begged the consul to take charge of these dangerous possessions. In any case the fact is not unlikely. As for the treasury of the republic, it is absolutely false to say that Antony went in the night of the 15th–16th to take it from the Temple of Ops, where it had been laid up; thus, historians who relate this exploit have misunderstood certain passages in the ancient writers which speak of embezzlements of public funds perpetrated in the course of several months; Cic. A. XIV. xiv. 5 (letter written probably in the month of May) *Rapinas scribis ad Opis fieri*; Cic. A. XIV. xviii. 8 (during the month of May). *O hominem pudentem!* (Dolabella) *Kal. Jan. debuit; adhuc solvit, præsertim quum se maximo aere alieno Faberii manu liberavit et Opis opem petierit.* Thus the public treasury had not been emptied on March 15, since money could be stolen from it in that month of May. This is confirmed by Cic. *Phil.* ii. 14, 15.

As for Lepidus, equally inaccurate is the statement that he had an army outside the pomerium which he was gathering in view of his early departure for his province. Dion, xlv. 22, speaks vaguely of στρατιῶται and Appian B. C. ii. 125, of the στρατιά, but neither tells us what these "soldiers" or this "army" of Lepidus was. Nic. Dam. xxviii. is more definite and says that during the night Lepidus collected a στρατιά ἐπικούρων: now the ἐπίκουροι are the "body-guards of the sovereigns." The statement therefore could not refer to military cohorts, but to a body hastily gathered for purposes of defence, which Nicolas truthfully compares with the king's body-guard. This, moreover, is far more probable, for it is impossible that Lepidus should have been collecting an army in the neighbourhood of Rome with the intention of going to Gallia Narbonensis. Lepidus was only to go and take over

the command of legions already stationed in the province ; in any case if he wished to augment his army, he certainly would not have recruited new legions in the neighbourhood of the metropolis, where serviceable recruits were scarce, but in Gaul itself ; and if he had recruited them in central Italy, he would not have concentrated them near Rome, but would have issued the usual order to the recruits to betake themselves separately to some frontier town. For some time previously no army had been organised in the neighbourhood of Rome. Moreover, only upon this supposition is it possible to explain the statement of Dion, xliv. 34, that on March 17, when peace was concluded, the soldiers no longer obeyed Lepidus. This would have been impossible if the soldiers had been legionaries, bound to the pro-consul by the military oath.

The conjecture is thus probable in itself that Lepidus spent the night of the 15th-16th in recruiting soldiers, Antony in finding the leaders of the Cæsarean party and in raising the veterans, the conspirators in preparing demonstrations for the next day. In fact, Nicolas of Damascus says that the next day, that is the 16th, Lepidus occupied the forum with soldiers and that Antony appeared there certainly for the purpose of fulfilling his duty as consul. He must have been one of the very few magistrates who appeared that morning, for the majority were among the conspirators in the Capitol. The appearance of Antony and the escort of Lepidus doubtless produced the desired effect and induced the people to believe that the Cæsarean party was not destroyed by the death of its leader. In fact, Nic. Dam. xxvii. adds that, as soon as he appeared, the soldiers of the numerous *collegia* of workmen, *ἐταππιαί*, who had previously been hesitating, recovered courage, hastened to take up arms and entered the forum to swell the escort of Lepidus. This fact enables us to regard the morning of the 16th, after the occupation of the forum by Lepidus and his troops, as the moment when the first successful demonstration on behalf of the conspirators took place and when Cinna delivered the speech to which Appian refers, B. C. ii. 121. The *ἐτεροί* who intimidated the demonstrations, could be no other than the soldiers of Lepidus and the *collegia* acting with them. These demonstrations thus took place on the morning of the 16th, a natural time to choose, as the conspirators would be anxious not to lose time, and our belief that the demonstrations were prepared during the night is thus confirmed. In the following chapter (122) Appian relates the usurpation of Dolabella. This succession of events seems too natural to be open to objection. Accordingly, in my narrative on behalf of the conspirators and followed it by the speech and usurpation of Dolabella. Here it should be noted, as an indication of the prevailing temper, that the veterans and the artisans in the forum, who had gathered



at the orders of Lepidus, allowed Dolabella to speak without hindrance, as they also had allowed Cinna to speak, an obvious proof that the original fear which the demonstrators entertained of the people was unfounded, and that the Cæsareans themselves and Lepidus were wholly undecided and irresolute like their adversaries, during the morning of the 16th. When Nic. Dam. xxviii. tells us that Lepidus on the morning of the 16th appeared in the forum to "avenge Cæsar", he is crediting Lepidus by anticipation with plans only formed in the evening and subsequent to the events of the day.

Meanwhile, what were Antony and the conspirators doing? A passage from Cicero (Phil. II. xxxv. 89) seems to allude to negotiations continued during the 16th; *Itaque cum ceteri consulares irent, redirent* (to Antony's house), *in sententia mansi, neque te* (Antony) *illo die neque postero vidi*. With what object? To solve this problem it is necessary to examine a document of first-rate importance, the only first-hand evidence which we possess of these famous days, the letter from Decimus Brutus to Marcus Brutus and Cassius in the collection of Cicero's letters *Ad familiares*, xi. 1.

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Schmidt deserves the greatest credit for his discovery (the term is by no means too pretentious) that this letter was written on the morning of March 17 before the senatorial session; it is but rarely that a historian of antiquity sees so clear a ray of light illumining the darkness amid which he journeys through the distant past.

The date given by Schmidt is as certain as if it had been written at the foot of the letter, *because it is the only date possible*. It is true that there are historians who regard this letter as belonging to the end of March or the month of April, but they merely display their lamentable ignorance of the history of this period. In truth it was absolutely impossible that after the vote upon the amnesty of March 17 and after Cæsar's funeral, Antony should have said to Decimus through Hirtius: *Se neque mihi provinciam dare posse aiebat, neque arbitrari tute in urbe esse quemquam nostrum*. Cisalpine Gaul then definitely belonged to Decimus Brutus and no one, not even Antony himself, could utter so insolent a phrase, *se . . . provinciam dare non posse*, as if the province had belonged to himself. A *senatus consultum* of the gravest importance had been delivered, in the literal application of which a large number of people were interested, from the veterans to Cæsar's murderers. Moreover, in the midst of the disturbances which followed Cæsar's funeral, it would have been ridiculous for Antony to tell Decimus that he had some doubts of his safety at Rome. This was obvious to everybody, as some men were fortifying their houses and others were taking flight. The phrase, therefore, must have been uttered before the disorders broke out and at a time when Antony was uttering gloomy forebodings to



intimidate his adversaries. Hence the letter was written after Cæsar's death and before the session of March 17. If we wish to fix the date more precisely, we must carefully study the phrase at the outset of the latter: *Quo in statu simus cognoscite*. *HERI VESPERI APUD ME HIRTIUS FUIT*; *qua mente esset Antonius, demonstravit*; *pessima scilicet et infidelissima . . . non dubito quin his de rebus ante HORAM QUARTAM Hirtius certio rem me sit factururus*. The letter was thus written in the morning after day-break, otherwise we should not have the words *heri vesperi* and before the *hora quarta*, that is to say, as we are in the month of March, between six and ten o'clock in the morning. The 15th is out of the question as Cæsar was then living and we must choose between the 16th and the 17th. If it was the 16th, as Grœbe (App. to Drumann I. ii. 411 ff.) assumes the words *heri vesperi* would indicate the evening of March 15; that is to say, upon that evening Antony must have sent Hirtius to tell Brutus that he could not give him Cisalpine Gaul. This is difficult to believe and, in fact, contradicts the clear statement of Nic. Dam. xxvii. who asserts that Lepidus and Antony on the evening of the 15th met in answer to the proposals of the conspirators, who asked time for reflexion until the evening of the next day. Now it is obvious that this embassy was an answer to proposals of peace made by the conspirators, a counter proposal offering acceptance of their proposals if Decimus would renounce his province. If, on the other hand, we admit that the letter was written on the morning of the 17th, the phrase *heri vesperi* agrees admirably with the text of Nicolas of Damascus and refers to the evening of the 16th when the delay requested by the conspirators had expired. Moreover, it is not likely that on the evening of the 15th, when the position was still uncertain and when Antony and Lepidus were without means of defence, they could have replied to the request of the conspirators, asking consideration for their vested rights by a claim which would impose upon the conspirators the renunciation of their best provinces. Such a statement would have been tantamount to an open declaration of war. It must also be noticed that when this letter was written Decimus Brutus had left the conspirators at the Capitol and had gone away, probably to his own house. His movements must be explained by some conjecture; as we shall see, I have a theory which seems fairly plausible if we admit that *heri vesperi* means the evening of the 16th, whereas if it be taken for the evening of the 15th, conjecture is at fault. Finally, the letter is an answer to one from Brutus and Cassius in which Decimus is asked for his view of the situation; *Quid ergo est tui consilii?* The answer is one of deep sadness. Now during the afternoon of the 15th and the night of the 15th-16th, nothing had happened which could explain this general despondency among the conspirators, as is shown by the fact that they were preparing the demonstrations which took place on the following

day, during which the negotiations with Antony were also continued.

The letter in Cicero's Correspondence F. xi. 1, was therefore written on the morning of the 17th, probably about dawn, towards six o'clock; it was written in reply to a letter from Brutus and Cassius which had arrived that morning and asked Decimus for his view of the situation. Let us now see what conclusions can be drawn from this letter; we will begin by stating the most important facts which appear from it. They are as follows:

(1) On the evening of the 16th Decimus Brutus was no longer in the Capitol with the other conspirators.

(2) On the evening of the 16th, when Antony gave his answer to the conspirators, he laid down as a condition of peace that Decimus should resign his claim to Cisalpine Gaul.

This idea, however, cannot have been suddenly conceived by Antony on the evening of the 16th. It is far more probable, as I have stated in my narrative, that Antony considered in the night of the 15th and 16th, that this plan would be highly advantageous for himself, if he could succeed in securing Cisalpine Gaul. The reason is very simple, and is as I have given it in my narrative; Decimus in Cisalpine Gaul would have been the strongest support of the conservative party in the Senate. Thus it is not surprising that in the night of the 15th and 16th Antony should have conceived the idea of securing this renunciation from the conspirators as the price of his agreement with them, and that on the morning of the 16th he should have made every effort to secure this concession. It would have been a great advantage to him if Decimus could be separated from his friends; in isolation he could be more easily induced to renounce his province and this would relieve Antony of the necessity for any violent or illegal measures, which are always dangerous. So much being admitted, the very probable conjecture follows, as I have given it in my narrative, that on the morning of the 16th, the negotiations were resumed which led to much coming and going of senators, and that Antony's object was to induce Decimus Brutus to leave the Capitol. Finally, the conjecture that in the course of the 16th Antony resolved to extort from his adversaries a renunciation of Cisalpine Gaul, is confirmed by a short and obscure passage of Appian, which would seem a great blunder and a great anachronism, if we did not possess this letter from Decimus Brutus. Appian B. C. ii. 124, after relating the embassy of the conspirators which belongs to the evening of March 15 as we have seen, and before giving Antony's reply, tells us, ἔδοκει τε . . . τεχνάζειν εἰ δύναντο περισπᾶσαι πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς τὴν στρατιὰν τὴν Δέκμου. It seemed good to them (Lepidus and Antony) to see if they could secure for themselves the army of Decimus. If we did not possess the letter of Decimus, we might have thought that Appian was here confusing

present events with Antony's later action in July; on the other hand, admitting our hypothesis, everything becomes clear. Appian found in his sources of information and related very obscurely the same fact of which the letter of Decimus provides first-hand evidence, the fact that Antony thought of taking Gaul from Decimus before the senatorial session.

With these secret intentions Antony therefore set to work on the morning of the 16th. The failure of the conspirators' demonstration during the morning was doubtless an encouragement to him and to the Cæsareans, whose vacillation was still great. This advantage, however, was soon counterbalanced by the treachery of Dolabella, which was dangerous to the Cæsareans. I have therefore followed Appian (B. C. ii. 122) who says that the conspirators resolved to make a great demonstration in the afternoon after Dolabella's treachery; with regard to this demonstration, I have assumed as true the statement of Appian B. C. ii. 122 that Cassius and Brutus were the only conspirators who came down to the forum. It is, indeed, likely that two leaders of the party alone came down, and that the other conspirators remained in the Capitol, as the defence of the whole body would have been a task of great difficulty for the senators. It is also evident that the conspirators expected to make a display similar to that which Cicero had made in the streets of Rome, after the condemnation of Catiline's accomplices, in order to impress the public.

The accounts of Plutarch, Appian and Nicolas of Damascus show us that Brutus was allowed to speak undisturbed and that Antony and Lepidus made no effort to interrupt the demonstration. We have already seen that in the morning, when the first demonstrators on behalf of the conspirators appeared in the forum, the soldiers and artisans offered no opposition. If it be remembered that Brutus enjoyed a high reputation, that the treachery and usurpation of Dolabella could not fail to cause Antony great anxiety, and that the colonists and veterans were only then beginning to reach Rome, it is not unreasonable to assume that Antony must have been greatly perplexed during the afternoon of the 16th when Brutus and Cassius came down from the Capitol, and that he resolved to wait quietly and see in what direction events would turn.

Plutarch (*Brutus* 18) says that the speech of Brutus, though delivered before a Cæsarean audience, was received in silence, and that when Cinna attempted to speak after Brutus, the people began to hiss and to make so great a disturbance that the conspirators were obliged to return to the Capitol. The account of Appian (B. C. ii. 123) is entirely different; according to him, after the speech of Brutus the conspirators returned to the Capitol, but he does not say with any precision what had happened but merely adds that οὐκ ἐθάρρουν πρὸς τοῖς παροῦσι, they did not feel themselves secure. Nicolas of Damascus (xxvii.) also make

no reference to the speech of Cinna, which is said to have followed that of Brutus, but merely says that when Brutus had finished speaking, the conspirators returned to the Capitol. On the other hand, as the demonstration had been organised beforehand, it is not likely that a second speech of Cinna should have been arranged to follow one of Brutus, as Cinna was a man of no importance. It is equally improbable that if the speech of Brutus was a failure, Cinna would have ventured to follow him on his own initiative. We may therefore assume that Plutarch is confusing the speech delivered by Cinna on the morning of the 16th and the hisses with which the veterans welcomed him on the morning of the 17th, as he went to the Senate. Basing my narrative, therefore, for the most part upon Appian's text, I said that the speech was coldly received and that the conspirators therefore returned to the Capitol, their demonstration being a failure. This explanation seems to me to be entirely confirmed by the change in Antony's attitude. The letter from Cicero's correspondence (F. xi. 1) has shown us that, though Antony did not venture to interrupt the demonstration in the forum during the day, he, none the less, issued a demand in the course of the evening that Decimus Brutus should renounce his provinces as a condition of peace. There is yet a further point; this kind of ultimatum is obviously connected with the convocation of the Senate for the morning of the 17th. The summons was unexpectedly issued on the evening of the 16th, probably a short time after Antony had given his answer. Appian (B. C. ii. 126) says, in fact, that the edict for the convocation of the Senate was issued *νυκτός* and (ii. 125) that the conspirators during the night earnestly begged the senators favourable to themselves to be present at the session. The session took place on the morning of the 17th and the night in question is therefore that of the 16th and 17th. Antony, therefore, who had deluded the conservatives throughout the 16th with his negotiations, suddenly resolved to convoke the Senate for the morning of the 17th.

This implies that on the evening of the 16th Antony thought himself able to dominate the situation and to impose his will upon the Senate. What could have been the reason for this rapid change of view? The arrival of numerous veterans and colonists and the growing excitement of the people were certainly not without interest. I see, however, another reason for the failure of the great demonstration organised by the conservatives. As I have said, the demonstration must have shown many people that the conspirators were afraid. In times of revolution the most fleeting impressions are generally the strongest; it is thus not surprising that Antony in his excitement, encouraged by the failure of the conservatives, should have issued his ultimatum and have convoked the Senate, *resolved to profit by the despondency of his enemies before some new event should have revived their courage.*



The result was that Decimus Brutus, surprised and unsupported, gave way and declared himself ready to renounce his province. He asked for a *legatio libera*, with the condition that it should also be granted to those of his comrades who might wish to leave Rome. So much is clear from letter F. XI. i. 2.

Thus we can also explain another and more complicated intrigue of Antony, by the attempt to discover for what reason Decimus wrote the letter F. XI. i. on the morning of the 17th. This letter is an answer to one from Brutus and Cassius in which, as can be seen from the answer, they asked Decimus for information upon two points :

(1) If it was true that he had declared to Antony his readiness to abandon Cisalpine Gaul.

(2) What was his view of the situation.

Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the letter contain a justification for his renunciation. He must, therefore, have been questioned upon the subject. The reply to the second question begins with paragraph III., *quid ergo est, inquis, tui consilii?* Hence we may conclude with much probability that Brutus and Cassius had learned of the negotiations between Antony and Decimus during the night, and that they sent to ask for an explanation.

How had they procured this information? Possibly Antony, to induce them the more readily to agree with his demands, informed them that the man chiefly interested was ready to renounce his province; Brutus and Cassius, expecting some deceit, may then have written to Decimus, to know if the information was correct.

Antony and Lepidus must have spent the night in raising the people and the veterans, gathering them round the temple of Tellus to intimidate the conservatives and in collecting the leaders of the Cæsarean party to arrange for their action during the senatorial session. The meeting of Cæsareans must have taken place at daybreak on the 17th; I confidently accept the verified hypothesis of Schmidt, that paragraph vi. of letter F. XI. i. is a *post-scriptum*, and that the words *post novissimum Hirtii sermonem* allude to the visit paid by Hirtius to Decimus on the morning of the 17th, while the senators were on their way to the Senate; Hirtius came to tell Decimus of the discussions held in the Cæsarean meeting, which had taken place a short time before and are reported with much probability by Nicolas of Damascus (xxvii.). It must be noted that at this meeting Antony declared himself opposed to all violence or illegality, a declaration which confirms our rumours concerning the prudence he had shown during the preceding days; in other words he feared a *coup d'état* as too dangerous. It must also be remarked that on the morning of the 17th, even when Hirtius had told him that the majority of the Cæsareans were anxious for peace, Decimus did not demand his province back again; he regarded it as



lost and was satisfied with the power to remain at Rome and with the right to a body-guard.

\* \* \* \* \*

Here an objection may be raised, and it may be asked why, in the discussion before the Senate, Antony did not refer to Cisalpine Gaul and made no proposals on the subject, though the amnesty was eventually approved and all Cæsar's acts were ratified ?

Appian (B. C. ii. 127-135) has given a very probable account of this session, which I have faithfully followed, but during it Antony speaks neither of Gaul nor of Decimus. What then had happened to his projects of the evening before ? The contradiction is strange, but it may be explained by the attitude of the Senate as depicted by Appian (B. C. ii. 127). The Senate suddenly showed itself so favourable to Cæsar's murderers that Antony quickly realised the impossibility of passing his proposal in spite of the absence of the conspirators and the presence of the veterans who were shouting without. The proposal to call the murderers to the session and the discussion to which this idea gave rise, must have immediately destroyed his illusions. Moreover, everybody came to the session in great anxiety and the situation created by the civil war, the dictatorship and the death of Cæsar, was so intricate and complex that the discussion could not fail to outrun the limits within which Antony may have wished to confine it ; it did so pass these limits and went outside the other proposals of the consul. In other words, it seems clear to me that Antony, emboldened by the failure of the conspirators in the forum, imagined on the evening of the 16th that the majority of the Senate would not support them, though it was impossible to learn the feeling of the Senate beforehand. However, to his great astonishment, he discovered that Cæsar's assassination was universally approved.

## APPENDIX B

### THE PROVINCES OF BRUTUS, CASSIUS, ANTONY AND DOLABELLA

THE question whether Cæsar, in the arrangements previous to his death, assigned provinces to Brutus, Cassius, Antony and Dolabella, and the further question what these provinces were, is a highly complicated problem, so contradictory is the information given by the ancient texts. I have come to the conclusion that Cæsar could not possibly have assigned Macedonia to Brutus or Syria to Cassius; on the contrary, I think that he did not assign any provinces to Brutus and Cassius, and that he had given Macedonia to Antony and Syria to Dolabella. My reasons for this conclusion are briefly as follows :

I do not believe that Cæsar appointed Brutus and Cassius to Macedonia and Syria for the reason that if he had done so, their deprivation of these provinces could only have been secured by some legal process or open deed of violence, which would have been a very serious event. The Cæsarean party could have made no more open declaration of war upon the conspirators. As it is we find no trace whatever of any such provocation nor did the course of events show any attempt to follow such a policy. If Brutus and Cassius had been deprived of their provinces, they could never have written to Antony in the month of May the letter F. xi. 2 in Cicero's correspondence or the letter F. xi. 8 in the month of August, in which they declared that they were not certain whether Antony meditated hostilities. Cicero constantly catalogues the outrages, illegal acts and the violations of Cæsar's will of which Antony was guilty, and how could he have omitted an outrage which the conservative party must have regarded as more serious and important than any other? We should therefore have to admit that the conservative party voluntarily consented to this spoliation, which was utterly impossible. Moreover, if Cæsar had intended Syria and Macedonia for Cassius and Brutus, we cannot explain why Cicero should have rejoiced so emphatically in his eleventh Philippic (xii. 27 to 30) over the invasion of Syria and Macedonia by Brutus and Cassius : *in*

*Macedoniam alienam advolavit; omnia sua putavit, quae vos vestra esse velitis . . . C. Cassius . . . profectus est ut prohiberet Syria Dolabellam qua lege? quo jure? Eo quod Juppiter ipse sanxit, ut omnia quæ reipublicæ salutaria essent, legitima et justa haberentur.*

To cloak deeds of violence beneath legal fictions is so valuable a device even in revolutions, that if there had been the smallest sophistical argument for the constitutional legality of Brutus' and Cassius' usurpations, Cicero would certainly not have ventured to defy legal superstitions by provocation of this kind, the more so as Calenus had vigorously opposed these proposals, stating that the usurpation of Brutus was illegal.

There is, however, a further argument. In a passage hitherto neglected by critics so far as I know, Cicero clearly says that Cæsar assigned no province to the two conspirators. In a letter to Atticus, when he had learned on June 5 that Antony wished to send Brutus and Cassius to buy corn in Asia and Sicily, Cicero says (A. XV. ix. 1); *O rem miseram! primum nullam ab istis, dein, si aliquam, hanc legatoriam provinciam.*

Thus, previous to this *provincia legatoria*, *isti* had given *nulla provincia* to Brutus and Cassius and the word *isti* obviously refers to Cæsar and the Cæsareans. If Brutus and Cassius had been deprived of such important provinces by any means, Cicero would have complained in a very different tone. It therefore seems certain to me that Cæsar, before his death, had given no province to Brutus or Cassius, nor is the fact surprising, for a man suddenly cut off would necessarily leave much business half performed.

If then the provinces of Macedonia and Syria were not given to Brutus and Cassius, to whom were they given and how? Historians have almost all followed the account of Appian which states (B. C. iii. 7, 8) that when Brutus and Cassius fled from Rome, Dolabella at the instigation of Antony and in spite of the opposition of the Senate, induced the people to pass a law, assigning Syria to himself and that when this law had been approved, Antony forced the Senate to give him Macedonia. Velleius Paterculus seems to allude to some event of the kind (ii. 60), but in a vague phrase which would be incomprehensible without Appian's text; *Dolabella transmarinas (provincias) decrevit sibi*. Dion (xlvii. 29) merely says that Dolabella secured Syria, but he gives neither date nor details. Οὗτος (Dolabella) γὰρ ἐτέτακτο μὲν τῆς Συρίας ἀρχεῖν. . . . The only account in any detail is thus that of Appian.

This account, however, is certainly false. Cicero (A. xiv. iv. 3), alluding to the rumours of an approaching war against the Parthians in Syria, says, *Ita mihi videtur bellum illud instare. Sed Dolabella et Nicias viderint*. Thus when Cicero wrote this letter Dolabella had been

appointed pro-consul in Syria for the year 43. The letter, however, was certainly written at Puteoli in the month of April, as is proved by the allusion in paragraph 2 to certain Roman personages, such as Hirtius and Pansa, who were staying in the country; the date is also proved by the further correspondence. Whether it was written on April 17, as some think, or on the 18th, or between the 22nd and the 26th, as others assert, is of little importance here. Brutus and Cassius had fled from Rome on April 13 and the events related by Appian must have taken place during the second half of April. That, however, is impossible. In the first place Antony and Dolabella were still opposed to one another, and Dolabella was posing as a conservative consul, a fact proved by his destruction of the altar of Herophilus at the end of the month, by the great demonstrations which the conservative public made shortly afterwards in his favour in the theatre, and by the letters of congratulation which Cicero wrote to him upon the destruction of the altar. It was impossible that the conservatives could have seriously regarded this action by Dolabella as a real service to their party, if he had already been struggling with the Senate and had used the comitia to secure the gift of this province, a proceeding which the conservatives invariably regarded as one of the most detestable usurpations of the senatorial power which the people could commit. Moreover, it is equally impossible that Dolabella could have applied immediately to the comitia in the month of April. At that moment he despaired so entirely of a reconciliation with the Cæsarean party that at the end of the month he threw himself into the arms of the conservatives by destroying the altar of Herophilus. How then a few days before could he have ventured to ask the comitia for his province?

Appian's account is improbable and an attempt has been made to correct it. A possible conjecture is that in the month of April the Senate, in gratitude to Dolabella for help given to the conservative party, had voluntarily assigned to him the province of Syria, to which Cæsar had appointed no one; that Antony then demanded Macedonia for himself, a province also vacant for the year 43, and that the Senate, having done this favour to Dolabella, could not refuse a similar favour to Antony. However, though it necessitates a complete rearrangement of Appian's narrative, I think the best course is to adopt the simpler and more radical conjecture of Schwarz, and to admit that Cæsar had assigned the provinces of Syria and Macedonia to Dolabella and to Mark Antony.

The conjecture is in itself highly probable. It is, to begin with, unlikely that Antony and Dolabella, who were on terms of intimacy with Cæsar, and saw him every day, should not have arranged for their pro-consulships for the following year as they wished with the dictator, who was to start upon a distant expedition three days later. This omission could not be explained, whereas it is easy to explain why Cæsar

had not yet thought of Brutus and Cassius, who held aloof, and affected not to mingle with the "rabble" which had thronged about the dictator during the recent months. Moreover, Syria and Macedonia were most important provinces for the war which Cæsar proposed to begin in Persia and to continue and conclude by a great expedition in the region of the Black Sea and a march across Gaul. It was therefore natural that he should have wished to entrust these provinces to friends upon whom he could rely if he needed their help. Finally this hypothesis enables us to explain another obscure point in the story; I refer to the manner in which the Macedonian legions came under the command of Antony. Appian referring to the Apollinarian games (the affair thus belongs to the month of July) says (B. C. iii. 25) that a sudden rumour arose of a threatened invasion of Macedonia by the Getæ, and that Antony demanded that the Macedonian legions should be placed under his command, instead of being sent to Syria for the war against the Parthians; in other words, he demanded that the Parthian war should be put off. Antony would thus have taken these legions from Dolabella, to whom he promised to give a legion as compensation. Finally, Appian adds that the Senate first hesitated and then sent an embassy to Macedonia to examine the possibility of an invasion and resolved to grant Antony's desire when he ἐψηφίσατο, proposed the abolition of the dictatorship. Now, in Appian's narrative we find a series of chronological mistakes which must first be corrected to determine the date of these events. Appian defines this moment by quoting a definite and very probable fact, namely, that the decree concerning the Macedonian legions immediately followed Antony's proposal against the dictatorship, for which proposal it was, so to speak, the reward. Antony dealt with the dictatorship upon two occasions, first to propose its abolition in the Senate, and secondly, to change this *senatus consultum* into law. Appian evidently alludes to the *senatus consultum* and not to the law; he uses in fact the term ψήφισμα and not νόμος. It will, moreover be understood that Antony produced a great impression when he appeared, to the general astonishment, for the first time in the Senate with a proposal so favourable to the conservatives; on the other hand, no influence of the kind could have been exerted when he afterwards proposed the same measure to the people coupled with revolutionary proposals, as we have seen in the text. The decree concerning the Macedonian legions was thus issued shortly after the decree abolishing the dictatorship. This latter was passed during the first fortnight of the month of April, before the murder of Herophilus, as is proved by the passage in Cicero, *Phil.* I. 1, 3: *Dictaturam (Antonius) . . . sustulit . . .* I. 2, 5 *Paucis post diebus . . . uncus impactus est fugitivo illi qui in Marii nomen invaserat.*

Thus the decree concerning the Macedonian legions was passed



in the first days of April. As, however, Antony was obliged to agree with Dolabella on the question of these legions and secure a compromise with him, it is clear that the two men were already regarded as the future pro-consuls of these two provinces during the early days of April. This brilliantly confirms the argument deduced from Cicero's letter, A. XIV. ix. 3 concerning Dolabella's inability to attempt a popular agitation, and it also proves that the two provinces were not given to the consuls either by the people or the Senate; had they thus been given, the moment of appointment would also have seen a decision on the question of the legions.

On the contrary, everything becomes clear when we admit that it was Cæsar who gave Syria and Macedonia to Antony and Dolabella. Under Cæsar's arrangements the question of the Macedonian legions could not arise, as Cæsar was then to lead them to Persia. When the Senate partly ratified Cæsar's acts in the session of March 19, it retained the two consuls in their provinces, but obviously decided nothing concerning the legions which were thus left, so to speak, stranded in Macedonia, without any information as to their destination or their future commander. Dolabella probably then hinted that Cæsar's measures intended these legions for himself, as they were destined for the Parthian war of which he, as Syrian governor, would have the conduct. Antony, on the other hand, intrigued with the Senate to secure part of the legions and proved successful, as he was then on good terms with the conservatives.

For all these reasons I support the conjecture that Cæsar before his death had given no provinces to Brutus or Cassius, but had assigned Macedonia to Antony and Syria to Dolabella.

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